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Abstract 
Ths thesis presents an interpretation of the forniation process of the post-Cold War international order 
with special reference to the Western debate regarding use of coercive power in the Bosnian conflict of 
1992-1995. As the role of multilateralism and the authonty of the UN were the most contentious issues 
of the debate, this thesis will provide a critical resource for comprehending the ongin and the nature of 
'American unflateralism', and its relationship with other Western allies. It will also be a useful tool in 
predicting future outcomes. 
This research will apply the concept of 'Quasi-multflater-alism' to analyse the relationship between the 
US and other Western states during the Bosnian conflict. It is held that the US justified its policies in the 
name of collective action without adhering to the outcomes of genuine multilateral consultation with its 
allies. However, this inevitably undennined. the quality of justice that the West alleged to promote. 
More specifically, this work will analyse the fact that there was a clear tension between Western states 
who sought to legitimize their role in international order based on shared values, and thus it will argue 
that the content of 'Western Value' was a product of power politics. Accordingly, this research will 
conclude that America's interpretation of justice was used as a means to project its own national 
interests under the logic of Quasi-multflaterahsm. 
This thesis will challenge the Liberal view of the present world order that Western states have common 
interests in promoting democracy and market economies across the globe and implementation of those 
Westem values will make the world safer and fairer. 
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Chapter 1 The Western Order and Multilateralism 
This thesis discusses international diplomacy in relation to the conflict in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina (hereafter the 'Bosnian conflict') from 1992 to 1995. The Bosnian conflict was one of the 
defining events in European security after the Cold War because NATO, for the first time in its history 
used serious military power in a conflict situation outside the tenitories of its own member states. The 
episode was also a watershed in the history of intemational security because the intemational 
community intervened in this conflict under the premises of the doctrine of 'humanitarian intervention'. 
This research represents a work that analyses a serious gap between Western rationales of 
intervention and their outcomes. This argument is based on a presumption that there are usuaUy 
strategic interests that define the use of force, even if those decisions have been justified by evoking 
ideational (ideological) interests. In other words, a combination of particular values often promotes 
someone's preferred strategic interests over those of others. Moreover, sometimes Western states' 
nutial commitment to a particular value succumbs to their strategic interests. Before we define the term 
West, we look at the main tasks of this thesis and how they will give substance to the above-discussed 
presumption. The work thus discusses the nexus between strategic interests and the moral values 
behind the West's-especially America's- approach to the Bosnian conflict, in combination with an 
analysis of differing transatlantic visions of post-Cold War European security. In order to analyse fis 
causal relationship, this thesis will focus on discussions of three points and will make three 
contributions to the literature accordingly 
Fustly, it will chronologically analyse diplomatic interactions between the US and its 
European allies during the Bosnian conffict of 1992-1995. Western policy-makers debated their 
approaches to the fonner Yugoslavia against a background of differing transatlantic visions of post- 
Cold War European security (see Chapter 2). This research will find that there was an intimate 
relationship between America's strategic interests in post Cold War European security and its preferred 
approach to the Bosnian conflict as opposed to that of its European allies. One of the significant 
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contributions that this research will make to the literature is that it will elucidates the above-discussed 
causal relationship based on primary empirical resources such as the author's interviews with the 
policy-makers of the period from both side of the Atlantic. 
Secondly, however, some liberal authors over play the relationship between America's 
strategic interests in Europe and its approach to the Bosnian conflict. On the contrary, moral values 
were the defining guide to the US approach to the Bosnian conflict. As this research will explain in 
detail, many liberal works point out that there is a stable intra-Western relationship even after the Cold 
War thanks to the democratic nature of the Western regimes and their particular mode of international 
interaction, namely the principle of multilateralism. 'Iberefore, it is essential for us to look at their 
theoretical arguments in order to compare the validity between the interpretation of this research and 
that of these libemls. 
Thirdly, the research will also provide an alternative approach to the liberal interpretation. It 
will highlight America's hegemonic leadership, the exclusionary nature of the post Cold War 
international order and the interventionist nature of America and its allies towards the former 
Communist regimes and other developing states. It will also establish a hypothetical interpretation as to 
how America's tramformed role in Europe resulted in the Western approach to the Bosnian conflict; 
and how it defined the formation of the European security order. The empirical material of this research 
will thus provide a touchstone with which of the two interpretations (i. e. that of liberul writers or my 
own) is more coherent. 
In order to discuss the above-mentioned points in empirical cases, this chapter now looks at 
the necessary literature and explains the research issues. Firstly, it will define the ten-ns, West and 
Tkstern Order. Secondly, it will look at the literature conceming the Bosnian conflict. It will also focus 
on the relationship between the US and its European allies relating to the Bosnian conflict in view of 
their differing interests regarding the institutional arrangements of the post Cold War European secun*ty 
order. Thirdly, it will discuss the liberal interpretation of the formation of the post Cold War order. It 
3 
will pay particular attention to the how this school of thought explains the stability of the intra-Western 
relationship and how it interprets the role of values and powers in detennining Westem actions. 
FourUy, it will articulate a critical interpretation in opposition to the liberal account: elaborating an 
alternative theoretical argument by building on Ian Clark's works; ' from this an alternative rationale 
will be put in place. Lastly, it will outline key research questions and the organization of this thesis. 
The Contentious Images of the West and the Western Order 
The West and the Western Order (also known as 'Liberal Order') is conunonly used 
terminology in academic as wefl as j ournalistic works. However, there are various ways of defining the 
term 'West'. Generally speaking, geo-strategic, economic and ideological factors are often used to 
specify the identity of the West. Neo-Realists adopt a geo-strategic interpretation. They use the tenn 
'West' as a synonym for the states that formed security alliances against the Soviet Union, and they 
presumed that the Western alliance would collapse as a result of the disappearance of its common 
enemy2 (see hnage of the West 1: Cold War Model). However, Westem nulitary alliances such as 
NATO and the US-Japan security treaty, and Western economic institutions such as the World Bank, 
the DAF, the GATT (since 1995 the WTO) and the OECD have survived and prospered since the 
demise of the Soviet Union. 
Liberals suggests that there is a gap between the Neo-Realists' assumptions and the reality of 
the persistence of Western solidarity ' In opposition to Neo-Realists' structural explanation of 
international affairs and the relative gain approach for accounting for the actions of states, Liberals look 
I Clark, Ian. Ae Post Cold War Order: Ihe Spoils ofPeace, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 200 1; Clark 
Ian. "The Great Transformation after the Cold War? ", Review ofInternational Studies 27 (2001): 237-255. 
2 For example, Kenneth Waltz once predicted the dissolution of NATO as the backdrop of the end of the 
Cold War. He said, 'NATO's days are not numbered, but years are. ' Cited in Kay, Sean. NATO and the 
Future qfEuropean Security. Lanham, MD.; Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.6. For more well-known 
arguments of this kind see: Mearsheimer, John J. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold 
War,,, International Security 15, no. I (1990): 5-56. 
3 For instance, see: Risse-Kappen, Thomas. Cooperation among Democracies: the European Influence on 
US. Fomign Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.5. 
4 
at shared economic interests and common ideologies for defining the West and the stability of the 
Western relationship. Some liberals-particularly known as liberal institutionalists-pay attention to 
the absolute gain and argue that stability emanates from the liberal economy based on its institutional 
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arrangements. Other liberals pay attention to 'ideational' (i. e. moral and legitimising) factors that 
maintain the stable relationship among the Western StateS. 5 These liberals point out that a commonality 
of the domestic political identity of each state is the foundation of Western actions in international 
affairs (see Image of the West H: Liberal Model). 6 Added to that, James Gow argues that the values (i. e. 
culture of openness and adaptability) and legitimacy of its actions, rather than geography and power, 
7 define the sphere and identity of the West. He considers the West as a 'social construction' and 
accordingly claims that 'defending the West defines the West' (see Image of the West IH: Post -Cold 
War Strategic Model) .8 Indeed, US policy-makers and their allies often remark that shared common 
values are important bridge which consolidates Western identity. 
We need to clarify, however: what kinds of values define the West? For example the US and 
China share not only economic goals (for instance, promoting international commerce) but also certain 
geo-stmtegic and n-ýifitary interests particularly with regard to international terronsm after II th of 
September 2001. Yet they have divergent views on the fimclamental. economic values (i. e. American 
capitalism as against China's so-called 'market socialism') and the principles of domestic politics 
(American democracy as against the Chinese Communist Party's monopoly of power). There are 
many instances of this kind, such as the US relationships with Russia, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. Thus, 
having common strategic interests with the US-which can be justified by an ideological rationale 
4 Krasner, Stephen D. International Regimes. Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1983; Keohane, 
Robert. Ar Hegemony. Pi eton: Princeton U iversity Press, 1984; Keohane, Robert. "Institutional 
. 
fte rinc ni 
Relations 'Meory and the Realists Challenge after the Cold War, " in Neorealism and Neoliberalism. - the 
Contemporary Debate, edited by David A Baldwin. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.269-30 1. 
5 For instance, Ruggie, John Gerard. "Mulfilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution, " in Multilateralism 
Matters: the Theoiý, and PraxLý of an Institutional Form, edited by John Gerard Ruggie, 347. New York; 
Chichester: Colur-nbia University Press, 1993. 
6 Tbe details of their argurnents will be discussed in the third section of this chapter. 
7 Gow, James. Dýfending the ýPýst. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005.7-17, Espec. 16-17. 
8 Gow, Dýfentfing the Jf ýst, 17. 
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such as anti-terrorism- does not alone constitute a state's membership of the West. 
To consider the above-discussed images of the West, the idea of 'liberal democracy' can be 
regarded as the pivotal criteria to identify a Western state. Ths ideology is based on the principle that 
the formal political decisions are made by the democratically elected representatives (as opposed to the 
direct democracy); the system is regulated by the rule of law; and is supposed to respect basic human 
rights as well as the interests of the market economy (in the form of protecting the rights of free- 
enterprise and the private ownership of cominodities). 9 However, at the same time, the interpretation of 
'liberal democracy' and implementation of this idea in practice carl vary from actor to actor. There is a 
tension between the US and its prosperous allies (that is, to mention the other members of GT Japan, 
Germany, UK, Fmnce, Italy and Canada) regarding what is the legitimate identity of the 'West'. In 
other words, there is a danger that 'liberal democracy' and its related values can be merely used as 
rhetoric to justify America's hegemonic: position in the name of multilateral cooperation (see, Image of 
the West IV: Quasi-Multilateral Model). 10 
Provisionally, as a common denominator of the term among the above-discussed literatures, 
the term Western state is used in this research in such a way as to satisfy the following three criteria. 
Firstly, it has at least either a bilateral/collective self-defence arrangement with the US or membership 
of security or economic institutions that were established during the Cold War in line with the strong 
strategic interests of the US (such as NATO, ANZUS, GAIT/WTO, and the OECD). Secondly, it 
shares 'liberal democratic' values. And thirdly, it has a developed market economy and advocates the 
continued liberalization of the global economy" Besides the members of G7, other important states 
9 For definitions of 'liberal democracy', see: Held, David. Models ofDemocracy. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1996. Chap. 3, Espec. 99,116; Fukuyama, Francis. -The 
End ofHistory and the Last Man. London: 
Penguin, 1992.42-43. 
10 See page 33-43 of fl-iis thesis for more detailed discussion of this point. 
II According to the UN Department of Economic and Social AffaiM, 'Japan in Asia, Canada and the United 
States in northern America, Australia and New Zealand in Oceania and Europe' are categorized as 
developed states or regions. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. "Definition of. Developed, 
Developing Countries [code 491 ] ", Standard Country or Area Codesfor Statistical Use. Series M, no. 49, 
Rev. 4: http: /hinstats. un. org/umd/cdb/Cdb_dict-XrXX. asp? def code=49 1. [Accessed on I March 2005]. 
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12 that meet these criteria include Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, Austria and Spam. Accordingly, the 
Western Order is fonned by the Westem States according to above-definition, which at least nominally 
espouse the principle of 'liberal democracy' (the combination of the market economy and domestic 
political pluralism) and project these to the intemational, sphere. 
With regard to the Bosnian conflict, this thesis discusses the relationship between: the US, 
LJK, France, Gen-nany, other member states of the European Union, other NATO member states, 
Russia and the newly independent states of the fonner Yugoslavia (i. e. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosrua- 
Herzegovina, Macedonia and the rurnp Yugoslavia of Serbia and Montenegro). Russia and the former 
Yugoslavia states are not categorized as Western states according to the above-discussed definition. It is 
important, however, for us to look at these countries relationship with the Western states, as it illustrates 
the extent to which Western policies can accommodate the interests of the non-Western world. This 
will test the validity of the liberals'claim that the Westem Order stabilizes the ffitemational relationship 
not only amongst the Western states but also of the wider international community (see the third section 
of this chapter m detail). 
13 
Before we discuss the details of the Western approach to the Bosnian conflict, it is essential 
to look at the literature on this subject. In particular we should understand how the causal relationship 
between the Western approach to the Bosnian conflict and the international order is explained. 
12 Tberefore, Switzerland (formally declared as 'neutr-al' power) is not considered as a Western state. South 
Korea and some ASEAN members have potential to become Western state. However, they are still not 
regarded as a Western state. 
13 The following are some of the works that discuss this from a liberal perspective. Among those who look at 
institutional as well as strategic dimension are: Keohane, After Hegemony; Deudney, David, and G. John 
ikenberry. "The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order, " Review of International Studies 25 
(1999): 179-196. Among those who pay serious attention to ideational factors are: Ruggie, John Gerard. 
Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era. New York; Chichester: Columbia 
University Press, 1996; Adler, Emanuel, and Michael Bamettý eds. Security Communities, Cambridge 
Studies in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Among those who 
criticize America or Western predominance are: Cox, Robert W. Production Power and TVorld Order: 
Social Forccs in the .1 lakii ig ofHistog, 
Political Economy qfInternational Change. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1989. Bacevich, Andrew. Anicikan Empire: the Realities and Consequences of US 
Diplomacy. Cambridge, Mass.: Han-ard University Press, 2002. 
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Chart 1: Four Images of the Western Order and International (World) Order 
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The Bosnian Conffict, the Transformation of the Western Relationship, and the Post 
Cold War Security Order 
There have been several major developments which impacted upon the European security 
order since the late 1980s, such as: the re-unification of Gennany; the collapse of the Soviet Union; the 
break-up of the fonner Yugoslavia and the subsequent conflict in Slovenia, Croatian and Bosnia- 
Herzegovina; the enlargement of NATO; and the Kosovo crisis. It is well-documented that there was 
an intimate causality between the German re-urufication process, America's revised security 
commitment in Europe, and the re-fonnation process of NATO in the post Cold War European security 
order, 14 In the same way, it is argued that the coHapse of the Soviet Union and the political instability of 
Russia, America's decision to renew its commitment to European security, and the NATO expansion 
were not isolated events. 
15 
The common feature in these cases is that the transformation of the European security 
architecture is strongly influenced by security issues in Europe and America's approach to these issues. 
The Bosnian conflict was one such case. 16 It was the first time that NATO and Western states used 
military power in a conflict situation in Europe. NATO's use of militarily power was against Bosnian 
Serb forces-domestic actors in the former Yugoslavia 17 Hence, this was the so-called 'out-of area' 
mission; outside NATO's territories as well as outside the scope of its original mission (protecting its 
member states from the external aggression, particularly, by the Soviet Union). 18 This happened against 
14 For instance, see: Zelikow, Philip, and Condoleezza Rice. Germany Unified and Europe Transformed :a 
Study in Statecraft. Cambridge, Mass; London: Harvard University Press, 1996; Hutchings, Robert L. 
American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: an Insiderý Account of US Policy in Europe, 1989- 
1992. Washington, D. C. Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. 
15 For example, see: Goldgeier, James M. Not nether but nen. - the US Decision to Enlarge NATO. 
Washington D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1999. 
16 For instance, Gow, James. Riumph of the Lack of Wilk Intemational Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War. 
London: Hurst & Company, 1997-298-299. 
17 James Gow suggests that there were various actors that were engaged Mi military actions on the part of 
Bosnian Serbs. In oi der to simplify, the present thesis uses the term 'Bosnian Seib forces' to indicate actors 
who undertook military activities in order to enhance Serbian interests in Bosnia during the conflict. The use 
of the terrn 'Bosnian Croat forces'denotes the same for Croatian interests. Gow, Jarnes. The Serbian Project 
and Its Adversaries: a Strategy qf War Ctimes. London: Hurst & Company, 2003.79-89. 
18 For detailed information about the transformation of the NATO's ftinctions, see the fifth section of this 
chapter, and Chapter 2. 
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the backdrop of the transformation process of NATO in 1990s, America's changmg role in Europe, and 
an unsettled intr-a-Westem relationship (see Chapter 2 in detail). It is necessary to understand how the 
Bosnian conflict and Western approaches to it provided a context for the transfort-nation of the 
European security order. 
There is a vast amount of literature on the collapse of fon-ner Yugoslavia and the Bosnian 
conflict. '9 This thesis wiH focus on academic and informative j ournalistic works on the issue of Westem 
approaches to the Bosnian conflict, and will attempt to find out general trends among them . 
20 As far as 
the subject of studies in regard to the Bosnian conflict is concerned, fl-ýs research adopts the following 
three categories: 1) the origin of the collapse of the fonner Yugoslavia and the nature of the Bosnian 
conflict; 2) Western approaches to the conflict; 3) NATO's policy towards the fon-ner Yugoslavia. 'Ile 
review aims simply to provide an overview of the literature on the subject. 
One of the most fundamental and prominent subjects here relates to a debate about the origin 
and nature of the conflicts in the fonner Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, and particularly to the Bosnian 
conflict. With regard to the cause of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, there are two dominant 
positions. Some of the literature criticizes Slovenian2'and Croatian nationaliSrn22, and the Gennan 
government's 'premature' recognition of their statehood, for exacerbating the situation that led to the 
collapse of the fonner Yugoslavia. 13 Others emphasise the policies of Serbian leader, Slobodan 
19 Mark Danner's series of nine review articles in the New York Review ofBooks gives us some hint of the 
contents of these literatures. See, 7he New York Review ofBooks XLIV, no. 18 (1997): 56-64; no. 19 (1997): 
55-65; no. 20 (1997): 65-81; XLV, no. 2 (1998): 34-41; no. 3 (1998): 41-45; no. 5 (1998): 40-52; no. 7 
(1998): 59-65; no. 14 (1998): 63-77; no. 16 (1998): 73-79. 
20 A well-regarded liter-ature review is: Stokes, Gale, John Lampe, Dennison Rusinow and Julie Mostov. 
"Instant History: Understanding the Wars of Yugoslav Succession, " Slavic Review 55, no. I (1996): 136-60; 
Also see: Campbell, David. "Meta Bosnia: Narratives of the Bosnian War, " Review ofInternational Studies, 
no. 24 (1998): 261-28 L 
21 Woodward, Susan L. Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution afier the Cold War. Washington, D. C.: 
Brookings Institution, 1995. Chap 5, Espec. 115-117; Woodward. Socialist Unemployment: the Political 
Economy qf Yugoslavia, 1945-1990. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1995. Chap 10, Espec. 355- 
364. 
22 Cohen, Lenard J. Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia !s Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition. 2nd ed. 
Boulder; Oxford: Westview Press, 1995. Chap 4, Espec. 128-135. 
23 Glenny, Misha. Ae Fall (? f1`ugos1cn, ia. Third ed, London: Penguin Books, 1996.111-112,149-150,18 8- 
192. 
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Milogevi&", and also Bosnian Serb leaders such as Radovan 
Karad2i6.25 In addition, one of commonly 
discussed points is the federal government's ineffective governance and its indifference to the interests 
of each its federated members' as well as its citizens. 26 
The analysis of the origin of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia links to two 
interpretations of the nature of the Bosnian conflict. 'Me first position tends to regard it as a civil war, 
27 
whereas the second claims it as a war of aggression or international conflict. The civil war perspective 
regards ethnic tensions within the former Yugoslavia as the critical factor in the conffict and thus it 
tends not to distinguish between the aggressors and the victims. In terms of the international reaction to 
the situation, this viewpoint provides a rationale for recommending the West assume a neutral position 
28 in the conflict. A contrasting view clams that the conflict was an international war of aggression 
brought about by Slobodan Milosevic's attempt to promote the 'Greater Serbia', and thus Serbia was 
considered guilty for militarily intervening in other states' politics. This is part of an interpretation that 
places Serbia (and Bosnian Serb forces) as the pnimary aggressor and regards Bosnian Croats and 
Bosnian Muslims as its victims. The pohcy-makers who held this view supported international Mlhtaiy 
intervention against the Serbian nationalism. 29 
To surn up, the above-discussed studies regarding the nature and the origin of the conflict 
provide important background to the Western use (or non-use) of coercive power. They show how, if 
24 For instance, Cmobmja, Mihailo. Ihe Yugoslav Drama. 2 ed. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. 
1996. Chap 6 and 7, Espec. 106. 
25 Rarnet, Sabrina P. Balkan Babel: 7he Disintegration of Yugoslaviaftom the Death of Tito to the Warfor 
Kosovo. Third ed. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999. Chap 3, Espec. 48-55,69-7 1. Also see: Gutman, 
Roy. A Witness to Genocide: the First Account of the Horrors of Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia'. New York: 
Macmillan, 1993. For a comprehensive account of the Serbian role in the conflict, see: Gow, James. The 
Serbian Project and its Adversaries. - A Strategy of War Cfimes. London: Hurst & Company, 2003, Espec. 9- 
13. 
26 in general see: Woodward, Balkan Tragedy; Lampe, John R. Yugoslavia as History: Twice Ihere Was a 
Country. 2 ed- Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Chap 11 and 12; Woodward, 
Socialist Unemploymeni; Ramet, Balkan Babel, 331-333. 
27 For a concise overview of this debate, see: Bose, Sumantra. Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition 
and International Inten, ention. London: Hurst & Company, 2002,18-22. 
28 The British government's approach to the Bosnia was a product of this logic. Hurd, Douglas. Memoirs. 
London: Little, Brown, 2003,452. 
29 For instance, Margaret Thatcher-one of the most vocal advocates of the intervention among the 
members of the Conservative Party-adopted this perspective. See: SuiTirris, Brendan. Unfinest Hour: 
Britain and the Destruction qfBosnia. London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 2001.49-50. 
II 
the Western states were to adopt the view of international aggression or pay attention to protecting the 
territorial integrity of Bosnia then it would promote a pohcy of international intervention. Then the 
subsequent fornis of the European security order have two possibilities. One possible option is an order 
based on a kind of alliance of democracy that would promote international intervention in order to 
either punish or exclude the aggressors. The other option is to reinforce an order among the sovereign 
states that would act regardless of the characteristics of those domestic regimes (that is, according to the 
collective security measures under Chapter VH of the UN Charter). Chapter 2 of t1iis thesis will look at 
the details of the Western debates on this issue. It is essential to look at the international context of this 
debate in order to understand the imphcations for European security order. 
Secondly, M conjunction with the above-discussed issue, there are number of works that 
have studied individual Western states' (or organizations') approaches to the conflict in the fonner 
Yugoslavia. One type is topical current analysis of a state's approach to the Bosnian conflict that may 
30 include analysis of the state's domestic political situation as well. These studies are quite informative 
in order to understand the factual details concerning the Western decision-making process. However, 
due to their narrow focus on the development of the actual policies of some states (or organizations) 
and their perfonnance, it is difficult to learn wider lessons regarding the Bosnian situation and the re- 
formation process of the European security order from these studies. 31 In contrast to this approach, 
others criticize the contradiction between the Western action of recognizing Croatia and Bosnia as 
states and their subsequent neglect of the situations that undennined their territorial integrity. 3'This 
position synthesizes its analysis of a Western approach with the above-discussed debate on the nature 
30 For instance, Wood, Pia Christina. "France and the Post Cold War Order: the Case of Yugoslavia, " 
European Security 3, no. I (1994): 129-152; Maull, Hams W. "Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis, " Survival 
37, no. 4 (1995): 99-130; Giltman, Maynerd. "US Policy in Bosnia: Rethinking a Flawed Approach, " 
Survival 38, no. 4 (1996): 66-83; Bert, Wayne. Ae Reluctant Superpower: United States'Policy in Bosnia, 
1991-95. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997. Sharp, Jane M. 0. Honest Broker or Perfidious Albion? 
British Policy in Former Yugoslavia. London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1997; Kinds, Anders G. 
"The EU's Foreign Policy and the War in Former Yugoslavia, " in Common Foreign Security Policy: the 
Record and Reforms, edited by Martin Holland. London: A Cassell Imprint, 1997.148-173. 
31 As an exception, Wayne Berl provides an infon-native analysis of the America's policy-making process in 
relation to the Bosnian conffict. Bert, The Reluctant Superpower. 
32 For instance: Simms, Brendan, Uqfinest Hour. 
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of the Bosnian conflict. 33 However, the majority of these studies of the pollcy-making process in 
individual states (or organizations) do not provide detailed accounts of diplomatic interactions between 
the Western states, and their implications for the situation in Bosma. Thus they cannot constitute the 
f6tuidations of fis research. 
Some studies focus more on intr-a-Westem or superpower diplomacy These studies analyse 
international approaches to the Bosnian conflict with reference to the interactions between the Western 
states. 34 These literatures inforrn us of important aspects of the conflict resolution process such as: what 
the key tensions between the US and its European allies were; how these issues were settled; and what 
the implications of those were for the silhiation in Bosnia. 35 However, the majority of these works were 
either written before the memoirs of the then policy-makers and other important informative works 
were published or do not attempt comprehensive analysis . 
36 Therefore, In order to provide a detailed 
account we should supplement the conclusions of the above-mentioned literature with the contents of 
memoirs and interviews of policy-makers . 
37 Memoirs and journalists' accounts provide us insights into 
the decision-making processes of some states and organizations regarding the Bosnian conflict. 
However, in order to understand the implications that the Bosnian conflict has had for the Western 
Order, particularly its security arrangements, it is indispensable to look at NATO's transfonnation 
process after the Cold War. 
The literature, which focuses on NATO's transfonnation process, pays attention to the 
33 Bose, Bosnia after Dayton, 19. 
34 For instance, Brug, Steven L. War or Peace? Nationalism, Democracy, and American Foreign Policy in 
Post-Communist Europe. New York: New York University Press, 1996; Gow, THumph ofthe Lack of Will. 
35 For instance, Gow and Bellon look at the relationship between the US and its allies with a special 
reference to the transfon-nation of the style of American leadership in the world affairs sMCe the end of the 
Cold War. Gow, James and Bellou Fontini. "Image and Intervention, Leadership and Legitimacy the 
Dynamics of Euro-Aflantic Engagement with Challenge to International Peace and Security, " Civil Wars 6, 
no. 2 (2003): 33-52. 
36 The important memoIrS include: Owen, David. Balkan Odyssey. London: Indigo, 1996; Holbrooke, 
Richard. To End a Mir. New York: Random House, 1998; Bildt, Carl. Peace Journey: the Stnýggle for 
Peace in Bosnia. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998; Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. Unvanquished. - a US - 
UN Saga. London: New York: I. B. Tauris, 1999; Zimmennann, Warren. Origins of a Catastrophe: 
Yugoslavia and its Destrovers. [Rev ]. ed. New York: Times Books, 1999; Daalder, Ivo. Getting to Dayton: 
the Making qf, 4merica ý Bosnia Policy. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. 
37 We are unable to see classified official documents at the present. Thus the contents of this work are subject 
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institutional adaptation process in the post Cold War security environment. 38However, not much of the 
literature seriously discusses how the Western approaches to the Bosnian conflict related to the future 
of NATO and America's role in the European security order. 39 
The above-<: hscussed literature review suggests that individual elements of European 
security-namely the changing European security environment, America's relationship with its allies, 
the ideology that regulates the transatlantic relationship, and the corresponding institutional 
frameworks- are well studied in relation to the Bosnian conflict. However, there is a lack of work that 
discusses the causal relationsMp between each aspect of the European security order in a 
comprehensive manner. The present research represents an attempt to analyse this by paying attention 
to Western debates relating to the justification of the use of coercive power outside Western territories 
in the post Cold War period, and its applications to the Bosnian conflict. For this reason, we will look at 
the liberal literature on the Western Order that may provide a standard interpretation of the West's use 
of coercive power to the Bosnian conflict and the transfonnation of the European security order. It may 
also help us to understand the relationship between national (vital) interests and the collective moral 
mterests of the West. 
Multilateralism and the Liberal Interpretation of America's Relationship to European 
Security 
This section looks at the works of Ruggie, Risse-Kappen, Ikenberry and their co-authors as 
examples of a liberal interpretation of how America relates to the West. 40 It provides an interpretation of 
to challenge by serious researches in ftiture. 
38 Concise overviews of the NATO's ft-ansfort-nation after the Cold War to the late 1990s. Kay, NATO and the 
Future qfEuropean Security; Yost, David S. NATO Transfonned: the Allianceý New Roles in Intemational 
Security. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998. 
39 For instance, Kaufinan studies NATO's intervention to former Yugoslavia but pays little attention to the 
interaction between NATO's transformation and the development of the Bosnian conflict and the vice-versa. 
Kaufi-nan, Joyce P. NATO and the Fonner Yugoslavia: Criyis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance. Lmiham, 
Maryland: Rowman&Litflewood, 2002. 
40 The key literatures are: Ruggle ed, Multilateralism Matters; Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among 
Democracie-v; Ikenberry, John, Afier Fictory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order 
Afier the Mqjor ý Vars. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 200 1. 
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how the West and the US M particular responded to the challenge posed by the BoSrUan conflict. As", e 
will discuss later, these authors do not consider that the Bosnian conflict and the Western approach was 
the critical case that transformed the nature of the Western Order and America's relationslýiip with its 
allies. In order to provide an overview of their arguments, we at first look at the theoretiCal foundations 
of their analysis. The section afterwards will elucidate their analysis of the West and Western 
approaches to the Bosnian conflict. 
These authors share the point of view that nonnative regulation (i. e. multilateralism) 
between the Western states is the ftindamental source of the strength of the Western Order. Tfiis is 
because they believe that the continuity of the Western institutions, such as NATO after the Cold War, 
urge us to look at the foundation of the West beyond the structural causality of Neo-realism. Neo- 
realists ask the reason why states form and maintain alliances despite the anarchic nature of 
international relations . 
41 Following this question, some (Neo-) liberal literature has analysed America's 
(or other states') domestic policy-making process. In this way (Neo-) liberals have challenged the 
(Neo-) realists that treat the states as unitary rational actors. Their claim is that it is domestic 
background rather than international distribution of power that detennines the relationship between 
alhes. 
42 
In contrast to the above-discussed alliance studies, those who pay attention to role of 
non-native values claim that the Western identity plays a significant role in detennining Western actions. 
They argue that the strength of the West does not come from the structure of its international 
relationship vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, but fi7om its shared value of 'liberal democracy' and the 
collective decision making process among the Western states. Thus, they presume that neither 
international strategic circumstances nor a state's domestic pohcy-maldng process alone, can fully 
. 'I Waltz, Kenneth. 77ieory ofInternational Politics. New York: Random House, 1979. 
42 For a classic example of these arguments see: Neustadt, Richard Elliot. Alliance Politics, Columbia 
University Press; New York, 1970. A work that pays attention to inter-state aspect of the bureaucratic 
politics. See: Richardson, Louise. ýVhen Allies Differ. - Anglo-American Relations during the Suez and 
Falklan& crises. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996. Neo-realist inspired systernic approach to alliance politics, 
see: Walt, Stephen. The Ortins qf Alliance. Ithaca, Connecticut: Cornell University Press, 1987. Snyder 
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43 
explain the relationship between Western states. In essence, a logic derived from 'Liberalism' is 
applied and the role of 'Multilaterahsm' is emphasized in order to explain the intra-Western relationship. 
This research refers to this position as Liberal Multilateralism-'4Concerning the key issue of this 
research-the intra-Westem relationship-the Liberal Multilateralists' studies proVide a 
comprehensive theoretical perspective. The following sections will elucidate Liberal Multilateralists' 
account of the notion of multilateralism, the nature of the intra-Western relationship and America's role 
within it, and how the Western Order contributes to stabilizing the world order. 
Multilaterahsm 
There are two ways of defining the term multilater-atism: one is a quantitative definition that 
Neo-liberal literatures adopt and the other is Liberal Multflateralism's qualitative (nonnative) 
interpretation. According to Robert Keohane's quantitative definition, multilateralism is a fonn of 
mternational policy-making process that involves more than ffiree states (or international actors). 45 
Unilateralism and bilateralism are antonyms with multilateralism. In tl-ýs way, the number of 
participants in international cooperation is regarded as the index of multilateralism. There are more than 
dirte states participating in the 'Western' poficy-making process and thus it is litemlly a multilateral 
process. 
In contrast, the Liberal Multilatemlists' definition of multilateralism is based on its nonnative 
Glenn, Herald. Alliance Politics. Ithaca, N. Y; London: Cornell University Press, 1997. 
43 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 4-5; Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity Essays on 
International InstitutionalLation. London; New York: Routledge, 1998.32-34. 
44 Use of capital letters indicates that this term refers to Ruggie, Risse-Kappen, Ikenberry and their co- 
authors'works. These authors share the viewpoint that multilater-alisin regulates the actions of the US and its 
democratic allies. However, Ikenberry does not dismiss America's national strategic choices In order to 
explain its adoption of multilateral policy co-ordination. This point distinguishes his arguinents from Risse- 
Kappen and Ruggie's assumptions. See: Risse-Kappen, Thomas. "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational 
Coalition, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War, " International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994): 
185-214. Especially 191-192. Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 6,16,24-27; Ruggie, 
Constructing the World Polity, 16-22. Ikenberry, G. John, and A. Charles Kupchan. "Socializantion and 
Hegemonic Power, " International Organization 44, no. 3 (1990): 283-315. 
45 Keohane, Robert. "Mulfilateralism: an Agenda for Research, " Inteimfional Joumal XLV, Autuinn (1990): 
731-764. 
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value (qualitative) rather than quantitative indicators. James Caporaso makes fl-ils clear: 
'Multflateralism' [ ... ] is a belief that activities ought to 
be organised on a universal 
basis at least for a 'relevant' group (for example, democracies). 46 
Indeed, the Liberal Multilateralists argue that a genuine definition of multilateralism must contain an 
explanation as to 'how that order is achieved. 47 It is not the balance of power or utilitarian motives, as 
Realists might suggest, but a normative values-namely multilateralism-that organizes the order. 48 
James Morgan clarifies this point: 'multilateralism is the legitimacy of an order that is organised by 
more than three nations'. 49This 'multilateralism' regulates intra-Westem. relationsl-ýps and thus the 
50 
power asymmetry between the Western states (i. e. the US and others) can be controlled. 
In short, Liberal Multilateralists believe that it is not the international structure (i. e. polarity), 
or balance of power, or coercion of a hegemonic state, but rather the legitimacy of multilaterafism-- 
which is maintained by Western democr-acies-that has preserved Western institutions such as NATO 
and the Liberal Order. In this way, Ruggie and Risse-Kappen define the transatlantic alliance (by 
referring to Karl Deutsch's work) as a 'pluralistic security community I. 51 
Democra 
Emanuel Adler and Michel Barnett modify Deutsch's 'pluralistic security community) 
concept by following the Liberal Multilaterslists' arguments. 52 They describe the foundation of security 
conununity M the foUowing way: 
46 Capor-aso, James, A. "International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: the Search for Foundations, " *in 
Ruggie ed. Multilateralism Matters, 55. 
47 Ruggie, Multilaterahlym Matters, 12. 
48 Ruggle, Multilateralism Matters, 7. 
49 Morgan's Italics. Morgan, M. Partick. "Multilateralism and Security: Prospects III Europe, " in Ruggie ed.. 
Multilateralism Matters, 346. 
50 Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters, 7. 
51 Ruggie, lVinning the Peace, 80-88; Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity, 230; Risse-Kappen, 
Cooperation among Democracies, 30-32; Deutsch, Karl. W. et al. eds. Political Community and the North 
Atlantic Area. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. For a more detailed account of plur-alistic security 
community, see: Adler, Enu-nanuel, and Michael Bamett. eds. Secuilýv Communities, Cambridge: Cambridge 
Urýversity Press, 1998. 
52 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Commuruties, " in Alder and Barnett eds. 
Security Communities. 
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A security community's governance structure will depend both on the state's 
external identity and associated behaviour and its domestic characteristics and 
practices. 
53 
In Us way, Liberal Multilateralists focus not only on the process of decision-making between states 
but also on the common domestic system of the Western states, namely democracy From this, Liberal 
Multilateralists endorse the 'democratic peace' theory. 54 The pluralistic democracies are more likely to 
engage in peaceful conflict resolution through a multilateral decision-making process because they are 
used to such process domestically 55 To elucidate this process: at the domestic level a pluralistic 
democratic policy-making process undermines the notion of the state as a unitary national actor, and 
thus paves the way to a consideration of a variety of actors and dimensions--such as bureaucratic 
politics and non-governmental actors--that are involved in deciding the outcomes of policy At the 
international level, pluralistic democracy encourages inter-state inter-actions of bureaucr-atic politics and 
the fonnation of ti-ansnational networks. 56 
In addition to this, Ikenberry and his co-authors have postulated another fimction that 
maintains stable interaction among the Western states, which is referred to as the ' socialization of 
nonns. 57 Tl-ýs 'socialization of nonns' is the processes by which leaders of secondary states accept 
hegemoriic states' liberal-democi-atic norms. Even if they had not shared the same domestic values at 
the beginning of interaction, the Liberal Order 'socializes' leaders of each state, and eventually 
common values (i. e. 'liberal democracy' and multilateralism) spread fi7om one place to another. " In 
53 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities, " 36. 
54 For more on the idea of democratic peace, see: Deutsch, Karl. W. et al. eds. Political Community and the 
North Atlantic Area. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957; Russet, Bruth. Grasping the Democratic 
Peace. - Piinciplesfor a Post-Cold War World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993; Doyle Michael, 
W. "Liberalism in World Politics, " American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (1986): 1151-1169. 
55 For instance, Ikenberry, G John, "Liberal Hegemony and the Future of American Postwar Order, " in 
International Oýder and the Future of World Politics, edited by TV Paul and John A Hall, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999.123-143. Espec. 126. 
56 According to James Rosenau, transnational network (or transnationalism) is defined as 'the process 
whereby international relations conducted by governments have been supplemented by relations among 
private individuals, groups, and societies that can and do have important consequences for the course of 
events. ' Rosenau, James. Yhe Study qf Global Interdependence. - Essays on the Transnationalization of 
If, Orld. 4#a-irs. New 'York: Nichols, 1980.1. 
57 Ikenberry and Kupchan, "Socializantion and Hegemonic Power, " 283-4. 
58 Ikenberry argues that this 'socialization of nonns' is more or less a product of hegemony In contrast, 
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essence the Liberal Multilateralists claim that the more the domestic characters of the Westem states 
converge, the more the muhilateral arrangements become secure. Risse-Kappen expressed the essence 
of this point in one phrase; 'democratic allies form democratic alliances'. 59 
Ruggie and Risse-Kappen also point out that multilatemlism has tr-ansformed the security 
concepts of America and its Western allies. 60'Ibey understand that America has changed its national 
security interests from a 'geostrategic logic'(i. e. power politics) to one that is 'more inclusive and more 
extensively institutionalized-even before the Soviet threat. '6'According to these authors, the US 
follows the logic of multilater-alism rather than a 'geostr-ategic logic' for promoting its foreign policy 
Tbus Ruggie claims that the creation as well as operations of the UN and NATO should be understood 
as an expression of the logic of multilateralism. 621n this way, Ruggie argues, the liberal institutions will 
63 
eventually be able to address some agendas by themselves. Multilateralism played a fimclamental role 
in promoting both the transformation of America's perception of its national security, and Western 
states communication with each other. 64 
AX-0 the result of such integration of common values (i. e. the pluralist nature of domestic 
policy-making processes) and convergence of interests, the Liberal Multilateralists suggest that there is 
65 
a high probability of so-called 'diffuse reciprocity' among Western states. This means that given the 
condition that both X and Y are members of the same international cooperation (e. g. regime, institution 
and alliance), when X acts by following a regulation of that cooperation, X expects its ally Y's similar 
behaviour. 66 To sum up, Liberal Multilateralists stress that intra-Westem cooperation is prMCipaHy 
Risse-Kappen claims that socialization of norms also occurs in the other way round (i. e. from secondary 
states to hegemonic state) as well. Ikenberry and Kupchan, "Socializantion and Hegemonic Power"; Risse- 
Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 6,16,24-27. 
59 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 204. 
60 Ruggie, Constructing the kVorld Polity, 14 ; Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 6,16,24-27. 
61 Italic in the original text. Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity, 14. 
62 Ruggi, e, Constructing the World Polity, 14. 
63 Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters, 34. 
64 Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters, 7. 
65 Ruggie, Multilateralism I fatters, 32-3 3; Risse-Kappen, Coperation among Democracies, 6-7; Adler and 
Barnett. "A Framework for the Study of Security Commuruties, " 32. 
66 Ruggie, Constructing the T fbrld Polity, 24. 
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maintained by the Western identity of 'liberal democracy' and its policy-coordination process based on 
the principle of multilateralism. In other words, they argue that it is power of values (i. e. 'liberal 
democracy' and multilateralism) not balance of power that regulates the relationship among the 
Western states. This point distinguishes the Liberal Multilaterahsts' worldview fi7om those who 
prirnýy focuses on the distribution of power (Realism and Neo-Realism) or on rational calculation of 
actors to maximise one's interests through cooperation (Neo-Liberalism). 67 
America ý 'Benevolent'Leadersh 
The Liberal Multilateralism literature highlights the point that the pluralistic democracy of 
the US (i. e. America's alleged open and competitive policy-making process) provides sufficient 'voice 
opportunities' for its Western allies to reflect their opinions on America's foreign policy-making 
process . 
68 This means that America's Western allies are able to participate in the US policy-making 
process and thus they are able to exercise their influence on the outcomes of American pohcy. '9 Risse- 
Kappen produced a well-regarded study on this subject in relation to European members of NATO and 
their relationship with the UN from 1950s to 1980s. 'O 
In Cooperation among Democracies, he spells out the methodology and criteria to assess the 
European influence on American policy in the following way. There would be 'disagreement over 
policies' between the Western states prior to their interaction. " Through intra-Western interaction they 
may dissolve such differences, and the outcomes of the US policy 'either come close to the initial 
67 Keohane argues for continuity of the Western alliance even if American power declines, because the 
international interdependence has Institutionalised Western relations. Risse-Kappen and Ruggle criticize this 
position (neo-liberal institutionalism). Keohane, Robert. After Hegemony; Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not 
Float Freely"; Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity, 63-04,105. 
68 Risse-Kappen, 'Momas, and Peter J Katzenstein. "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: the 
Case of NATO, " in Ae Culture ofNational Identity: Norms and Identity in World Politics, edited by Peter J 
Katzenstein, 357-399. New York: Colombia University Press, 1996; Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among 
Democracies, 95;. Ikenberry, 4fier Victory, 51-53,203-204; Also, Ruggie implies this point by arguing that 
NATO is a 'security commumty. ' See: Ruggie, Winning the Peace, 80-88. 
69 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 95. 
70 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies. 
71 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 13. 
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European demands or represent intr-a-alliance compronuse. '721'he central stage on which to assess 
Europe's influence is the American foreign policy-making process, where Western values would guide 
the inter-actions among actors. 73According to Risse-Kappen: 
European demands are represented in the American foreign policy process, either 
directly through interallied [sic] consultations or indirectly through domestic 
and/or bureaucratic U. S. actors referring to allied concerns in the iiiitial 
deliberations. 74 
According to this methodology, the influence of America's allies can be found in either the mtr-a- 
Western policy coordination mechanism, or in the US policy-making process. Risse-Kappen then 
looks at alternative forces within the US policy-process-such as 'the power structure of the 
intemational system', '[America's] domestic politics', and 'leader-ship behefs'-that possibly define 
the outcomes of America's decisions . 
75 If these alternative factors are insignificant for determining the 
outcomes, then he concludes that 'European influence on American foreign policy' exists. 76 
Risse-Kappen also suggests that three factors may prevent the US administration from 
following the outcomes of multHateralism. The first case is the situation that involves Amenca's vital 
strategic interests . 
77 Secondly, he points out European pohcy-makers'indifference to Western values (of 
multilateralism and of 'liberal democracy') by promoting self-serving interests (such as imperialism). '8 
The last case is that America's domestic actors (e. g. Congress, bureaucratic politics and others) 
overwhelm its intentions regardless of the outcomes of the intra-Western multilateralism . 
79 Despite the 
concems raised by Risse-Kappen, Liberal Multilateralists (even Risse-Kappen himselo contmue to 
argue that there is a successful operation of intra-Western multilateralism-and America's allies"voice 
72 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 14. 
73 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 13-14,33-34. 
74 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 14. 
75 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 13. 
76 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 13-14. 
77 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 13-14. 
78 See Risse-Kappen's interpretation of the failure of the intra-western multilateralism during the Suez War. 
Cooperation among Democracies, Chap. 4. 
1 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 13-14, 
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opportunities'-in the post Cold War world-80 
In addition to these 'voice opportunities', Ikenberiy ar-gues that America's 'stmtegic 
restraint' and a willingness not to impose its particular interests on other Western states provides a 
stable intra-Western relationsWp. 81 He combines this point with his analysis of the interaction between 
the US and other Western states after VVWH. In this way, Ikenberry under-stands that the structure of 
this American liberal hegemony to be a result of the settlement of the Second World War, and that this 
provides a stable intra-Western relationship. 82 He refers to this relationship between the 'liberal 
hegemony' of the US (i. e. not coercive leadership) and its Western aflies as the 'constitutional order' 
that creates an orderly relationship among the Western states as similar to the constitutionally regulated 
Westem. domestic politics . 
83 
Ruggie also suppoits this connection between Ametica's benevolent leadership of its allies 
(i. e. restruin to America's self-serving interests for the sake of common Western interests) and the 
formation of the Liberal Order among the Western states: 'Amefican hegemony that was decisive after 
World War H, not merely American hegemony. '84 To paraphrase this point, it is not America's 
hegemonic leadership towards its allies but America's role as a leader of 'liberal democracy' and of 
Western multilaterafism (i. e. its self-restraint M advocating its interests and its open and penetrated 
policy-making process) that was the key factor for the West's construction and maintenance of a stable 
order. 
To sum up, the Liberal Multilateralists; suggest that as a result of the above-discussed 
80 Risse-Kappen. "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community", 394. 
81 Risse-Kappen cnficises the concept of strategic restmint. This is because Ikenberry's arguments focus too 
much on America's mfional choice, mther than national and communal identity for analysing its behaviour in 
international coopemfion. Ikenbeny, G John. "Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Persistence of 
American Post-war Order, " International Security 23, no. 3 (1998): 43-73; Ikenbeny, Ajter Victory, 199-203; 
Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely, " 191-192. 
'ý2 lkenberTy, G John. "Multilateralism and U. S. Grand Strategy, " in Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy 
Ambivalent Engagement, edited by S Patrick and S Forman, 121-140. Color-ado; London: Lynne Rienner, 
2002; Deudeny, David, and Ikenbeny, G John "The Natur-e and Sources of Liberal Intemational Order, " 
Revieii, ql- International SMdies 25 (1999): 179-196; Ikenbny, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the 
Persistence of Amencan Postwar Order, " International Security 23, no. 3 (1998): 43-73. 
83 Ikenberry,. 4ftcr T ictoty, 29-34.210-214. 
8.4 italic Hii the original text. Ruggie, Constmcting the Pfrorld Polity, 14. 
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combination of multilateralism, pluralistic democracy of the Western regimes, and American 
leadership, the Western states are able to overcome the Realist-presumed balance of power politics in 
the context of anarchy (in the sense that there is no central authority to regulate inter-state affairs). 
These mechanisms that maintain the intra-Westem relationship distinguish the Western Order fi7om 
other historical orders such as the balance of power-based order of pax-Biltannica and any fonn of 
85 
hegernonic order. 
Liberal Interpretations of the Western Actions in Relation to the Bosnian Conffict 
As we have discussed, the Liberal Multilaterahsts believe that the Westem Order forras a 
C 86 87 pluralistic security commurlity' or a 'constitutional order'. To elucidate the implication of such 
features, the Liberal Multilaterahsts consider that the end of the Cold War shýifted the security 
enviromnent, and wiped out the main external ffireat in the fonn of the SoViet Union. As discussed 
ý11 above, they posit that the Western states are now able to overcome traditional power politics when it 
deals with security ffireats. However, every order is accompanied by the potential to project coercive 
power. The Western Order is no exception. As previously discussed, by referring to the ideas of 
'democratic peace' and 'pluralistic security community', they contend that the Western actions have 
been making a positive contribution to the stability of Europe. Accordingly, they suggest that the West 
collectively has been using its coercive power after the Cold War and that this promotes Western values 
of 'tiberal democracy' and multilateralism, not in order to accomptish its geo-strategic objects and vital 
interests. 
It is important to note, however, that we have been witnessing the fi-agile nature of the 
relationship between the US and its allies regarding their use of coercive power towards non-Western 
states in the post Cold War period (such as the Ir-aq War of 2003, the Westem militarily action in 
85 IkenberTy, After Victory, 44-48. 
86 Ruggie, Winning the Peace, 80-88; Ruggie, Constructing the ffbrld Poli4l, 230; Risse-Kappen, 
Cooperation among Democracies, 30-32; Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. 
87 Ikenbeny,, Ifier Victo? y, 29-34,210-214. 
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Afghanistan of 2001, and NATO's intervention in the Kosovo War of 1999). Even some of the Liberal 
Multilateralists raised concern about this trend of the abuse of America's supremacy 88 Among these 
cases, the Western approach to the Bosnian conflict represents a critical test case to evaluate the validity 
of the above-discussed interpretation of Liberal Multilateralism. As empirical study of this thesis will 
demonstrate, Western states failed to provide a coherent approach and a timely resolution to the 
Bosnian conflict. This case can also be seen as a precedent for Western actions based on self-serving 
interests, indicating the failure of Western multilateralism. 
Some Liberal Multilateralists, in fact, accept that Bosrua represented a case where 
multilateralism failed. As previously discussed, the Liberal Multilateralists spell out the conditions 
under which the US is unable to follow the outcomes of multilateralism. They are: powerful domestic 
opposition in America; European indifference to Western values; and cases where America's Vital 
interests are at stake. 89 Following these criteria, some Liber-al Multilateralists view the West's response 
to the Bosnian conflict as a failure of multilateralism due to: US congressional pressure not to comply 
with European opinions 90; bureaucratic opposition to the foreign entanglement 91; or European policy- 
makers' lack of respect for the 'ideational' (moral) interests of the West (i. e. protecting the territorial 
mtegnty of Bosnia and empowenng the victims of the conffict in the form of Bosnian MUSlillIS). 
92 
However, they do not regard America's action as based on its vital interests and thus the Bosman 
conflict did not alter the nature of the Western Order. 
in short, Liberal Multilateralists believe that the Bosnian conflict did not undennine the logic 
93 
of the 'plumhstic security community'in Europe. Accordingly, Liberal Multilateralists claim that four 
consequences have emerged from the Western experiences during the Bosnian conflict as f6flows: 
88 Ikenbeny, C _1 john. 
"Liberalism and Empire: Logic of Order in the American Urnpolar Age. " Review of 
international Smdies 30, no. 4 (2004): 609-630. 
89 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 13-14,37. 
90 Ruggle, [Vinning the Peace, 172. 
91 Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition, " ForeignAffairs, Vol. 81, No. 5.2002.44-60. 
92 To be precise, Risse-Kappen himself does not see that the Bosnian case damaged the coherence of NATO. 
See: Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Commuluty, " 394; 
93 Risse-Kappen, "Collective identity in a Democnitic Community, " 394. 
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Multilateralism is the only existing legitimate logic to regulate the intra-Westem relationship. 
Therefore, there is no disagreement among Western states regarding the contents of multilateralism. 
Multilateralism, in practice, implies the principles of enhancing America's democratic allies ''voice 
opportunities' and embracing international norms such as the authority of the UN Security Council. 
2) America's supremacy within West and its demomtic allies "voice oppoftunities'are compatible. 
3) NATO kept its coherence and hybrid character, and thus NATO worked in harmony with other 
security institutions. Also, it did not exclude non-Western states fi7om its decision making process. 
4) As a result of those factors, the Bosnian conflict posed a challenge to the values of the West (i. e. 
'liberal democracy' and multilateralism), but it did not pose a threat to the geo-strategic and vital 
interests of each Westem state. 
Ian Clark's Critique of the Western Order under Quasi-Multilateralism 
The literature on Liberal Multilateralism discussed above provides a standard and 
comprehensive but faflible narrative of the formation of the European security order, especiafly 
America's relation to other Western states. It identifies that Western values of promoting liberal 
democracy and multilateralism, not geo-strategic goals or vital interests, are the reason for the Western 
use of coercive power. The essence of this interpretation is that what is good for the West is always 
good for the rest of the world. Ian Clark criticizes such Liber-al Multilateralist interpretations of the 
causal relationship. 94 He pays attention to the potential gap between Westem moral values and the 
West's practical application of them, by analysing the negative impacts of Western actions on the non- 
Westem world. 
Clark at first elaborates on Ikenberry's perception (previously discussed) of the order which 
Ikenbeny claims to have been formed after the major wars. " IkenberTy axgues that an order consists of 
a particular pattern of re-distribution of power, including use Of coercive power on the part of a 
94 Clark, Ae Post Cold ITar Order, Clark, "The Great Tramfonnation after the Cold Wai-T' 
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hegemonic state, and a re-definition of the legitimacy that would persuade secondary states to 
voluntarily take positions required by the order. 9' Clark terms the fon-ner element as 'distributive peace' 
and the latter as 'regulative peace. "' Liberal Multilateralists understand that the Westem Order is stable 
because it has relied on what Clark called 'regulative peace' rather than the use of coercive powers to 
maintain it. 98 Multilateralism. is regarded as the essence of the 'regulative peace' of the Western Order 
Clark questioned how tfýs multilateralism works in practice. 99 
Clark notes that Russia and its allies have been poorly treated by the Western states since the 
end of the Cold War. 11is interpretation is that as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is natural 
to consider the Western states as the 'victors' of the Cold War and define the tenns of the Cold War's 
conclusion in the form of the West's receiving of the 'spoils' of war from Russia as the loser. '00 Clark 
suggests that the re-unification of Germany, NATO's eastwards enlargement, INT's structural 
adjustment and loss of Russian influence as a global power in general are regarded as the 'spoils'. 101 
The West is able to obtain these 'spoils' because it has undeniable asymmetric power over the non- 
Western world. Clark concludes that the West justifies imposing its policies on the non-Western world 
in the name of promoting multilateralism; however, in reality, such Westem use of multilateralism does 
not give substantial 'voice oppoftunities' to the non-Westem states regarding how the West treats 
them. '021berefore, the Western Order and its multilateralism amounted to a 'harsh' settlement against 
the losers of the Cold War, namely Russia. 103Here Clark sees a tension between formal logic of 
multilateralism among the Western states and its application towards the non-Westem states. His 
verdict on practices of multilateralism is negative. Clark sums up his analysis saying that the West does 
95 ikenbeny,, 4fter Victory, 7-8. 
96 Ikenberry, 4fier Victory, 57-58,259. 
97 Clark, The Post Cold War Order, 64. 
98 Deudeny and Ikenberry, "Tbe Nature and Sources of Liberal Internafional Order. " 
99 Clark, Ae Post Cold War Order, 78. 
100 Clark, Ae Post Cold T Var Order, 60-6 1. 
101 Clark, Ae Post Cold TI iir Order, Chap. 4,157-158. 
102 Clark, Ae Post Cold Tf i7r Order, 175,182-183. 
103 Clark, The Post Cold Mar Onier, 85-89,110. 
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not promote 'constitutional order' as Liberal Multilateralists, claim, ' 04but a quasi-constitutional order' 
that imposes a settlement on the 'losers'of the Cold War in the name of multilateralism. 105 Accordingly 
Clark predicted that such practices on the pait of the West would make the contemporary order 
unsustainable. 'O' 
This research adopts Clark's interpretation regarding the Western use of power to the non- 
Western world and its negative outcomes (i. e., in Clark's term, 'harsh' reality) with the following 
qualifications. 'Ihe difference between the genuine 'constitutional order' and a 'quasi-constitutional 
order' is based on the content of the 'regulative peace' wiffiin the Western Order. The fon-ner requires a 
genuine kind of multilateralism (i. e. the Liberal Vision of multilateralism) but the in the latter the US 
follows a logic that can be called Quasi-multilateralism. A genuine multflateralism demands 
procedural legitimacy when the West uses its coercive power towards the non-Westem world. This 
means that the West should act based on consent among the Western states and through the fi=ework 
of a multilateral international organization, especiaRy the UN. Hence the non-Western states also have 
some 4voice opportunities' to define the outcomes of the Western action. However, Quasi- 
multilatemlism is accompanied with an ideological interpretation of the moral values of the West that 
does not necessary demand a procedural interpretation of multilateralism. It rather compels the West to 
consider the 'quality' of the result. Iberefore, the non-western states do not have a chance to participate 
in policy-making process of the West. 
AXS previously discussed, Liberal Multflaterahsts claim that legally speaking, NATO takes a 
form of collective self-defence, however, in practice, it operates according to a genuine logic of 
multilateralism and can cooperate with coHective security organizations such as the UN and other 
regional organizations. In this way, they suggest that NATO can accommodate the interests of the non- 
Western states. However, what happens if the West or the US uses NATO to maintain its strategic 
104 ikenbeny,, 4fier fIctory, 29. 
105 Clark, Ae Post Cold If ýzr Onier, 178. 
106 Clark, The Post Cold Hair Onier, 253. 
27 
interest on the basis of its ideological moral values of 'liberal democracy' iristead of procedural 
normative value of multilater-alism? The above interpretation, derived fi7orn Ian Clark's works, 
encourages us to make four counter claims vis-A-vis Liberal Multilateralists as follows; 
1) Liberal Multilaterlists are indifferent to a potential conflict between the ideological Western moral 
values of promoting a justice based on the principles of 'liberal democracy' and respecting the 
procedural nonnative value of multilatemlism. 
2) There can be a potential ffiction between America's strategic interests for maintaining Western 
Order under its hegemonic leadership and the procedural nonnative value (i. e. multilateralism) 
that legitimises America's allies' 'voice opportunities. In other words, America may abuse 
ideological values of Westem multilateralism in order to constram its allies 'voice opportunities'. 
3) A Western security institution, such as NATO cannot dissolve this tension between procedural 
values and ideological values in the fonn of a hybrid organization of collective self-defence and 
collective security 
4) In such a situation, it is highly likely that NATO and the US do not follow genuine multilateralism 
but Quasi-multilateralism In order to promote Western interests and that would not work in favour 
of non-Westem states. 
The next section elucidates this point by studying definitions and implications of collective security and 
collective self-defence in conjunction with the differing principles of multilateralism and Quasi- 
multilaterahsm. 
NATO is Not a Hybrid Organization: a Tension between Western Moral Values and 
America's Strategic Interests 
There are three factors that distinguish the concept of coUective security from that of 
collective self-defence: 1) the use of logic of balance of power, particularly the existence of any 
hegemonic leader within a security arrangement; 2) the obligations of the collectivity to its member 
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states; and 3) the way the coHectivity treats non-member states. 
Firstly, there are differing ideas as to what role power asymmetries play among the members 
of security an-angements. As Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan summarize it, an ideal type of 
coflective security has highly convergent security interests among the members. '[B]alancing 
behaviour [among the members] occurs only in response to aggression. " 0' Multilateralism in the fonn 
of 'voice opportunities' serves to shape common security interests among the members of a collective 
security arrangement. An ideal type of collective security is ahnost identical to the Liberal 
Multilateralists' interpretation of the Westem Order and its 'pluralistic security community'. 
In contrast, collective self-defence is usually organized in line with the international balance 
of power and thus keeps the logic of power asymmetry between participants. For instance, it would be 
impossible to explain the establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO without 
considering the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the US. Hence, Quasi-multilateralism (in the 
fon-n of giving priority to a hegemonic leader's strategic interests over its allies"voice opportunities') is 
highly likely to regulate the relationship among the members of a collective self-defence. With regard 
to this point, even some Liberal Multilateralists, accept that NATO was a product of American 
hegemony 108 However, as previously discussed, they distinguish between different aspects of NATO. 
They consider that NATO has hybrid characteristics. It protects the original strategic or niaterial 
interests of its members fluough a collective self-defence finiction in order to deter the threats posed by 
outsiders (i. e. the Soviet Union). At the same time, it pursues internal ideational interests to promote 
Westem values (i. e. 'liberal democracy' and multilateralism) across the globe by facilitating collective 
security ftinctions to support non-member states/regions. As a result, they assume that NATO 
simultaneously maintains two fimctions; a genuine multilateralism among its members, and col-lective 
107 Kupchan, A. Charles and Kupchan, A. Clifford. "Concerts, Collecfive security, and the Future of 
Europe, " Inteniational Security 16, no. 2 (1991): 114-161.120. 
108 As previously discussed, despite this fact, Liberal Multilateralists argue that the nature of America's 
benign hegemony and NATO's inclusiveness have created a 'security community', and have established its 
collective security measures. Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity, 14; Ruggie, I'Unning the Peace, 44-45, 
80-88; Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 32. Ikenberry. Ifier victor,,, 233-239. 
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security actions regarding NATO's 'out of area' rnissions. By extending its collective security function 
(promoting its values of 'liberal democracy'), Liberal Multilateralists believe that NATO can act in 
harmony with other security organizations. In other words, they presume that shared ideational 
interests and multilateralism makes NATO able to accommodate America' hegemonic interests, its 
allies' 'voice oppoftunities', and the interests of other security organizations without serious ffictions 
among them. 
Secondly, with regard to the obligation to protect other member states, collective security 
imposes greater responsibilities on its members. A prime responsibility is the 'all against one' principle 
that guarantees Universal commitment (or total solidarity) amongst participant states against 
aggressors. 109 Thus, all members of the arrangement share the same levels of responsibility. In other 
words, when it faces a security threat, the normative regulation imposed on each member of the 
collective security arrangement should be in accordance with the genuine definition of multilateralism. 
In contrast, collective self-defence restricts the conditions and geographical scope of its 
responsibility. There are various cases in NATO's history that the strategic interests of the US took 
precedence over ideational interests of promoting 'liberal democracy'and multilatemlism. For instance, 
NATO defined the scope of its defence obligations and its membership not purely by ideolo, 91%ICU 
criteria but by geograpMc locations. Fonning a defence organization against the potential invasion by 
the Warsaw Treaty Organization was the principal rationale of NATO's existence. Accordingly, NATO 
accepted Portugal (a founding member), Turkey and Greece as member states despite the fact that they 
did not have democratic regirnes. ' 10 Neither the moral interests of facilitating intra-Western 
multilateralism nor promoting 'liberal democracy' defined NATO's geographical orientation, but 
America's strategic interests vis-A-vis the SoViet Union ultimately determined its membership. In 
109 Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe, " 118. 
110 In addition, as Lawrence Kaplan suggested, Amenca's geogmphical interests in Spitzbergen (Norway), 
Greenland (Denmark), Azores (Portugal) may explain why the US in L- included these states * NATO. in 
pmcfice, NATO did not prevent the conflict between Turkey and Greece on the issue of Cypnis. Kaplan, 
Lawrence S. 7he United States and NA TO .- the Formative Years. Lexington, Kentucky-. University Press of 
Kentucky, 1984.83,107-110. For Risse-Kappen's acknowledgement of this point, see: Risse-Kappen, 
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addition, as Risse-Kappen accepts, multilateralism in the form of America's allies"voice opportunities' 
could be restricted when America's strategic interests were at stake. "' The well-known examples of 
this were: America's reluctance to support the British and the French actions in the Suez War of 1956; 
De GauHe's demands to reform NATO's decision-making system in 1959; and the so-caUed Skybolt 
crisis between the US and the UK in 1962.1 12 TMs means ffiat so far as the US placed priority on its 
own strategi .c mterest over a common norm of multflateralism, the collective sel(-defence organization 
of NATO could not overcome a potential tension between the hegemonic position of the US and its 
allies 'voice opportunities' or the interests of non-Western states. 
Lastly, there is a difference between collective security and collective self-defence regarding 
their definitions of threat and response. The fonner does not have a clear image of threat at the 
beginning and thus the corresponding measures will be negotiated among the member states on a case- 
by-case basis, whereas the latter defines the enemy at its inception and tends to have a fixed means to 
counter the ffireat. This would suggest that collective self-defence arrangements are exclusive in nature 
and potentially wiffiendly to outsiders. 
To elucidate this point: under a collective security arrangement, threat is perceived M 
accordance with Claude's well-known phrase: 
[t]he world is conceived not as we-group [sic] and they-group [sic] of nations, 
engaged in competitive power relations, but as an integral we-group in which 
danger may be posed by "one of us" and must be met by "all the rest Of US. 5ý1 
13 
This suggests that collective security does not pay substantial attention to the polItIcal 
orientation (i. e. type of domestic regime) or the strategic interests of its members. Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter stipulates that the UN Security Council 'shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
CoOPeration among Democracies, 32. note 59. 
11 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 29-30. 
112 The fon-ner was only resolved by French possession of own nuclear weapons and her withdrawal from 
the NATD's militaiy organization. 'Me latter was prompted by the American decision to withdraw its 
technical support to the British nuclear weapon systems unilaterally in 1962. The British fi-ustration was 
resolved by her concession to the US. For details of flýiis crisis and the lessons America learned see: Neustadt, 
Richard E. Kport to JFK. * The S4-bolt Crisis in Perspective. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999. 
113 Claude, Power an-d Inteniational Relations, 114. 
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1114 peace' and if necessary it will 'decide what measures shall be taken. In relation to tlýs point, Article 
51 of the UN Charter also recognizes that '[n]othing in the present [UN]Charter shall impair the 
inherent rights of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international 
peace and security. " 15 In this way, Afticle 52 provides the legal foundation for establishing regional 
(collective security and self-defence) arrangements. However, in practice, institutionalization of thýs 
particular self-defence arrangement (namely NATO) effectively created quite a different approach to 
security from UN-based collective security when it comes to perceptions of 'threat. ' There is a 
consensus in the literature on security that collective security accommodates potential enemies within 
the group, whereas collective self-defence-based on the mechanism of alliance-defines the enemy 
according to its own values and seeks to exclude potential enenuies at the outset. ' 16 Collective self- 
defence, in other words, would take coercive action for the sake of its own values and against its fixed 
conceptualisation of the enemy In this respect, the notion of 'democratlc peace' may define the salient 
Western value and may become a rationale of using coercive power against non-democratic regimes 
(see Chapter 4, below). ' 17 
To surn up the three elements discussed above, it is logical to say that the concept of a 
collective security arrangement fits with the Libeml Multilatemlists' view of multilatemlisn-4 and it 
would accommodate the interests both Western and non-Westem states. In contrast, a collective self- 
defence arrangement tends to promote Quasi-multflaterahsm and thus it would restrict the input of both 
114 Article 39, Chapter VH, Charter of the United Nations. 
115 Article 5 1, Chapter VII, Charter of the United Nations. 
116 Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters, 10; Dewittý David B. "Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative 
Security, " The Pacýfic Revimt, 7, no. I (1994): 4-7; Clarký T, Mark. "The Trouble . krith Collective Security, " 
Or&ý: A Journal qf World Affairs 39, no. 2 (1995): 237-245; Goldenker, Leon, and Weiss, Thomas. "The 
Collective Security Idea and Changing World Politics, " in Collective Security in a Changing World, edited 
by Thomas Weiss, 3-18. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne, 1993.6. 
117 This PO 1-r1t is well-discussed by one of the proponents of democratic peace, Michael Doyle. He wams of 
the war-prone tendency of West. In contrast, there are some authors who support the use of coercive power 
in order to promote 'democratic peace'. Doyle, Michael W. "Liber-alism in World Politics, " American 
Political Scictice Revic-ii, 80, no. 4 (1986): 1151-1169. Also see, Cooper, RoberL "Why We Still Need 
Empires, " Ae Obserier, 7 April 2002,27. 
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Westem and non-Westem states on America's policy Contrary to the Liberal Multilateralists' 
prediction, however, NATO still maintains its collective self-defence identity by keeping de facto 
mdependence from the authority of the UN for its military operations (see Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 for 
details). Thus, it is logical to consider that the maintenance of NATO's collective self-defence identity 
and its quasi-multilateral characteristic is in the critical strategic interests of the US or the Westem 
states. Accordingly there is a tension between such strategic interests and the ideational interests of the 
US and the West in the form of promoting multilateralism in security (i. e. coRective security). 
The above study of security concepts suggests one critical point. It is now clear that the 
relationship between the West and the non-western world is constructed not only based on power 
politics between the two but on a logic of Western Order (i. e. genuine multilateralism that emphasises 
procedural values or Quasi-multilateralism that inclines to ideological values) and its institutional 
approaches to security (i. e. collective security or collective self-defence). Therefore, the politics that 
determines the logic of Western Order-namely the intra-Western relationship--is the critical part of 
understanding the nature of the World Order since the end of the Cold War 
Two Visions of the Western Order: Working Hypothesis and Methodologies 
Four Research Questions and Two HTpothetical Interpretations 
According to previously reviewed literatures, it is possible to consider that the intr-a-Westem 
debate on the Bosnian policy was a critical moment for the West to detenriine the organizing principle 
of its order, and its approach to the rest of the world. This section categorises two concepts of the intra- 
Western relationship and how it moulded the role of the West In international (world) affairs and its 
relationship with non-Westem states during the Bosnian conflict. They are namely Liberal 
Multilateralisin and Quasi-multilateralism. (See Table I for overView). 
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Table I The organizing principles of international relations and policy implications' 18 
Intra-Westem reguladon 
Unilateralism Quasi-multilateralism Multilateralism 
Alhes'voice Almost none Formally given but less Formal and substantial 
opportunities substantial 
Criteria to justify Strategic interests of Normative cntena Procedural critena 
the use of Hegemon (Liberal Democracy) (International law & 
coercive power agreements) 
Relationship between the West and the Non- Western states 
Unilateralism Quasi-multilateralism Multilateralism 
Non-western 
actors 
Excluded Considered but would not 
have substantial voice 
Included 
Organizations US>NATO>theUN NATO>the UN The UN>NATO 
Security 
arrangements 
Classic balance of power 
jor Empire building 
Collective self-defence Collective security 
Implicadonsfor the Bosnian conflict 
Unilateralism Quasi-multilateralism Multilateralism 
Bosnian policy America's unilateral Lift and strike policy Negotiation-based peace 
intervention or plans 
isolationism 
Implementation America's military power Western military power Formal international force 
of the coercion & local collaborators' (e. g. UN Peacekeepers) 
actions 
There are four analytical agendas that illustrate the difference between the two categories as 
follows: 
1. Was there only one nonnative value that regulated the intra-Western relationship? 
2. Why was the US not able to support the UN-EU sponsored peace plans? 
3. To what extent did NATO cooperate with the UN and other international organizations? 
4. Did the ideological values that originally adhered to the Western order force the US 
administration to adopt a policy of ignoring the LJN-EU sponsored peace plans and advocate the 
'lift and strike' policy in the name of promoting Western values (i. e. protecting the 'victim' of the 
conflict in the fonn of the Bosi-ýian government under the leadership of Ahj a Izetbegovi6)? 
118 Unilater-alism' is indicated in order to provide an idea of the evolution process from Multilateralism to the 
alleged features of the current US foreign policy Therefore, this thesis does not make any academic claim to 
define the ten-n 'unilaterahsm'. 
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The following section summarizes the inteipretations of each concept of Western collective action. 
Liberal Multilateralism 
The international order based on Liberal (genuine) Multilateralism places emphasis on the 
procedural legitimacy of collective decision-making. Insofar as it corresponds with fis, the practice of 
America's hegemony within the intra-western relationship is considered as quite resft-ained and its 
allies "voice opportunities' are guaranteed not only in theory but also in practice. The outcomes of the 
intra-Western negotiation are based on mutual understanding of the benefit of actions, not on balance of 
power between the US and its aflies. 
In addition, the boundaries between the 'West'and 'the international community'are less figid 
than under Quasi-multilateralism. As the result of the end of the Cold War, it is considered that there is 
no substantial antagonism between the Western states and the non-Western states. The post-Cold War 
international order is managed on the basis of the voluntary acceptance of Western values by non- 
Western states. It is assumed that the virtue of the intra-Western relationship based on multilaterahsm 
(i. e. America's constr-ained behaviour towards its allies) will attract its former adversaries to transform 
their identities and interests. Thus the membership of the originally Western collective policy-making 
fonan is open to non-Westem states. 
Accordingly, collective security and the UN as a symbol of this become key security 
principles and organizations of genuine multilateralism. Collective use of coercive power ideally takes 
the form of 'international' agreements rather than of bilateral agreements between the 'Western states'. 
NATO is considered as a hybrid organization between collective security and collective self-defence. 
The practices of its defacto independence from the UN Security Council are narrowed as a result of 
this. 
As far as the Bosnian policy is concemed, a (genuine) multilateralist view would take it that 
the UN-EU sponsored peace plans reflected Arnefica's allies' OPinions (because they were supported 
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by the majority of US allies and also used the UN as the core organization). This policy was m 
accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council and international agreements (see Chapter 2 for 
details). Therefore, as far as procedural aspects are concerned it did not exclude non-Western states 
from the decision-making process. It even provided opportunities for the majority of Bosnian waning 
parties to pailicipate in the negotiation process. Nevertheless, some advocates of Libeml 
Multilateralism accept that America's lack of cooperation with the UN-EU sponsored peace plans, and 
its so-called 'lift and strike'policy were a faihire of this theory. 
They regard it as an exception and blame the US domestic actors that forced the US 
administration to ignore its affies" voice opportunities. "Mey understood that it was an uTegular failure 
that did not change the nature of the US as a Liberal Multilateralist actor. Based on a more casual 
interpretation of multilateralism, some might argue that the Bosnian experience was a 'success' of 
Liberal Multilateralism. This was because the US did not implement the 'lift and strike' policy, as a 
result of European countries opposition to it. Added to that, the policy-makers of the US administration 
endorsed these perspectives and legitimised their poticy of non-cooperation with the UN-EU 
sponsored peace plans on the basis of protecting the 'victirns' of the Bosnian conflict. They understood 
that this was a moral obligation of the Western states under the values of Liberal Multilateralism. In all 
these scenarios, Liberal Multilateralists understand that the Bosnian conflict did not cause any threat to 
America's vital interests and the US did not use its sheer asymmetric power over others to impose its 
preferred policies. Therefore, America under the Clinton presidency is still characterized as a Liberal 
Multilateral actor, and the nature of the Western order is intact according to their theories. 
Ouasi-multilateralism 
An international order that adopts Quasi-multflaterahsm places emphasis on the identity of 
each actor (whether it accepts liberal democratic values and regimes or not) over procedural values for 
defining the membership of any collective pohcY-making forum, However, it tends to reflect Amenca's 
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hegemonic interests vis-A-vis its Western allies. America's allies' 'voice opportunities'are constrained. 
In practice, the balance of power between the US and its allies, rather than the multilateral negotiation 
process, determines the outcome of Westem pohcies. 
An image of the post-Cold War international order is of an extension of Western values to the 
non-Western world. However, the West's emphasis on the identity of its domestic regimes rather than 
its international collective procedural fairness and openness, sometimes prevents non-Westem states 
from taking part in collective decision-making processes. In other words, the boundaries between the 
West and the non-Western world are more rigid under Quasi-multilateralism than genuine 
multilateralism. 'Western' states could use collective coercive power based on their own values 
regardless of any 'international' consensus that may reflect the interests of non-Western actors. Tl-ýs 
kind of practice would arguably create a tension between the interests of the Western states and the 
non-Westem states. Westem action cannot be treated as a synonym for intemational action. 
Accordingly, Western states still maintain bilateral and collective self-defence arrangements as 
the pivotal fonuns, of collective security. Collective coercive use of power can be Jimplemented on the 
basis of 'Western' consensus regardless of the existence of forinal 'international' legitunacy such as 
consent from the UN Security Council. NATO is not a hybrid security organization between coUective 
self-defence and collective security. In other words, NATO attempts to maintain its de facto 
independence from the UN Security Council as far as possible. 
Where the Bosnian policy is concerned, the UN-EU sponsored peace plans and the US 
approaches to the conflict can be discussed not only based on their procedural legitimacy, but also on 
ideological values. The US administration criticized the UN-EU sponsored peace plans for appeasing 
Serbian and Croatian aggression and proposed to implement the so-called 'lift and strike' policy in the 
name of supporting the interests of the Bosnian government and of the civilians on the ground. 
This research supports mterpretations based on Quasi-multilaterahsm. Accordingly, this 
research posits the following working hypothesis in regard to post Cold War European security as 
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follows: Western policy towards Bosnia did not work to support the interests of the Bosnian 
governtnent, and adversely affected its civilians, who suffered as a result of conflict being prolonged 
and of the WestS'fiailure to protect them in the early stages of international involvement. Western 
hypocrisy was exacerbated due to US manipulations of the interpretation of Western nioral values in 
order to organize the Western Order under Quasi-multilateralism. 
The empirical chapters of this thesis will examine the validity of this hypothesis regarding the 
four questions as above stated. If the answers to these questions turn out to be in favour of this 
research's arguments, it will suggest that America's policy was deliberately implemented to transform 
the regulative principles of the Western order from Liberal Multilateralism to Quasi-multilateralism for 
the sake of its own national interests. The following section will address methodological issues in 
relation to the contents of the empirical study. 
De Lnition ofthe Tenm 
Here the interests of the Bosnian government is understood as maintaining its territorial 
integrity under the leadership of the Izetbegovi6 govenunent (hereafter the Bosnian government) and 
as protecting the civilians on its controlled territories in order to prevent imminent violence upon them, 
and to cease the conflict as soon and as peacefully as possible. ""Me overall vital interests of the US 
are provisionally understood as maintaining its hegemony vis-A-vis its allies in the post Cold War order. 
In practice, with regard to the European security order, this was expressed in the form of consolidating 
NATO's coherence and fimctions, regardless of the pressure to enhance collective security 
arrangements in Europe. In other words, it is the position that maintains NATO's defacto independence 
fi-om the authority of the UN Security Council. As far as the Bosnian conflict is concerned, the US 
administr-ation did not want to use its ground troops to implement the UN-EU sponsored peace plans 
119 Of course, this is a su-nPlIfied inteipretation of their interests. Neither of the organi2ing principles of the 
Western order can guarantee the interests of the Bosnian government and its civilian on the ground. However, 
it is clear that the US policy emphasised the interests of the Bosnian governi-nent more than the UN-EU 
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for fear of undermining NATO's role and America's military flexibility. 120 
The tenn NATO ý defacto independencefrom the UN is defined in the Mowing way So far 
as NATO undertakes its collective self-defence missions (i. e. NATO's Article 5 mission) it is 
considered that NATO maintains both de jure and de facto independence fi7om the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) provided that the latter does not take relevant action regarding such an issue. 
However, according to the usual interpretation of international law, the LJNSC becomes the supreme 
legal authofity to establish NATO's missions when it engages in missions beyond collective self- 
defence matters (e. g. peacekeeping operations and the so-called 'non-Article 5' missions). In other 
words, NATO does not have de jure independence from the UN for establishing a peacekeeping 
mission outside of the territories of its signatories. In the case of the Bosnian conflict, UN Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR) No. 713 established the arms embargo over the former Yugoslavia. "' In 
addition, UNSCR 743 set up the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and it was deployed 
firstly in Croatia then in Bosnia. 122 Accordingly, WEU and NATO provided support to the anns 
embargo scheme and NATO also provided infi-astructure for the UNPROFOR missions. However, as 
far as the implementation of such missions is concerned, there is a political space for NATO and the 
UN Security Council to negotiate the extent to which NATO maintains its operational flexibility. 
Therefore, the tenn NATO ý defacto independenceftom the UN suggests a policy, which seeks greater 
operational flexibility from the UN Security Council regarding the use of air powers in Bosnia. Tl-ýs 
policy is a part of strategy that attempts to maintain NATO's principal role in the European security 
order accompanied by America's hegemonic leadership in Europe, as well as to support the supremacy 
of collective self-defence arrangements over collective security. This thesis will empirically 
demonstrate that the advocates of these two positions were almost identical; namely the US policy- 
peace plans. See Chapter 3,4,5 and 6 for detail. 
120 in retrospect, it can be argued that not deploying US forces on the ground was a preference and 
maintaining NATO's de facto independence firom the UN one was the vital *interests. However, the US 
administration did not clearly give priority to one over another until summer 1995; thus it treats two factors 
as vital interests. See Chapter 2,3,4,5 and 6 for details. 
121 United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 713.25 September 199 1. (S/Resn 13). 
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makers. 
To look at this point in a wider context, the extent of NATO's operational flexibility in 
relation to the Bosnian conflict was the symbolic issue regarding the future of Western security 
amangements. 123 It was also the critical issue for defining the inclusiveness of the Western order. 124 
With regard to the definition of a particular state's (or organisation's) policies, this research 
adopts the following general guideline that is often used in the studies of diplomatic history. BKfish 
policy is defined as a policy that was expressed by the then British govenunent. It should be at least 
substantiated either by government official documents, parliamentary records, statements or memoirs 
of the policymaker(s), or the author's interview with the policymaker(s) in charge of foreign and 
defence policy. 125 In other words, the narratives of empirical study are mostly based on the above- 
mentioned materials. The use of academic works (the secondary materials) that interpret individual 
states' policies or bilateral relations regarding the Bosnian conflict is kept at the most minimal level. 
The general guideline is that academic works are only referred to when they are the only resources that 
provide reliable background information or evaluation of a Policy. 
126 
The same approach is taken for defining the policies of the United States and other states. 
European policy is generally defined as a policy wl-&h is endorsed, declared or recommended either by 
the European Council (a meeting of the head of govemments and the highest decision making 
institution of the EC/EU), or meetings of Foreign Ministers or Defence Ministers. Therefore, British 
policy and European policy are not always the same. However, when British policy is in hannony with 
122 United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 743.21 February 1992. (S/Res/743). 
123 In other words, it asks whether NATO operates relies on multilateralism or Quasi-multilater-alism; and 
whether it encourages to give substance to collective security arrangements in Europe or not. 
124 Inclusiveness of the Western order depends on whether the West considers the interests of the former 
communist regimes in a relatively formal, substantial and favourable manner or demands that they accept 
Western opinions. 
125 This research acknowledges common caution relating to the reliability of interview research in historical 
study However, the use of interviews as a resource in this study is justified with regard to the limited 
availability of official documents (such as minuets of cabinet meetings, diplomatic telegrams, and the drafts 
of policies) dunng the Bosnian conflict. 
126 Tberefore, this research acknowledges the potential danger that it could sometime fail to provide 
comprehensive cover-age of important academic works in relation to interpretation of the transatlantic 
relationship and US foreign policy during the Bosnian conflict. However, this is not the principle critena to 
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the EC/EU's policy this research does not consciously distmguish one from the other. Tl-ýs is for the 
purpose of simplification and thus this research does not dismiss the reality that a 'European policy' 
often contains divisions among members of the European Union. 
The findings of this research in regard to European and British influence on US foreign 
policy relates also to wider questions, including: Is the US as well as the West multHateralist or quasi- 
multilateralist? And are the consequences of Western policies on the non-Western world harsh or 
benevolent? If we find evidence that intra-Western interactions produce the above-<fiscussed. features of 
collective security and do not produce harsh outcomes for the non-Western world, then the Liberal 
Multilateralists' view of intra-Western relationship should be regarded as a coherent interpretation. 
Conversely, if we find that America consistently acts to promote the diree features of collective self- 
defence and that Western policies result in harsh outcomes for non-Western states, it would be 
appropriate to say that the US promotes Quasi-multilateralism. 
MethodoLogLes 
In contrast to Liberal Multilateralism which pays attention to the process of intra-Western 
pohcy-making, this research adopts Susan Strange's notion of 'power over outcomes' as the criterion to 
evaluate one state or actor's influence on American policy. "' This means that one state or group's 
influence on American policy is evaluated not in terms of how they participated in the American 
poficy-making process but how they managed to define the consequences of a US or Western pohcy. In 
other words, this research evaluates European influence on American policy not through analyzing the 
American policy-maldng process, but the outcomes of the Western poticy This is because European 
policy-makers would not be satisfied with only participating in the US policy-making process. As far as 
the domain of America's European allies' influence is concemed, the research assumes that the 
evaluate the validity of the interpretations of research. 
127 Strange, Susan. Retreat qf the State. - the DOuion of Power in the World Economy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996.25-26. 
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'outcomes' of Westem interaction includes an oveft policy itself and the way they legitimize it. This 
demonstrates the extent to which Western states shared common values prior to and after their 
interaction. Thus the Liberal Multilaterahsts'asswnption that Western states share a non-native vision to 
deal with some particular situation phor to intra-Western inter-action is contested. 128 
The notion of 'power over outcomes'also defines how the actions of the West betrayed their 
values and the promises to the non-Western world and devastated conditions of civilians on the ground. 
Those Western hypociisies will be discussed in the following three respects: a) an approach or a peace 
plan that would dismiss the Bosnian government's desire to maintain a single and unified sovereign 
state; b) a method to impose a settlement that would impose further violence on Bosnian civilians (e. g. 
anning Croatians and launching excessive air strikes); c) a settlement that would deprive Bosma's 
rights of self-govemance and self-detennination. 
In order to evaluate the role of moral interests and vital (or strategic) interests for defining 
Westem (and the US) policy, this research follows Risse-Kappen's previously-discussed 
methodologies. 129 In other words, we will look at an initial US policy and initial European policies (as 
well as those of non-Western states) in relation to the Bosnian conflict prior to and after (i. e. the 
consequences) intra-Western interactions. If the intra-Western inter-action resulted in the advancement 
of European policy, this can be seen as European influence on US policy. Thus we may conclude that 
intra-Western interactions are explained by the Liberal Multilaterahsts' interpretation. However, if an 
initial American policy is persistent throughout intra-Western interaction and that detennines the West's 
actions, this will mean that there was no substantial European influence and thus it will suggest a failure 
of multilateralism. In the case of the Bosnian conflict, Liberal Multilateralists claim that the failure was 
either due to European policy-makers ignoring the Western moral values or American domestic actors' 
129 Spec To be precise, some Liberals (e. g. Ikenberry) are more conscious of the coercive at of the 
establishment of shared Western norms. Thus they discuss the process of promoting 'Western values' (e. g. 
4socialization of norms') in relation to American hegemony. Ikenberry and Kupchan, "Socializantion and 
Hegemonic Power, " 283-315; Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Persistence of American 
Postwar Or-der, " 43-73. 
Risse-Kappen, Cooper-ation among Democracies, 13-14. 
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opposition to the outcomes of multilateralism. Accordingly, they disrnissed. the interpretation that the 
failure of multilateralism was a result of the US government's strategic calculation to promote its vital 
mterests. In order to examine the critical factor that caused the US policy to oppose the outcome of 
multilateralism, we will look at America's domestic actors' positions and the characteristics of the 
European actors'policies. We will also consider America's vital interests when these two factors do not 
explain the US policies. 
The Organization of the Thesis 
Each chapter examines the working hypothesis in relation to the intra-Western relationship 
regarding the Bosnian conflict. As previously discussed, there are four theoretical points by which we 
will evaluate the coherence of the Liberal Multilateralism and the working hypothesis of this thesis. 
The organization of the thesis is as follows. 
Chapter 2 presents background information of the collapse of the Yugoslavia, the Bosnian 
conflict and Western debates in relation to international conflict resolution mechanisms since the early 
1990s. It will underscore the ad hoc nature of institutionalization of the Western approach to the crisis 
engulfing the former Yugoslavia, and will also underline the fact that European states needed to rely on 
their political and diplomatic skills rather than institutional multilateralism to establish a Western policy 
to address the situation in the fonner Yugoslavia. In this way, this chapter will look at whether the 
Western states promoted one vision of multilateralism or differing ideas of Western cooperation. 
Chapter 3 wiH discuss the period fi7om August 1992 to May 1993. It will demonstr-ate the 
fallacy behind the notion that Arnefica's allies' have 'voice opportunities. ' It will also tmce the fact that 
the US administration was detennined to not to accept the EU-UN approach to the Bosnian conflict 
prior to intra-Westem interaction and even before the US domestic actors (e. g. Congress, media and 
leaders of public opinions) demanded that the Clinton admii-listration oppose the EU-UN approach. In 
dus way, we will look at the relationship between America, s vI int sts and I tal ere its reactions to the 
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Bosnian conflict. 
Chapter 4 will look at the period from June 1993 to September 1993. It will analyse 
America's justification of its ideological interpretation of Westem values instead of following the 
procedural value of multilateralism. For this purpose, it closely studies the texts of the series of 
speeches presented by the high-ranking officials of the Clinton administration in September 1993. It 
will illustrate how the US administration promoted the idea of Quasi-multilateralism by employing the 
'democratic peace' theory in order to follow its vital interests of maintaining NATO's de facto 
operational independence from the UN (i. e. collective self-defence) and consolidating America's 
hegernonic role within the West. 
Chapter 5 wiH cover the penod from October 1993 to December 1994. Tl-ýs period 
illustrates Arnefica's application of Quasi-multilateralism to the situation in Bosnia that was launched 
by the series of speeches in September 1993. This resulted m the transformation of the maM 
institutional fi-amework of international mediation from the EU-UN sponsored International 
Conference of the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) to the so-called Contact Group. Despite tWs 
transformation, the Western states were still unable to fonn a coherent position. This factor will 
challenge the fallacy of the Liberal Multilateralists' claim that NATO can cooperate with other security 
organizations such as the UN by virtue of its alleged hybrid characteristic based on multilateralism. It 
also criticizes the Liberal Multilateralists' interpretation that explains America's failure to follow the 
outcomes of multilateralism as being due to its domestic political pressures. Instead, it argues that the 
critical factor for neglecting multilatemlism was the Clinton administration's policy of protecting its 
vital interests (i. e. keeping the US away fi7om the ethnic conflict on the ground and mamtammg 
NATO's de facto independence from the UN). 
Chapter 6 will discuss the final phase of the Bosnian conflict in 1995. The remarkable 
differences between thýs period and the previous ones were NATO's and the US'active involvement in 
the conflict not only politically but also militaffly. However it was accompanied by the fact that the US 
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launched rnilitary actions wHe effectively sidelining its European allies and the UN fi7om the 
substantial decision-making process. Hence it is appropriate to discuss how America's promotion of 
Quasi-multilateralism affected the interests of the Bosnian government and the situation of the civilians 
on the ground. 
The conclusion of this thesis is in Chapter 7. Ths chapter spells out exactly how the working 
hypothesis is consistent with the empirical cases compared with the empirical analysis. It assesses the 
validity of the Liberal notion of multilateralism and of the Western Order. These theoretical comments 
wiH be f6flowed by some discussion regarding the implication of this research for the understanding of 
the current Western Order 
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Chapter 2 The West in Search of a Multilateral Approach in the Face of the 
Collapse of the Former Yugoslavia, 1991-1992 
This chapter chronologically traces the development of Western interactions concerning the 
dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereafter 'foriner Yugoslavia') in 1991- 
1992, with particular reference to the outbreak of the Bosnian conflict. It sets the scene for the empirical 
studies that will follow in the subsequent chapters. This chapter will also look at the cases that are 
inconsistent with the assumptions of Liberal Multilateralism. Especially it challenges the interpretation 
that the Western states share a view that multilateralism regulates Western collective action. 
The key feature regarding intra-Westem relationships at the outbreak of the Bosnian conflict 
was the lack of a transatlantic Western institutional framework to deal with the situation. TWs was due 
to the fact that the US was relatively indifferent to the collapse of Yugoslavia, while the Europeans 
11r. 
began to construct some form of international framework to promote peace. This raises the question: 
what happens when America's allies want to address an issue that the US is simply not interested M? 
For the Liberal Multilateralists this is an unusual situation. As previously discussed M 
Chapter 1, Liberal MultHateralists claim that multdateralism regulates the Westem Order. In other 
words, they do not see the tension between the procedural nom-lative value of multilateralism and the 
ideological moral value of promoting 'liberal democracy'. The Liberal Multilateralists are, however, 
prepared to accept the possibility of the failure of multilateralism under the following circumstances. 
They are: Amenca's insistence on maintaining its vital national interests; interference from America's 
domestic politics; and America's European allies' ignoring of Western values. ' Yet, as we have 
discussed in Chapter 1, none of them accept that Bosnia was the case that fimdamentally challenged 
the validity of their understanding of the intra-Western relationship. This is because they believe that 
the US govenunent did not msist on its vital interests (and strategic interests) vis-A-vis its allies' 
opinions but paid lip semce to multilateralism. In tl-ýs way, they think that America's failure to follow 
1 Risse-Kappen, Coopcration among Democracies, 13 -14. 
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the outcome of multflaterahsm in Bosnia was just an irregular situation. 
In order to challenge such an interpretation, this chapter will make the following three claims. 
First of afl, the opportunities on the pail of European states for exercising their influence on American 
foreign policy are not always naturally guaranteed. This will be discussed in relation to Western 
approaches to the process of the collapse of the fonner Yugoslavia. Secondly, the failure of intra- 
Western cooperation regarding the conflicts in the fonner Yugoslavia was due to the existence of 
competing visions (i. e. different ways of defining the 'ideational' interests) of Western collective action 
in the early 1990s. Tfýs point will be analysed with reference to the Western policies regarding 
Slovenian and Croatian independence. Thirdly, America's vital national interests defined the contents 
of its global vision and its approaches to the Bosnian conflict. The vision aimed at maintaining its 
hegemonic political position in Europe and keeping NATO's pivotal role in the European security order. 
In other words, America's advocacy of ideological moral value is instrumental rather than a natural 
expression of belief This claim will be examined in relation to the independence of Bosnia and the 
initial phase of the Bosman conflict. 
The content of each section of this chapter has five basic empirical themes. These are: 1) 
background information on the general political situation in the former Yugoslavia and the international 
relations involved; 2) initial European policies; 3) initial American policy; 4) the outcomes of intra- 
Western interaction; and 5) the assessment of one of the three claims of this chapter as aforementioned. 
The Collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Search for a 
Common Western Approach 
The fonner Yugoslavia began its process of dissolution when Slovenia and Croatia declared 
their independence in December 1991. Since the late 1970s, along with other East European 
cornmunist regimes, Yugoslavia had been experiencing serious difficulties in maintaining its federal 
structw-e. EspeciAy, its poor econonuc performance in the 1980s consistently undernýiined the 
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legitimacy of the federation. 2 The process of dissolution was, however, unique in comparison with 
other East European states. It was not simply a matter of the transformation of govenung powers and 
principles (i. e. from communism to libeml democmcy). The case of Yugoslavia was a matter of 
survival of unity and integrity of the territorial state (federal structure) itSelf. 3 Yugoslavia's effinic 
diversity, which in the past proudly proclaimed the 'brotherhood' of its multi-ethnicity, was one of the 
main means employed to foment the tUrMoil. 
4 Moreover, there was a serious lack of international 
interests in the situation it faced. In essence, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union had worked against Yugoslavia. The West was no longer interested in supporting Yugoslavia as 
a strategic bastion against the Soviet Union. 5 These factors had a negative impact on the Yugoslav 
economy which ended up undermining the legitimacy of the fedeml system. 
Against this background, nationalist movements had since the 1980s become the major 
driving force in the transfort-nation of the former Yugoslav regime. For instance, Susan Woodward 
argues that the local leaders had shifted the foundations of the re-distribution mechanisms from the old 
commurnst-party based system to the one based on effinic identity that often ended up as increasmg the 
unemployment rate among those ethnic Serbs who worked in manual labour sections in non-Serbian 
republics in the former Yugoslavia. 6 She considers this as a root cause that inflamed nationalism across 
the fonner Yugoslavia. Sabrina Ramet provides detailed analysis of cultur-al and religious factors In 
order to comprehend the complexity of the dissolution process in the former Yugoslavia. 7 Nonetheless, 
she points out that the critical factor that inflarned the confficts in the fonner Yugoslavia was not these 
factors .8 It was ethnic Serbs' nationalism 
in the fonner Yugoslavia--especially those in non-Serbian 
2 See, Ramet, Sabrina P. Balkan Babel: the Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the War 
for Kosovo. P ed. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999, Chapter 3, Espec. 48-50. 
3 See generally, Lampe, John R. Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country. 2nd ed- Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, Chap. 11, Espec. 332-333. 
4 Ramet, Sabrina P Balkan Babel, 55-58. 
5 Zimmermann, Warren. "The Last Ambassador A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia, " Foreign Affairs 
74, no. 2 (1995): 2-20,2-3. 
6 Woodward, Susan L. Balkan Tragedy : Chaos and Dissolufion qfter the Cold War. Washington, D. C.: 
Brx)okings Institution, 1995,222,272. 
7 Ramet, Sabrina P. Balkan Babcl, Chapter 4,5,6 and 7, Espec. 79-80. 
8 Rarnet, Sabrina P. Balkan Babel, 79-80. 
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republics- that stimulated counter-nationalism, and that facilitated the fi-agmentation of the federal 
structure. 9 Indeed, it is widely considered that the Serbian leader Slobodan Milogevi6 and other ethnic 
leaders exploited this situation. ' 0 Robert Hayden makes a counter-claim that the origin of the conflict 
was not so much ethnic or cultural confrontation as such. He believes that the formation process of the 
constitutions in the new republic- especially Slovenia-that refused to accept any central authority 
1- - beyond nation sovereignty, that institutionalised the series of conflicts in the fonner Yugoslavia. " 
Despite these different interpretations regarding the origins of the conflicts in the fonner Yugoslavia 
among the well-known works, it is possible to under-stand that effinic identities became the central 
means to express political issues, such as territorial disputes, the direction of regime transformation, and 
constitutional rights. This ethnicity-driven politics was often accompanied by violence. 
The end of the Cold War opened the question of the legitimacy of the Yugoslav state, after 
decades in which the overriding consider-ation had been independence vis-a-vis Nazi-Germany and the 
Soviet Union. The actions of the Yugoslav National Anny (JNA) exacerbated a situation that was 
fuelled by ffiction between a Serbian nationalism that attempted to maintain the federation structure in 
the former Yugoslavia under its hegemony, and other nationalist movements that aimed either at 
seceding from it or at altering the structure of the Federation. 12 As a result, the JNA ended up being 
employed as an instrument in the forging of a 'Greater Serbia. ' 13 This situation only intensified the 
violence in the fonner Yugoslavia. 
The international community had been attempting to resolve the chaotic situation since the 
outbreak of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in 1991. With regard to this situation the Conference 
9 Ramet, Sabrina P. Balkan Babel, 34-38. 
10 Detailed accounts of ethnic politics, see: Thomas, Robert. Serbia under Milosevic. - Politics in the 1990s. 
London: Hurst & Company, 2000; Sell, Louis. Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia. 
Durhw-n, NO Duke University Press, 2002; Gow, James. The Serbian Project and its Adversaries. - a 
Strategy of TT ar Crimes. London: Hurst & Company, 2003. 
11 Hayden, Robert M. Blueprintsfor a House Divided. - the Constitutional Logic qf the Yugoslav Conflicts. 
Ann Arbor, Michigan: the University of Michigan Press, 1999,16-19. 
12 This is a general characterization. For details, see. Gow, James. Ttiumph of the Lack of JVilk International 
Diploniacy and the Yugoslav 11 ýzr. London: Hurst & Company, 1997,31-44. 
13 For instance see: Gow. 77ze Serbian Project and its, 4cAvrsaries, 57-65. 
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on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) held a Foreign Ministerial meeting in Berlin on 19 and 
20 June 1991. It expressed international concern regarding the situation in Yugoslavia and suppofted. 
4temtonal integrity', 'the rights of minorities' and peace based on negotiation. " This confererice 
meeting formalized international support for the EC's efforts to arbitmte the dispute in Yugoslavia . 
15 It 
would be possible to argue that CSCE provided an institutional fi-amework to coordinate Western 
policy during this period. " However, in fact, the CSCE was not able to coordinate an international 
approach to the collapse of former Yugoslavia, and conflicts resulted from that because of the following 
disagreements among the major international actors. 17 
There were four international Imes of diVision regarding this issue: the relationsMp between 
the different EC member states, between the EC and the UN, between the US and the EC and between 
the US and the UN. At the time of the collapse of the federal structures of the former Yugoslavia, the 
most serious division was that between the members of the European Community 18 Tlýs disunity was 
conspicuous as a result of the lack of engagement of the US and the UN regarding the collapse of the 
Yugoslavia. The UN was not eager to engage in this conflict for fear that a dram on its limited resources 
would undermine its other efforts such as those in Affica, Asia and Latin America. 19 Moreover the US 
was also not enthusiastic, as it perceived that it held no security or geographical interests in Yugoslavia. 
Ibus there was a substantial gap between the American position and that of its European allies in 
regard to the collapse of the fonner Yugoslavia. As a result, during the early period of the conflict in the 
fonner Yugoslavia the central agenda was the fonnation of a conunon European policy 
14 CECE, "Statement on the situation in Yugoslavia, " Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
First Meeting of the Council, Berlin, 20 June 199 1. 
15 Hutchings, Robert L. American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War. - An Insiderý Account of US 
Policy in Europe, 1989-1992. Washington, D. C. Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1997,309-312. 
16 Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, 308-309. 
17 Howorth, Jolyon. "Renegotiating the Marriage Contract: Franco-Amencan Relations since 1981. " In 
Coming Infi-om the Cold War. - Changes in US-European Interactions since 1980, edited by Sabrina P. 
Ramet and Christeine Ingebritsen, 73-96. Lanham, Malyland: Rowman&Littelfield, 2002.79. 
18 For general overviews of this issue see: Freedman, Lawrence, ed. Military Intervention in European 
Coj! flicts. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994; Ramet, Sabrina P, and Christine higebritsen, eds. Coming in 
fi-oin the Cold Mar. 
19 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. Unvanquished. -A US-UN Saga. London: New York: I. B. Tauris, 1999,38,42, 
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nwrican Polig. - Iden ti&ina Its ri tal In terests 
At the beginning of the conflict, the US government had regarded the issues faced by 
Yugoslavia as less important than the situation in the former Soviet Union and the post-Gulf war 
Middle East . 
20 Generally speaking, the US had no geo-strategic interests in the foriner Yugoslavia itself 
at that time . 
2'However, the US administration preferred to maintain the territorial integrity of the 
fonner Yugoslavia for fear of the spill-over of ethnic conflicts across Europe. 22 The then Secretary of 
State, James Baker, had been to Yugoslavia in June 1991 just before the outbreak of the conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia. During this visit, he fomented an idea that despite America's lack of geo-strategic 
interests there was an urgent need for military action against the nationalist movements in the former 
Yugoslavia. 23 However, before they forinally proposed to use intemational coercive power, the US 
24 
policy-makers also paid attention to the gr-and strategic questions. The dissolution of the former 
Yugoslavia happened just at the moment when re-construction. of the post Cold War security 
architecture in Europe was being undertaken. 
Against this backdrop, the EC asked the US to let Europeans take an initiative on the fonner 
Yugoslav issues. 25 The Bush administration accepted the EC's requests with regard to the intemational 
initiatives because the US wanted to focus on other issues such as the situation in the Soviet Union. " 
However, at the same time, the US was not comfortable with the idea of the revitalization of the 
44. 
20 Baker, James Addison, and Thomas M. DeFrank. The Politics ofDiplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 
1989-1992. New York: Putnam's, 1995,636-637; Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End ofthe Cold 
War, 273-283. 
21 Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 636-637; Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold 
War, 273-283. 
22 Baker, James. ""First Amendment" Freedoms in Central and Eastern Europe, " US Department of State 
DLýpatcli 2, no. 26 (1991): http: //dosfan. lib. uic. edu/ERC/bnefing/dispatch/1991/htmMispatchv2no26. htrnl. 
ýAccessed on 10 February 2005 ]. 
3 Baker, Vie Politics qfDiplomacy, 635; Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, 
309-312. 
24 Baker, Ae Politics (? fDiplomacy, 636-637. 
25 interview with Thomas Niles (US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, 1991- 
1993) on 21 May 2004. 
26 jntervicýN, vvilth Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004. 
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European-led security organization called the Western European Union (WEU) for fear of losing 
NATO and American supremacy in Europe. 27 Successful European political actions on the former 
Yugoslavia would certainly boost such European security initiatives . 
2'To interpret the rarnification of 
this development, there was a potential danger for US policy-makers that their decision to intervene in 
the former Yugoslavia under the given transatlantic situation would allow the Europeans to claim the 
credibility of their political initiatives at the cost of the US troops. For these reasons, the US 
administration decided not to advocate international intervention. 
To provide institutional context regarding America's strategic calculation, there was a 
serious transatlantic debate regarding the fature of NATO in European security. 29At that time NATO's 
role in the post Cold War European security system was not assured and thus the US administration 
wanted to preserve NATO's pivotal position in It. 30 From 1988 to 1991, NATO held five summit 
meetings attended by the heads of state. 31ThS fact indicates the changing security environment M 
Europe in view of the fact that NATO does not nonnaUy convene summit meetings even annuafly. 32 
The central pail of Western debate during this period was regarding the extent to which NATO would 
support Europe's own security initiative of the so-cafled European Security Defence Identity (ESDI) in 
the fonn of revitalizing the WEU. 33 Concerning the practical application of this initiative, NATO's 
suppoil to the European states' peacekeeping missions outside of the territories of its member states 
(the so-called 'out of area' operation)-in other words a domain of coHective security rather than 
27 Baker, 7he Politics ofDiplomacy, 636-637. 
28 Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 636-637. 
29 As a background information and general overview of transatlantic tensions on security issues during 
1990s, see, Allen, David. J. "A Competitive Relationship: the Maturing of the EU-U. S. Relationship, 1980- 
2000. " In Coming infi-om the Cold War: 31-49. Espec. 41-45. 
30 Baker, Tbe Politics of Diplomacy, 636-637. 
31 They were: on 2-3 March in Brussels; on 29-30 May 1989 'in Brussels; on 4 December 1989 in Brussels; 
on 6 July 1990 in London; and on 7-8 November 1991 in Rome. 
32 For instance, the last NATO suminit meeting before May 1988 was held on 10 June 1982 in Bonn. The 
first summit meeting after 1992 was convened on 10- 11 January 1994. After that the summits were held as 
follows: on 8-9 1997 in Madrid; on 23-25 April 1999 in Washington D. C.; on 21-22 November 2002 in 
Prague; on 28-29 June 2004 in Istanbul; and on 22 February 2005 in Brussels. 
33 For details on this issue, see: Taylor, Trevor. "West European Secun*ty and Defence Cooperation: 
Maastricht and Beyond, " International. 4#ýirs 70, no. 1 (1994): 1-16. 
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collective defence-became the heart of the debate. 34 
As a result of a series of summit meetMgs in November 1991, NATO adopted the so-called 
New Strategic Concept. " It on the one hand endorsed the idea of NATO's support to the European 
initiative but on the other hand it emphasised. NATO's collective self-defence identity as follows: 
The creation of a European identity in security and defence will underline the 
preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their 
security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity. However [ ... 
] NATO is 
the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement 
on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members 
36 under the Washington Treaty. 
However, this compromise statement did not amount to a consensus between the US and its allies. The 
US considered that the other Western states agreed that NATO maintain its position at the head of 
European security and its identity as a collective self-defence organization. 37 In contrast, some 
European states, especially France and Belgiurn, believed that this new concept would give substance 
to their demands that NATO should provide support for European-led peacekeeping missions and thus 
accept UN authority over its collective security actions (i. e. the so-called 'out-of area' peacekeeping 
mission) . 
38 These actions would give substance to the ESDI and would revitalize the European-led 
collective self-defence security organisation of WEU. This was the key strategic context regarding the 
Western debate on the issue of the former Yugoslavia. 
Against this backdrop, in order to maintain NATO's supremacy and its de facto 
independence from the UN, it was a prerequisite for the US to make Europeans recognize the 
importance of NATO. Accordingly, James Baker drew up a 'wait and see' policy while taking the 
34 For instance, see: Howorth, Jolyon. "Renegotiating the Mamage Contract: Franco-American Relations 
since 198 1. " In Coming in fi-om the Cold War, Espec. 78-83; Halverson, Tbomas. "Disengagement by 
Stealth: the Emerging Gap between America's Rhetoric and the Reality of Future European Conflicts. " In 
Military intervention in European Conflicts, Espec. 80-82. 
35 NATO, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept Agreed by the Heads of State and Govenu-nent Participating mi 
the meeting of the North Atlantic Council North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th-8th Nov. 1991, " 
http: //www. nato. int/docu/ýoinm/49-95/ý9lllO7a. htm. [Accessed 15 March 2005]. 
36 NATO, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept, " Para. 2. 
37 Hutchings, Ame4can Diplomacy and the End ofthe Cold Mar, 273-283, Espec. 281-283. 
3" Hutchings, 4merican Diplomacy and the End ofthe Cold JVar, 273-283, Espec. 281-283. 
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39 actions of America's European allies into account. The essence of this policy was that the US would 
just 'see'what Europeans did and then 'wait'until the moment that they finally realized the importance 
of America's and NATO's presence in Europe. Thýs did not require any US military deployment in the 
fonner Yugoslavia. Given the situation in the Persian Gulf and the Soviet Union, the US did not want 
to sacfifice any troops. 40 For the purpose of implementing the 'wait and see' policy, the US accepted a 
leading role for the EC regarding the fornier Yugoslavia. 41 
In short, this 'wait and see'pohcy was one that aimed at promoting America's vital national 
interests, not the alleged Western normative value of multilateralism, concerning European security 
order. American vital interests as perceived by the Bush administration were those of maintaining 
American hegemony in Europe via means of NATO's de facto independence from the UN, and 
keeping the US away from military irivolvement in the former Yugoslavia. 
European Reactions: a Nascent Challenge to Ametican HeRemoyy 
The EC, in contrast to the US, had paid serious attention to tl-ýs issue and it intended to lead 
intemational efforts to settle the conflict. Reflecting the Euro-enthusiasm. symbolized by the Treaty on 
European Union (also know as the 'Maastricht Treaty') in December 1991-which promoted further 
integration of European social and economic policies under the auspices of the European Union-both 
US and EC policy-makers regarded former Yugoslavia as a test case for European competence in 
international politics in comparison with that of the US. 42 When the EC began to engage in mediating 
this conflict in June 1991, Jacques Poos, the Foreign Minister of Luxembourg that held the EC 
, 43 Presidency, said: 'tlýiis is the hour of Europe. It is not the hour of the Americans. The EC designated a 
39 Baker, Ae Politics qfDiplomacy, 637. 
40 Baker, Ae Politics of Diplomacy, 636-637; Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold 
War, 273-283. 
41 Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End ofthe Cold War, 309-312. 
42 Baker, Ae Politics (? fDiplomaQ,, 636-637. 
43 Quoted in Riding, Alan. "Conflict in Yugoslavia: European Send High-Level Team, " 7-he New York 
Tiii icýs, 29 June 199 1, A4. 
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'troika'44to take an active role on the Yugoslavia issue. 45 
Yet the EC suffered from serious division among its member states. There were four 
contentious problems. The first concerned the perception of the conffict in Yugoslavia, namely whether 
it was a civil war or an international conflict. 46The second related to the EC members' dispute over 
whether they should recognize the newly-declared independent republics of the foriner Yugoslavia, 
namely Slovenia and Croatia. Thirdly, it was not clear which international institutions would be used to 
take an initiative on arbitrating the conflict in Yugoslavia. Lastly, there was a dispute over the necessity 
for deployment of the EC or WEU (or even UN) peacekeeping troops. Britain, France and Gennany- 
the three biggest powers in the EC-had different opinions relatmg to their own sets of interests. 
The British perception of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in general and that of Bosnia 
in particular was a civil war (or domestic ethnic conflict) rather than an international conflict (according 
to which scenano some specific aggressors caused the violence from outside) . 
47 It was linked to the 
two British positions of supporting the ter-ritorial integrity of the fonner Yugoslavia and not being 
willing to intervene in the conflict militarily The British govenunent was not in favour of natary 
intervention under conditions of no consent from the warring parties to have international troops 
deployed on the ground . 
48 The UK was uneasy about the idea of sending European-led peacekeeping 
44 The EC troika consists of the foreign minister of the past, incumbent and the next President of the 
European Council. At that time [as of June 199 1] they were respectively Gianni de Michaelies (Italy), Jacque 
Poos (Luxernburg) and Hans van den Breck (Holland) Gow, Diumph ofthe Lack of Will, 50-53. 
45 For details of their activities, see: Genscher, Hans-Dietrich. Rebuilding a House Divided: A Memoir by the 
Architect of Germanyý Reunification. Translated by Ruth Hem. New York: Broadway Books, 1998.495, 
497-498 ; Kintis, Anders G. "The EU's Foreign Policy and the War in Former Yugoslavia, " in Common 
Foreign Security Policy: the Record and Reforms, edited by Martin Holland. London: A Cassell Imprint, 
1997,149-150. 
46This does not dismiss altemative conception of the nature of the conflict. The use of these two concepts is 
based on the discourse among the Western policy-makers. Alternative understanding of the nature of the war, 
see: Gow, Diumph ofthe Lack of Will, 4-5. 
47 Interview with Douglas Hurd (British Foreign Secretary, 1990-1995) on 7 April 2004. 
Bose, Sumantra. Bosnia qffer Dayton : Nationalist Partition and International Intervention. London: Hurst 
& Company, 2002,18-22; Bert, Wayne. The Reluctant Superpower: United States'Policy in Bosnia, 1991- 
95. NewYork: St. Martin's Press, 1997,94-97. A concise overview of the British debate regarding the nature 
of the conflict, Towle, Philip. "The British Debate About Inten, ention in European Conflicts. " In Militaty 
Intervention in Eut-opean Conflicts, 94-105. Espec. 99-104. 
4S Drozdjak, William. "EC Balks at Sending Force to Yugoslavia; Britain Warns Against 'Open-Ended' 
Move, " Ae T 14shington Post, 19 September 199 1, A 19. 
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. 
41 ear on the part of troops (M the fonn of the WEU) to Yugoslavia At the heart of this position was the f 
the British that this would constitute the EC's fonnal support for establishing a European-led mihtary 
organization (in the form of the WEU) that would be in competition with NATO and the US. 50 -Me 
British government was also anxious about the lack of European capability to carry out such 
multilateral military action without American leadership. " For these reasons, the British government 
put emphasis on the CSCE's role in conflict resolution and it supported the introduction of economic 
sanctions, including an an-ns embargo over the former Yugoslavia and diplomatic isolation of Serbia (if 
necessary) instead of military action. 52 
The French perception of the Yugoslav issue was not expressed clearly, as it aimed at 
obtaining two potentially contradictory objectives. On the one hand it argued that the territorial integrity 
of the Former Yugoslavia had to be maintained. " Ihere were various reasons why France took this 
position, such as: the fear of enhancing Gennan influence which would result if the EC followed the 
German policy of recopizing Slovenia and Croatia (see the German approach to the fon-ner 
Yugoslavia in the following paragraphs); anxiety about the potential recognition of newly independent 
states that might possibly get out of European control and whose dissolution would demand a serious 
intemational military intervention; and its historical sympathy for Serbian nationalism. 5' On the other 
hand, however, France was in favour of sending peacekeepmg troops. It argued that deployment of 
VvTU troops under the UN autflo=tion was the best option . 
55 is was because, establishing a 
49 Hurd, Douglas. Memoirs. London: Little, Brown, 2003.448; Kintis "The EU's Foreign Policy and the 
War in Former Yugoslavia, " 150-15 1; Usbome, David, "Hurd calls for Caution on Use of Troops; Britain's 
Role in EC Policy on Yugoslavia May Accelerate Union, " -The 
Independence 1991,8. 
50 For instance, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Recent Developments in Eastern Europe with Special 
Reference to Yugoslavia, 6 November 199 1, " in Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, "Central 
and Eastern Europe: Problems of the Post-Communist Era, Report, Together with the Proceedings of the 
Committee, Volurne I, " Parliamentary Papers (1991-92); IX: (HC 21-1) 15-19, Espec. 18. 
51 Sharp, Honest Broker or Peýfidious Albion?, 7-8. 
52 Foreign and Con-u-nonwealth Office, "Recent Developments in Eastern Europe with Special Reference to 
Yugoslavia, 6 November 1991, " 15-19; AFP, "Hurd Suggests Oil Embargo against Yugoslavia, " Agence 
France Presse, 19 September 199 1, Lexis-Nexis Executive. 
53 Wood, Pia Christina. "France and the Post Cold War Order the case of Yugoslavia, " European Security 3, 
no. I (1994): 129-152, Espec. 131-132. 
54 Wood, "France and the Post Cold War Order: the Case of Yugoslavia, " 131-132. 
55 Howorth. "The Debate in France over Military Intervention in Europe, " 113. 
56 
European-led security organization with visible military competence reflected the French interests at 
the beginning of the 1990s. Sending WEU-Ied peacekeeping troops was expected to pave the way for 
fleshing out such a vision. 56 Accordingly, France argued that the EC and WEU should take the lead on 
international diplomatic efforts to arbitrate the Yugoslav crisis, with the authority of the UN . 
5"Mese 
two elements, namely European political independence from the US and European-led peacekeeping 
forces, were closely linked in French policy calculations. 
18 These policies fuelled political tension between the US and France. For instance, at the 
French-American summit in March 1991, the French President, Franýois Mitten-and, argued for the 
necessity on the part of Europe to organize its own military competence . 
59 This claim was based on two 
factors; a traditional French vision that Europe needed to regain its political independence from 
American hegemony, and a widely held prediction that the US and NATO would reduce their military 
presences in Europe as a result of the end of the Cold War. 60 The US President, George Bush senior, 
was finious with the French position. According to Robert Hutchings (the Director for European 
Affairs at the US National Security Council in 1998-1992), when the European leaders gathered at the 
NATO summit in Rome in November 1991 and some of them supported the above-discussed French 
advocacy, George Bush said to one European leader, '[i]f Western Europe intends to create a security 
organization outside the Alliance, tefl me now! '61 Then Bush emphasised his determination to a 
European leader that 'he [Bush] would stake his presidency' on guaranteeing the continued American 
presence in Europe through NATO. 62 
The Bush administration clearly perceived a nascent fon-n of challenge to American 
56 Wood, "France and the Post Cold War Order: the Case of Yugoslavia, " 134. 
57 Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End qfthe Cold War, 282. 
58 For a concise guide to this Franco-Amencan debate, see: Howorth. "Renegotiating the Marriage Contract: 
Franco-Arnerican Relations since 198 1. " 78-83. 
59 Hutchings, American DiplomaQ, and the End ofthe Cold War, 274-275. 
60 For instance, President Mitten-and's Special Adviser analyses in this way See: Attah, Jacques. Millennium. - 
I es oo ff'inncrs and Losers in the Coming Morld Order. Translated by Leila Conners. New York: Tun B k: 
Randorn House, 1991.65. 
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hegemony-in other words America's Wtal interests-on the part of European leaders. In short, intra- 
Westem interactions in relation to the former Yugoslavia became a stage that would define the future of 
the European security order and the role of the US within it. This provided the context M which, as 
previously discussed, James Baker decided to test European unity and its competence in the Yugoslavia 
crisis. 
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European efforts, however, should have been accompanied by reliable political and military 
resources. They needed to obtain international authority that would bring international support to 
European-led peacekeeping operations. Moreover, there was neither agreement among the nationalist 
movements in the former Yugoslavia as to the form to be taken by the future federation nor any consent 
among them to deploy international peacekeeping troops on the ground. In such a situation, it was 
essential to obtain authorization from the UN Security Council (UNSC) under the provision of its 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It stipulates that the UN Security Council has the authority to recognize 
'the existence of any threat to the peace' (Article 39); and it may decide the necessary means to restore 
the peace ranging from 'measures not involving the use of armed forces' (Article 41) to military 
measures (Article 42). 64Therefore, Fr-ance was eager to put the Yugoslavia issue forward m the UNSC. 
It created a clear tension between France on the one hand and the US and UK on the other. 
For Gennany the issue was more directly related to the situation on the ground; would the 
international community support the self-determination of Slovenia and Croatia or not? The then 
German Foreign Mi: nister Hans-Dietrich Genscher explained the upshot of the Gennan position. It 
supported the right to self-detennination for A nations and that opinion was based on the CSCE's 
Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Genscher interpreted this to mean that 4without a guarantee of rights for 
minorities, a change of borders could hardly be avoided, 65 However, Germany faced a dilemma. it 
63 Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 636-637. 
64 Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This was a shared view among the Westem states regarding establishment 
of peacekeeping operation. See: Ministry of Defence (UK), Wider Peacekeep mig. London: FLMSO, 1995,1 - 
2. 
65 Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided, 495,497-498. 
58 
was not able to send troops outside of NATO under its constitution. Therefore, the activities of 
international organizations were an essential element for protecting these rights. 66The UN is the highest 
mternational authority. If the sovereign statehoods of Slovenia and Croatia were recognized, then the 
international community-essentially the UN- would have been in charge of their security situation. 
This paves the way for satisfying the conditions for imposing enforcement measures as weH as 
establishing self-defence rights for these states under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 67 Hanns Maull 
summarized the German position as giving recognition to Slovenia and Croatia as a means to ensure 
the security of these two states urider the umbrefla of Chapter VU of the LN Charter. 68 In order to 
accomplish this purpose, Genscher supported French efforts to include the UN in the peace promoting 
process. 69 However, he also demanded that the EC should closely cooperate with CSCE in the 
diplomatic activities concerning the conflict in Yugoslavia. The rationale of doing such a thing was that 
the UN and CSCE would be able to reflect the opinions of the US, the Soviet Union and other 
70 European states. 
To sum up thýs section, regardless of the above-discussed differences among the member 
states, the EC took the leading role in the international. atbitr-ation of the conflict in the fonner 
Yugoslavia. However, it was not able to obtain serious American support at the beginning. America's 
unwillingness to support European initiatives was based originally on its lack of geo-strategic interests 
in the former Yugoslavia in the aftennath of the Persian Gulf War. 71 However, as a result of France's 
and its supporters' advocacy of organizing a European security institution independent of NATO and 
without the presence of the US, the Bush senior administration looked at this issue more strategically 
66 The Gennan debate on the use of force in the former Yugoslavia, see: Milfler, Har-ald. "Military 
Intervention for European Security: The German Debate. " In Military Intervention in European Cof! flicts, 
Espec. 128-13 L 
67 However, once the LINK takes action the member state's rights should be conceded to the LJNSC. Gow, 
Piumph qfthe Lack qf f Fill, 90-91. 
68 Maull, "Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis, " 102. 
69 Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided, 500-501,504-505. 
70 At that tir-ne Gen-nany held the chairmanship of the CSCE. Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided, 498. 
71 Baker, 7he Politics of Diplomacy, 635-636; Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold 
If (ir, 308-309; Interview . krith Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004. 
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In this way, the Bush administration also held a tight grip on the US policy-making process. 'Me result 
of US policy was to examine the European competence via means of its 'wait and see'pohcy In other 
words, the Bush administration deliberately sidelined America's involvement in Western multilateral 
policy-coordination in order to maintain its vital interests. 
Against this background, cooperation between the EC and the UN was also not smooth. 
Amenca's distance fi7om the fon-ner Yugoslavia issue influenced the UN position. The UN was not 
eager to take an active role in the conflict in Yugoslavia at the beginnirtg2or even when it began to 
place troops on the ground. 73 Because of these conflicting interests among the international actors, 
CSCE was not able to take the central role for mediating the conflict. During the early period of the 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia the central agenda was the fon-nation of a common European policy 
In short, because of America's strategic decision to sideline it from the former Yugoslavia issue, 
Western multilateralism failed to mitigate transatlantic interaction at this stage. The next section truces 
the fonnation of 'European policy' and the EC's attempt to organize a workable international approach 
to the conflicts in the fonner Yugoslavia. 
The Independence of Slovenia and Croatia: Two Western Visions 
Slovenian independence was the first test for the formation of a common European policy 
towards the former Yugoslavia. Unlike in subsequent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav 
army and the army of the newly established sovereign government of Slovenia reached a cease-fire 
agreement soon after fighting broke out between the two. The so-caUed Brioni Agreement (the 
settlement pact of the Slovenian conflict) was adopted within a month of Slovenia's declaration of 
independence on 8 July 1991 as a result of mediation efforts. 74 The prompt settlement of the Slovenian 
72 De Cu6llar, Javier Perez. Pilg7imageforpeace. - A Secretary-Generalý Memoir. London: Macmillan, 1997, 
477-478. 
73 The then Under-Secretz-iry-General of the UN Marrack Goulding recalled that the newly appointed UN 
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (1992-1996) wanted to retreat from d-ds issue as soon as possible. 
Goulding, Marrack. Peacemonger. London: John Murray, 2002,294. 
74 Harden, Blaine. "Yugoslax, Crisis Pact Sets EC Involvement In countrys Future, " The TVashington Post, 9 
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situation was partly due to its demography and partly due to the nature of the war. The Serbs consisted 
of only about 10 percent the population in Slovenian areas. The Slovenian war was regarded as a 
conflict between Slovenia and the federal system. 75 
In contrast, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia were regarded as nationalist conflicts between the 
76 Croats, the Muslims and the Serbs. Nationalist wars tend to be prolonged since, in order to satisfy 
nationalism, there is often no middle way. The aim is to conquer al-I of the contested space in question. 77 
In Croatia, the war between the JNA and the Croatian forces became tense and prolonged in contrast to 
what had happened in Slovenia. In tenns, of demography, the Serbs make up 30 to 40 percent of the 
population in Croatia. In particular, the Serbian population was concentr-ated in the region of Krajina. 
Furthennore the war was between various groups of nationahsts. As Susan Woodward argues, there 
were little incentives among the political leaders to produce a compromise in this kind of war. 78 
Ae Westem States'Initial Approaches 
International efforts to restore peace in Croatia were not easy As previously discussed, there 
was a lack of coordination among the major international actors on the shape of the UN and the EC. 
Moreover, as also previously discussed, the EC had serious divisions among its member states. 
However since it had managed to broker the Slovenia ceasefire agreement, the EC carried on working 
to promote an intemational fi-amework to resolve confficts in the case of Yugoslavia more generally 
and concerning Croatian independence in particular. The EC attempted to establish a framework of 
arbitration that would both be able to reconcile the competing nationalist factions in each Yugoslav 
July 199 1, A 12. For the details of this process. see: Gow, Tfiumph ofthe Lack of Will, 50-53. 
75 Silber, Laura, and Allan Little. 7-he Death of Yugoslavia. Rev. ed. London: Penguin/BBC Books, 1996, 
166. in contrast, Woodward and Hayden argue spill over effect of the Slovenian war for independence 
across the fon-ner Yugoslavia. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 222,272; Hayden, Blueprints for a House 
Divided, 16-17. In addition, Hayden interprets that the Sloveman case set the precedents for the process that 
led to the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina- See, Hayden, Blueprints for a House Divided, 
Chapter 3 and 4. 
76 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 165-167 and 202-203. 
-n Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 222,272. 
78 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 222,272. 
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republic and also to engmeer a peaceful re-fon'nation of the Fon-ner Yugoslavia. 79The US State 
Department supported this attempt. 80 
In order to promote such a plan, the EC decided to take a conditional approach to 
recognition . 
81 The first priority was the promotion of a cease-fire agreement and the establishment of a 
constitutional framework for Yugoslavia in order to mollify Serbian and Croatian nationaliSM. 82 Then 
secondly, if all parties had agreed on this procedure, the EC would have been willing to discuss the 
matter of recognition. In principle the EC was neither pro-recognition nor in favour of vigorous 
international peacekeeping. 83 MS simply followed the British perspective regarding the conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia. With regard to the cease-fire, the EC nominated the former British Foreign Minister 
Peter Carrington as the chairman of the EC-hosted peace conference that aimed at promoting the 
above-discussed peace plan. 84With regard to the recognition process, the EC set up an Arbitration 
Conu-nission that would produce a juridical recommendation concerning the recognition of each of the 
republics of Slovenia and Croatia. 85 
In order to promote this policy Carrington convened the EC-hosted peace talks in The 
Hague on 7 September 1991. TWs International Conference on Yugoslavia in effect consolidated the 
EC's leading position in the peace negotiations. Canington tried to promote a comprehensive 
agreement among Yugoslavia's ethnic leaders, but one wl-kh was still based on the principle of the 
79 EPC, "Statement by an Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting concerning Yugoslavia, " 27 Aug 1991, 
European Foreign Policy Bulletin, (1991): (91/252). 
80 Richard Boucher (the US State Department Deputy Spokesman), "Call for a Cease-fire in Yugoslavia, " 
US Department ofState Dispatch, 2 September 199 1, 
http: //dosfan. lib. uic. edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1991/litinl/Dispatchv2no35. html. 
81 Silber and Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, 190-19 1; Gow, Triumph ofthe Lack of Will, 53. 
82 Silber and Little, 7he Death of Yugoslavia, 190-19 1; Gow, THumph ofthe Lack of Will, 53. 
83 The new UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali understood that Carrington attempted to not solely blame 
the Bosnian Serbs but to regard the Bosnian Croats and Muslims as sharing the responsibility. Boutros-Ghah, 
Unvanquished, 42. 
84 EPC, "Statement by an Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting concerning Yugoslavia, " 3 September 
199 1, European Foreign Policy Bulletin (1991): (91/254). 
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86 
mutual recootion of selfldetem-ýnation on the part of each ethnic group. Carrington suggested to the 
tlien UN Secretary-General that the former Yugoslavia was not able to control the situation. 8' Therefore, 
agreement among the ethnic leaders was essential to establish a cease-fire as well as organizing the 
constitutional fi-amework. As a result of negotiations at The Hague, the Croatian President, Franjo 
Tudjman, the Federal Yugoslav Defence Secretary, General VeIjko Kadijevi6, and the Serbian leader, 
Slobodan Milos'evic', signed a cease-fire agreement. 88 Following this agreement the situation on the 
ground did not change substantially Then the EC brokered another ceasefire agreement after 
Carrington had obtained MilogeviCs consent on maintaining the territorial integrity of Croatia. 89 
However, this was again ineffective in preventing fighting on the ground. There was no substantial 
willingness among the local leaders to maintain any ceasefire. 
There were, however, three additional obstacles. Firstly there was the inconsistent European 
position. The then German Foreign Minister was quite adamant In his support for the independence of 
Croatia. 90 Germany was set on recognizing Croatia as an independent state whereas France and the UK 
were less willing to accept that. 91 
Secondly, there was also disagreement among the European leaders over the matter of what 
form peacekeeping troops should take. This was paralleled by disputes over the kind of institutions that 
should or should not be used and also how EU and the UN should coordinate each effort. On 17 
September 1991 Germany and France agreed between themselves that the European-led (i. e. WEU) 
peacekeeping troops should be sent if the leaders of each republic of Yugoslavia agreed with the cease- 
fire. 9' However, for fear of transatlantic tension and the potential military burden the UK government 
opposed this initiative. 93 Iberefore, the EC and also the WT-U were not able to reach an agreement at 
86 Silber and Little, The Death qf Yugoslavia, 190. 
87 De Cu&Har, Pilgfimage. for Peace, 482. 
88 Gow, THumph qfthe Lack qf Will, 54. 
89 Gow, Triumph qfthe Lack of Will, 53-54. 
90 De Cu6llar, Pilgfirnage, for Peace, 482. 
91 Genscher, Rebuilding a House Dividcd, 498. 
92 Howorth. "The Debate in France over Military Intervention m Europe, " 123. 
93 The British government was \vary of the fonn the potential peacekeeping troops should take. At first, 
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their Foreign Ministerial meeting on 19 September on the form peacekeeping troops would take. 94 
France was keen on obtaining the authorization of the UNSC and institutional support fi7om the UN. 
Germany supported this position. However wMe the UK government softened its opposition 
eventuaRy, it was at first not eager to endorse this EC-UN coflaboration-95 The British govenunent was 
wary about authorizing VvIEU-led peacekeepers as well as about the potential demand on the UK in 
contributing to it. 96 However, by 17 September 1991 the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, 
recognized that the UK should deploy some form of troops. Of course this would not be under the 
umbrella of the WEU, and it became one of the most essential reasons why the UK agreed to work 
with the UN instead. 
97 
The last problem was the lack of international support for the policy of sending 
peacekeeping troops, which was essential in order to compensate for the lack of administrative 
authority of in the former Yugoslavia. International cooperation between the EC and the tN, the EC 
and the US, and the EC and the Soviet Union proved defective. First of aH, as discussed above, the EC 
did not have a consistent position concerning the authority of the UN on this issue. The UN was also 
reluctant to provide serious institutional support for these European-led initiatives as it wanted to obtain 
a cease-fire agreement before the deployment of any peacekeeping troops. 98 
Moreover, the US assisted European efforts merely on the rhetorical level. 99 In substance it 
was considering an American solution to the Yugoslavian situation that marked a departure form the 
initial 'wait and see' position vis-a-vis the potential European policies. "O Concerning the Croatian and 
Luxemburg and France wanted to deploy WEU troops. But Bfitain was not prepared to get Involved in war 
situations on the ground. Hurd, Memoirs, 448; Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided, 500. 
94 EPC, "Statement by an Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting concerning Yugoslavia, " 19 September 
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Slovenian recognition the US administration began to form its own preference. The US administration 
did not recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia as a way to ease the tension but rather the 
reverse. 101 With regard to this point, James Baker had given more attention to the policy memorandum 
that the Director of Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, Dennis Ross, produced on 5 June 
199 1. It recommended that the US needed to establish a comprehensive as well as practical framework 
for providing recognition to any new state in former communist regimes including those from the 
former Yugoslavia. ' 021n order to establish such a scheme, it argued that the US might employ 'carrots 
and sticks' in order to make new countries formerly under communist regimes follow a particular 
policy before deciding whether or not they should recognize a state. 103 Tfiýs implied that such a scheme 
would not act in tandem with the EC-held International Conference on Yugoslavia and also that it 
would create a situation where competition to win American recognition of a state would occur. 104 
Furthermore, the Soviet Union provided negative inputs. It interrupted the diplomatic 
process after the Carrington-chaired conference in The Hague and thus it produced confusion over the 
locus of international authority. 105 Moreover, there was an attempted coup d'etat in the Soviet Union in 
August 199 1. Despite the fact that it was suppressed, this coup d'etat became a catalyst for the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. As a result, this averted US attention ftuther away from the situation in 
Yugoslavia. 106 
A Fragile International Compromise: UNSCR 713 (Arnu Embarizo) and the Vance Plan 
Since the EC and the Vv'EU were able to reach an agreement on the form that peacekeeping 
troops should take, Canada (at that time a non-pennanent member of the UN Security Councfl) called a 
101 Interview with 'Momas Niles on 21 May 2004. 
102 Baker, The Politics qfDiplomacy, 637-639. 
103 Baker, Ae Politics ofDiplonuxy, 637-639. 
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105 For more on the Soviet Union's intervention on this issue, see: Gow, THmph qfthe Lack of [Vill, 56-57. 
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meeting of the Security Council in order to consider sending UN peacekeeping troops. '07Tbe meeting 
was driven by a compromise between France and the UK. In essence, they agreed to accept the UN's 
role in Yugoslavia and support the EC's efforts (this was the French opinion) but the UN Secunty 
Council (UNSC) was not to authorize either European-led peacekeeping troops or large-scale 
mternational military action (which was the British position). log The US also supported this 
compromise because it backed peace based on negotiation, and it wanted to prevent a spiH-over of the 
conflict. 109 Eventually on 25 September 1991 the LJNSC held a ministerial-level meeting and 
unanimously adopted the Resolution (LNSCR) No. 713.110 UNSCR 713 established an arms embargo 
over the whole of Fonner Yugoslavia and it also became the backbone of the international approach to 
the Bosnian conflict. The resolution was intended as a means to restrain ftuther violence on the 
ground. "' However, in reality this placed a block on the ability on the part of each republic in 
general-and Bosnia in particular- to defend itself militarily Therefore, this UNSCR 713 created a 
tension between the Western states as weH as domestic actors within the Western societies, as to how 
the Western collective policy to Bosnia should be put into practice. 
The European approach to UNSCR 713 was based on the above-discussed compron-ýse 
between the UK and the France. The Bush administration's initial rationale for supporting LJNSCR 713 
was that this docut-nent provided a scheme to minimize fiuther violence in the region and thus prevent 
Serbian aggression as well as to prevent Croatia from anning itself as a means towards self- 
detennination. 1" However, towards the end of 1992, as the Bosnian conflict intensified and the US 
107 Bone, James. "Security Council Split on Options for Action, " The Times, 21 September 1991, Lexis- 
Nexis. 
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administration realised. that the Serbs had easy access to am-is, it began to regard UNSCR 713 as a 
Mistake. 113 Accordingly, the Bush administration directly voiced its opposition to UNSCR 713 to the 
members of the EC at the end of 1992.1 14 In addition, both chambers of the US Congress reflected and 
amplified the apprehension on the part of the Bush administration. Some of the members of Congress 
demanded the lifting of the arms embargo once the Bosnian conflict intensified. GraduaHy this became 
the dominant position in the Congress. ' 15 However, the Bush administration stood behind the arms 
embargo scheme throughout 1992. Therefore, it is clear that regardless of domestic obstacles the Bush 
administi-ation held its grip on America's approach to the former Yugoslavia and the Bosnian conflict 
by the end of 1992. This point can be regarded as a success of European allies' 'voice opportunities'. 
However, the US administration still maintained its 'wait and see'position at that time. Thus America's 
vital interests regarding the fonner Yugoslavia issue at that time were to avoid taking a heavy burden 
and to keep a distance from substantial international political and military involvement on this issue. 
Supporting UNSCR 713 initiafly contributed to satisfýing Ns position. Therefore, the greatest tension 
that was occw-red was between the EC and the UN. 
Regarding this aspect, UNSCR 713 demanded various points such as: a cease-fire in 
Yugoslavia; an expression of support for EC efforts; and a request to the UN Secretary-General to 
support intemational mediation and to negotiate with the Yugoslav leaders. 116 yet there Was no 
consensus among the members of the UNSC concerning the fonn peacekeeping should take. The UN 
secretariat was still reluctant to get involved, as it was wary of the potential conflict between the UN 
and the EC. "' Tl-ýs was because there was lack of substantial American endorsement of the EC 
promoted peace process. Despite the UN Secretary-General's unease on this issue, the EC demanded 
113 Interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004. 
114 See: Owen, Balkan Oaý, ssey, 86; Interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004. 
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that he nominate the peace envoy on 6 October-' 18 in order to satisfy the EC, the UN Secretary-General 
appointed the fonner US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance as his special envoy Nevertheless, 
cooperation between the UN and EC was not making a positive impact on the ground. 
According to the then UN Secretary-General Perez de Cu6Har, Carrington (the EC 
representative) and Vance (the UN Envoy) had a good personal relationship. However, as far as the 
direction of the peace process was concerned, they took different and almost opposite approaches to the 
Croatian issue. ' 19 On the one hand, Vance stifl relied on the ability of the then- existing Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia to control the situation. Therefore, he placed priority on the Croatian issue 
rather than promoting a settlement in Yugoslavia as a whole. 120 Carrington, on the other hand, however, 
did not take administrative capability of the still nominally existmg Federal Yugoslav government for 
granted. Thus he argued that the issue of Croatia should be handled as a part of the whole settlement. 
Furthennore, Carrington considered that Croatia was one of the countries to be blarned for the collapse 
of Former Yugoslavia. 
121 
In effect, Vance worked separately fi7om the fi-amework that was set by the EC, whereas 
Carrington attempted to promote a settlement in the former Yugoslavia as a whole. Vance focused on 
brokering a settlement in Croatia. In November 1992 the warring parties in Croatia, excluding the 
Krajina Serbs, made a cease-fire agreement and offered thew support of the implementation of the so- 
called Vance Plan provided the deployment of a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). 122 
The European Approach. - Recogmizing Slovenia and Croatia Based on the 'Sovereign Peace' 
In the meantime, the EC took its next step in leading the Croatian issue. On 16 December 
1991 , the Council of 
Ministers decided that the EC would consider giving recoglution to Slovenia and 
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Croatia on condition that the assessment of the EC Arbitration Conunission's (the so-called Badinter 
Commission) regarding the qualifications of each republic of former Yugoslavia was a positive one. 
This repoi-t was scheduled to be submitted by 15 January 1992.123 However, on 19 December 1991 the 
Gennan Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher declared that it would recognize Slovenia and 
Croatia provided the EC Arbitration Commission's terms were satisfied. 124 On 23 December 1991, 
Germany went ftuther by suggesting its intention to set up embassies in Slovenia and Croatia by 15 
January 1992 when the EC Arbitration Commission's report was due. 125 This Gen-nan action meant to 
recognize defacto independence of these states but that impeded the dejure process in puiamt to the 
outcomes of the EC Arbitration Commission's report. However, in effect, it had strong impact upon the 
direction of the EC policy... Eventually, on II January the EC Arbitration Conunission came to the 
view that the independence of Croatia and Slovenia should be recognized. 127ACCordingly on 15 
January the other EC members followed this recommendation. 128 The German Foreign Minister 
justified his position that it was in line with the decision taken by the EC Council of Ministers on 16 
December 1991: 
The Community and its Member States confirm their attachment to the principles 
of the Helsinki Final Act and the Challer of Pafis, in particular the pnnciple of self- 
deterMination. 129 
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In his interpretation, the EC placed the self-detennination rights as the pivotal guideline of relations 
between states. 130 However, the Gennan policy was criticised that it acted regardless of the other 
countnes5 concern regarding the effects of recognizing the international independent personalities of 
Croatia and Sloverýa at that time and that undennined the coherence of the EC. 131 
Despite the controversy over the EC's coordination of the policy regarding Slovenian and 
Croatian independence, it set the precedent for the EC to respect the self-detennination rights of 
residents in the fonner-Yugoslavia. In this way, the EC demanded Bosnia to hold a referendum on its 
independence to confinn its' peoples' opinions. 132 It did not recognize Macedonian independence 
despite the fact that the Badinter Commission confmned that it had satisfied the conditions laid down 
by the EC Ministerial meeting on 16 December 1991.133 This was due to opposition on the pail of the 
Greek government's objection that it had a province called 'Macedonia. ' 
Accordingly this emphasis on national self-detenriination defined the EC's vision of 
organizing the post Cold War international order in general and the situation in the fon-ner Yugoslavia 
in particular. This vision interpreted the values within the Helsir-Ad Final Act of 1975 in the following 
order of priority: national self-detennination, equality of sovereignty, non-intervention, peaceful 
settlement of disputes and other democratic values. If there were any possibility that the EC would use 
coercive power it would be to protect the order based on sovereignty. Tberefore, intervention In internal 
affairs was restricted. 'Mis can be caUed the 'sovereign peace. ' AU international security organizations 
such as the UN, CSCE and NATO are expected to protect this kind of order and the UN commands the 
highest legal and political authority. America was of course not an exception to this rule. Hence former 
130 Helsinki Final Act "VIII. Equal Rights and Self-detennination of Peoples; Questions Relating to Security 
in Europe. I (a)Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, " (1975). 
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Yugoslavia is a critical case for examining the reality of America's allies' 'voice opportunities' with 
regard to their 'power over outcomes'in relation to US foreign policy. 
Amefica ý Approach. - Not Recognizing Slovenia and Croatia in the Name of 'Democratic Peace' 
At this time, however, American action was not coordinated with that of the EC. The EC 
prioritized the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia on the basis of respecting their rights of self- 
detennination. With regard to the procedure and the effects of Croatian recognition, the US 
administration was clearly discontented with the mechanisms that European states used to grant 
recognition to Croatia. 134 In contrast to the European policy, the US argued that Bosnia and Macedonia 
deserved international recognition more than Slovenia and Croatia on the basis that the two former 
states did not rely on military means to achieve their goals. 135 The US administration believed that the 
Croatian and Slovenian actions were not in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, as they 
used military force to implement it. 136 If the US had recognized the independence of such countries as 
Croatia and Slovenia where military force was used to secure independence, then surely, so America 
argued, it should recognize countries seeking to obtain indq)endence via democratic Means. 137 
The US President, George Bush, and the Secretary of State, James Baker, decided not to 
follow the European policy of recognizing Slovenia and Croatia first. Instead, they decided to support 
Vance's efforts. 138 Vance argued that on the one hand, recognizing Bosnia was a way to facilitate the 
settlement. On the other hand he argued that it was necessary to deploy peacekeeping troops before any 
recognition of Bosnia. 139 The US did not recognize Croatia and Slovenia until such time as it did the 
same for Bosnia in April 1992. 
America's vision was therefore different fi7om that of the EC. The US put emphasis on the 
134 interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004. 
135 Baker, The Politics ofDiplomacy, 639-40. 
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peaceful settlement of disputes and democratic values as the foundation of its approach. Therefore 
America's mtionale for using coercive power might have been based on the promotion of democracy 
Restraint use of coercive power to one state's internal affairs would thus be disýnissed by this logic. 
This vision is namely the legal foundation of 'democmtic peace. ' International security organizations 
are expected to promote this democratic value, rather than the principle of non-interference and the 
value of sovereign state system. From the American perspective such an institutional arrangement 
would provide an opportunity to get legitimacy for a pre-conceived policy. This may promote 
democracy and Westem values in other states, but it would not be carried out followmg the logic of 
genuine multilateralism but rather that of Quasi-multilateralism. 
Indeed, the Bush administration changed its 'wait and see' approach vis-a-vis the EC policy 
regarding the situations in the fonner Yugoslavia. This created a serious difference between the EC's 
4sovereign peace' and America's 'democr-atic peace. ' It also suggested America's shift of its 
international vision fi7om. the New World Order to that of 'democratic peace'. Hence the Bosnian 
conflict became the critical case for defining the vision to organize the intemational order, namely the 
tension between multilateralism and Quasi-multilateralism. 
Was There Onl oLWestem Values? y One Vision 
It is now clear that there were at least two visions of international collaboration regarding the 
independence of Croatia and Slovenia. On the one hand the EC's approach placed national self- 
determination at the top of its rationale and promoted the 'sovereign peace'. The EC, armed with this 
approach, requested the US to recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia at the same time as 
the EC. This could have been the catalyst for the substantiation of Western multilateralism in regard to 
the former Yugoslavia. However, the US refused to accept the logic of 'sovereign peace' and did not 
recognize Croatia and Slovenia. Instead it demanded that the EC and other international actors 
139 Baker, Ae Politics qfDiplonway, 639. 
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recognize Bosnia and Macedonia on the basis of their peaceful and democratic means for pursuing 
independence. By insisting on this 'democratic peace' in opposition to its allies, the US adrninistration 
gradually moved its policy from 'wait and see' to actively promoting America's preferences. It is 
important to note that such American actions in the face of European-led multilateralism were 
accompanied by the manipulation of Western values. 
As Risse-Kappen suggested, if vital interests had been at stake-provided there were neither 
substantial domestic obstacles, nor a violation of Western values by America's allies forcing the US to 
act urlilaterally-the US would have persistently refused to coordinate its policy with her European 
alhes. 140 So far we have discussed, there were neither serious domestic political forces nor any Violation 
of the Western procedural value of multilateralism on the part of the America's allies. Therefore, it 
would be plausible to say that America's vital interests were the key motives for defining its actions 
regarding the fonner Yugoslavia. 
Bosnian Independence and America's Vital Interests 
In this section we analyse to what extent the US agreed to give substance to the UN's 
authority over Western military actions at the outbreak of the Bosnian conflict. At that time the only 
common Westem poliCy was the arms embargo on the fon-ner Yugoslavia and the UN's legal authority 
to impose it. However, it was not clear how they could implement it. Therefore this case is important to 
evaluate the validity of the Liberal Multilateralists' interpretations regarding America's approach to the 
multilateral policy-making process with its allies. 
At the end of 199 1, the giving by European states of international recognition to Croatia was 
regarded as just a matter of time. Peter Carrington, the EC Envoy, together with Jose Cutileiro 
(Ambassador from the then EC Presidency holder Portugal) went to six republics of the fon-ner 
Yugoslavia. The EC proposed that it would recognize them if they met criteria that the EC Arbitration 
14" Risse-Kappen, Coolwation among Democracies, 13-14, Chapter 4. 
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Committee's report was to stipulate. "' The Bosnian leader Alija Izetbegovi6 decided to go for 
independence towards the end of 1991. The Bosnian Serbs insisted that Bosnia-Herzegovina should 
remain a part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Accordingly the Bosnian Serbs declared 
their provisional independence on 9 January 1992 provided Bosnia-Herzegovina was to be recognized 
as an internationally independent entity. 142 MS suggests that there was a serious division in the region 
regarding the form that the future of Bosnia should take. 
As the Bosnian government had decided to seek independence, it Mowed the procedures as 
laid down by the EC Arbitration Committee. The Opinion No 4 of the EC Arbitration Commission 
report recommended Bosnia to hold an internationally monitored referendum on the issue of 
independence. 143 Accordingly, the EC-assisted Bosnian referendum was held from 29 February to 1 
March 1992. The result of the referendum was in favour of independence, although the Bosnian Serbs 
boycotted the vote. On 6 March the Bosnian President Ahja Izetbegovi6 declared independence. 144At 
the same time, the Bosnian Serb forces intensified its military actions. 145 As a result, the conflict in 
Bosnia escalated. There developed an urgent need for the nationalist groups in Bosnia to reach a 
compromise on the fi-amework of the independent state. In addition, the international community was 
under pressure to provide peacekeeping troops on the ground. In order to respond to these demands, the 
EC hosted peace talks between the three waning parties in Lisbon. 
European Polic - Recognition of Bosnia and Neutrality in the Conj Lic 
Since its failed attempt to form a united approach regarding of the recognition of Croatia, the 
141 Silber and Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, 216-217. 
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EC had been trying to establish a common position among its members. Although it was not able to 
fmd a compromise on the issue of the recognition of Macedonia due to Greece's stiff resolve to oppose 
it 146 , at least regarding the issue of Bosnian independence it managed to form some ki-nd of common 
position. This was facilitated by a change in style on the part of the German government. The German 
position became more cooperative on the issue of Bosnian independence. 147 'Me first EC policy on the 
Bosnian independence issue was to demand that Bosnia hold a referendum in whose implementation 
the EC would assist. 148 Secondly, it would recognize Bosnian indq)endence, proVided the three largest 
Bosnian ethnic groups reached an agreement on the form to be taken by an independent Bosnia. "'The 
Bosnian declaration of indq)endence, as led by a Muslim-dominated government (i. e. the Bosruan 
government) that did not pay sufficient attention to minority rights (i. e. those of Bosnian Croats and 
Bosnian Serbs), only exacerbated the armed fighting among the different ethnic areas. 150 The EC came 
to regard the situation as a conflict between three ethnic groups (i. e. Muslims, Bosnian Croats and 
Bosnian Serbs) and so for the EC the future of Bosnia would consist of territorial divisions based on the 
ethnic groups rather than the concentration of administrative power in a multi-ethnic Bosruan 
govemment. 
151 
In order to be a credible international mediator, the EC should have been able to provide 
military backup for the implementation of any agreement. Yet, in reality, there was no serious readily 
deployable military capability available for the EC, to meet the burdens that such a peacekeeping 
mission would involve. Moreover there were some unresolved issues among the member states. One 
145 Honig and Both. Srebrenica. 72-73. 
146 Baker, The Politics qfDiplornacy, 638-64 1. 
147 According to James Gow, it partly reflected German policymakers' sensitivity to the intemational 
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of the most urgent matters was that of peacekeeping itself Vance and Carrington were wary of 
allowing a situation on the ground in which there were no international peacekeepers at the time of the 
recognition of Bosnia. On the one hand, Carrington demanded that the US work with the EC. On the 
other hand, however, he- as well as Vance- urged the EC to delay recognition until such time as the 
UN peacekeeping troops were already deployed on the ground. 152 However, the EC was still not able to 
reach an agreement on whether the UN peacekeepers be deployed in Bosnia or not. As previously 
discussed, France and later Germany supported the idea of WEU-Ied peacekeeping troops. 153 
]h contrast, the UK, the UN and the US did not like this idea. Britain and the US had 
apprehensions that if a WEU-Ied peacekeeping force got off the ground, the solidarity of the 
transatlantic relationship would come to be undennined. 154 The newly appointed UN Secretary- 
General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, also did not want to take the responsibility of another mission. 155 The 
other unresolved policy related to the question of economic sanctions against Serbia. The opinion of the 
French government was that the EC should maintain a political dialogue with Belgrade while it 
proposed economic sanctions through the UN. In contrast, the UK and Germany argued in favour of 
full-scale econornic sanctions by the EC. 156 
VVhile the EC was stumbling over these differences, the tension in Bosnia grew considerably 
Arbitrating the positions of the Bosnian ethnic groups became the only credible option for the EC. EC 
policy regarding to the issue of Bosnian independence can be summed up under the following four 
points: 
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1) Holding the Bosnian referendum on independence was deemed a prerequisite for the 
recognition of Bosnia. 
2) The future of the Bosnian state should consist of the three ethnic groups (or 
4 components') in the form of several different eflu& areas. 
3) Peacekeeping troops would be needed but the EC could not decide what the form of 
this should be as well as how it should be sent. 
4) Economic sanctions against Serbia were needed. But the EC did not manage to reach 
agreement as to the mode in which sanctions were to be imposed 
American Polia: Recognition but with Pijofiýy Placed on the Bosnian Govemment 
A. 's discussed previously, since the later 1980s, the US did not have critical national interests 
in the fonner Yugoslavia and Bosnia. This was one of the reasons why the Bush administration adopted 
the 'wait and see'policy with regard to the dissolution the former Yugoslavia. However, as the situation 
came to demand international involvement, the US administration began to form its own preferences. 
The American preference at this time was to recognize Bosnia and Macedonia more than Slovenia and 
Croatia. On the one hand, the US decided to follow the EC regarding the Macedonia issue, due to 
Greece's strong opposition to recognizing Macedonia. 157 On the other hand, however, the US was 
detennined to recognize Bosnia. Its rationale in recognizing Bosnia was on different basis fi7om that of 
the EC. The American perception was that Bosnia had been pursuing independence through 
democratic means. ' 58 Accordingly, the US insisted that Bosnian independence should be recognized 
and that the new Bosnia should be represented by a Bosnian central govenunent, not by the eau-fically 
defined 'components'as sketched out in the EC policy' 59 
On 2 March 1992 Baker decided that the US would commit itself to the above-discussed 
157 Baker, The Politics qfDiplomar-y, 639-64 1. 
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policy with the caveat that the US administration should review international reactions before 
implementation. '60 During the process of reviewing, Baker decided to foHow the EC's procedure and 
timetable regarding the recognition of Bosnia. 161 In addition, after Bosnia declared independence, the 
US pushed the EC to take action to isolate Serbia. 162This action on the part of American opinion stood 
in contrast to the European priority of maintaining negotiations with the warring parties including 
Serbia and of attempting to broker a cease-fire agreeMent. 163 However, US support was conditional. 
First of all, the Bush administration rejected any American military contribution to the peacekeeping 
mission. 164Moreover, on 5 March Baker told a congressional hearing that the US was willing to 
support the activities of UNPROFOR but not be responsible for all its costs. He, in effect, demanded 
that UNPROFOR minimize its CostS. 
165 In this way, the US goveniment not offly rejected the idea that 
it might contribute intemational peacekeeping personnel in Bosnia but also it gave only conditional 
support to UN peacekeeping on the ground. American policy can be suinmarized as follows: 
1) The US would recognize Bosnia in its own way but it would first consider the 
international reactions (including consulting with the EQ before making any 
recognition official. 
2) BoSMan tenitorial integrity was to be maintained under the auspices of its central 
goveniment. 
3) The existence of the local cease-fire agreement was to be a prerequisite for sending UN 
peacekeeping troops but the UN was to reduce costs and no American troops would be 
sent. 
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4) Imposing economic sanctions on Serbia and isolating it were urgent mattm to be 
attended to. 
A Fraaile Consensus A mon,, a the Western States ReaardinR- the Recoonition of Bosnia 
After the Bosnian referendum and its declaration of independence, the Western leaders 
commenced diplomatic activities in order to set up an appropriate international approach regarding the 
process of Bosnian recognition. The EC Foreign Ministers held a meeting in Brussels on 10 March 
1992. James Baker also took pail in this meeting. There the EC members decided to recognize Bosnia 
on 6 April and the US agreed to follow this schedule. 166The EC and the US accepted a strategy that 
they should wait to recognize Bosnian independence until the Bosnian parties concerned had reached 
an agreement on the future of Bosnia. 1671n order to accomplish this aim, the EC hosted negotiations 
between Bosnia's warfing parties in Lisbon. However, it is important to note that the EC and the US 
did not reach an agreement on the fi-amework for Bosnia (i. e. the above-discussed policy summarized 
point 2 of European policy and American policy respectively). 
The EC-brokered mediation in Lisbon produced an agreement. Bosnia's three warring 
parties-namely the Bosnian Government, the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosman Croats-agreed a 
constitutional framework for Bosnia on 18 March. 168 Internationally they confinned the existing 
external borders of Bosnia. Domesticafly, this so-caUed Lisbon Agreement (also known as the 
Canington-Cutihero Plan) prescribed that the future of Bosnia would consist of dime etlu-k 
C components' in the form of several different administrative districts of the so-called 'cantons. ' This 
meant that the three ethnic components and corresponding 'cantons' would substantially replace the 
fimctions of the Bosnian government and thus, in effect, would restrict the sovereignty of Bosnia. 169 
166 Baker, The Politics qfDiplomacy, 64 1. 
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Yugoslavia, Vol. 1,24-28. 
79 
The Lisbon Agreement was based on the perception that the Bosnian conflict was a ch4l war. 
Based on this perception, the EC was committed to international mediation via negotiations. This 
posture reflected the British position towards Bosnia. "O Therefore, although the members of the EC 
awoke to the necessity of deploying some form of peacekeeping troops, in practice they tended to 
focus on humanitarian aid, not full military operations on the ground. 171 The fi-amework of the Lisbon 
Agreement consisted of three main requirements: 
1) Bosnia would consist of 'components'based on ethnic identity. 
2) In order to prevent filfther violence, LJNSCR 713 (the arms embargo) was to be 
maintained. 
3) International military coercion was only to be used as a last resort. 
In order to satisfy these requirements the EC needed to construct a good working relationship not only 
with the UN but also the US. 
The official American position was to support the Lisbon Agreement and the EC's peace 
negotiations 172 . Despite the fact that the Lisbon Agreement was not implemented, the EC and the US 
recognized Bosnian independence on 6 and 7 April respectively following their agreement of 10 
March. 173 On the same day the UN Security Council (UNSC) recommended deploying UNPROFOR 
troops from Croatia to Bosnia. "4Sending peacekeeping troops and isolating Serbia now became the 
central issues of international diplomacy in the region. However, there were three latent tensions 
between the US and EC. The first was the content of the settlement. The US Secretary of State had 
insisted that the Bosnian government should remain sovereign not only in its nominal status but also in 
170 Hurd, Memoirs, 452. 
171 Hurd, Memoirs, 452. 
172 Tutwiler, Margaret (State Department Spokeswomen). "US Recognition of Fonner Yugoslav Republics 
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substance and thus the ethnically defined components were not deemed suitable to replace it. 175 The 
second contentious issue was the necessity of a peacekeeping mission on the ground and also the form 
that this should take. The third problem was Serbian isolation. The US government demanded of its 
European counterparts that the Western states should collectively isolate Serbia as a means for the 
promotion of peace. 176 This disagreement between the US and the EC became clear when the 
European leaders began to take steps to negotiate a map of Bosifia based on constitutiomil principles of 
the Lisbon Agreement. 
First of all, with regard to the Lisbon Agreement, regardless of its official position the US 
Ambassador to Yugoslavia encouraged the Bosnian government leader to reject it. Warren 
Zinunennann, the then US ambassador to Yugoslavia, 'encouraged' the Bosnian leader Izetbegovi6 to 
'stick by what he'd agreed to. "" It was not difficult to predict that an inconsistent international 
approach would have the effect of intensifying the conflict. Furthermore, the relentless offensives of the 
Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat forces intensified the conflict even further. Hence there was an urgent 
need to maintain stability and security in Bosnia (i. e. by sending peacekeeping troops). 
Secondly, as for the peacekeeping mission, there were several issues to be sorted out. On top 
of fis issue, the UN office was not eager to collaborate with the EC. Boutros-Ghali emphasised that 
the UN's effort would be concentrated on promoting an agreement among the waning parties. "8 In 
theory, the Lisbon Agreement could have paved the way to a fort-nal settlement process. However, 
following Zimmermann's 'encow-agement', the Bosnian govenunent withdrew its support for the 
Lisbon Agreement. Instead, the Bosnian government demanded the Western leaders deploy UN 
peacekeeping troops in Bosnia and when this was not agreed to, it demanded that the UN lift the arms 
175 Baker, Ae Politics ofDiplomacy, 641. 
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embargo on Bosnia. 179 It was difficult for the UNSC as well as the EC members to ignore the Bosnian 
government's call for a deployment of a peacekeeping mission given that they had already recognized 
its independence. 
Legally speaking, coHective security action under the provision of Chapter VU of the UN 
Charter was the only possible justification for dispatching peacekeeping troops where there was no 
consent among the waning parties to accept it. If the conditions of Charter VU of the UN Charter were 
applicable to this situation, the UNSC had two choices. One was to send a military intervention force 
and the other was to provide military protection for humanitarian aid. France preferred the former 180 
and the US and the UK supported the latter option. 181 Fwthen-nore, as a result of the collapse of the 
Lisbon Agreement, it was a UN mission that lacked the consent of the waning parties on the ground as 
well as sufficient intemational support. Towards the middle of May 1992, the EC and the tN could not 
supply additional missions in Sarajevo since the fighting in the area had escalated. 182 As a result the 
LJNSC could not take vigorous united action. The next move of the peacekeeping mission became a 
major concern for the Western policy-makers. 
Thirdly, the US demanded that Serbia be isolated in the process paying more attention to this 
issue than other aspects. James Baker targeted Serbia as guilty of orchestrating a humanitarian crisis in 
Bosnia and thus demanded that international economic sanctions be brought against it. 183 The US 
government attempted to exclude Serbia and Montenegro (which together formed the rump 
Yugoslavia) from international institutions such as the UN, the CSCE and so on. France was uneasy 
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with such a move and argued that the international community should maintain a dialogue with Serbia 
and prevent the EC from taking finther sanctions against it. 184hi contrast, the US chaUenged that the 
French were not doing enough to prevent the humanitaiian crisis. 185 In order to facilitate sanctions 
being imposed on Serbia, James Baker even suggested that the US could have supported the 
establislunent of a multilateral force against Serbia under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 186 Eventually, 
regardless of French reservations, Serbia was expelled fi7om the CSCE on 12 May 1992. On 30 May 
1992, UNSCR 757 was also authorized under provision of Chapter VH of the UN Charter. 187ThS 
endorsed the economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, and demanded that the Sarajevo 
airport be open for free flowing of humanitarian aid. 
To sum up, the US administration successfufly managed to maintain its position of not 
sending American ground-troops while drawmg international attention to the isolation of Serbia instead 
of seriously protecting the interests of the Bosnian government. However, James Baker's diplomacy 
was implemented under the cover of the UN's collective secutity fimction under Chapter VU of the UN 
Charter. From Baker's perspective, accepting the UN's role and the EC's initiatives-in other words 
nil abiding by multilateralism-was a means to prevent America's military involvement in Bosnia. 
However, if the situation had deteriorated, UN authority demanded the US to be accountable for any 
actions wider the umbrella of the UN-namely taking coercive action on behalf of the UNSC. As we 
will discuss below, the Sarajevo crisis of June 1992 crystallised this dilemma for America. 
The Sarajevo Crisis of June 1992: Multilateralism and UN Authority 
Acting in accordance with the recommendation by the UNSC regarding the revitalization of 
the UN's conflict resolution fimctions, on 18 June 1992 the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros- 
183 Baker, Ae Politics ofDiplomacy, 645-648. 
184 Wood, "France and the Post Cold War Order: the Case of Yugoslavia, " 137-138. 
1 "5 Baker, Vie Politics qfDiplomacv, 645-648. 
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Ghali, produced a paper entitled, An Agenda for Peace-"' TIfis document recommended the UN to 
conduct so-called peace enforcement missions even where there would be no agreement from the 
wan-ing parties to do so. Bosnia as weH as Somalia became the test case for this. On the same day, the 
WEU issued another important document in relation to peace enforcement measures: the Petersberg 
Declaration. ' 89 
The Petersberg Declaration was significant in two respects. On the one hand, the UK-French 
dispute over the identity of the WEU was softened as a result of French acceptance of the identity of 
WEU as a 'European Pillar of the Atlantic Alhance. '190 On the other hand, however, the same 
document decided to conduct peacekeeping operations only 'in accordance with the UN Charter. " 9' By 
basing itself on the UN Charter the YvEU announced that it would take a UN-centred multilateralist 
approach to peacekeeping operations. As far as the UN's authority over its operations was concerned, 
VVEU's position was a more positive one than that taken by the NATO and the US. 192 In shoM 
European states, France in particular, shared the same view as the US in seeing that the Bosnian 
conflict required some forins of the international intervention. However, Europeans, especiahy France, 
differed fi7om the US on the issue over who would take that action. 
It was under the above-mentioned international circumstances that the crisis in Sarajevo 
drew international attention. By the end of May 1992, Sarajevo was under siege and was surrounded 
by Bosnian Serb forces. International action was widely urged. Negotiations concerning the form that 
international peacekeeping should take, became the focus of the debate. On 8 June the LTNSC 
authorized Resolution No. 758, wWch again demanded the re-opening of Sarajevo airport as well as 
188 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacekeeping and Peace-making, 
Report of the Secretary-General, " 17 June 1992, (A/47/277-S/241 1). 
189 WEU, Council of Ministers. "Petersberg Declaration, " Bonn, 19 June 1992. 
http: //www. bits. doNRANEU/docs/petersberg92. pdf [Accessed on 15 March 2004]. 
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192 Taylor, Trevor. "West European Security and Defence Cooperation: Maastricht and Beyond, " 
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84 
recommending additional personnel for the UNPROFOR missions in Bosnia. 193 On 18 June UNSCR 
760 was also adopted, which repeated the urgency of hurnanitarian aid efforts in the fonner Yugoslavia 
but under the provision of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 194 Re-oPening Sarajevo Airport was 
regarded as an essential part of ensuring the flow of sending 'humanitarian assistance' throughout 
Bosnia. 
These resolutions indicate that preventing a humanitarian crisis became the central political 
objective at the UNSC. The UN offices finally went along with fts. On 26 June 1992 Boutros-Ghali 
announced that the tN would take the 'necessary means' if Sarajevo Airport had not been opened 
within the next 48 hours. 115 On the same day, both the US and the EC held the highest level decision- 
making meeting. 
America's reaction to the Sarajevo crisis underlined difficulties imposed on the Bush 
administration. There were not only intemational but also domestic pressures upon the US 
administration to do something about the situation in Sarajevo. On 9 June 1992 the UN envoy and the 
former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance supported American participation in the UN peacekeeping 
mission in Bosnia in a congressional hearing. 196 Following Vance's suggestion, on 12 June 1992 the US 
Senate voted in favour of Amencan participation in the multilateral enforcement operations (S. Res. 
306). 197 
In the meantime, the US Secretary of State James Baker proposed the use of coercive power 
at the UNSC in order to liberate Sarajevo from the Bosnian Serb's siege of late June 1992.198 With 
regard to Boutros-Ghali's ultimatum on 26 June, on the same day the US administration held a 
National Security Council (Nsc) meeting. 199 They discussed Baker's proposal . 
200 However Baker was 
193 Uriited. Nations Secunty Council Resolution 758,8 June 1992, (S/Res/758). 
194 Uriited. Nations Security Council Resolution 760,18 June 1992, (S/Res/760). 
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unable to unite the US administration behind American participation in multilateral force. After that the 
National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, gave a press conference. He hinted at what the 
conclusions of the NSC would be. He emphasized that the US would not dispatch its forces without the 
war-fighting parties' consent even if these forces were only to be employed for the sake of 
humanitarian assistance . 
20' This meant that the US decided to draw a line separating it from the 
European policy-makers expectation to obtain American military involvement for the service of the 
UN resolutions. In other words, America's vital interests were not to get involved in peacekeeping 
missions on the ground in Bosnia. 
To look at the European side of the reaction to the Boutros-Ghah's ultimatum, the EC 
summit was held on 26-27 June. It discussed the potential use of multilateral forces in relation to the 
humanitarian situation in Bosnia. In the statement after the summit, the EC approved the use of mititary 
means if necessary202 . However, it was a conditional support. On the one hand, it adopted the French 
position that demanded coercive action without the war-fighting parties' consent. However, on the 
other hand, it did not say who (or which organization) would take such action. This was because the 
203 
other EC leaders were concerned about the French option that emphasised the role of the WEU. 
There was stifl a gap among the European states regarding their differing perception of the nature of the 
Bosnian conflict. 
As a result of the two international decisions above, even if the UNSC had decided to take 
coercive action, there would have been no international organization willing to implement it. The EC 
meeting on 26-27 June 1992 suggested that European leaders except the French would not dare to 
implement the EC's decision until NATO or the US were willing to provide substantial military 
200 Baker, The Politics qfDiplomacy, 048-65 1. 
201 Wielaard, R. J. "European Leaders Consider Humanitarian Aid to Sarajevo, " The Associated Press, 26 
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SUpport. 204Further embarrassment for the EC loomed. In order to mamtain the EC's lead intemational 
role, the Sarajevo Airport issue had to be sorted out by the European states. It was the French President, 
Francois Mitterrand, who was most detenTiined to keep the EC's firm grip on the diplomacy regarding 
205 the Bosnian conflict . Mitterrand went so far as to land at Sarajevo Airport on 28 June 1993. Tlýs 
action 'proved' the safety of Sarajevo Airport. 206 The French air force and other air force camers 
including those of the US began to send humanitarian aid via Sarajevo Airport from the following day 
As far as international relations among the major powers were concerned, Mitten-and's visit 
to Sarajevo had three specific consequences. Firstly, it postponed the use of coercive power against the 
siege of Sarajevo. Secondly, it maintained the EC's role as a leading international body in the mediation 
of the Bosnian conflict. This reinforced political pressure for the UN to fully cooperate with the EC. 
However, as the EC was reluctant to send sufficient nw-nbers of troops, this put a severe burden on the 
UN's capability on the ground and thus undernýiined any attempt to give teeth to UN resolutions and its 
207 
ultimatum. Thirdly, however, it marked the failure of the French attempt to get the EC to support the 
Vv'EU-Ied peacekeeping operations on the ground in Bosnia as humanitarian assistance was re-started 
without use of coercive power. As a result, as far as the Bosnian issue was concerned, the political 
208 leadership within the Europe gr-adually shifted fi7om France to Britain. At this time Britain was about 
to become the holder of the EC Presidency for the second half of 1992. 
To sum up this section, the Bush administration's vital interest was to not get militarily 
involved on the ground. The US administration's reaction to the Sarajevo crisis of June 1992 confin-ned 
fis point. However, as the Sarajevo crisis was 'settled' as a result of political negotiations, the US did 
Lexis-Nexis; Gow. Tfiumph ofthe Lack of Will. 94. 
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not have to show whether it would give substance to the UNSC resolutions or not. In other words, the 
US escaped a serious test as to whether it would act in accordance with multilatemlism or not. 
However, because of this situation, it did not explicitly spell out how America's policy in Bosnia was 
linked to its vision of 'democratic peace' and the corresponding security order in Europe. Therefore, it 
can be argued that by that time, the US policy-makers regarded the Bosnian conflict as a regional issue 
that would not undennine America's interests in relation to the institutional fi-arnework of the European 
security order, i. e. maintaining NATO's defacto independence fi7om. the UN. Therefore, there was no 
urgency for the US policy-makers to link their vital national interests to the situation in Bosnia. More 
fimdamentally, the EC had failed to put a pressure on the US to give substance to intra-Western 
multilateralism in the form of 'sovereign peace'and the coRective security functions of the UN. 
Conclusion 
During this period (from the middle of 1991 to the summer of 1992), European policy- 
makers were unable to construct a consistent position in relation to the situation in the former 
Yugoslavia. Europe's inability to organize an internationally coordinated policy in Bosnia was 
essentially due to the escalating conflict situation on the ground. Nevertheless, regarding the Bosnian 
situation, the European leaders produced three important policies. These were: the Lisbon Agreement; 
the international hurnanitarian efforts concerning the situation in Sarajevo; and their support for the 
maintenance of LJNSCR 713 (the arms embargo). However, these efforts did not produce sufficient 
results. Insufficient support fi-orn the US and the UN office were important causes of ongomg failure. 
However, the tension between France and Britain concerning the status of the WEU was the centr-al 
factor in European incompetence at tl-ýs stage. 
Concerning this point, it seems clear that the British government had shared interests with 
the US administration over its objection to any international peacekeeping mission in Bosnia under the 
unibrella of WEU. However, the fact is that the US did not put any troops on the ground despite the 
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British expectation that if troops were to be sent the US was to bear the main responsibility for 
providing peacekeeping mission . 
209 As we have analysed, the US administration maintained its grip on 
America's policy-making process regarding its approach to the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. 
Given this fact, it is also clear that Europe's lack of influence on American foreign policy during this 
period was not due to America's domestic politics or Europe's ignomnce of Western values. It is safe to 
state that the influence of the Western European states on American foreign policy was not guaranteed 
either by maintaining an alliance with the US or sharing so-called democratic identities with them. 
With regard to this point, this chapter has discussed three claims of why intra-Westem 
multilateralism failed. The first claim is that intra-Western multilateralism and its corresponding 
institutional mechanisms were not given. As above discussed, this point has been endorsed by the 
empirical evidence. The second claim is that intra-Western cooperation is not naturally guaranteed 
because there is more than one vision of multilateralism. These different visions of multilateralism had 
taken shape in the form of the two approaches to the independence of Slovema and Croatia. On the one 
hand the EC recognized their independence on the basis of the 'sovereign peace. ' On the other hand the 
US insisted on placing itself on the side of 'democratic peace. ' 
The fl-ýrd claim is that America's reactions to European initiatives in the former Yugoslavia 
related to America's vital interests. As discussed above there was a tension between America's vital 
mterests and some European states' favoured vision of European security. However, Europe's actions 
were incoherent and thus they could not pose the cKtical threat to the vital interests perceived by the 
US administration. In other words, for any influence to be felt the European states would have had to 
be united. Moreover, they needed to politically construct an international institutional arrangement that 
209 'Me US administrafion clearly dismissed this possibility. Interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004; 
Major, 7he Autobiography, 534-5 3 5; Sharp, Honest Broker or Perfidious Albion? 8-9. 
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the US would fmd impossible to contravene. Chapter 3 will look at the process of how the US 
administration linked the situation in Bosnia and its vital interests in Europe. 
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Chapter 3 British and European Influence on American Foreign Policy: the 
London Conference and the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, from August 1992 to May 
1993 
This chapter examines the validity of the Liberal notion that America's allies have 'voice 
opportunities' in the US foreign policy-making process. It will also illustrate the formation process of 
conceptions of vital interests on the part of US policy-makers in relation to the European approach to 
the Bosnian conflict. In this way, it will analyse corresponding US policies to protect these vital 
mterests. 
Chronologically speaking, this chapter looks at British and European influence on the 
American foreign policy-making process in relation to the Bosnian conflict from August 1992 to June 
1993. The establishment of the International Conference of the Former Yugoslavia (hereafter ICFY), 
the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, and its subsequent failure characterized this period. The key political 
forces that promoted multilateralism during this period were twofold: EC member states were at least 
relatively united behind the EC-UN peace-plan; the EC and UN consolidated their working 
relationship behind the promotion of the peace plan. At this time the British government was at the 
centre of most European initiatives. Obtaining a workable peace agreement from the waning parties 
was the pivotal task for the EC and the UN. In order to bring this about, they needed American political 
and military support. However, both the Bush and the newly elected Clinton administrations were 
reluctant to agree to European demands. 
'Meoretically speaking, these events will challenge the premise of Liberal Multilater-ahsts 
that America's supremacy is compatible with its own and its allies"voice opportunities'. This chapter 
demonstrates, contra-Liberal Multilateralists, that there was an increasing sensitivity among US policy- 
makers regarding the prospect of the ICFY-promoted Bosnian peace plan and its potential impact upon 
America's vital interests. bi other words, US pOhcY-makers perceived a tmde-off between the success 
of the ICFY-led peace process and the dernise, of America's vital interests in Europe. At fht, Vital 
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interests were to prevent the deployment of American ground troops in Bosnia. This took the form of 
challenges to the authority and legitimacy of the ICFY. TWs was because the activities of the ICFY 
were regarded as the incarnation of the EC's chaHenge to America's strategy to maintain de facto 
independence of NATO fi7orn the UN regarding NATO's so-cafled 'out-of area'operations. 
Discussion of vital interests will lead to us to evaluate the coherence of the working 
hypothesis of this research. In order to prove its validity-especially the claim of America's intentional 
promotion of Quasi-multilateralism in relation to the Bosnian conflict and NATO's role in Europe-we 
shall provide evidence showing that American policy makers were aware of a causal link between their 
vital interests and the development of international diplomacy regarding the Bosnian conflict. 
Therefore, this chapter will trace the relationships between the vital interests and the corresponding 
policies, by reading America's reactions to the Bosnian conflict. 
With regard to this causality, the tension between the EC-UN and the US in 1993 on the 
issue of the Bosnian conflict underscores the fact that there was a fimdamental disagreement among 
Western states as to what kind of multilateralism they should suppoit. This tension was between the 
European vision of multilateralism based on 'sovereign peace' and America's vision of Quasi- 
multilateralism founded on the logic of 'democratic peace. ' In the face of this tension, the US 
administration pursued two kinds of policy One was to disagree with the EC-UN policy, and to impose 
its own preferred direction instead. This was the so-caRed 'lift and the strike'poticy The other was to 
challenge and attempt to alter the definition of multilateralism itself The first policy will be discussed 
in this chapter and the second in Chapter 4. 
With regard to the organization of the chapter, it first discusses the London Conference of 
August 1992. The claim in this section will be that Europe had only limited influence on the outcomes 
of US foreign policy even if both parties agreed on the set up of the multi-later-al fi-amework. For 
example, the Bush Senior administration did not want to send any American ground troops to 
implement the ICFY-promoted Bosnia peace plan. This POl-iCY was fOnned regardless of domestic 
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Opposition m America, and without acknowledging European states' Violation of Western values. In 
other words, according to the previously discussed Risse-Kappen's methodology, not deploying its 
ground troops was the key vital interest of the US at that time. 1 
Secondly, the discussion will look at intra-Western relationships regarding the Vance-Owen 
Peace Plan of January 1993 and the international reactions to it. The main theme here will be similar to 
the previous section, that is, the evaluation of British and European influence on American foreign 
policy-making processes. The argument will then suggest that America shifted its focus in the foreign 
policy from merely preventing the deployment of American troops on the ground to challenging the 
fi-amework and logic of the ICFY. This transformation will be illustrated by the fact that the Clinton 
administration was determined to refuse the EU-LN's approach prior to intra-Westem interaction, and 
even before US domestic actors (e. g. Congress, media and leaders of public opinion) demanded the 
Clinton administration do so. 
Tbirdly, it will discuss the fate of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. It analyses intra-Western 
interactions regarding the Bosnian waning parties' meeting in Athens in May 1993 and the so-caRed 
'Joint Action Program'of June 1993. This section will argue that the Clinton administration was aware 
of the causality between the ICFY's activities and its challenge to America's vital interests. This will be 
demonstrated by analysis of the international diplomatic context of the Clinton administration's policies 
in Bosnia. 
The London Conference of August 1992 and European Multilateralism 
The Bosnian conflict was intensified while the international conununity stniggled to find a 
way to coordinate its actions. By August 1992, the Bosnian Serb forces' use of 'concentration camps' 
and their 'ethnic cleansing' of other Bosnian ethnic groups had been reported. 2 international opinion 
1 Risse-Kappen, Thomas. Cooperation among Democracies: the European Influence on US Foreign Policy. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.13-14. 
2 American journalist Roy Gutman xvon the Pulitzer Prize for his one of the earliest and also influential 
reports on this suýject- See a revised version of the reports: A1 f"itness to Genocide: the First Account of the 
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was outraged. Pressure on Western policy-makers to do something about this mounted. As a result, the 
LJNSC adopted resolution no. 770 on 13 August 1992. It stated that the UN would take 'all necessary 
means' for providing humanitarian assistance in Bosnia. 3 However, David Hannay, the British 
Ambassador to the UN, commented on the resolution, '[tjhis resolution does not prescribe the use of 
force, it merely authorizes it as a last resort' and 'it is very important we try every means possible to get 
supply through without use of force. A The intention of comment was to make clear that there would 
not be anY international military intervention. 'Accordingly, the hurnanitarian assistance was provided 
without heavy armaments. This was not sufficient to satisfy humanitarian needs on the ground. 6 Some 
(including US presidential candidate Bill Clinton) began to argue in favour of liftig the amis 
embargo. 7 Others supported limited military action such as air strikes (e. g. David Owen)8, or ffill-scale 
military intervention (e. g. Margaret Thatcher), against Bosnian Serb forces. 9 On 25 August even the 
UN General Assembly adopted a resolution that supported the Bosnian government's 'just struggle' for 
self-determination. 10 Calls for urgent international action in Bosnia were mounting. In the meantime, in 
late July 1992 the EC announced their intention to convene with the UN a joint international 
conference on the former Yugoslavia in London from 26 August 1992.11 
British and European Polig: Promoting, Multilateralism on the Basis of the 'Sovereign Peace' 
Mobihsmg international action towards a negotiations-based settlement was the 
Horrors of Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia' * New York: Macmillan, 1993. 3 United Nations Security Council Resolution 770,13 August 199 1. 
4 Quoted in Graham, Victoria. "Council Okays Military Force to Deliver Aid, No Intervention Planned, " The 
Associated Press, 13 August 1992, Lexis-Nexis. 
5 Nelson, Dale. "U. S. Closer to Agreement with British, French, White House Says, " The Associated Press, 
9 August 1992, Lexis-Nexis; Gow, James. Tfiumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the 
Yugoslav War. London: Hurst & Company, 1997.111-112. 
6 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. Unvanquished. - A US-UN. Saga. London: New York: I. B. Tauris, 1999.43-46. 
7 Dale, "U. S. Closer to Agreement with Bntish, French, White House Says. " 
8 Owen, David. Balkan Odyssey. London: Indigo, 1996.15-17. 
9 Dale, "U. S. Closer to Agreement With British, French, White House Says. " 
10 UN General Assembly, "The situation m Bosnia and Herzegovina, " Adopted at the 91 st plenary meeting 
of the 42nd session. 25 August 1992 (A/RES/46/242). Para 4. 
1 Roberts, John. `Yugoslavla: Intemational Conununity Hopes to Impose Peace, " Inter Press Ser-i4ce, 27 
July 1992, Lexis-Nexis. 
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principal airn of the London Conference. 12 Politically, the EC and the British government wanted to 
fon-nalize their relationship with the UN in relation to peace promotion. 13 Before the London 
Conference, the relationship between the EC's attempts at peace-promotion and those of the UN were 
not fonnally institutionalized. Combining UN and EC efforts was an important step in the EC's 
organizing of a coherent international diplomacy vis-a-vis the Bosnian waning parties. As previously 
discussed, the UN office was not wiHing to work with the EC Mission for fear of taking wibearable 
burdens on its shoulders. 14 The EC did not want to use 'Military force against hostile opposition to 
achieve a military solution'. It argued that such a policy would place a heavy financial and military 
burden on the West. Hence it attempted to engage the warring parties in negotiations to reach a 
settlement. 15 . Moreover, there was an additional political calculation 
in the EC's attempt to formalize 
the relationship with the UN. The idea was that the EC's efforts along with that of the UN authority 
would persuade the US to support it. " Indeed, they considered the fact that the US President had been 
promoting the so-called 'New World Order'based on the revitalized conflict resolution mechanisms of 
the LN. 17 
Amefican Policy: Multilateralism Without Following Its Outcomes 
American policy in relation to the London Conference was not simple. Officially at least it 
supported the EC's attempt to formalize the EC and the UN working together. 18 There was a tension 
within the US administration's policy direction however. On the one hand it aimed at promoting peace 
12 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004. 
13 Interview With Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004. 
14 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 43-46. 
15 Douglas Hurd quoted in Roberts, John. "Yugoslavia: Intemational Community Hopes to Impose Peace, " 
Inter Press Service, 27 July 1992, Lexis-Nexis; EPC, "Statement on the Situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 16 
September 1992, " European Foreign Policy Bulletin, 16 September 1992, (92/319). 
16 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004. 
17 National Security Strategy of the United States August 1991 http: //www. fas. org/marýdocs/918015- 
nss. hti-n [Accessed 14/Feb/2005]. Bush, George. "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the 
Cessation of the Persian Gulf Conflict March 6,1991. " Presidential Papers of the United States. 
http: /, Iiushlibrwy. tamu. edu/researchJpapers/1991/91030600. html [Accessed 14/Feb/2005]. 
18 InterviewAith Tbomas Niles on 21 May 2004. 
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through negotiations. On the other hand, it paid more attention to the hwnanitarian tragedies in Bosnia 
and demanded that the EC and the rest of the international community condemn Serbian actions in the 
former Yugoslavia. 19 Yet, despite the fact that it supported UNSCR 770, the US administration was 
reluctant to fully endorse this resolution for fear that American troops would have to be deployed on the 
ground . 
20 In short, so far as the fi-amework was concerned, the US administration accepted the EC's 
moves provided that American military support was not required. 21 
The London Conference and Institutionalization ofEuropean Multilateralism 
The London International Conference on the Fonner Yugoslavia (ICFY) was held on 26-27 
22 August 1992. It adopted principles that consisted of thirteen points. The essence of principles can be 
summarized as follows. Firstly, in order to conduct the peace process in accordance with the principles 
of the UN Charter, the London Conference confumed that any peace plan that the EC and the UN were 
to promote must recognize the territorial integrity of Bosnia, and that it must not accept any 
trawformation of Bosnian borders that was imposed by military means. Secondly, the London 
Conference delegated to the UN and EC representatives the task of mediating between waning parties 
in Bosnia. This Conference also established a pen-nanent office in Geneva. Vance continued as the UN 
envoy However, the EC norninated the fonner British Foreign Minister David Owen as the Special 
Representative to the fonner Yugoslavia, replacing Lord Carrington. Thirdly, the London Conference 
endorsed the idea that any peace plan be implemented in accordance with UN peacekeeping operations 
19 Eagleburger, Lawrence. "Detention Centers in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia: Statement released by the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, August 5,1992, " Department of State Dispatch 3, no. 32 
(I 992): http: //dosfan. lib. uic. edu/ERC/biiefing/dispatch/I 992/htrnMispatchv3no32. html 
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22 ICFY, "International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: London Secession (August 1992), Statement 
of Principles, " in Bertrand Ramcharan ed., 7he International Conference on the Former 1ugos1m, ia. - Official 
Papers. Vol. 1. Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997-33-34; Also see: Gow, Riumph of the Lack of [Vill, 
299-230. 
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(i. e. sending a UN peacekeeping mission after the peace agreement). In this way, the ICFY fully 
adhered to UNSCR 713 (anns embargo on Bosnia). 
IF(egarding the third decision, there was a contentious issue during the London Conference. 
This related to the issue of the interpretation of LJNSCR 770 that suggested usmg 'all measures 
necessary' (i. e. including military means) under the provision of Chapter VH of the UN Charter to 
assist humanitarian aid. 23 The Bosnian Serbs leaders were worried that the ICFY together with UNSCR 
770 could work as a catalyst for international intervention. 24 However, the military escorts 
accompanying humanitarian aid eventually became a pwt of the UNPROFOR mission under the 
provision of UNSCR 776.25 LJNSCR 776 expressed the UNSC's lufl support' for the decisions and 
principles of the London Conference. In addition, on 9 October UNSCR 781 was adopted regarding 
the so-called no-fly zone. Ths prohibited all Military flights over Bosnia and Herzegovina and thus 
'airned at ensuring the safety of the delivery of the humanitarian assistance. ý 26 In this way, the military 
escorts accompanying humanitarian aid were distinguished from military intervention. In other words, 
the LJNSC dismissed any coercive intervention to the conflict. These developments were in harmony 
with the then British policy For instance, in the face of political pressure from Muslim world to 
intervene in the Bosnian conflict militarily, British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, emphasized that 
the UN Security Council should control the use of military power and also be cautious about launching 
military intervention until 'the case is absolutely proven I. 27 
'Ihe London Conference fonned the perception of the conflict as a civil war and thus 
attempted to develop a solution by promoting negotiations among the warring parties, instead of 
23 United Nations Secunty Council Resolution 770.13 August 1992. (S/Res/770). 
24 Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 299-230. 
25 United Nations Security Council Resolution 776.14 September 1992. (S/Res/776); Also see: Gow, 
Triumph qf the Lack c? f Will, 230-232. 
26 United Nations Secunty Council Resolution 781.9 October 1992, (S/Res/78 1). 
27 Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, "Exarmination of Witness, Rt. Hon Douglas Hurd, 12 
October, 1992, " in "the 'Ihird Report, the Expanding Role of the United Nations and Its Implications for 
Uriited Kingdom Policy, Volume 11, Minutes of Evidence and Appendices, " Parliamentary Papers XXXVI 
(1992-1993): (HC 235-10. Appendix 1; 245. 
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instituting international intervention. Thýs viewpoint, in line with the British perspective, became the 
orthodox interpretation of the conflict among the EC member states and guided the relationship 
28 between the EC and the UN office. As a result of the London Conference, the British and European 
policy in Bosnia became more multilaterahst. '9 On the basis of the London Conference, there were 
now new institutional stnictures in place for Britain and the EC members to exercise influence on 
Amcaican foreign pohcy 
To sum up, the EC and UN established the institution of the ICFY It can be regarded as an 
institutionalization of the European approach to international security, namely intra-Westem 
multilateralism and its logic of 'sovereign peace. ' European policy-makers demanded the US endorse 
this. By establishing the ICFY, the members of the EC wanted to obtain the following support from the 
US: 
1) that it would continuously stand by LJNSCR 713 
that it would provide sufficient political support for the peace negotiations by placing 
diplomatic pressure on the waning parties 
3) that, if possible, it would accept NATO's participation regarding the implementation of 
any peace agreement. 
Regarding the last point, at that time the ICFY did not request specific American troops as such but 
hoped to use NATO . 
30 However, the US administration was reluctant to offer any military support for 
the implementation of a settlement. 31 'Merefore this was one of the most controversial agendas 
regarding the Western approach to the Bosnian conflict. 
Ile London Conference and the estabfislunent of the ICFY gave substance to the EC's 
28 Hurd, Douglas. Memoirs. London: Little, Brown, 2003.452. The UN office was still not willing to follow 
the EC's demands regarding financial constraints. It was also concerned about the efficiency of proposed 
peacekeeping plan. Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 46-49. 
29 The US administration endorsed UNSCR 776 and also the acting Secretary of State Lawrence 
Eagleburger attended the Ministerial meetings of the ICFY Stealmig Committee. Therefore, the ICFY and its 
supporters understood that the US fully participated in the policy-making process of ICFY activities. 
2004. Interview with David Owen on 16 March . 
30 Interview with DaNid Owen on 16 March 1993. 
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efforts with the authority of the UNSC. The ICFY becarne the sole legitimate intemational body to 
promote the peace-plan for a settlement of the Bosnian conflict. The United States was faced with 
pressures from the EC and the UN to support their missions. It was difficult for the US to dismiss the 
legitimacy of the EC and the UN claim, as it had praised the revitalization of the UN's conflict 
resolution mechanisms in accordance with Present Bush's concept of a 'New World Order. 02 Indeed, 
the US was caught in a dilemma. On the one hand it endorsed the EC's efforts and the ftamework of 
the ICFY itself However, on the other hand, it did not want to follow the outcomes of the ICFY 
negotiations that might result in American military contribution towards a UN peacekeeping mission in 
Bosnia for implementing a peace plan. 33 
Domestically, the presidential election put ftuther political pressure on the US administration. 
The Democmtic Party's presidential candidate Bill Clinton criticized President Bush for not doing 
enough for the sake of the Bosnian people and promised vigorous American action against Bosnian 
34 Serb forces. He implied that he would support coercive action against the Bosman Serbs. A 
congressional ma ority also agreed to take tougher action against the Serbs. 35 In October 1992, j 
Congress voted in favour of the so-cafled Biden Amendment on the FY 1993 budgets. This 
Amendment allocated $50million worth of self-defence armaments to the Bosnian government if the 
US d ide ec d to lift the arms embargo . 
36 It was eventually authorized by President Bush on 6 October 
37 1992 . Furthermore, on 15 
October, the Bosnian government demanded that the US President and the 
31 Interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004. 
32 Hutchings, Robert L. American Diplon7acy and the End of the Cold War. - an Insiderý Account of US 
Policy in Europe, 1989-1992. Washington, D. C. Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1997.145-149. 
33 Interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004. 
34 Clinton, Bill. "Clinton Would Stress Economic Issues in Foreign Policy, Address to Los Angels World 
Affairs Council, August 13,1992, " Clinton on Foreign Policy Issues. London: United States Inforniation 
Service, 19-26. not dated. 22-23. 
35 Interview with Robert Hand (Policy Staff of a member of House of Representative, Steny Hoyer, (D-Md. ) 
who was one of the influential opponents of the UN arms embargo on Bosnia) on 19 May 2004. 
36 Biden Axnendment No. 3336. Congraysional Record, 30 September 1992, (S 15890). It was later authorised 
7b the Present Bush as P. L. 102-391, (1992). 0. 
, 
jUile. n "Congress and the Conflict in Yugoslavia in 1992, " CRS Reportfor Congress. Washington: 
Congressional Research Service, 1993.21-22. 
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UN lift the arms embargo. " The editorials of the well-known newspapers such as The New York Times 
and The Washington Post began to support this idea. 39 
It seems that the US administration faced much domestic pressure to act against UNSCR 
713 and thus it was not able to contribute anything to the ICFY. Nevertheless, having endorsed a 
controversial budget, the US administration made it clear that it would stand by the resolution 713 and 
the ICFY40. George Bush defended his position; 
We're working through the international organizations. That's one thing I learned 
by forging that tremendous and greatly, higWy successful coalition against Saddam 
Husseiri, the dictator: Work intemationally to do it. rm very concemed about it. " 
George Bush even pledged American support for the implementation of the no-fly zone under UNSCR 
42 78 1. In the meantime, the ICFY steering comn-fittees drafted a fonnal peace plan for Bosnia at the end 
of 1992. The ICFY Co-Chainnen as well as Bush administration officials were confident the US would 
support their plans if George Bush had been re-elected. 43 However, Bill Clinton won the US 
presidential election of November 1992. The Mcoming administration began to formulate its policy 
from the end of 1992 and showed signs of a shift M the American position. 44 
To sum up, it can be said that the Bush administration, on the rhetoncal level, pnoritised its 
intemational pledges to support the ICFY over American domestic pressures. From tl-ýs it would 
appear that the Bush administration followed the logic of multilateralism that was promoted by its 
European allies. It was reported that George Bush intended to endorse the ICFY by announcing the 
possibility of deploying US ground troops if the violence began to spread to other republics of the 
38 Sdajd2ic, Harris. "Press Conference by the Delegation of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina, 16 
October 1992, Washington D. C, " Federal News Senice, 16 October 1992, Lexis-Nexis. 
39 The New York Times, Editorial, "The Dead of Winter, in Bosnia, " Yhe Nevt, York Times, 28 September 
1992, A 14; The Washington Post, Editorial. "Air Cap over Bosnia, " 1he Washington Post, 6 October 1992, 
A 20. 
-4) In relation to this, the then Assistant Secretary of State for Canadian and European Affairs, Thomas Niles, 
recalled that the Bush administration did not consider the so-called lift and strike policy up until the end of its 
duty in the office. Interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004. 
41 Bush, George. "Presidential Debate in St. Louis, " Public Papers of the Presidents, II October 1992. 
Lexis-Nexis; United Nations Security Council Resolution 781,9 October 1992, (S/Res/78 1). 
42 Bush, "Presidential Debate in St. Louis. " 
43 intenoeNv with David Owen on 16 Marr-h 2004; Interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004. 
44 Interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004. 
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fon-ner Yugoslavia 
. 
45 However, instead he decided to send American troops to Somalia. It is unportant 
to note that, as we have discussed, since the outbreak of the Bosnian conflict, the Bush administration 
had maintained its initial position that the US would not send any ground troops to Bosnia. In shoft, the 
Bush administration's support for the ICFY was only political and excluded military deployment. This 
was the vital interest of the US regarding the Bosnian conflict at that time. 'Me result of the US 
presidential election in 1992 cemented this resolve. Despite the fact that presidential candidate Bill 
Clinton had pledged to support a strengthening of the UN, the elected new administration began to 
formulate a policy in opposition to LJNSCR 713 (i. e. lifting the arms embargo) as well as the ICFY's 
peace plan. 
46 
The Vance-Owen Peace Plan and America's Perception of Its Vital Interests 
The EC and the UN proposed the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) in January 1993.47 
Establishing a plan on the principles of the London Conference, the VOPP envisaged a new Bosnia 
that would consist of 10 so-called 'cantons. ' Each 'canton' would reflect a specific ethnic distribution. 
48 
However, distribution was based on the 1991 census, not on the situation as a result of the conflict. In 
tl-ýs way, at least in theory, the VOPP refused to recognize any territorial gams based on ethnic 
expansionism. This went to the heart of the principles which had been proclaimed at the London 
Conference. 
In order to implement this plan, du-ee agreements from the Bosnian parties were needed: the 
constitutional agreement that Vance and Owen obtained; a map demonstrating how the Bosnian patties 
45 Kim, "Congress and the Conflict in Yugoslavia in 1992, " 7. 
46 In fact, according to David Owen, on 16 December 1992 acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger 
' raised the need to re-examine the arms embargo. ' Yet he made clear his personal support to Vance and 
Owen. Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 86; Clinton, Bill. My Life. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004.510-512; 
Albright, Madeleine. Madam Secretary. - A Memoir. New York; London: Miramax; Macmillan, 2003.179- 
180; Holbrooke, Richard C. To End a War. New York: Random House, 1998.50-5 3. 
47 "The Vance-Owen Peace Plan, " in The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia : Official 
Papers, edited by Berwmd Ramcharan, The Hague: Kluwer Law hitemational, 1997.249-274 
av ti -Military Inte ace. 48 Messervy-Whiting, Graham. Peace Coq/erence on Former Yugosl ia: the Poli co rf( 
London: Brassey's / The Centre for Defence Studies, 1994.4 1 -notes 39. 
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intended to divide up the land; and a cease-fire in hostilities. Vance and Owen convened three plenary 
meetmgs in Geneva in January 1993. At the end of these meetings on 30 January 1993, the three 
wamng Bosnian paities signed constitutional agreements that outlined the future of Bosnia under the 
VOPP. In addition, the Bosnian Croats and Serbs signed a cease-fire. However, the leader of the 
Bosnian government Izetbegovi6, refused to sign the agreement because he wanted to keep heavy 
arnis around Sarajevo in order to provide a balance to the Bosnian Serb's military presence. Owen later 
criticized the new American administration's approach to the Bosnian conflict that encow-aged 
Izetbegovi6 to take an uncompromising stance. 49 
European Polig. - The VOPP as a Symbol ofEuropean Multilateralism 
It was important for Vance and Owen to obtain international, and especially American, 
support for the VOPP in two respects. Firstly, they needed political support fi7orn the US administration 
that would allow them to impose serious political pressure, not only on the Bosnian Serbs but on all the 
waning parties to accept the Vopp. 50 In particular, the possibility that America might move to lift the 
an-ns embargo to Bosnia would certainly have fuelled tension on the ground. 51 Secondly, Vance and 
Owen planned to send a UN peacekeeping mission of around 25,000 troops to Bosnia in order to 
implement the VOPP. 52 For this purpose, Vance and Owen expected to have a contribution from 
Nmo. 53 
Organizing coherent diplomatic action to promote the VOPP became the heart of British and 
49 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, II 1- 112. 
50 Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004; Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 111-112; Hurd, Memoirs, 457- 
458. 
51 Hurd, Memoirs, 457458. 
52 "Report of the Secretary-General on the New York round of the Peace Talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
(3-8 Febniary 1993), " (UN Doc. S/25248). Reprinted 'in Rarricharan ed., 7-he International Conference on the 
Former Yugoslavia. Vol. 1.688-696. 
53 At first, the ICFY did not specify the role of NATO for the implementation of the VOPP. The ICFY 
decided to ask NATO's contribution after the US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher's speech on 10 
February 1993. Inten, iew Nvith DaNid Owen on 16 March 2004. 
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EC's Bosnian Policy. 54 This was because Europeans considered that the possibility of ending the 
Bosnian conflict at this stage depended on the extent to which international cooperation was 
maintained between the EGUN and the US. 55 British and EC policy regarding inter-action with the US 
admirýistration can be summarized as foUows: 
1) The VOPP was the only credible intemational peace plan at that time. 
2) The fi-amework of the peace plan was M accordance with the principles that were 
endorsed at the London Conference. 
3) In order to promote the VOPP, LNSCR 713 (the arms embargo) must be maintained. 
4) American persuasion vis-a-vis all the wan-ing parties of Bosnia was essential in 
promoting the VOPP. 
American Polig. - RefiMing the VOPP on Moral Grounds 
According to David Owen, the new US administrution's reaction to the VOPP was not 
56 initially coherent. On the one hand, it was reluctant to support the VOPP due to the complexity of its 
implementation on the ground; on the other hand, however, it had accepted the fi7amework of the 
London Conference before it had formally taken over the White House. " In order to justify its position, 
the Clinton administration at first implied that it would keep its distance fi7om the ICFY's activities. The 
newly appointed Secretary of State, Warren Cluistopher, and the US Ambassador to the UN, 
Madeleine Albright, hinted at attempts to distance their position from the ICFY and the vopp in their 
congressional confirmation hearing on 13-14 and 21 January respectivel Y. 58 For example, on 13 
54 Hurd, Memoirs, 457-458; EPC, "Statement on Bosnia-Her-zegovina, I February 1993, " European Foreign 
Policy Bulletin, I February 1993, (93/034). 
55 interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004; Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004. 
56 Owen, Balkan Odý, ss(v, 10 1- 
57 Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004; Interview with Thomas Niles 21 May 2004. 
58 "Heanng of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subject: Confirmation Hearing for Warren 
Christopher as Secretary of State, " 13 January 1993, Federal Nevis Service. Lexis-Nexis-, "Hearing of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subject: Nomination of Madeleine Albright as Ambassador to the 
UN, " 21 January 1993, Federal News Service. Lexis-Nexis. 
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January Christopher remarked: 
I don't think we can make those negotiations [in Geneva] our sole reliance [ ... 
]. I 
think we have to have an independent position with respect to Bosnia and the 
former Yugoslavia countries because the stakes are too large for us to rely solely on 
the negotiations taking place at Geneýý much as I hope they'll succeed [emphasis 
59 added]. 
Vance and Owen were concerned about the Ameiican position. They attempted to influence 
the US by explaining about the VOPP, in order to ensure that the 'Clinton administration listened and 
shifted course when the facts became clearer. '60 Accordingly, they went to UN headquafters in New 
York to sell the VOPP in public, and obtained the EC's fonnal backing to do S0.61 On 1 February 1993 
Vance and Owen met newly appointed US Secretary State, Warren Christopher. To their surprise, 
Christopher had little knowledge about the VOPP, despite the fact that the US administration had been 
criticizing its deficiencies. 62Vance and Owen explained the VOPP and Christopher agreed that he 
would at least not oppose it until the US administration defined its policy towards Bosnia. 63The ICFY 
Co-Chainnen decided they could use fis opportunity to persuade the US to understand and support the 
VOPP. 64However, after the meeting Christopher spoke to the press and aHuded to his MIsgivings about 
the plan. Vance and Owen were watching on television and realized they had been betrayed by the US 
Secretary of State. 65 This episode suggests that US hostility towards the VOPP preceded any intra- 
Western inter-action. 
As the Bosnian leaders had planned to come to New York by the end of February 1993, 
diplomatic interaction intensified despite American unwillingness to support the VOPP. By that time, 
the Clinton administration's formal approach to the Bosnian conflict had been more clearly developed. 
59 "Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Comnuttee, Subject: Confinnation Hearing for Warren 
Christopher as Secretary of State, " 13 January 1993. 
60 Owen, David. "The Future of the Balkans: an Interview with David Owen, " Foreign Affairs 72, no. 2 
(1993): 1-9.3-4. 
61 EPC, "Statement on Bosnia-Herzegovina, I February 1993, " (93/034). 
62 Owen, Balkan Odyssc. V, 113-114; Messervy-Whiting, Peace Coqference on Former Yugoslavia, 17. 
63 Interview With David Owen on 16 March 2004. 
64 Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004. 
65 Interview VAth David Owen on 16 March 2004. 
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In fact, during this process, Clinton decided not to support the VOPP66To express this policy, on 10 
February Christopher outlined the America's six points plan for promoting a settlement in Bosnia. " 
These six steps were as follows: America would provide pol-itical support for the VOPP as well as 
nomination of Reginald Bartholomew, the former US Ambassador to NATO, as peace envoy; the US 
would attempt to persuade different Bosnian edinic groups to engage with the negotiations; it would 
increase economic and political pressures on the Republic of Serbia; it would tighten enforcement of 
the no-fly zone, intensify humanitarian efforts, and propose the establishment of an international war 
crimes tribunal; it would provide American military support for the implementation of the peace plan; 
and it would broaden the consultation with America's allies and ffiends. On 12 February, the EC 
welcomed Christopher's six steps. 68 
American support for the VOPP, however, was conditional. Christopher emphasized that the 
peace plan should be 'just and workable' and that it must not be imposed on the Bosnian people fi7om 
the outside . 
69Thus, the promise of an American contribution to the implementation was stated pursuant 
to their condition. Yet it was clear that the Bosnian governinent was not keen on accepting the VOPP A 
specialist in military issues of the fon-ner Yugoslavia, James Gow, criticized Christopher's 
announcement: '[i]n effect the US was sticking with its policy but pretending, for want of a better 
option, to lend its support to the work of ICFY. "0 
On 18 February, Bosnian Prime Minister, Haris Silaj&i6 appeared at a hearing of the US 
Senate. He emphasized the legitimacy of the Bosnian government (and thus the temtonal integrity of 
Bosnia) and his fight to defend the nation. He demanded that the arms embargo on Bosnia be lifted in 
66 Clinton, Ali, Life, 511. 
67 Christopher, Wan-en. "Nex Steps Toward Conflict Resolution in the Former Yugoslavia, Opening 
Statement at a NeNvs Conference, Washington, DC, February 10 1993, " US Department ofState Dilypatch 4, 
no. 7 (1993): Article I- 
68 EPC, "Statement on Amencan Steps to Promote Peace and a Political Settlement in Former Yugoslavia, " 
European Foreign Policy Bulletin, 18 February 1993, (93/053). 
69 Christopher, "New Steps toward Conflict Resolution in the Former Yugoslavia, Openin-2 Statement at a 
News Conference, Washington, DC, February 10 1993. " 
70 Gow, Triumph (? fthe Lack qf Rill, 244. 
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order to accomplish this task . 
71 Vance and Owen, and probably the other EC policy-makers too, were 
confused by these developments. Owen was not sure 'where the US administration was heading'when 
the Bosnian president Izetbegovi6 and the Bosnian Serb leader Karadz'i6 came to New York at the end 
of February for negotiations. 72Under these circumstances, the first phase of negotiations between the 
Bosnian parties in New York did not produce much of substance. 
Internationally, the leaders of the EC member states had begun their top-level diplomacy 
towards the US president in order to assist the VOPP negotiations In New York. John Major, Fr-anqois 
Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl attempted to put over the peace plan to President Bill Clinton on 24 
Febnkuy, 73 9 March74 and 26 March 1993 75 respectively However, no substantial transatlantic 
agreements on Bosnia were announced, and when West European leaders Visited Washington D. C., 
Clinton tended to avoid mentioning, 'the Vance-Owen Peace Plan'. When it was necessaiy to mention 
it, Clinton just gave conditional support to the VOPP at the joint press conferences with each West 
European leader in turn. 
Behind the scenes the US administration hinted that the real intention of Christopher's six 
steps was to promote an alternative policy to the VOPP. In essence, America's position stressed the 
need for a fonn of Western military intervention with no US ground troops, rather than the EC-UN 
promoted peace process. Therefore, the difference between the EC-UN position and the US 
administration was clear. The European states were in favour of promotmg the VOPP as well as 
negotiations. Then, following the announcement of the Christopher's six steps, the ICFY considered 
deploying UN-authorized NATO peacekeeping operations that would be accompanied by forces from 
71 "Hearing of the European Affairs Subcommittee the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, " 18 February 
1993, Federal News Service, Lexis-Nexis; Abrums, J. "Former Officials Assail Administration over Policy 
on Bosnia, " The Associated Press, 19 February 1993, Lexis-Nexis. 
72 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 128. 
73 Clinton, Bill, and Major, John. "US-UK Special Relationship' Opening Remarks at News Conference on 
24 February 1993, Washington D. C, " US Department ofState Dispatch 4, no. 10 (1993): Article 1. 
74 Clinton, Bill, and Mitten-and, Francois. "US-French Cooper-ation in the Post Cold War World' Opening 
Statements at News Conference on 9 March 1993, " US Department of State Dispatch 4, no. II (1993): 
Article 4. 
75 Clinton, Bill, and Kohl, Helmut. "US-Gen-nan Relationship' Press Conference on 26 March 1993, 
Washington D. C, " US Department qfState Dispatch 4, no. 14 (1993): Article 4. 
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Other states (e. g. Russia) on the ground. " In contrast, the US argued for an entirely different strategy; 
the so-called 'hft and strike' policy. This advocated both lifting the arms embargo that had been placed 
on the Bosnian government as well as canying out aenal attacks against Bosnian Serb forces. 
With regard to this policy, on 23 Febnlary Boutros-Ghah met Clinton and his cabmet 
members in the White House. Boutros-Ghali asked Clinton to support the VOPP and to contribute 
troops to endorse the plan. According to Boutros-Ghali, Vice President Al Gore replied on behalf of 
Clinton. Gore emphasized the point that the VOPP would amount to an endorsement of Serbian gains. 
He called for the acceptance of a 'lift and strike' policy rather than supporting international efforts to 
enforce the VOPP. Clinton added that the US would try to support the VOPP, but it 'did see a need for a 
modification of the envisaged borders' in favour of the Bosnian government. " This had the effect of 
undermining not only the progress of the VOPP negotiations but also their credibility. The US 
administration justified its unwillingness to support VOPP negotiations by using moral arguments. 78 
Owen was 'shattered' when he realised that his American fiiends 'believed that Vance and I were 
somehow rewarding ethnic cleansing and aggression. 79 In retrospect, Christopher's six-step plan had 
set up the rationale for the US to draw a clear line between their 'just and workable' solution and that of 
the EC-UN. 80 
In short, the US would not support the VOPP regardless of European efforts. The ICFY 
supporters, especiafly at the British offices in the US, were frustruted at the American administration's 
ignoring of their opinion and realised that the Anglo-American alliance was not working in relation to 
the Bosnian issue. 81 The American policy at the beginning of the tr-ansatlantic interaction regarding the 
VOPP can be sununarized as foHows: 
76 Owen, "The Future of the Balkans: an Interview with David Owen, " 5. 
77 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 72. 
78 Anthony Lake commented that the US mainly criticized the VOPP's pructical difficulties but this aspect 
and the plan's moral issue were 'uilseparable. ' Interview with Anthony Lake (the US National Security 
Adviser, 1993-1996) on 19 May 2004. 
79 Owen, "The Future of the Balkans: an Inter-viewAith David Owen, " 5. 
80 Christopher, 'New Steps toward Conflict Resolution in the Former Yugoslavia. " 
81 Interviex with Robin Renwick (the UK Ambassador to the US, 1991-1995) on 5 October 2004; Interview 
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1) The US administration reserved the right to hold its own views on Bosnian peace (i. e. 
the VOPP was not the only peace plan) 
2) The warring parties were to be treated in accordance with their respect for human rights 
issues and thus it used the moral arguments as a means to criticize the VOPP, (i. e. in 
other words, the US could support one party of the conflict against others and thus this 
point demonstrated transatlantic disagreement regarding one of the prMCiples of the 
London Conference that was to be neutr-al to the warring parties). 82 
3) The US administration preferred lifting the an-ns, embargo (scrapping UNSCR 713 in 
relation to Bosnia) as opposed to the deployment of NATO or US peacekeeping troops. 
4) The US government was not willing to use political pressure to force the Bosnian 
govemment to accept any peace plan. 
Yhe Realities of the Westem Interaction: America's Strateaic Challemye to the VOPP 
During the spring of 1993, European leaders made efforts to persuade the US administration 
to endorse the VOPP while also trying to obtain consent from the waning parties for implementmg it. 
However, the US position towards the VOPP had hardened. In this divided international context, the 
second phase of the talks between the Bosnian parties was held at New York from 16 to 25 March. At 
the end of this, the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Croatian leaders signed an interim 
arrangement and the provisional map. 83 The Bosnian Serb leader did not sign them. Obtaining a 
signature fi7om the Bosnian Serbs on the provisional map became the key target of the negotiations. As 
they could not rely on American political pressure on the three waning parties of Bosnia, Vance and 
with David Hannay on 6 October 2004. 
82 Anthony Lake commented that the US recognized Bosnia under the leadership of Izetbegovi6. Thus the 
onlv legitimate government was that of Izetbegovi6. In this respectý he added that the US administration did 
not oppose the principles of the London Conference but it did oppose the practices of the ICFY. Interview 
with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004. 
ý3 Owen, Balkan OqYSSev, 133. 
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Owen decided to use MilogeviCs influence on the Bosnian Serbs. 84 The French President, Franýols 
85 Mitterrand, created an opportunity in Paris to discuss the VOPP with Milogevi6 on II March 1993. 
He persuaded Milogevi6 to put pressure on the Bosnian Serb leader Kara&i6 to accept the VOPP. 
Vance and Owen also attended part of the meeting, where they realized that MilogeviCs bottom line 
was lifting economic sanctions against Serbia. 86 
Since the second phase of the talks between the Bosnian paities in New York at the end of 
March 1992, and keeping Milos'eviCs demands in mind, Vance and Owen had begun to construct a 
strategy to obtain the consent of all paities to the implementation of the VOPP. This was the legitimate 
procedure of the 'sovereign peace', which gave shape to the conventional UN coriffict resolution 
process and to the principles of the London Conference. This was also a natural choice for the ICFY 
Co-Chairmen, given the fact that they could not rely on coercive powers to impose the settlement. 
They wanted to obtain the LJNSC's clear support for the VOPP and also possible ftuther sanctions on 
Serbia if it did not cooperate with Vance and Owen. 87 Accordingly, Boutros-Ghali asked LJNSC 
members to assist Vance and Owen, and the EC supported this idea. 88 Following tl-ýs request, the 
British and the French delegations at the UN began to draft a resolution to endorse support of the VOPP. 
However, on 30 March the US blocked tl-ýs draft even before it was placed on the table of the UNSC. 89 
This was because towards the end of the warring parties' meeting in New York the US administration 
had begun to promote a lift and strike policy 
America's next move became clear when Clinton met German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in 
Washington on 26 March 1993. Izetbegovi6 happened to be in Washington at the same time and thus 
met both leaders. At a joint press conference with KoW, Clinton stated that the need to fift the arms 
84 Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004. Also, Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 142. 
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86 Owen, Balkan Odý, sscy, 142. 
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88 Owen, Balkan Oqý, ssey, 142; EPC, "Statement on American Steps to Promote Peace and a Political 
Settlement in Foriner Yugoslavia, " (93/053). 
89 Boutros-Ghali, UnvanquLs-hed, 77-78. 
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embargo on Bosnia was their new approach to the Bosnian conflict. 90 In the official statement Kohl 
disagreed with Clinton and instead emphasized the importance of promoting the VOPP91 However, on 
2 April Clinton repeated his argument in favour of lifting the arms embargo at the Vancouver G7 
sumnut. 92 Other Western leaders refused to support Clinton 93 Despite this international pressure on the 
US) it did not seek to form a compromise with the Europeans. On that day (2 April) Cyrus Vance 
decided to leave his position as UN Special Representative, a resignation that came into effect on 2 
May 1993. Fonner Norwegian Foreign Minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg, was appointed as 1-ýs successor. 
Although Vance had acted in the capacity of UN-appointed Co-Chairman of the ICFY, there had been 
anticipation among international actors that his career as a former US Secretary of State would facilitate 
America's cooperation to the Bosnia peace process. However, his resignation clearly dismissed such 
potential. 
These international divisions had the effect of softening the pressures on the Bosnian Serbs 
to endorse the peace plan. 94 On 2 April, the day of the Vancouver G7 summit, the Bosman Serb 
Assembly grasped this opportunity by rejecting the provisional map of the VOPP. 95 In addition, the 
situation in Srebrenica-where Muslims comprised a majority- became tense as Bosnian Seib forces 
had been intensifying their attack on the city since March 1993. With regard to this situation, on 13 
April NATO began its so-called Operation Deny Flight to give substance to UNSCR 816 (adopted 31 
March 1993). 96 UNSCR 816 strengthened the concept of 'no-fly zones' that prohibited all air flights 
90 Clinton and Kohl, "US-German Relationship'Press Conference on 26 March 1993, Washington D. C. " 
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over Bosnia without permission from UNPROFOR. 9'The UNSC also adopted resolution 819 and 
98 declared Srebrenica. a 'safe area' on 16 April. However, the LNSC and other UN member states 
could not provide sufficient ground troops to enforce the concept of 'safe area'. 99 Therefore the 
adoption of UNSCR 819 did not deter the Bosnian Serb forces' attack on the city. '00 International 
political, as well as military collaboration was urgently needed. 
On the same day (16 April), Clinton announced that with the exception of sending American 
troops, he would consider all options to restore peace including revising the VOPP. 101 As one of these 
options, he again proposed lifting the arms embargo and also launching aerial strikes for restoring to 
restore peace in Bosnia. 102This suggested that the US administmtion had intensified its opposition to 
the VOPP. Clinton implied that the heart of the US-EC row on the issue of Bosnia related to the role of 
multilaterahsm. As he stated the matter: 
I have gperated from the beginnffig under the assumption that whatever is done 
must be done within the framework of a multflateral cooperatio that this was not 
something the United States could effectively do alone. 
However, he added: 
[] those are the d-fings that I have been able to do, takinR a situation that was in 
quite bad shape when I found it and within the limits of multflatemhsm. I wouldn't 
rule out other stqp [emphasis added]. 
103 
After making these announcements, on 19 and 20 April, Clinton telephoned Major and Mitten-and to 
discuss his plan. 10'They shared the view that they should do something about the Bosnian situation 
since the UN 'safe area' of Srebrenica was about to fall into the Bosnian Serbs' control. 105 However, 
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they disagreed what to do. On the one hand, the European leaders were in favour of the VOPP and thus 
wanted to continue with the peace negotiations. On the other hand, the US administration promoted a 
lift and strike policy with the threat that the US would do thýs unilaterally, if necessary. However, M this 
conversation with Clinton, Major got the impression that Clinton had not completely made up 1-ýs mind 
what his position would be. Major also states that Mitten-and began to soften his opposition to the fift 
and strike I)OliCy. 
106 
A 
,, Ls a compromise, they agreed to tighten UN economic sanctions against Serbia, in pursuant 
to the latter's support to the VOPP. Accordingly UNSCR 820 was adopted on 17 April. 10' It contained 
an article stating that economic sanctions would be imposed against nimp Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) nine days after the resolution was passed (i. e. 26 April) if the Bosnian Serbs refused to 
accept the VOPP. However, there was no substantial reaction from the Bosnian Serbs after the nine 
days in question. On 28 April, the LNSC adopted resolution 821, and it recommended expelling 
Yugoslavia ftorn the UN Economic and Social Committee. 108 
As a result of these sanctions on the pall of the UN, the ICFY obtained the UNSC's fonnal 
support in their attempts to urge Milogevi6 to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to accept the VOPP. 109 This 
strategy worked well. On 25 April Milogevi6 decided to support the VOPP and he was urged to 
persuade Karad2i6 to accept it. "O The next day Milogevi6 and the other rump Yugoslav presidents sent 
a letter to the Bosnian Serb Assembly demanding that it accept the VOPP On 26 April, the Bosnian 
Serb Assembly voted for the idea that the final position vis-A-vis the VOPP would be decided by the 
refermdum. "' Ms was scheduled for 15 and 16 May. 112 The result of the referendum could easily be 
predicted. However, the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan, Karad2i6 suggested that there could be no 
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forinal decision until the referendum. 113 -MS implied that they nught reconsider their position 
depending on the outcomes of the result of the negotiations with the other warring parties. 
By that time the Greek govemment had agreed to provide ICFY with an opportunity to hold 
a meeting of the three Bosnian parties in Athens. ' 14 The three parties accepted a meeting for 1-2 May 
1993. This was a critical moment if the VOPP was to be saved. United and sustained international 
pressure on the Bosnian Serb authority was clearly needed. The EC had been united behind the VOPP 
since early 1993. The UN and NATO also began to discuss the implementation of the Vopp. 115 
American support for the VOPP was eagerly anticipated. However, just before the meeting, the US 
administration indicated that America's new policy would be put into action regardless of the outcomes 
of the Athens meeting. The US Department of State Spokesman, Richard Boucher remarked: '[fl wont 
pre[-ýudge the outcome of the Athens meeting. But the President and the Secretary have made clear 
that we'll continue on our course. ' 116 
To sum up, the Clinton administration had been actively promoting the so-called 'lift and 
strike' policy in opposition to the VOPP. It did not have any serious intention of accepting European 
influence on the Bosnian issue either ptior to or after the intra-Western interaction. Moreover, the 
Clinton administration eventually challenged the logic of multilaterahsm itself This is clear in 
Clinton's speech on 2 April 1993 as well as the State Department Spokesman Boucher's statements on 
30 April. To quahfy the political context, chronological evidence indicates that the Clinton 
administration had formed its opposition to the VOPP as soon as it took over the White House in 
January 1993. This suggests that the Clinton administmtion's policy to defy the VOPP and its 
multilateralism had been decided before US domestic actors (e. g. Congress, media and public 
opinions) attempted to define the direction of America's Bosnian policy As we have shown, M January 
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1993 when Vance and Owen visited New York the Clinton administration reacted negatively to the 
VOPP without knowing the contents of it. This also implies, that the US government's criticism of the 
moralistic deficit of the VOPP was substantially prepared after they had decided to oppose the VOPP 
Tberefore, according to the previously-discussed Risse-Kappen's criteria (see Chapter 1), there is a 
reasonable foundation to assurne that the Clinton administration's use of moral values in the form of 
undennining the credibility of the VOPP was related to its vital interests. Accordingly it can be said that 
such a manipulation of Western values was a well-calculated policy to prevent European 'voice 
oppofturýties'. 
The Clinton administration's approach to the Bosnian conflict was clearly a departure from 
that of its predecessor. The Bush administration had decided to accept the principles of the London 
Conference and did not challenge the idea of multilateralism that was the guiding non-n of the ICFY. It 
only refused to deploy the US troops on the ground. However, the Clinton administration's approach to 
the Bosnian conflict transformed America's perception of its vital interests from minimal opposition to 
the pailicular outcomes of multilateralism to the logic of multilateralism itself. This was because the 
ICFY, the EC and the UN created a situation in which the US could not avoid the outcomes--namely 
sending US ground troops as a pail of the peace implementation mission-so long as it supported the 
logic of multilateralism that was incwnated M the principles of London Conference and the ICFY 
fi-arnework. Iberefore, as a next step the US administr-ation would challenge the political ft-arneworks 
that sustained the legitimacy of the VOPP, the principles of the London Conference, the framework of 
the ICFY and the European vision of multilateralism. 
The 'Lift and Strike' Policy and the Failure of Intra-Western Multilateratism 
On 1-2 May 1993 in Athens Vance and Owen held a meeting with the BoslUan and 
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Yugoslav leaders to get the agreement to implement the Vopp . 
117 At the end of the meeting, Vance and 
Owen got a long awaited signature from the Bosnian Serb leader Radvan Kara&i6 on the provisional 
map and the interim arrangements-' 18 Karad& signed up to both on 2 May 1993 on condition that they 
would only be valid if the Bosrýian Serb Assembly ratified them. 1 19 Despite Karad&'s stated condition, 
the ICFY suppoiters believed that the Bosnian conflict would soon cease. 120 On 4 May the UN 
Secretary-General even presented a 'working paper' to the LJNSC that considered possible 
reinforcement of the peacekeeping operation. In this paper he proposed to send 70,000 troops to Bosrua 
to secure the 'safe areas. ' It envisaged NATO as having operational and tactical control with the UNSC 
holding political and strategic authority. 121 The ICFY Co-Chairmen eagerly awaited American support 
for the success of the process to obtain the 'final' agreement to the VOPP fi7om the Bosnian Serbs. 122 
Despite this, the US administration's resolve to oppose the VOPP was strong. The Clinton 
administration in fact had no intention of executing politiCal pressure for the ffiree Bosnian parties to 
accept the VOPP. It also refused any American contribution to the implementation of the VOPP. On 27 
April, Christopher hinted at the American rationale of this position in his congressional testimony He 
explained four rules for the use of American military force that are known as the Weinberger-Powell 
Doctrine. These are as follows: there must be a clear goal; there must also be a high chance of success; 
a clear exit strategy is required; and American public support is necessary. 123 Owen thought that: 'none 
of these conditions was likely to be met in the early stages of implementation. ' 124 By that time, Owen at 
last understood the motives behind Christopher's six points from 10 February. 125 In short, America's 
117 At the end of this meeting, Cyrus Vance formally stepped down as the UN co-chainnan of the ICFY and 
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advocacy regarding the Bosnian peace was used as a tool to legitfi-nize its lack of interest in supporting 
the VOPP in both its negotiation aspect and the implementation process. 126 
As previously discussed, the Clinton administration legitiný its position by appeal to a 
moral argument. The US kept its distance from the European approach by criticizing Europeans for not 
caring about the difference between the 'victims' (Bosnian Muslims and Croats) and the 'aggressor' 
(Serbs). Subsequently, on I May the Clinton admiýnistration formalized the so-called 'hft and strike' 
policy in order to deter the 'aggression' on the part of Serbs. 12' This was a policy that lifted the UN 
anns embargo to fon-ner Yugoslavia-which LJNSCR 713 had imposed on September 199 1 -M order 
to support the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Croats. In addition, it advocated aenal attacks 
against Bosnian Serb forces. In order to promote tWs policy, Christopher was dispatched to Europe on 
the day it was formalized. 128According to him, this action was needed not merely because 
humanitarian values were at stake: '[b]ut fundamentally our actions are also based upon the strategic 
interests of the United States. ' 129 The vital interests in this context were clearly to prevent the US troops 
gettmg involved in the peace implementation missions on the ground. 
For the leaders of the EC and the ICFY, the 'lift and strike' policy was America's milateral 
move, and they strongly refused to accept it. 130 Some authors argue that Christopher's soft style of 
negotiation was the reason why he could not persuade European allies. 13 'However, the opposite was 
the case. The US administration did not provide any substantial opportunity for its allies to have their 
views reflected in any of the outcomes of the American policy, not only before it had formalized the 
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'lift and strike'policy but also after it had decided the policy Officially, the US administration claimed 
that carrying out 'consultations with its allies' were precisely the aim of Christopher's mission to 
Europe. 132 However, the then British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, has negatively assessed the 
reality of the 'consultation'. 
He believed Christopher had made up his mind, and, effectively ignored all actual 
consultation and demanded the UK accept the policy of 'lift and strike'. In response, Hurd defended the 
British position. Christopher did not listen but simply repeated his own views and the proposed US 
policy solution. 133 Furffiermore, the US administration refused British input prior to the formalization of 
the 'lift and strike' policy Before Christopher's mission, the British government had suggested to its 
US counterparts that it would not be able to support the 'lift and strike' policy 134 For instance, John 
Major had sent a message to Clinton prior to Cliristopher's visit stating that air strikes for the service of 
diplomacy of the ICFY and an enforcement of the no-fly zone should be considered instead. 135 
Christopher did not even mention the British proposal when he came to promote the 'hft and strike' 
policy. 
136 However, the Clinton had realized the fact that the European allies were not willing to accept 
the 'lift and strike' policy prior to Christopher's visit. ' 3'This episode illustrates the reality of the intra- 
Western cooperation that was directed by the US not by multilateralism. From America's perspective, 
'consultation'with its allies meant compelling Europeans to accept US policy. 
Cluistopher received cold reactions from his European counterparts. 138 For the European 
leaders responded as such for the following three reasons. Firstly, they were concerned about the effect 
of the 'lift and strike' policy on the ground. David Owen, as well as John Major and Douglas Hurd 
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recognized the fimction of the air strikes M pushing the Bosnian Serbs to sign up to the Vopp . 
139 
However, they opposed the idea of lifting the arms embargo, as this would certainly result in the 
intensification of fighting on the ground. "0 This in turn would increase the risks to the peace-keeping 
mission to which the EC member states had contributed the bulk of its personnel. Accordingly, lifting 
the an-ns, embargo might force the delay of humanitarian aid. 141 The European message was clear, 
Douglas Hurd stated that diplomatic pressure for the settlement was the most important aspect of 
Western cooperation but 'hft' was not pressure for peace but a vote for war. 1142 Secondly, they also 
emphasized that it is indispensable to have America's military participation on the ground for 
iM I ing h Vopp 143 L'astly, indee p ement ted, the Europem leaders had expected a positive result from the 
ICFY's meeting M Athens, and anticipated positive outcomes of the debate at the Bosnian Serb 
A-6sembly regarding the acceptance of the VOPP. 
The Bosnian Serb Re Lerendum and European Attempts to Save Multilateralism 
The expectations among supporters of the ICFY regarding the success of the VOPP were 
unsustainable. American proposals regarding the 'lift and strike' policy, which had not yet been 
implemented, encouraged the Bosnian Serb Assembly to harden its position. As a result, it refused to 
endorse the VOPP and instead decided to hold a referendum on 6 May. Milogevi6 was there to 
persuade representatives to vote in favour of the VOPP. 1441n relation to the VOPP negotiations, the 
ICFY tried to use Milogevi6 as a substitute for American political support. However, he fai-led to 
convince the Bosnian Serb Assembly On 17 May 1993 the referendum turned out to be against the 
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VOPP International pressure did not work either. The referendum among the Bosnian Serbs drove a 
final nail into the expectations that had been raised by the Athens meeting. 
This was a clear failure of international diplomacy Pressure on the Bosnian Serbs did not 
ensure support for the VOPP. Moreover, the US launched its alternative policy of 'lift and strike' when 
there seemed to exist a possibility for success in gaining consensus for the VOPP. In this respect, not 
only the contents, but also the timing of the American decision to promote the 'hft and strike' policy 
damaged the unity of international efforts behind the VOPR The 'blame game' for such a failure in 
international diplomacy began when the US failed to obtain consent for the 'hft and strike'pohcy from 
its allies. 
There were two European attempts to save the ICFY framework in general and the VOPP in 
particular. One of these was instituted by the French, who proposed to include Bosnian cities under the 
aegis of UN 'safe areas. ' However, the US blocked discussion of this issue at the UNSC 145 . The other 
attempt came from the Russians. Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, indicated Iýiis agreement with 
Owen and Stoltenberg's idea of the so-called 'progressive implementation' of the VOPP. 146 This idea 
was to implement the VOPP in Muslim and Croatian areas regardless of whether the warring parties on 
the ground were to stop fighting or not. 147 Such a plan would require an armed UN force of 25,000, 
which would likely involve a substantial contribution from NATO. 148 
Owen and Stoltenberg discussed this plan with Tudjman and Izetbegovi6. The latter two 
agreed to this on 18 May 149 The following day the ICFY Chainnen discussed the plan with NATO's 
Southern Commander, Admiral Boorda, and NATO's Supreme Alhed Commander in Europe 
(SACEUR), General Shalikashvili. Owen was impressed by the fact that these senior NATO staff had 
studied the VOPP and prepared military deployment plans in detail. Apart from their caution about the 
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difficulty regarding the Bosnian Serb-controlled area, these NATO officials did not oppose the 
proViSional ilnp lementation of t1le Vopp . 
150 
On 19 May, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev and his Bosnia envoy Churkin went to 
D- 
Rome to discuss this issue with European Foreign Ministers attending a meeting of WEU. According 
to Owen, the Russians were convinced that European Foreign Ministers would be in favour of the 
idea. 15' At the same time, French and British Foreign Ministers were making preparations to re-vitalize 
the VOPP at the UNSC. 152 The British Foreign Secretary was also suggesting the possibility of 
potential sanctions over Croatia regarding the Bosnian Croat forces' offensives in Mostal. 153 These 
European reactions encouraged Kozyrev and he decided to refer the 'provisional iMPlementation'plan 
of the VOPP to the UNSC with the aim of authorizing it. Tl-ýs was scheduled for 21 May 1993.154 
The Clinton Administration ý Answer to European Multilateralism 
While the Europeans were promoting the VOPP and the UN's role M Bosnia, the US 
administration strengthened its resolve to keep its distance from both. It reacted in three ways. Firstly, 
the US shifted attention away from the Bosnian conflict to the Balkan Peninsula in general. It is widely 
reported that Bill Clinton changed his mind from promoting a 'lift and strike' policy to the 
'containment' of the Bosnian conflict at the same time Christopher sold the former policy to his 
European counterparts. 155 It was reported that Clinton's shift in his approach resulted from his having 
read Robeit Kaplan's book, Balkan Ghost. 156 This book emphasized persistent ethnic antagonism that 
penneated the history of the Balkan Peninsula. Accordingly, the US administration decided to dispatch 
a small number of peacekeeping troops to Macedonia in order to prevent the 'spiU-over' from the 
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Bosnian conflict. 157 However, this was merely a face-saving device on the part of Clinton. Despite the 
impression inside and outside of the US government that the 'hft and strike' policy had been 
nil 1581 act retained it. At the Mghest level, they contMUed to abandoned the Clinton administration in f 
promote the 'lift and strike'policy to the allies ffirougliout 1993 - 
Secondly, the US administration rationalized its disengagement from the VOPP negotiations. 
In his congressional testimony on 18 May Warren Christopher, tried to dissociate the US fi7om 
responsibility in relation to the Bosnian problem. He said that Bosnia was a 'problem fi7om hell'. He 
also underlined, however, that 'at heart, this is a European problem. '160 In this way, he justified the 
policy of trying to contain rather than to settle the Bosnian conflict. This implied that the Clinton 
administration's concern regarding human rights was selective and hence politically motivated. 
Ihirdly, the US attempted to peimanently scmp the VOPP. The Clinton administrution 
persuaded the Russian Foreign Minister to launch a joint US-Russian initiative regarding the Bosnian 
peace process instead of holding a LJNSC meeting on the 'progressive implementation'of the Vopp. 161 
The US requested the UK, France and Spain (the then chair-state of the UNSC) to support this 
initiative. 162 As a result, they announced the so-called 'Joint Action Program' on 22 May. 163 T he Joint 
Action Program re-named the Vance-Owen Peace Plan as the Vance-Owen Peace 'Process'. Even 
before the Joint Action Program, the US administration had used the term 'process' to refer to the 
VOPP. This mclicated that they did not regard the VOPP as the only possible plan but rather one of a 
157 Christopher, Warren. "U. S. Leadership After the Cold War: NATO and Transatlantic Security: 
Intervention by Secretary of State Warren Christopher at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting 
Athens, Greece June 10,1993ý" U. S. Department of State Office of the Spokesman (1993): 
http: //dosfan. lib. uic. edu/ERC/briefing/dossec/1993/9306/93061Odossec. html [Accessed on 17 February 
2005]. 
158 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 19-20. 
159 interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004. 
160 Cluistopher, Warren. "Hearing of the House European Affairs Subcominittee the Senate Foreign Affairs 
Con-u-nittee, " Federal Neivs Service, 18 May 1993, Lexis-Nexis; Drew, On the Edge, 162. 
161 Drew, On the Edge, 79; Silber and Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, 288. 
162 Hurd, Memoirs, 462-463. 
163 Christopher, Warren. "Announcement of the Joint Action Program on the Conflict in Bosnia, " US 
Department qfState Di-spatch 4, no. 21 (1993): Article 2. 
http: //dosfan. lib. uic. edu/ERC/biiefing/dispatch/I 993/btml/Dispatchv4no2 I. html [Accessed on 20 March 
2005]. 
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number of choices. 1641n other words, keeping the ICFy away fi7om the international poticy-making 
process in relation to the Bosnian conflict was the American aim behind the Joint Action Program. 165 
CriticaRy, given America's morafly charged opposition to the VOPP, the Joint Action Program did not 
even help the 'victims' in the form of the Bosnian Mushms. Therefore, on 23 May, immediately after 
the announcement of the Joint Action Program, Izetbegovi6 rejected it. 166 
In short, the essence of the Joint Action Program was to shelve the Vopp. 167 The European 
leaders' unified support collapsed. There were two reactions from the European policy-makers who 
participated in the launching of the Joint Action Program. On the one hand, Kozyrev only later realiZed 
what America's concealed objective in announcing the Joint Action Progr-am was and regretted what he 
had signed up to. 168 On the other hand, however, Douglas Hurd was clearly aware of American 
mtentions and the Joint Action Program's implication regarding the fate of the Vopp. 169 However, the 
US presented the Joint Action Program as one that transcended the issues of Bosnia. The US demanded 
its allies consider the transatlantic alliance between the US and Europe. This forced European leaders 
to ask themselves whether they should choose the Anglo-American alliance or implement 
multilateralism in the form of the VOPR'70 Under such circumstances Hurd and the French Foreign 
Minister Alain Jupp6 'had to judge how far we could carry out reasonable disagreements with the 
Americans on Bosnia without endangering the wider partnership'. "' This shift in a locus of 
international policy fi7om the European solidarity in the form of the VOPP to the Atlantic alliance 
undern-tined the unity widiin the EC. For instance, Gennany was not invited to participate in the 
programme. The German Defence Minister, Volker Riffie, strongly condemned the Joint Action 
164 
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Program as 'morally catastrophic. "721ndeed, multilateralism. could not contain the abuse of America's 
power asymmetry vis-a-vis the other Western states. The US did not allow its allies what the Liberal 
Multilateralists refer to as 'voice opportunities'. 
Arnefican actions to undermine the legitimacy of the ICFY's role in the Bosnian issue went 
even finther than this. The US administration challenged the very basis of intra-Western interaction at 
that time. The institutional framework and principles of the London Conference of August 1992 gave 
the ICFY the legitimacy of UN-centred multilateralism. On 18 May the US Ambassador to UN, 
Madeleine Albright, and the Peter Tamoff, the US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 
demanded that the UN Secretary-General relinquish the fi-amework of the London Conference. 
Boutros-Ghali recafled: 
Albright pLoposed that "once and for all" we simply drop the Mroach set by th 
London Conference of Aug_ust 1992. "1 hate being involved in arguments over the 
Vance-Owen map, " she said. Instead, she proposed to move to "a Balkan 
conference. " Yes, Tarnoff added, we want "a Balkan perspective. " I [Boutros- 
Ghali] asked what this meant. "All the countries of the Danube, " Albright said. I 
could make little sense of d-iis [ ... ]. The London Conference was the queed 
international fi-amework for dealing with the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.. 
The United States had fully participated in it; it could not simply drojo it. I 
suggested instead that the Undon Conference hold a second session [emphasis 
addedi. 173 
Thýs suggested the next target of American diplomacy regarding the Bosnian conflict. The US would 
challenge the fi-arnework of London Conference and the authority of UN-centred multilateralism. 
To surn up, it is logical to consider that the timing of America's launching of initiatives 
regarding the Bosnian conflict (such as the fonnalization of the 'hft and strike' policy and the 'Joint 
Action Program) were deliberately aimed at clashing with that of the ICFY's critical efforts to 
promote the VOPP. By that time, Arnefica, was not only opposing the outcome of multilater-alism (i. e. 
deploying the US troops on the ground) but also challenging the very fi-arnework that legitimized such 
172 Owen, Balkan 0(4ssey, 190. 
173 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanqlkýhed, 84. 
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demands (i. e. the London Conference and the ICFY). Given this context, it is clear that America's 
ultimate object of proposing the 'lift and strike' policy and launching the 'Joint Action Program' was to 
undermine the authorities of London Conference and the activities of ICFY-m other words the 
symbol of the European vision of multilateralism. Therefore, the challenge to multilateralism within the 
Western Order was intrinsic to America's Bosnia initiatives. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the inter-action between Western states in their promotion of the 
VOPP. The main theoretical aspect of this process relates to the extent to which the US administration 
followed a multilateral path. In other words, it evaluates Westem states'-M particular British-, 
influence on the American foreign policy-making process. In ten-ns of the 'process' as well as 
4 outcomes' of intra-Western interaction concerning the VOPP, there were few opportunities for British 
and European policy- makers to have their views reflected in the American policy-making process. The 
Clinton administration did not support the peace plan promoted by the EC and the UN. From the time 
the VOPP was proposed up until its collapse in May 1993, the Clinton administration progressively 
strengthened its resolve to block the plan. 
In the 'consultation' process with its allies following the fonnalization of the 'hft and strike' 
policy, the US administration repeatedly attempted to impose this policy. They conceded that they 
would not unilaterally implement a 'hfl and strike'policy. Therefore, any European influence at that 
time was to prevent the US resorting to unilateral action to replace the internationally legitimate 
institutional fi-amework of the ICFY This concession was only possible because European states 
refused to accept the policy as it stood. 174 However, European states were not able to change the 'lift 
and strike' policy itself Even after the US faced serious opposition fi7om the Europeans, the Clinton 
174 Wiltney, Craig. R. "Conflict in Balkans: Europe; Europe's call: Lead on, US, " The New York Times, 7 
May 1993, Al. 
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administration did not abandon the potential of the 'hft and strike' PoliCy. 
175 In fact, Anthony Lake 
recalled that he did actually promote the 'hft and strike'policy again when he visited various European 
capitals irl July 1993.176 
Indeed, it was the United States government that refused to accept not only a coflective 
policy-making process among the Western states but also the political consequences of multilateralism. 
The Liberal Multilateralists claim that multilateralism prevents any potential abuse of America's 
asymmetric power over other Western states. However, the outcomes of intr-a-Westem inter-action in 
relation to the VOPP demonstrated such a claim is unsustainable. In essence, the US administration 
supported the multilateralism to the exterit it agreed with the outcomes that it generated. This is the 
form of intemational. cooperation that this research refers to as 'Quasi-multilatemlism. ' Douglas Hurd 
underscores this point and recaUs the nature of intra-Western mteraction at that time as foHows: 
[American leaders] admire and sometimes practise blunt speech, but it is almost 
always within a fi-amework of accepted thought which they regard as correct. 177 
Like Douglas Hurd himself, British policy-makers have undergone similar experiences in their attempt 
to influence American foreign policy through the supposedly established fi-amework of multilateralism. 
The overwhelming irony was that the Clinton administration had constantly praised the idea of 
cmultilateralism'. It can be concluded that there was no substantial British and European influence on 
the outcomes ofAmerican policy from January to May 1993 regarding the Bosnian conflict. 
This American chaHenge to the European vision of multilateralism was accompanied by the 
transfon-nation of its vital interests and the means to achieve them. The initial US position accepted the 
logic of multilateralism (i. e. the London Conference and the ICFY) but opposed its outcomes, as they 
did not accord with America's vital interests (i. e. not sending America's troops). However, the Clinton 
administration believed that in order to oppose the outcomes they also needed to re-define the forin of 
175 Clinton, Bill. "The President's News Conference: May 14,1993, " Public Papers qfthe Presidents (1993). 
Lexis-Nexis; Interview With Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004. 
176 Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004. 
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international cooperation in accordance with their preferences. Their 14tal interests were now not only 
preventing America's military involvement in Bosnia but also replacing the normative regulation of the 
West fi7om multilateralism to Quasi-multilateralism. Quasi-multilateralism would allow the US to 
command international leadership without producing outcomes that imposed a heavy burden upon her. 
For legitimizing this transformation, the US advocated an alternative approach to Westem values. In 
opposition to European procedural interpretation of Western value-multilateralism-the US 
advocated the ideological interpretation of Western value in the fonn of protecting the interests of the 
'victims' of the conflict (i. e. the Bosnian government). Chapter 4 will demonstrate America's ftirther 
manipulation of moral values. It will also suggest the ramifications of such a policy to the Bosnian 
conffict and to the re-formation of the Western Order. 
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Chapter 4 Legitimizing Quasi-Multilateralism in the Name of Promoting 
'Democratic Peace', from June to September 1993 
This chapter provides an empirical foundation for one of the main clauns of this thesis. The 
claim is that the US will only give substance to the procedural value of the West (i. e. respecting the 
outcomes of multilateralism), if they are in accord with America's geo-strategic and vital interests 
wl&h the US has already decided before any Western multilateral interaction. When the consequences 
of multilateralism differ fi7om the preferences of the US, the latter typically takes the following two 
steps. Firstly, the US refuses to follow the consequences of multilateralism and insists on the adoption 
of an alternative US-promoted policy. Secondly, the US attempts to distort a value of Western 
interaction, namely multilateralism. The first case has already been discussed in Chapter 3 with regard 
to the relationship between the VOPP and the 'Joint Action Program' as well as the 'lift and strike' 
policy This chapter focuses on the second case. 
From June to September 1993, instead of following the outcomes of multilateralism, the US 
attempted to alter the orthodox interpretation of Western value in order to justify its vital interests. A 
part of the working hypothesis of this research will be evaluated in relation to this case, namely that 
there is a link between the West European states' loss of influence on America's foreign policy-making 
process and the US administration's manipulation of the definition of Western values In accord with its 
quasi-multilateral vision of international cooperation. This chapter will argue that America's advocacy 
of an ideological interpretation of Western values, based on the idea of 'democmtlc peace', was a 
means to promote America's vital interests, opposed to following the outcomes of the procedural 
normative value of multilateralism and its concept of 'sovereign peace'. In the context of the Bosnian 
conflict, America's vital interests were to maintain NATO's de facto independence from the UN 
regarding the use of coercive power (i. e. keeping its collective self-defence identity) and to enable the 
US to desist fi-om sending ground t: roops to Bosnia. The outcomes of multilateralism were America's 
endorsement and support of the ICFY-promoted peace plans. 
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The first section of this chapter will look at the transatlantic debate on NATO air strikes 
during the summer of 1993. The study of this period will point out the implications of the European 
approach to the Bosnian conflict in respect of America's vital interests. There was mounting pressure 
on NATO to abandon its de facto independence from the UN as regards its coUective security 
operations outside of NATO's jurisdiction (i. e. 'out-of area'peacekeeping nussions). Tl-ýs was a critical 
issue because accepting the substantial authority of the UN over the NATO decisiOn-making process 
has the potential to transform the identity of NATO from that of collective self-defence to forming a 
subordinate part of UN collective security mechanisms; meaning NATO would have to abide by UN 
Security Council decisions. Although such a transfonnation is in accord with the Liberal 
Multilateralists' interpretation of the nature of NATO and the Western Order, the Clinton admirýistmtion 
did not want to endorse it. 'Me analyses of America and of NATO reaction to tl-ýs transatlantic debate 
are thus essential to evaluate the coherence of the Liberal Multilateralists' arguments on NATO's 
hybrid charactenstics. 
The second section will follow the developments of the above-discussed tension and will 
discuss the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan of August 1993 and its failure to obtain America's support. It 
will also elucidate the fact that America's opposition to the ICFY's initiatives was not based on the 
contents of the peace plans (i. e. ideological moral values) but on the implications of them for 
America's interests, that is, in the way the UN might gain any authority over NATO's use of coercive 
power. The key claim in this section is that America's vital interests were not only to send ground 
troops to Bosnia but to be able to maintain NATO's defacto independence fi7om the UN. 
The third and the fourth sections will analyse the relationship between the political context 
of Western debates on the Bosnian conflict and the contents of a series of 1-ýigh-ranking US policy- 
makers' speeches In September 1993. It will provide evidence for the previously-discussed claim that 
America's attempt to re-clefine the moral missions of the West was simply a means to justify one of its 
ence vital interests, namely maintaining NATO's collective self-def 
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The Western Debate on NATO Air Strikes in August 1993 and the Role of 
MultHateralism 
The Bosnian Serb forces again surrounded the Bosnian capital Sarajevo in early June 1993. 
'Me situation called for international action. The Clinton administration had demanded its European 
allies accept the need for coercive power in the Western approach to Bosnia. ' This demand reflected the 
fact that the failure of the VOPP and the 'Joint Action Program'had gradually transfon-ned the political 
landscape of the Bosnian peace process. America intensified its political pressure on its allies to accept 
the 'hft and strike'policy. America's demand was partly manifested in the form of UNSCR 836 of 4 
June 1993. This UN resolution authorized UNPROFOR to implement 'safe-areas' under Chapter VH 
of the UN Charter, the airn of which was to provide a safer enviromnent for residents and refugees of 
23 
the areas. It demanded the UN member states provide multilateral forces to protect 'safe areas'. 
Following the adoption of UNSCR 836, on 10- 11 June NATO held a meeting of its decision 
making body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC). France suggested it would only accept NATO's air 
strikes provided there was clear pennission fi7om the UNSC. 4 This condition stipulated the so-called 
'dual key' of air strike action; a requirement for both NATO and the UN to give permission. Ineffect, 
NATO's operation was placed under the authority of the UN. It was a difficult condition for the US 
administration to accept. As a compromise, the NATO ministerial communique suggested the 
possibility of air strikes M the following way: 
[NATO wiH] offer our protective aiipower in case of attack against UNPROFOR 
in the perfort-nance of its overaH mandate, if it so requests. 5 
NATO promised to protect the UNPROFOR missions but it was not a full commitment to give 
I Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004; Interview with Robert Hunter (the US Ambassador to 
NATO, 1992-1995) on 17 May 2004. 
2 United Nations Security Council Resolution 836.4 June 1993. (S/Res/836). Para5. 
3 United Nations Security Council Resolution 836.4 June 1993. (S/Res/836). Para8. 
4 This is according to the WEU Secretary-General's memoir. Van Eekelen, William. Debating European 
Securjo,. - 1948-1998. The Hague: Sdu publishers, 1998.116. 
5 NATO, "Final Communiqu& Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Athens, Greece, 10 June 
1993, " X4 TO Press Communiquýs M-NAC- 1 (93) 38 (1993): Para3. 
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substance to 'safe-areas'. Thýs meant that NATO imposed a self-restriction on the interpretation of 
UNSCR 836 . 
6, MS point impH4 however, that NATO's cooperation with the UN in the Bosnian 
peace process became a serious political issue among Western states. A peace plan has two phases: its 
promotion, and its implementation. The VOPP was promoted by the EC-LN and was supposed to be 
implemented by NATO under the authority of the UN. It was a peace process based on negotiation. In 
contrast, the American preference was the use of coercive power in the service of diplomacy' For fl-ýs 
purpose, the US attempted to maintain NATO's de facto independence fi7om the UN regarding 
potential implementation of enforcement measures. 
The EC Summit o LJune 1993. - a New Attempt to Promote European Multilateralism 
In the meantime, the American drive to a policy of lifting the arms embargo in effect divided 
the EC members. The German govemment officiaUy decided to accept the 'lift and strike' policy8 
American diplomacy towards Germany had intensified since the 'Joint Action Program'. On the one 
hand it offered a 'carrot' to Germany. A few days after Kohl condemned the 'Joint Action Program', 
Clinton announced he would support Gen-nany's bid to become a permanent member of the UNSC 
together with Japan. 9 On the other hand, however, there was a stick. Christopher had publicly criticized 
the German position towards the 'Joint Action Program'. In an interview to USA Today, Christopher 
even suggested that the German policies at the end of 1991 that effectively promoted the EC's decision 
to recognize the statehood of Croatia in January 1992 was one of the origins of the Bosnian conflict. 'o 
The next day the German Chancellor dismissed such accusations and asked for the State Department's 
clarification of Christopher's comments" 
6 Gow, James. Tilumph qfthe Lack c? f Will.. International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War. London: Hurst 
& Company, 1997.135-136. 
7 interview with Dr. Robert Hunter (US Ambassador to NATO, 1991-1995) on 17 May 2004. 
8 Riding, Alan. "Kohl Urges AnTiing of Bosnian Muslims, " The New York Times, 26 June 1993, A6. 
9 Lewis, P. "US to Push Germany and Japan for UN council, " Ihe New York Times. 13 June 1993, A5. 
10 Neurnan, I "Christopher Raps German Role on Bosnia, " USA Tot*, 17 June 1993, Al. 
11 Williams, Daniel. "Three-Party Partition of Bosnia: Realities of War Come to the Fore; Vance-Owen Plan 
of Multiethnic Makeup Seems to Evaporate, " 7-he Washington Post, 19 June 1993, A 12. 
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This US-Gennan tension worked to America's favour. 12 Gennany changed its initial 
position and now begun to support the Ihft and strike'pohcy On 21 and 22 June 1993 the EC held its 
regular summit in Copenhagen and on that occasion Helmut Kohl proposed to lift the arms embargo to 
Bosnia and asked other member states of the EC to suppoll the possibility of air strikes. Kohl 
demanded that EC members accept the 'hft and strike' policy in response to the Clinton 
administration. 13 Mitten-and categorically refused to accept Clinton's idea via Kohl. Instead, he argued 
that the EC must put priority on strengthening UN peacekeeping operations rather than lifting the arms 
embargo. As a result, the EC summit's conclusion stated its support for the enforcement of the UN safe 
areas in Bosnia but not for the 'lift and strike' PoliCy. 
14 Mitten-and was determined to defend the EC's 
support for peace negotiations in opposition to the 'lift and strike'policy After the Summit, Mitten-and 
sent 1,300 additional French troops to reinforce UNPROFOR. 15AIthough it was not adopted, the 
German support for the 'lift and strike' policy and their emphasis on the Bosnian Muslims' interests 
created the first visible division between the EC members since the London Conference of August 
1992. 
Instead of supporting the 'fift and strike' policy, European leaders decided to back the 
revitalization the ICFY's peace negotiations. Owen suggested that the next peace plan would be based 
on the 'three-part confideration. ' According to him, the Dutch Foreign Minister was not satisfied with 
the new peace plan as the EC Foreign Ministers had expressed their official support to the VOPP only 
12 In the meantime, Christopher nominated Richard Holbrooke as the next US Ambassador to Germany. In 
1992 Holbrooke was a key foreign policy adviser to the then Presidential Candidate, Governor Clinton and 
recommended that Clinton adopt the so-called lift and strike'policy. Less than one year after the nomination 
of the German ambassador post, Holbrooke was appointed as the Assistant Secretary of State for European 
and Canadian Affairs in order to revitalize US policies regarding Bosnia and NATO. The former US Bosnia 
Envoy (from the surnmer 1993 to the spring 1994), Charles Redman, took over the position of the US 
Ambassador to Germany. It provided a context for America's attention to Gennany regarding the Bosnian 
conflict. Holbrooke, Richard. To End a War. New York: Random House, 1998.40-43,50-53,55-56; 
Christopher, Warren. Chances qfa Lifetime. New York: Scrbner, 2001.256. 
13 Riding. "Kohl Urges Arming of Bosnian Muslims. " 
14 EPC, "Statement on Bosnia-Her-zegovina: Conclusion of the European Council, " 21/22 June 1993, 
European Foreign Policýv Bulletin, (93/250). 
15 Economist, "Direr and Emptier, " Economist, 26 June 1993,39 [UK edition]; Peterson, John. "Europe and 
America in the Clinton Era, " Journal QfCommon Market Studies, 3, no. 3 (1994): 411-426.415. 
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ten days earlier. " As a result, the EC Summit's conclusion avoided mention of the VOPP, as well as the 
new peace plan, but expressed its support for the new negotiations in the following way: 
The European Council expresses its full confidence in the co-chairmen of the 
Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and 
encourages them to pursue their efforts to promote a fair and viable settlement 
acceptable to aR three constituent peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 17 
The EC leaders supported ICFY's new peace initiatives provided that they were not organized 'at the 
expense of the Bosnian Muslims' and reaffirtned. their support to the principles of the London 
Conference of August 1992.18 The EC Foreign Ministers also agreed to facilitate negotiations for the 
new peace plan and decided that the EC Troika would discuss the plan with Izetbegovi6.19 Following 
the EC Summit, the ICFY Co-Chainnen facilitated the negotiation among the waning parties, who 
reached agreement on 30 July 1993 regarding the new provisional draft of the peace plan . 
20 From then 
on the new Peace Plan was discussed as the basis of this draft. 
The Transatlantic Debate in the Summer of] 993. - Was NATO Becominz More Multilateral? 
Just a few days after the EC summit of June 1993, Clinton's National Security Adviser, 
21 Anthony Lake, and Bosnian Envoy, Reginald Bartholomew, flew to Europe. They demanded British 
and French officials accept the 'lift and strike' policy, particularly aerial strikes in the service of 
diplomacy. 22 In order to obtain their consent, Lake emphasized that NATO and the transatlantic alliance 
were at stake in fiS POHCY. 
23 British policy-makers agreed at least to the use of aerial strikes, but their 
16 Owen, David. Balkan Odyssey. London: Indigo, 1996.206-207. 
17 EPC, "Statement on Bosnia-Herzegovina: Conclusion of the European Council, " 21/22 June 1993, 
(93/250). 
18 EPC, "Statement on Bosrua-Her-zegovina: Conclusion of the European Council, " 21/22 June 1993, 
(93/250). 
19 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 206-207. 
20 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 218-219. The constitutional plan can be found in: Owen, Balkan Odyssey, CD- 
Rom No. 119. 
21 Daalder, Ivo H. Getting to Dayton: the Making ofAmerica ý Bosnia Policy. Washington, D. C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2000.19-2 1. 
22 Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004. Also see, Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 19-2 1. 
_)3 Drew, Elizabeth. On the Edge: the Clinton Presidencý,. I st Touchstone ed, A Touchstone book. New 
York; London: Simon & Schuster, 1995.277; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 19-2 1. 
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French counterparts had reSerVationS. 24 As previously discussed, France demanded the UNSC's 
authorization for such action. Despite this apprehension on the part of its Western allies, on 29 June 
25 1993 the US supported a motion to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia at the UNSC . As predicted, it 
26 failed to obtain support from other Security Council members. As a result of this, the US facilitated 
the modification of its policy by focusing on launching air strikes. 
In early July 1993, Clinton asked Lake and other policy-makers to look at the possibility of 
27 American military engagement, including sending troops. By late July 1993, the US was emphasising 
necessity of air strikes for protecting safe areas rather than sending US ground troops . 
28The specific 
aim of the policy at that time was to remove Bosnian Serbs forces fi7om Mount Igman near Sarajevo. 29 
However, a majority of European policy-makers as well as UNPROFOR commanders in Bosma did 
not request air strikes at that time. 30 The European objection to the policy was not surprising. The EC 
encouraged the ICFY's promotion of the new peace plan. In August 1993, the ICFY intensified its 
negotiations with Bosnian wax-ring parties and discussed delicate issues such as temtorial divisions in 
regard to the new peace plan. 31 
At the same time NATO held a NAC meeting in Brussels (on 2 August). The subject of the 
meeting was the issue over authorization of NATO air strikes. This was due to America's strong 
pressure on the European states. For instance, a few days before the NAC meeting, the State 
Department Spokesman Mike McCurry had suggested that if NATO member states did not support the 
US position, it would take a unilateral decision. 32 Although Clinton watered down McCurry's rhetoric, 
24 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 19-2 1; Hurd, Douglas. Memoirs. London: Little, Brown, 2003.459. 
25 United Nations Security Council, "Draft Resolution [on Exemption of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the 
Arms Embargo Irnposed on the Former Yugoslavia by Security Council Resolution 713 (1991)], " 29 July 
1993. (S/25997). 
26 UN. "Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3247th Meeting, Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 
29 June 1993: Security Council, " (S/PV. 3247). 148. 
27 Drew, On the Edge, 273-278; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 19-2 1. 
28 However it still did not exclude the option of lifting the arms embargo as well. Interview with Anthony 
Lake on 19 May 2004; Interxiew with Robert Hunter on 17 May 2004. 
29 Drew, On the Edge, 273-278; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 19-2 1. 
30 Owen, Balkan Odyss, ýi,, 222. 
31 Owen, Balk-an Oaý, ssei,, 218-219. 
32 Marcus, Ruth and Rick Atkinson. 'NATO Envoys Agree to Back U. S. Air Strike Plan in Bosnia, " The 
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he did not dismiss the essence of McCun-y's position. 33 Faced with such a cfitical threat to the raison 
d'Are of the transatlantic alliance, the European member states within NATO reluctantly agreed with 
the American plan of using an aerial strike in order to protect the UNPROFOR missions on the 
34 35 
ground . On 2 August 1993, NATO decided to authorize air strikes at the end of its NAC meeting. 
Immediately after this, David Owen denounced the timing of NATO's decision, as it would 
undemine the credibility and the prospect of the ICFY-led peace negotiation at Geneva. 36 European 
policy-makers had woken up to the fact that NATO's decision would not help the ICFY's activities. 37 
Indeed, f6flowing NATO's decision, the Bosnian government begun to demand more tenitonal gains 
and were less willing to negotiate, whereas the Bosnian Serb leadership were increasingly sceptical 
about the motives of Western involvement. 38 However, American pressure was hard to throw off. As a 
result, the NAC meeting deepened divisions within the EC. On the one hand, Britain and France were 
concemed with the potential implications of air strikes for the ICFY's diplomatic activities and the 
39 
safety of their peacekeeping troops on the ground. On the other hand, the German foreign ministry 
and EC Commissioner for external affairs Hans Van den Broek of HoUand raised questions about the 
nature of the Geneva negotiations. 40'Mey were concerned that the Geneva talks would force the 
Bosnian government to accept an unfair and unjust settlement. 
Against this backdrop, Britain, France and UNPROFOR troop-contributing states, (such as 
Washington Post, 3 August 1993, Al. 
33 Socolovsky, Jerome. "U. S. Pledge to Go It Alone in Bosnia, If Need Be, " 7-he Associated Press, 2 August 
1993, Lexis-Nexis. 
34 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004; A letter exchanged with Malcolm Rifidnd dated on 19 
March 2004; Socolovsky, J. 'NATO Allies Back U. S. Call for Air Strikes in Bosnia, But May Not Act, " The 
Associated Press, 3 August 1993, Lexis-Nexis; Marcus, Ruth. "NATO Envoys Agree to Back U. S. Air 
Strike Plan in Bosnia, " The Washington Post, 3 August 1993, Al. 
35 NATO, "Press Statement by the Secretary Gener-al: Following the Special Meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council, " Ministerial Communiquýs, 2 August 1993. 
36 Socolovsky, Jerome. 'NATO Allies Back U. S. Call for Air Strikes in Bosnia, But May Not Act, " 1he 
Associated Press, 3 August 1993, Lexis-Nexis. 
37 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004. 
38 Marcus and Atkinson. "NATO Envoys Agree to Back U. S. Air Strike Plan in Bosnia"; Owen, Balkan 
Odyssey, 219-223. 
39 Interview With Robert Hunter on 17 May 2004; Interview with Douglas Hurd on 9 April 2004. 
40 interview With Da,, id Owen on 16 March 2004; Owen, Balkan 04, ssc-il-, 225-228. 
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Canada) were united to prevent NATO air strikes . 
41 For them, promoting peace negotiations and not 
enforclng the air strike were synonymous. 42 Promoting peace negotiations was the ciitical condition 
that they could use to prevent air strikes, without increasing the risks for their troops on the ground. 
Ihey employed two instruments to prevent NATO air strikes. One was criticizing the practical 
consequences of the air strike as European pohcy-makers had done before, and the other was 
questioning the air strikes' legality. 
With regard to legahty, ICFY supporters, especiafly France and UK, and the UN Secretary- 
General, Boutros-Ghali, emphasized that according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter the UNSC 
should play a piVOtaI role in any military action. 43 This interpretation was proVided in opposition to the 
American view. US Vice President Al Gore told Boutros-Ghali that NATO would not seek any 
permission from the UN when it begun the aerial attack on 2 August. 44Legally speaking, the ICFY 
supporters' position was a logical interpretation. By 6 August the Clinton administration had agreed 
- 45 that the authority to pennit aerial strikes belonged to the LN Security Council. As a result, NATO 
held another NAC meeting to clarify the operational details of the air strike on 9 August 1993. The UK 
and France succeeded in inserting UN authority into the procedure for NATO's potential air strike as 
f0flows: 
[Tbe NAC] agrees with the position of the UN Secretary-General that the first use 
of air power in the theatre shaH be authorized by him. 46 
As previously discussed, the NAC had already agreed in June 1993 that the air strike would 
41 Socolovsky, "NATO Allies Back U. S. Call forAir Strikes in Bosnia, But May Not Act. " 
42 'fle ICFY Co-Chain-nan David Owen was not always in favour of this opinion. He supported, on a case- 
by case basis, the air strikes in the service of the ICFY negotiation. The UK administration basically 
distinguished peace negotiations from air strikes and preferred the fornier to the latter. Owen, Balkan 
Odyssey, 13-20,108-110; Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004; Interview With Robert Hunter on 
17 May 2004. 
43 Rothberg, D. "U. S. Official: Wintei's Approach Marks NATO Bosnia Deadline, " The Associated Press, 19 
August 1993, Lexis-Nexis. Boutros-Ghali, Unianquished, 88-89. 
44 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 88-89. 
45 Boutros-Ghali, UmanquLýhed, 91. 
46 NATO, "Decisions Taken at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 9th August 1993, " NATO 
Press Rcleases: (93) 52'. 
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be carried out in order to protect UNPROFOR missions, not to protect the 4safe-areas' itself" Ms 
meant in practice that, as long as the UNPROFOR commanders did not ask the UN Secretary General 
to assist their operation with air strikes, it would not be implemented. That was the legal hurdle for 
NATO to launch air strikes. The US administration intensified its political pressure on UN 
commandm in Bosnia in geneml and the UN Secretary-Geneml in particular. 48 Since the middle of 
August, the US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, began a public campaign to criticize 
UNPROFOR officers' negative comments on air strikes . 
49At that time, UNPROFOR commanders 
were reluctant to utilize air strikes in order to put pressure upon Bosnian Serb forces to remove most of 
its troops from the mountains around Sarajevo as they threatened the safety of its troops on the ground. 
However, Albright's blunt criticism forced the UN officials to accept the necessity of air strikes with 
regards to the situation on the ground. 'O 
Concerning the British and the French resolve against the air strike, US ambassador to 
NATO, Robert Hunter, warned that if NATO failed to endorse it, 
NATO's future is on the line ... Tfýs is deadly serious 
business, not only for 
Sarajevo, but for the future of the affiance. 51 
The US administration again linked this issue with the future of the Western alliance and the existence 
of NATO. As previously discussed (see Chapter 2), European policy-makers, (except some traditional 
French Gaullists), did not have the will to sacrifice NATO and the transatlantic alliance (i. e. collective 
self-defence) as a result of the Bosnian issue (in other words, a collective security agenda). There was a 
consensus among member states of NATO that it (NATO) played a pivotal role in European security. 
Ibus America's challenge to the existence of NATO was a critical threat for its European allies to 
47 NATO, "Final Communiqu&: Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Athens, Greece, 10 June 
1993, " NATO Ministerial Communiqu& (1993): M-NAC-1(93) 38. Para 3. 
48 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 91. 
49 IPS, "BOSNIA: U. S. Protests against Statements by UNPROFOR Generals', Inter Press Service, " Inter 
Prýss Service, 17 August 1993, Lexis-Nexis. UPI, "U. S. Says U. N. Officers Misbehave in Sarajevo, " United 
press international, 18 August 1993, Lexis-Nexis; Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 225-228. 
50 UPI, "U. S. Says U. N. Officers Misbehave in Sarajevo. "; PA-Reuter, "UN Ready to Use Air Power in 
Bosnia, " 7he Press Association, 18 August 1993. Lexis-Nexis. 
51 Quoted in Rothberg, Donald. "U. S. Official: Wii-iter's Approach Marks NATO Bosnia Deadline, " The 
, 4ssociatetl 
Press 19 August 1993. Lexis-Nexis. 
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C carry out reasonable disagreement'with the US regarding the Bosnian conflict. 52 
Av we have discussed, European policy-makers defended their position by s 1 113 ecuring a 
second NAC resolution that included the UN Secretary General's consent as a condition for 
commencing NATO air strikes. In addition, they attempted to prevent the implementation of NATO air 
strikes. The ICFY supporters, in particular the British govemment, warned the US that they would pull 
out UNPROFOR troops from Bosnia if NATO commenced the air strike. 53 Thýs logic put the Clinton 
administration's assertion regarding the necessity of air strikes on hold. 54 Under this scenario, the US 
would most likely have had to send its own troops to take over the UN's operation. In effect it would 
have implied that the US forces participate in the war against the Bosnian Serbs on behalf of the 
55 Bosnian government. Thus, it could have forced the US to stake its national interests on the future of 
Bosnia. Both the Bush senior and Clinton administrations had dismissed such an intimate relationship 
prior to intra-Western intemctions on the Bosnian issue. 56 Not sending ground troops to Bosnia was a 
general consensus among the US policy-makers. Gradually, the Clinton administration softened its 
attitude towards the urgency of the air strikes. 57 As a result, the only credible international approach to 
the Bosnian conflict at this time was the ICFY's peace negotiations. 
It is important to note, however, that the US retreat was based on its reluctance to take 
responsibility for the consequences of the 'lift and strike'policy America's determination to use NATO 
air power was not diminished in any way. It was not European influence as such but rather American 
interests (i. e. not to get militaffly involved on the ground) that suspended the implementation of NATO 
air strikes. This means that, therefore, it was not the outcomes of mulfilateralism but r-ather American 
interests that defined the US action. This is the nature of the Western Order that Liberal Multilateralists, 
52 Hurd, Memoirs, 463. 
53 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April; Interview with Robert Hunter on 17 May 2004. 
5-1 Interview with Robert Hunter on 17 May 2004; Interview with Charles Redman (the US Special Envoy to 
Bosnia, 1993-1994) on 5 February 2004. 
55 Hurd, Memoirs, 459-460; Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 311-312. 
56 interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004; Interview with Robert Hunter on 17 May 2004. 
57 Warjrn Christopher. "Secretary of State Warren Christopher on CNN's 'Tbe World Today', " U. S. 
Department of State Office of the Spokesman, Washington, D. C. August, 12,1993.11 
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have fafled to understand. 
To sum up the transatlantic debate on the issue of NATO air strikes in August 1993, it is 
clear that the US pohcy-makers emphasized their determination to impose air strikes regardless of its 
allies' opinions by flu-eatening the very existence of NATO. This forced European poliCy-makers to 
concede to America's position. However, European policy-maker-s were, able to prevent the 
implementation of the NAC's decision regarding air strikes on 2 August 1993. This resulted in NATO's 
second resolution on 9 August 1993 that inserted the UN Secretary General's consent as a condition to 
implement air strikes. The logic of multilateralism in the form of UN authority over NATO air strikes 
was used to prevent American policy fis time around. However, the Clinton administration was not 
nil able to override the Europeans not because of the power of multilateralism but rather due to the 
strategic implications of air strikes that would have undennined the Amencan desire to keep its ground 
troops away fi7om Bosnia. To elucidate this point, if the US promoted air strikes regardless of its allies' 
objections it would have to take over UNPROFOR's role on the ground. If the US supported the 
European peace initiatives it would need to follow the consequences of the ICFY negotiations. Again 
this would demand that the US or NATO provide troops on the ground. The US thus faced a dilemma 
over the implementation of air strikes. As a result, the US administration on the one hand criticized the 
activities of UNPROFOR on the ground but on the other hand, the US softened the pressure on its 
European alhes to support NATO air strikes. 
The Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan and America's Ambiguous Support for the Bosnian 
Government 
SMCe the failure of the VOPP, leaders of fon-ner Yugoslavia initiated another move to re- 
fi-ame the Bosrýian peace process while Westem leaders were trymg to consolidate their new approach. 
By June 1993, Serbian leader Slobodan Mflo§evi6 and Croatian president Franjo Tudiman agreed to 
http: //dosfan. lib. uic. edu/ERC/briefing/dossec/1993/9308/930812dossec. htA [Accessed on 7 March 2005]. 
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promote the so-called 'Union of Three Republics' of Bosnia. 58 This plan envisaged that BosnIa would 
consist of three ethnically defined territories, namely: a Bosnian Serb area; a Bosnian Croat area; and 
Muslim tenitory. 
This proposal pushed the Bosnian peace process into a new phase. In terms of territorial 
59 distribution, the plan clearly retreated fi7om the principles of the London Conference of August 1992. 
The 'Union of Three Republics' was at odds with the principles of the London Conference which 
refused to recognize territorial gains by any military means and to accept an ethnic-based state 
formation in Bosnia. Germany and the Netherlands were critical of this departure from the principles of 
the London Conference. 60 Neveitheless, the ICFY Co-Chairmen attempted to formalize fis peace plan 
as they had obtained 'fuH confidence' in their personal competence from EC member states. 61 The 
practical rationale for promoting the new peace plan was to settle the conflict through negotiation. 62 
The 'Union of Three Republics' was clearly in breach of the principles of the London Conference. 
However, the institutional framework of the London Conference-narnely the ICFY as well as the EC 
and the UN's commanding position in relation to the direction of the international mediation-was still 
mtact. 
The ICFY Co-Chairmen, Owen and Stoltenberg, spent the summer of 1993 in mediation 
between the diree waning parties of Bosnia on the matter of the 'Union of Three Republics', also 
known as the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan-63The Bosnian government was reluctant, as they believed 
the plan would undennine the sovereignty of Bosilia. However, because of the absence of any 
58 For details of the Plan see: "Annex: Report of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on 
the Former Yugoslavia, Letter Dated 8 July 1993: From the Secretary-Geneml Addressed to the President of 
the Security Council, " (UN Doc. S/26066); "Annex: Report of the Steering Committee of the International 
Conference on the Fon-ner Yugoslavia, Letter Dated 3 August 1993: From the Secretary-General Addressed 
to the President of the Security Council, " (UN Doc. S/26233). Reprinted in The International Conference on 
the Former Yugoslavia. - Official Papers, edited by Bertrand Ramcharan, The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1997. Vol. 1.782-794,794-820. 
59 Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004; Interviewwith Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004. See also: 
Owen, Balkan odyssey, 223-224,227-230,239. 
60 Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004; Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 224-225,227-230,239. 
61 EPC, "Statement on Bosnia-Herzegovina: Conclusion of the European Council, " 21/22 June 1993, 
(93/250). 
'-" Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004; Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004. 
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alternative peace plan in the offer, the Bosnian govenunent decided to take pait in the negotiation of 
64 As a result, on 30 July 1993 the three waning parties of Bosnia reached an agreement on the 
constitutional arrangement. 65 
Despite the row over NATO's aerial strikes, the ICFY, the Bosnian waning parties, 
Milogevi6 and Tudjman carried on to discussion of the map. 66As a result of the negotiations, on 20 
August, Owen and Stoltenberg tabled a fonnal version of the 'Union of Three Republics' plan to the 
67 Geneva negotiations. Although it emphasised that the principles of the London Conference should be 
respected, EC member states reaffirmed their support to the ICFY negotiations and the implementation 
of the peace plan. " As we will discuss later, from the NATO and American perspective, the success of 
the ICFY's peace negotiation would increase pressure for them to provide substantial troops for 
implementation of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. In other words, the prospect of the Owen- 
Stoltenberg Peace Plan would roll back America's hitherto attempt to maintain NATO's de facto 
independence from the UN in the form of promoting the 'lift and strike'policy 
By September the Bosnian parities signed an agreement for the cessation of hostilities. To 
formalize the provisional agreement of the peace plan, on 20 September the Co-Chairmen convened a 
meeting of the three warring parties of Bosnia on board the British Air carrier RMS Invincible in the 
Adriatic. The three Bosnian leaders, Milogevi6, Tudjman, Momir Bulatovi6 (President of Montenegro), 
and tile ICFY Co-Chairmen attended the meeting. 69 In addition, the US Bosnia Envoy observed the 
discussion. 'o David Owen recalled that this was another critical moment for settling the Bosnian 
63 For details of the negotiation see: Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 204-223. 
64 Izetbegovi6, Alija. Inescapable Questions: Autobiographical Notes. Translated by Saba Rissaluddin and 
Jamina Izetbegovi6. Leicester The Islamic Foundation, 2003.256. 
65 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 218-219. The constitutional plan can be found in: Owen, Balkan Odyssey, CD- 
Rom No. 119. 
66 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 204-223. 
67 "Annex: Report of the Steering Committee of the Intemational Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, 
Letter Dated 20 August 1993: From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, Addendum, " (UN Doc. S/26337/Add. 1), (UN Doc. S/26337/Add. 2). Reprinted in Ranicharan ed. 
77ie In terna tional Coqference on th e Former Yugoslavia .- Official Papers. Vol. 1.8 5 1-8 91,8 91- 8 92. 68 EPC, "Statement on Bosnia-Herzegovma, " 3 September 1993. (93/352). 
69 Owen, Balkan Odýlsscv, 232-233. 
70 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004. 
140 
conflict. " All participants except Bosnian govenunent leader, Alija Izetbegovi6, agreed to formalize 
and implement the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. 72 Izetbegovi6, however, reserved his signature 
because he wanted to obtain consent from the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina (nominally it 
consisted of all three ethnic areas) and the Bosniac Assembly (consisting of Bosnian Mushms). 73Both 
A ssemblies' meetings were set for 27 September. There was a modest expectation for the success of It LO 
the Peace Plan among those attending the HMS InWncible negotiations (including America's then 
Bosnia Envoy, Charles Redman). 74 
While Izetbegovi6 was expected to secure the support of the Bosniac Assembly, the ICFY 
75 Co-Chairmen elabomted on a detailed implementation plan at NATO headquallers. Unifonned 
officers at NATO had been studying potential implementation plans since August 1993 . 
76 It seemed 
77 
that the issue at stake was the number of implementation forces. However, on 22 September the 
NATO Secretary-General turned down Owen and Stoltenberg's request for NATO to contribute to the 
implementation of the Peace Plan on the basis that it lacked clear military goals. " Furthermore, on 21 
September, Izetbegovi6 remarked that he was 'not inclined to accept' the peace plan. 9 In the meeting 
80 
of the Bosniac Assembly on 27 September, Izetbegovic took a 'neutral' position on the Plan. 
71 Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004. 
72 For details of the Peace Plan see: Raincharan ed. "The Stoltenberg-Owen Plan, " The International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia : Official Papers. Vol. 1.275-329. 
73 Izetbegovi6, Alija. Inescapable Questions: Autobiographical Notes. Translated by Saba Rissaluddin and 
Jamina Izetbegovi6. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 2003.258; Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 232-233. 
74 Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004; Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February; UPI. 
"Owen Still Hopeful for the Peace Deal, " United Press International, 21 September 1993, Lexis-Nexis. 
75 AFP, "Bosnian Moslems Hold Key to Peace, Says Owen, " Agence France Presse, 22 September 1993, 
Lexis-Nexis; Lancaster and Williams. "NATO Plans Deployment in Bosnia; U. S. Could Dispatch 
Thousands ofTroops To Maintain Peace, " The Washington Post, 27 August 1993, Al. 
76 AP, 'NATO Forces Could Be Moved Quickly to Implement Peace Plan, " Associated Press, 19 August 
1993, Lexis-Nexis. 
-n NATO Southern European Commander, Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda, estimated that NATO needs to 
send around 20,000 troops if Bosnian parties agreed to implement the Stoltenberg-Owen Peace Plan. 
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Maintain Peace. " 
78 Tett, Gillian. "Woner Cautious on Bosnia Deployment, " Financial Times, 23 September 1993,4. 
79 AFP, "Parliament to Decide Next Week on Peace Deal, " Agence France Presse, 21 September 1993, 
Lexis-Nexis; Owen, Balkan Oaý, sscý,, 235-236. 
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However, the majority of the Assembly followed his initial remarks and effectively tuned down the 
Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan which then collapsed as a result. The key obstacle to the acceptance of 
the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan was the reluctance on the part of the Bosnian government and of the 
US administration. 
Ameilcan Polig. - 'Neutral'Re2ardin eiýotiatio g the Bosnian Peace N 
'Me ICFY was not able to convince the Bosnian govenunent of the necessity and ments of 
the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. The Bosrýan govemment was unwilling to give up the temtorial 
integnty of Bosnia. The ICFY did not have a well-constructed relationship with the US administmtion 
either. Yet America's support was the critical element that the ICFY Co-Chairmen needed for the 
success of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. According to David Owen: 'we were going to need the 
United States to pressurize Izetbegovi6 to accept the map' of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan in the 
last stage of the negotiation. 81 However, the US did not provide the eagerly-awaited support for the 
ICFY 
Regardless of its European allies' expectations, the Clinton administration insisted that the 
formalization of the peace plan should be accompanied by the wilting consent of the Bosnian 
government. 82 Hence, it was 'neutral'to the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. 83 Despite the official stance, 
it was not literafly 'neutral' to the conflict, as the US administration insisted on enforcing the 'lift and 
sbike'poticy to support the Bosnian government. 84 This 'neutrality'was however not sirnply rhetoric to 
promote the interest of the Bosnian government in the form of American military support, but was used 
a means to protect the US intention not to deploy ground troops. Clinton suggested that the US would 
85 
not do so for fear of the UN's command and control authority over the US or NATO ri-ýssions. 
81 Owen, Balkan 0dj,, Ysey, 213. 
82 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004; Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004. 
83 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004; Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004. 
84 Inteniew with Robert Hunter on 17 May 20(9; Interview with Anthony LAe on 19 May 2004. 
85 Clinton, Bill. "Remarks and Exchanges with Reporlers Prior to Discussions with President Alija 
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Aus a result, the US administration and the Bosnian government shared concerns vis-A-vis the 
necessity of air strike and the prospects of the ICFY's peace negotiation. They hinted at this shared 
concem in the period from the agreement on the provisional draft of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan 
in August, to the HMS Invincible meeting of September 1993. Regarding the air strike, the US and the 
Bosnian government were closer to each other than to EC member states. On the same day as 
Albright's aforementioned critical remark regarding UNPROFOR (17 August), Bosnian Vice President 
Ejup GaniC' supported her opinion by condemning UNPROFOR's lack of concern about the situation 
in Sarajevo. Gani6 pointed out that each country providing troops was more concerned about its 
national interests than the situation on the ground, and this, in effect, worked in favour of Serbian 
aggression. 
86 
The other case was that concerning the nature and implementation of the peace plan. When 
the ICFY Co-Chairmen asked the Bosnian parties to state their final position by 31 August, on 22 
August Izetbegovi6 recommended that the Bosnian Assembly reject the plan . 
8' At that time, 
Izetbegovic' was fighting a war for the self-detennination and territorial integrity of Bosnia not only 
against Bosnian Serb forces but also in the face of Bosnian Croat forces. In fact, he requested that the 
US President endorse NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serb forces and urged the UNSC to lift the 
anns embargo in order to deter the Bosi-ýian Croat forces' offensives. 88 
Izetbegovi6, in effect demanded that the US clarify whether it was denouncing Croatian 
offensives as well as those by the Serbs in Bosnia or simply blan-dng Serbia and Bosnian Serb forces 
for the atrocities. Denouncing Bosnian Croat forces as well as Bosnian Serb forces would directly place 
the US administration in accordance with its ideological interpretation of Western value (i. e. to support 
the temtorial integrity of Bosnia under the Izetbegovi6 government as a foundation for a 'just' peace). 
Izetbegovic of Bosnia, 8 Septernber 1993, " Public Papers of the President of the United States, William J 
Clinton 2 (1993): 1445. 
86 Green, P. "Bosnian Leader Cautious on Sarajevo Plan, " United Press International, 17 August 1993. 
Lexis-Nexis. 
87 Owen, Balkan Odyssc 
" 1,, 
228. 
88 lzetbegoviý, Inescapable Questions, 159-163. 
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However, denouncing the Bosnian Serbs alone would effectively place the Bosnian Croats in the 
position of 'victims' of Serbian 'aggression'. This latter option would allow the US administration not 
to give substance to its rhetorical advocacy to protect the Bosnian government by balancmg America's 
commitment to both the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Croats. Effectively, this policy would 
protect one of America's vital interests; of keeping the US away fi7om any military confrontation on the 
ground, yet without seriously undermining America's profile as a promoter of its self-designated moral 
role as protector of the 'victirm'of the conffict. 89 
Against the above-discussed background, Izetbegovi6 flew to Washington to meet Clinton. 
In their meeting on 8 September, he asked Clinton to support the Bosman government by launching air 
strikes and lifting the arms embargo. 90 Clinton refused to fulfil Izetbegovi6's requests. 91 However, 
before the meeting he hinted at American political support to the Bosnian government M the following 
way: 
I've been willing to do that [guarantee an American military contribution] since 
February [ 1993]. But in order to do it, we have to have a fair peace that is willingl 
entered into by the partie . 
It has to be able to be enforced or if yQu will, be 
guaranteed by a peacekeqping force from NATO, not the United Nations but 
NATO. And of course, for me to do it, the Congress would have to agree 
[emphasis added]. 92 
Indeed, the instructions for the US Bosnian Envoy who attended the F1W Invincible meeting were 
that he should simply observe the negotiations and not impose any peace plan on the Bosruan 
government. 93 He acted accordingly America's 'solution' to the above-discussed tension between 
89 In retrospect, it can be argued that this was 'preference' rather than 'vital interests'. However, until July 
1995, the US administration was unable to decide whether it is necessary to deploy its troops in Bosnia *in 
order to protect another vital interest; NATO's dejacto independence from the UN. In other words, by the 
summer 1995 the US administration was not considering a hierarchical relationship between the two Vital 
interests (i. e. not deploying ground troops on the ground and maintaining NATO's de facto independence). 
They rather considered that both interests were equally vital and compatible (see, Chapter 6 of this thesis in 
detail). 
90 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004. 
91 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004. 
92 Clinton, Bill. "Remarics and Exchanges with Reporters Prior to Discussions with President Alija 
lzetbegovic of Bosnia, 8 September 1993, " Public Papers of the President of the United States, William J 
Clinton 2 (1993): 1445. 
93 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 Febniary 2004. 
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moral values and strategic interests was 'neutral'to the conflict. This not only marked a retreat from its 
initial moral commitment to protect the interests of the Bosnian government, but it also compromised 
the success of the ICFY peace negotiations. David Owen criticizes the US position because this 
cneutrality' encouraged Izetbegovi6 to demand more territorial gains, and eventually undennined the 
credibility of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. 94 In fact, the US administration did not provide any 
substantial alternative and that effectively prolonged the conflict in Bosrua. 
The US administmtion legitinýed its 'neutrahty'by setting increasingly tough conditions to 
support the ICFY. A week before Clinton's remarks as above-quoted (8 September), he had put forth a 
15 
similar set of conditions. At that time he did not spell out the need for congressional consent. In fact, 
there was no imminent congressional move against the Bosruan peace plan at that time. This was 
because the majority of the congressional legislators were opposed to the ICFY promoted peace plan(s). 
96 Since late 1992 they had advocated lifting the arms embargo. Despite this fact, on 23 September, 
Clinton administration officials consulted with members of the US Congress in relation to the Bosnian 
Policy. 
97 In the meeting, the members of Congress sensed that Clinton administration officials did not 
insist on the necessity of American participation in the implementation of the Owen-Stohenberg Peace 
Plan. 9' Moreover, on 22 September the NATO Secretary-General had already rýected the idea of 
contributing to the implementation of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. 99 It would be plausible to 
consider that the Clinton administration (and NATO) had fornied its position prior to interaction with 
members of US Congress. Indeed, Madeleine Albright's remark on 23 September was clearly 
sympathetic to congressional concerns: 
Young men and women should not be sent in harm's way without clear mission, 
94 Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004. 
95 Marcus, R. "Clinton Stresses Hill Support is Needed for U. S. Peace Keepers to Go to Bosnia,, ' Ae 
Washington Post, 3 September 1993, A32. 
96 Interview with Robert Hand on 19 May 2004. 
97 Drew, On the Edge, 282. 
98 Sciolino, Elaine. "Conflict in Balkans: Nunn Says He Wants Exit Strategy Before U. S. Troops Go tc 
Bosnia, " Thc Ncli, York Times, 24 September 1993, A 1,5. 
99 Tett, "Woner cautious on Bosnia deployment. " 
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commanders, sensible rules of engagement and the means to get the j ob done. 100 
To sum up, it is clear that America's application of its ideological interpretation of Western 
value in the forrn of protecting the interests of the Bosnian govenunent was as opportunýistic as its 
approach to the procedural value (i. e. multilateralism). The Clinton administration's policy of 
4neutrahty' towards the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan was not only indifferent to the success of the 
ICFY-led negotiations but also to America's initial commitment to protect the interests of the Bosnian 
government. It is essential to consider why the Clinton administration did not give substance either to 
both interpretations of Western values (i. e. multilaterahsm in the fonn of supporting the ICFY and 
ideological moral value in the form of protecting the Bosnian government) of the West. 
According to Risse-Kappen and the Liberal Multilateralists' interpretation (see Chapter 1), 
America's failure to follow the outcomes of multilatemlism or other moral values of the West was a 
result of one of the following factors: America's alhes'ignoring the moral issues regarding the contents 
of their policy (i. e. it's allies' tendency to promote 'unjust' policies, such as imperialism or support to 
anti-democratic regimes); America's domestic opposition to follow it's allies' policies; and America's 
vital interests being at stake in regard to its allies'proposed policies. 
The ICFY's clear departize fi7om the principles of the London Conference (i. e. not diViding 
Bosrua in accordance with its ethnic distribution) can be argued to be an instance of such a violation of 
Western values. However, if the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan's departure from the principles of the 
London Conference involved the ignoring of one Western value (maintaining the territorial integrity of 
Bosnia), the US administrution's overt criticism of the fi7amework of the ICFY as weH as the London 
Conference would also constitute a serious violation of another Western value (multilateralism). 
Moreover, if the ICFY's actions were regarded as detrimental to other Western values, such as 
protecting the 'victims' of the conflict, the Clinton administration's 'neutrality' towards the Bosnian 
conflict at this period can be seen as being indifferent to the plight of the Bosnian government. 
100 Albrightý Madeleine. "Use of Force in a Post-Cold War World', Address at the Nafional War Collage, 
Nafional Defense University, Fort MacNair, Washington DC, Septernber 23,1993, " US Department of 
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T?, ý JKegarding America's domestic politics: as we have previously noted, on 8 September 1993 
Bill Clinton employed a Liberal Multilateralist interpretation Of the factors that defined America's 
policy of not endorsing the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. These suggested factors were, one, 
congressional opposition and, two, Europe's violation of Western values in not respecting the interests 
of the 'democratically' elected Bosnian government in regard to territorial integrity. However, In the 
same speech he also underlined the importance of maintaining NATO's de facto independence from 
the UN. Moreover, as we have discussed, the US administration eventuafly dismissed Bosman 
President Alija IzetbegoviCs direct plea for the lifting of the arms embargo, despite US congressional 
support for such a Hing, as weR as the Chnton administmtion's irýtlal advocacy of that poficy. In short, 
America's domestic politics alone cannot explain the Clinton administration's actions. 
Hence, it is rational to argue that the US administration's policy of maintaining America's 
vital interests was the critical factor in clinching its indifference to the outcome of Western 
multilateralism and also of its initial conunitment to protecting the interests of the Bosman govenunent. 
This challenges the foundations of the Liberal Multilateralist interpretation that there was no link 
Ibetween America's vital interests and its actions in regard to the Bosnian conflict, and that thus the 
nature of the Western Order under multilateralism was therefore maintained during this period (see 
Chapter 1). However, as this thesis has demonstrated, America's policy was to re-organize the Western 
Order under Quasi-multilateralism for the sake of its vital interests. In order to implement this policy 
without. undermining its vital interests, the US administration needed a rationale that was able to satisfy 
the contentious demands of, on the one hand, disguising its profile as a supporter of international justice, 
and on the other hand preventing the Europeans from being in a position to justify their Bosnian policy 
in the name of multilateralism. The next section will look at the Clinton adn-ýinistration's answer to this 
question of legitin-dzing America's advocacy of Quasi-multilateralism. 
States Dispatch 4, no. 39 (1993): Article 4. 
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America's Global Vision: Multilateralism as a Means to Promote Its Vital Interests 
While it did not react positively to the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan, the US administration 
took a further step to prevent any input that would constrain its foreign policy Clinton administration 
officials demonstrated this position in a series of speeches delivered in September 1993, clearly 
expressing their foreign policylol These speeches discussed the American chaHenges to multilateralism 
in the form of the LN authority over international use of coercive power (i. e. peacekeepmg operations 
and multilateral forces under the provision of Chapter VU of the UN Charter). 
Their critical concern was the relationship between the UN's authority over American 
peacekeeping operations and NATO's 'out of area' operations. The Clinton administration insisted that 
any American military action should not be under the command. and control of the UN. 102The US 
provided a rationale drawing a line between the kinds of multilateral cooperation which the US was 
able and not able to participate in. American national interests would define fis. In this way, the 
Clinton administration rejected the claim that the US would not always follow the logic of 
multilateralism. This series of speeches was the foundation of the Clinton administration's official 
intemational. strategy and formed their policy towards intemational peacekeeping operations. 103 
TWs refonned strategy was later entitled as 'A National StratqD; of Engagement and 
Enlargement' (hereafter 'Engagement and Enlargement Strategy'). ' 04This identified American foreign 
policy as an instrument for expanding liberal democracy and reasoned that its foreign entanglements 
should be defined by these values. 105 As for peacekeeping operations, the Clinton administration later 
101 They deliberately coordinated the contents of a series of speeches, which are fisted here in chronolo ical gi%lal 
order: the Secretary of State Warren Christopher on 20 September, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake 
on 21 September, US Ambassador to UN Madeline Albright on 23 September and the President Clinton on 
27 September. Also, Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004. 
102 Clinton, Bill. "Remarks and an Exchanges with Reporters Prior to Discussions with President Alija 
Izetbegovic of Bosnia, 8 September 1993". 
103 Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004. 
104 The White House, A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement, Washington. D. C.: 
U. S. Government Printing Office, July 1994. 
105 Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004; Also see: Cox, Michael. "Wilsonian Resurgent? The 
Clinton Administration and the Promotion of Democracy, " in American Democracy Promotion. - Impulses, 
Strategics, and Impacts, edited by Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, 218-239. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000.244. 
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authorized a Presidential Directive Decision 25 (hereafter IPDD25') in May 1994 by following logics 
that the Engagement and Enlargement strategy had advocated. 'O' PDD25 set tough criteria for 
America's participation in international peacekeeping operations. This effectively constrained the US 
role in UN-authorized peacekeeping missions. In other words, PDD25 stipulated that any American 
involvement in international peace operations should be decided on the basis of American national 
interests. This meant that the US should maintain command and control authority when it participated 
in peacekeeping operations. 
Accordingly, the abovementioned documents implied that the merit of Western 
multilateralism should be qualified in terms of the Engagement and Enlargement Strategy. In addition, 
the US could not follow the decisions of the UN or any other international organization or regime, if 
they were not in accord with America's preferred outcomes. This was a clear departure from the logic 
of George Bush's vision of a 'New World Order' that advocated UN-based multilateral solutions for 
international conflict. This had provided legitimacy for the London Conference and the ICFY's peace 
initiatives. The Clinton administration's new vision suggested that US policy towards Bosnia would be 
defined in conjunction with America's re-orientation of its world vision regarding the role of 
'multilateralism'and 'the UN'for the use of Western coercive power. 
At the beginrýng of this series of landmark speeches, on 20 September 1993 Warren 
Christopher outlined the general principles ofAmerican foreign policy in the following way: 
Let me be clear: Multilateralism is a means, not an end. It is one of the man 
foreign p9licy tools at our diMps . 
And it is wan-anted only when it serves the 
central purposes of American foreign policy: to protect American interests. This 
cgpýn will never subcontract its foreigi policy to another powe or another 
person [emphasis added] 107 . 
The Clinton administration went finther than this. Instead of following the logic of multilateralism that 
'()6'Me 
. 
gist of PDD25 is reprinted in "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Refortning Multilateral Peace 
C tion, " International Legal Materials XXXHL no. 3 (1994): 798-813. 
Christopher, Wan-en. "Building Peace in the Middle East'Address at Columbia University, New York, 
September 20,1993, " USDepartment qfStates DiTatch 4, no. 39 (1993): Article 2. 
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they believed could constrain the American national interests, 21 September 1993 Anthony Lake 
argued for the necessity of a new strategy of 'engagement'. 108 Ms new rationale re-focused the 
direction of American foreign policy According to Lake, US policy should be discussed in the 
f6flowing manner: 
Un&ýtqel, 6 debates over both Bosnia and Somalia have been cast as doctrinal 
matters involving the role of multilateralism. This focus is misplaced. [ ... W]e 
should not let the particular define the doctrinal. [ ... II believe strongly that our 
foreign policies must Mqn principles and pragmatism. We should be princi-pl 
about our purposes but pragmatic about our means. [ ... ] [O]nly one overriding 
factor can determine whether the U. S. should act multilaterally or unilaterally, and 
that is Amcaica's interests [emphasis added]. 1 (9 
In essence, the US administrution wanted to change the direction of the foreign policy 
debate for the sake of its vital interests. Before the enlargement strategy, the successes of US foreign 
entanglements were evaluated in terms of their compliance with multilateralism. In order to revise this 
criterion based on America's preferences, the Clinton administration now argued that its 'foreign 
policies must many principles and pragmatism. "'0 In order to make this happen, the US had to define 
its ideal values, which must correspond to its national interests. It was neither the UN nor 
'multilateralism', but the US president that should define the normative criteria of international affairs 
and the priority of policies. Accordingly Madeleine Albright suppoiled fis point In the following way: 
In trying to explain why it was important to have partners in dealing with regional 
conflicts, I said, "U. S. leadership within collective bodies requires what I would 
term 'assertive multilateralism. "' By this I meant that when America acted with 
others, we should lead in estabhshinR Roals and ensurinR success. I did not in 
way rule out the p9ssibihty that we would have to act on our. own in self-defence 
or to pLotect other vital interests [emphasis added]. "' 
It was likely that the US administration would use its foreign policy tools to re-configure the rules and 
108 Lake, 
I 
Anthony. "Trom Containment to Enlargemenf, Address at Johns Hopkins University, September 
21 1993, 'USDepartinent ofShite Dispatch 4, no. 39 (1993): Article 3. 
109 Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement. " 
110 Lake, Tr-orn Contaim-nent to Enlargement. " 
111 Albright, Madeleine. .4 
fadam Sect-etaty. - A Memoir. New York; London: Miramax; Macmillan, 2003. 
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systems of international relationships according to such a principle. 
Anthony Lake explained what he wanted in order to make fis t-ansformation. First of all, he 
urged the US should continuously play a pivotal role in international relations. It was not because it 
facihtated multilaterahsm but for the foRowing reason: 
If we rAmerican ppolel do not rengagel, our govenupent's reactions to forei 
events can seem discomected; [ ... 
] and America could be hanned by a nse m 
protectionism, unwise cuts to our pjjUtM force structure or readiness, a loss of the 
resources necessM for our diplomacy-and thus the erosion of U. S. influence 
abro [eMphaSiS addedi. 112 
In the context of the Bosnian conflict, in order to prevent 'erosion of U. S. influence' abroad, the Clinton 
administration attempted to avoid military involvement on the ground in Bosnia and keep NATO's 
independence over its use of military force. However, US interests were defined not based on the Cold 
War style of geo-politics (such as 'containment strategy') but on the new unique enviromnent in the 
post-Cold War world. In order to clarify this point, Lake addressed four salient facts that conditioned its 
behaviour. 
Firstly, 'America's core concept"emocracy and market economics--are more broadly 
accepted than ever. " 13 Secondly, the US is the dominant power; thirdly, there are explosions of ethnic 
conflicts; and lastly, developments of communications and transportation have closely linked world 
events. Lake added: '(in) such a world, our interests and ideals compel us not only to be engaged but to 
lead' in order to enlarge market-based economies and democracy' 14 According to Lake, this is because: 
The expansion of market-based economics abroad helips eLcpand our en2orts and 
create American jobs, while it also improves living conditions and fuels demands 
for political liberalization abroad. The addition of new democracies makes us more 
secure, because democracies tend not to wage war on each other or ýpqnsor 
terrorism [emphasis added]. ' 15 
To paraphrase the Lake's speech, a safer international situation would help the healthy operation of the 
112 Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement. " 
113 Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement. " 
114 
Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement. " 
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market, and the democratization of other countries' domestic regimes would be one way of 
contributing to the stabilization of international relationships. Lake argues that in order to protect 
America's influence abroad, the US should not look at the procedural legitimacy of multilateratism but 
rather at the degree of the existence of a market economy and formal democratic structures: in other 
words, the US should focus on ideological justification of its foreign policy orientation. This became 
America's new interpretation of the value of West that would be used to organize the Western Order. 
The new ideological interpretation of the Westem value (i. e. based on the ideas of 'democratic peace') 
was used as a means to promote America's vital interests without losing its profile as an internationalist 
leader, and earnest about promoting Western values more than its material interests. However, Lake 
acknowledged that he chose 'democratic peace'theory not because of its theoretical inlPlications but as 
a means to promote America's national interests. " 6 
'Democratic peace' theory provides a justification for the US to use coercive power against 
the non-Western world without paying serious attention to procedural legitimacy under a UN-centred 
multilateralism. According to Michael Doyle, this theory on the one hand envisages stability between 
democratic regimes. On the other hand, however, it does not dismiss the likelihood of the democratic 
regimes' abusive intervention towards non-democratic states in the name of promoting peace. "' Yet 
fis logic is detrimental to the US interests in that it would impose a moml responsibility on the US to 
protect 'democratic' regimes abroad. Foreign leaders can exploit this logic of responsibility which 
might potentially 'entrap' the US in conflicts in which it has no clear material interests. " 8 Indeed, 
America's advocacy of protecting the interests of the Bosnian government m the name of 'democratic 
peace' had certainly this potential. Tberefore, the US administrution needed to clarify how they 
mtended to apply the logic of 'democratic peace'. In other words, the US emphasised that it was not 
116 Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004. 
117 Doyle Michael, W. "Liberalism in World Pohtics, ", 4merican Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (1986): 
1151-1169. 
118 For detailed discussions about this concept see: Snyder Glenn, Herald. "The Security Di. lemma in 
Alliance Politics, " JVorld Polity 36, no. July (1984): 461-495; Lake, David A. Entangling Relations. - 
, 4niciican 
Foreign Policy in Its Centun', Princeton Studies in International History and Politics. princeton, 
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multilateralism (i. e. a legal agreement at the UN), or democratization of the decision-making process of 
a regime but rather the promotion of 'market democracy' (i. e. liberal democracy) that should be the 
priority of US foreign policy as well as that of other Western states. Moreover, the futures of Bosnia 
and of humanitarian issues across the globe were also not on the main agenda of the US foreign 
policy' 19 Lake stated this point in the following way: 
A strategy of enlargement suggests our principal concerns should be strengthening 
our democratic core in North America, Europe and Japan; consolidating and 
enlarging democracy and markets in key places; and addressing backlash states 
such as Iran and jrqq. Our efforts in Somalia and Bosnia are important eLcpressio 
of our overall engagement, but they do not by themselves define our broader 
120 
strategy in the world' [emphasis added] 
In retrospect, it was in September 1993 that the US re-defined the intemational nonns that they would 
follow. They also outlined America's policy priorities accordingly As we will discuss below, the US 
administration generally followed these values and priorities for the next few years. 
The re-vitalization. of the 'core' parts of 'market democracies' was implemented in the fonn 
of a decision on NATO on enlargement 12 1 and the reinforcement of the US-Japan SeCUity Treaty. 122 AS 
for the coercive aspect, by June 1993 the US and the UK had already carried out air strikes against the 
Iraq regime. Clinton legitimized this attack with the charge that Saddarn Hussein regime planned to 
assassinate the fonner President George Bush in Apffl 1992.123 In tenns of international law, this joint 
US-UK military action was highly controversial . 
12'This event symbolically set a precedent for the 
launching of air strikes without clear UN authority. In 1994, Anthony Lake argued that Iran must be 
N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1999.53. 
119 For instance, the US did not act to prevent humanitarian atrocities in Rwanda in 1994. 
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NATO, "Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlanfic Security and Cooperation, Issued by the Heads of State and 
Goven-unent, 8th July 1997, " NA TO Press Releases (1997): M- 1 (97)8 1. Par-a6; Clinton, Bill and 
122 Ryutaro Hashimoto. "Japan-U. S. Joint Declaration on Security- Alliance for the 21st Century-17 April 
1996. " http: //www. i-nofa. go.. _jp/r-egionJn-ainericaAls/Secun'ty/security. 
html [Accessed on 15 March 2005]. 
123 UPI, "Clinton Confin-ns U. S. Military Attack Against Iraq, " United Press International, 26 June 1993, 
Lexis-Nexis. 
124 Roberts, John. "Iraq: Moral and Legal Reasons Behind Attack under Question, " Inter Press Sen4ce, 28 
153 
4 contained' together with Iraq for the sake of protecting America's national interests and democracy. 125 
Furthen-nore, the US administration had been prepared to initiate 'pre-emptive' air strikes against North 
V- 126 daa result of former US President Korean nuclear facilities in June 1994. Tfiis was prevente s 
Carter's visit to Pyongyang, where he managed to reach a political settlement with the then North 
Korean leader Kim 11 Son. The Clinton administration was the first to use the term 'rogue states' 
regarding the states that harbour terrorism and ignore human rights. Based on such criteria it criticized 
regimes such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Cuba, Suclan, Ubanon and North Korea. 121 In this context, Serbia and 
the Bosnian Serbs could be regarded as 'rogue states (or regimes)'. 
Following the above-discussed link between America's values and its use of coercive 
actions, the US administration re-defined the importance of the Bosnian issue. This was not for the sake 
of multilateralism or purely humanitarian concerns as such, but for strictly American interests. Lake 
stated this point in the foRowing way: 
The conflict in Bosnia deserves American engagement: It is a vast humanitarian 
tmgedy; it is driven by ethnic barbarism, it stemmed from aggression against 
independent state; it lies alongside the established and emerging market 
democr-acies of Europe; and it can all too easily explode into a wider Balkan 
128 conflict [emphasis added] . 
Ths suggestion is that the US ought to be engaged with this issue not due to its obligation. to the UN or 
to a principle of multilateralism. Rather, the reason was that the Bosnian tragedy clashed with 
American value of promoting 'market democracy' and its geo-pohtics. In fis way, Lake defined the 
conflict as an international conflict not a civil war. He added the Idnd of policy he thought appropnate 
for responding to this. 
June 1993, Lexis-Nexis. 
125 Lake, Anthony. "Confi-onting Backlash States, " Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (1994): 45-5 5. 
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This is why this Administration supported lifting the an-ns embargo against Bosnia 
[ 
... 
]. It is why we remain comnutted to helping implement an accessible and 
enforceable mace accord [ ... 
]. But while we have clear reasons to engage and 
persist, they do not obliterate other American interests involving Europe and 
Russia, and they do not justify the extreme costs of taking unilateral re§Wnsibility 
for imposing a solution [emphasis addedi. 129 
30 Lake dismissed ICFY-promoted peace plan(s) as neither 'accessible'nor 'enforceable'. ' Moreoverhe 
suggested that the US would not bear 'unilateral responsibility for imposing a solution'. Ms cunningly 
implied that the US administration would support neither the ICFY-promoted peace plans nor any 
ethnic war on behalf of the Bosnian government. 13' Lake's remarks also indicated America's 
perceptions of Bosnia, namely that Bosnia is not important for itself (i. e. in tenns of humanitanan 
concerns or democratic values) but only in so far as it relates to America's vital interests and its strategic 
goals (i. e. maintaining NATO's defacto independence fi7om the W. 
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On 23 September the US ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, reinforced 
Christopher and Lake's previously discussed position. She stressed that multilateralism was but just 
one of many foreign policy tools. 
rSjome say we must make rigid choices between unilateral and multilater-al, global 
and regional, force and di-olomacy. But that is not true. We have the flexib in 
this new era to steer a reasoned course between the counsel of those who would 
have us intervene everywhere and of those who see no American purpose 
anywhere [emphasis added]. 133 
To conclude this series of systematically collaborated statements, on 27 September 1993 President 
Clinton expressed his quasi-multilateralist position in relation to the American policy towards UN 
peacekeeping operations at the UN General Assembly meeting. According to him: 
129 Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement. " 
130 Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004. 
131 According to the then US Ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter, the US made it clear that it would not 
come to fight on the ground on behalf of the Bosnian government. Intemiew with Robell Hunter on 17 May 
2004. 
132 This was a shared vision within the Clinton administration. Interview with Robert Hunter on 17 May 
2004. 
133 Albright, Madeleine. "Use of Force in a Post-Cold War World', Address at the National War Collage, 
National Defense University, Foil MacNair, Washington DC, September 23,1993, " US Department qfState 
D&patch 4, no. 39 (1993): Article 4. 
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In recent weeks in the Security Council our nation has begun asking harder 
questions about proposals for new peacekeeping missions: Is there a real threat to 
international peace? Does the proposed mission have clear objectives? Can an end 
point be identified for those who will be asked to participate? How much will the 
mission cost? From now on, the United Nations should address these and other 
hard questions for eyM proposed mission before we vote and before the mission 
beýý [emphasis added] . 
134 
Accordingly, Clinton advocated how the UN should act in the following manner: 
The United Nations simply cannot become engaged in every one of the world's 
conflicts. If the Amefican. vppple are to sgy yes to UN Mcekegping, the United 
Nations must know when to say no [emphasis added]. 135 
The logical consequence of the Engagement and Enlargement strategy was the restriction of 
the UN's role in regulating the international use of coercive power. It was not the UN who should 
decide how its members states respond to the conflicts but the criteria laid out by the US should guide 
what the UN can do. In other words, multilateralism. and the UN peacekeeping MIssion became less 
urgent political issues for the Clinton administration. 'Me consequences of this were, the US 
administration pulled its troops out from Somalia. It did not become actively engaged in the Rwanda 
crisis of 1994, and did not send any ground troops to Bosnia acting In a combat capacity until the final 
settlement agreement was signed. In short the Engagement and Enlargement Strategy was America's 
attempt to re-define Westem values and its priorities in opposition to that of Europeans. This was 
accompanied with a sfýift away fi7om 'sovereign peace' towards 'democratic peace'; and away from 
European ideas of multilateralism towards Quasi-multilatemlism. This transformation corresponded 
with the devaluation of LN-centred multilateralism as reflected in the ICFY and the rise of the Westem 
alliance m intemational politics. However, it was carried out at the cost of undennining the legitunacy 
of multilateralism, and restrictmg America's allies' 'voice opporturýities'. In this respect, Lake admitted 
134 Clinton, Bill. "Confi-onting the Challenges of a Broader World: Address to the UN General Assembly, 
New York, September 27,1993, " US Department ofState Dispatch, . 4, no 39: Arficle 1. 135 Clinton, "Confi-onting the Challenges of a Broader World: Address to the UN General Assembly, New 
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that the Engagement and Enlargement Strategy was not popular among European policy-makers. 136 
The Political Context of the 'Engagement and Enlargement Strategy': Somalia and 
Bosnia 
AS we have discussed, this research presumes that there was a causal relationship between 
America's vital interests-in the fonn of maintaining NATO's defacto independence from the UN and 
not becoming militarily involved on the ground-and its negative reaction to the ICFY-promoted 
peace plans. 'Merefore, the claim being made is, contrary to the Liberal Multilateralist proposition, that 
it was neither America's domestic politics nor its European allies' violation of Western values, but the 
Clinton administration's conscious calculation of its vital interests that led the US to promote its 
alternative vision of multilateralism. In other words, this reading suggests that Bosnia was the critical 
turning point in the nature of intra-Western relationsl-ýips, as it transfonned regulative principles of 
cooperation fi7om multilateralism to Quasi-multilateralism. Accordingly, this transfonnation implied 
that 'democratic peace' (accompanied by a policy to maintain NATO's defacto independence from the 
UN) was replaced by the idea of 'sovereign peace', a UN-centred conflict resolution mechanism, and 
the revitalization of a collective security system. To substantiate this reading, it is necessary to analyse 
the political context behind the Clinton administration's launching of the Engagement and Enlargement 
strategy in September 1993. Therefore, we must consider the extent to which the Bosrda issue defined 
the Clinton administration's policy-making process in comparison with other events at that time (such 
as the US MVolvement in Somaha). 
With regard to the Somalia issue, if we consider the fact that Warren Christopher was 
demanding that the UN alter Somalia policies in mid September 137 , and problems the UN 
peacekeeping operation faced in Somalia at that time, one might believe that September's series of 
136 InterView with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004. 
137 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanqu&hed, 97-102; Hirsh, John L. and Robert B. Oakley. Somalia and Operation 
Restore I-Iope. - Rqflection on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. Washington D. C.: Unted States Institute for 
Peace Press, 1995.126-128. 
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speeches would have introduced a new US approach to Somalia. In other words, that the situation m 
Somalia forced the US administration to reject the logic of multilateralism. However, this interpretation 
is not appropriate. Instead, the series of speeches should be considered as highlighting the US reaction 
to the logic of multilateralism in general and the ICFY-promoted peace plans in particular. There are 
four reasons to support this as follows: the contents of the speech itself, the timing of the policy 
announcement; the reality of the relationshýp between the US and UN regarding the Somalia 
peacekeeping; and the American action following the sequence of speeches. 
Firstly, as far as the texts of the speeches were concerned, Clinton regarded this as an 
opportunity to outline his prospective peacekeeping operations. To quote Clinton's statement again: 
From now on, the United Nations should address these and other hard questions 
for every proposed mission before we vote and before the mission be 
[emphasis addedi. 138 
The US administrution had already committed itself to peacekeeping operation in Somalia at that time. 
The mission involved a controversial use of coercive n-fihtary power. 
Facing the difficulties of the mission in Somalia, the US administration on the one hand 
intended to transform the nature of the mission. 139 In this way, the US administration demanded the UN 
Secretary-General adopt an exit strategy as soon as possible and on 22 September 1993 the LJNSC 
approved the resolution No. 865. UNSCR 865 urging the UN to take political and economic actions 
along with the ongoing military measures in Somalia. 140 This resolution seemed to indicate an 
American retreat from the military mission. 141 On the other hand however, the Clinton administration 
was still committed to disanning Geneml Aideed's militia in Somalia. Clinton supported the continuity 
of the US mission in Somalia even after the incident on 3 October that killed eighteen American 
138 Clinton, "Confronting the Challenges of a Broader World: Address to the UN General Assembly, New 
York, September 27,1993 -" 139 Hirsh, John L. and Robert B. Oakley. Somalia and Operation Restore Hope. - Rqflection on Peacemaking 
and Peac vkeeping. Washington D. C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1995.126-128. 
140 United Nations Security Council Resolution 865,22 September 1993. (S/ Res 865). 
141 Albright, Madeleine. Madam Secretary. - 4 Memoir. New York; London: Miramax; Macmillan, 2003. 
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soldiers and was generally regarded as the fatal turning point of the rnission. 142He acknowledged the 
fact that at that time 'there was no support in Congress for a larger military role in Somalia'. 143 
Nevertheless, he 'did not mind taking congress on' with regard to this issue. 1 44 Despite this tough 
rhetoric, in the end, on 6 October 1993, Clinton ordered the completion of American efforts against 
Aideed's militia, and withdrew US troops. 145 Clinton explained his rationale in the following way: 
I had to consider the consequences of any action that could make it even harder to 
get congressional support for sending American troops to Bosnia and Haiti, where 
we had far greater interests at stake. '46 
It was not the Somalia issue that dictated US policy towards Bosnia. However, it was Bosnia that 
defined the US policy towards Somatia. As Clinton suggested, America 'had far greater interests at 
stake'regarding the situation in Bosnia. 
Secondly, as far as the chronology is concerned, the critical event for the US presence in 
Somalia occurred on 3 October 1993. On that day 18 US soldiers were killed and more than 50 were 
injured. On 6 October the Clinton administration held an urgent NSC meeting to review policy towards 
Somaha. 147 However, it was before October (specificafly, from 20 to 27 September 1993), that the 
Clinton administration made a series of speeches that challenged logic of multilateralism. During this 
period, Bosnia was the one that had imminent and substantial potential to require the US or NATO 
troops on the ground. The HMS Invincible meeting was held on 20 September and the Bosnian 
A 
., ussembly convened on 27 
September 1993. 
Moreover, a day before the US president's 27 September speech, an official of the Clinton 
administration suggested that the series of speeches would neither be a follow up of the Bush senior's 
UN speech in 1992 nor Boutros-Ghah's An Agenda for Peace that encouraged the UN's active 
142 Clinton, Bill. My Lýfe. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004.552. 
143 Clinton, My Lýfe, 552. 
144 Clinton, Ati - Lýfe, 552. 
145 Hirsh and Oakley. Somalia and Operation Restore Hope. 128; Clinton, Mv Lýfe, 551-552. 
146 Cllnton,, Iýy Lýfe, 552. 
147 Hirsh and Oakley. Somalia and Operation Restore Hope. 128. Clinton, My Life, 551-552. 
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involvement of peacekeeping mission but also implied American obligation for implementing it. "' In 
other words, it would not substantiate America's conuiiitment to multilateralism. Instead, the official 
said, 'this is more a response to the current environment and where we may be going or not going In 
Bosnia, as [the] case maybe. "49To clarify this point, Anthony Lake has dismissed the idea that the US 
administration set the timing of the series of speeches to clash with the ICFY's meeting on the I-IMS 
Invincible. 150 According to Lake, this was simply a coincidence, as he does not remember the contents 
of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan [as at May 2004]. "1 However, he acknowledged the fact that the 
contents of September's series of speeches demonstrated America's preference as to how the Bosruan 
issue should be settled. 152 In fact, regardless of Lake's reluctance to admit the causal relationship 
between the timing of September's series of speeches and the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan, the 
contents of the speeches worked in detriment to the ICFY peace plan, just as the US officials had 
intended. With regard to this point, one US official recalled that the series of speeches in September 
1993 indicated the Clinton administration's answer to the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. 153 British 
foreign policy-makers also shared the same impression. 154 In other words, Lake's deiiial of the 
relationsl-ýp between the timing of the speeches and the development of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace 
Plan should be scrutinized in the future on the basis of hitherto unreleased official documents. However, 
chronologically speaking, it is still rational to take the view that the Clinton administration's series of 
speeches in September constituted American policy, which was to reject any American political or any 
military support for the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. 
Ihirdly, there was a controversy about the LTN's command and control authority over 
American peacekeeping troops. The Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan envisioned deploying NATO's 
148 The White House, Office of Press Secretary, "Transcript of Clinton Administration Background Briefing 
on the President's U. N. Speech, " US. Newswire, 27 September 1993, Lexis-Nexis. 
149 ne White House, Office of Press Secretary, "Transcript of Clinton Administration Background Briefing 
on the President's U. N. Speech, ". 
150 interview With Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004. 
151 Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004. 
152 Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004. 
153 Intenriew with a State Department official on 21 May 2005. 
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peacekeeping troops on the ground under the authority of the LNSC. 155 On 8 September the US 
president spelled out his conditions for this. On 22 September after the meeting with Owen and 
Stoltenberg, the NATO Secretary-General dismissed NATO's participation in implementation of the 
peace plan. "' It clearly reflected America's reluctance to endorse the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. As 
Clinton had stated before the HMS Invincible meeting, the US administration's principal concern 
regarded the implementation of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plai-4 especially the issue of the UN's 
command and control authority over US or NATO troops. 157 Indeed, at the news conference after the 
speech, one journalist asked him about the conditions the US would apply when sending troops on 
peacekeeping operations. Clinton replied: 
For example, there is no question that the United Nations could not directl 
manage an operation the size of the Bospian pperation, [ ... ]. I would want a clear 
understanding of what the command and control was. I would want the NATO 
commander in charge of the operation. [ ... ] And I would want a clear expression 
of support from the United States Congress [emphasis added]. 118 
In relation to this point, officials of the Clinton administration as well as members of the US 
Congress blamed the failure of the Somalia mission on their concession to the UN's command-control 
authority over the US troops. 159 However, according to the UN Secretary-General's repoil on Somalia, 
the US deployed its troops separately from the UN peacekeepers. Tl-ýs meant that the US forces 
involved in the combatant activities were in fact not responsible to the UN command structure. 160 
Boutros-Ghali recalled that the fatal American military operation in Somalia on 3 October (that resulted 
154 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004; Interview with David Hannay on 6 October 2004. 
155 Lancaster and Williams. 'NATO Plans Deployment in Bosnia; U. S. Could Dispatch Thousands of 
Troops To Maintain Peace, " The Washington Post, 27 August 1993, Al; AP, "NATO Forces Could Be 
Moved Quickly To h-nplement Peace Plan, " Associated Press, 19 August 1993, Lexis-Nexis. 
156 Tett, Gillian. "Woner Cautious on Bosnia Deployment, " Financial Times, 23 September 1993,4. 
157 Clinton, Bill. "Remarks and Exchanges with Reporters Prior to Discussions with President Alija 
Izetbegovic of Bosnia, 8 September 1993; Drew, On the Edge, 281-282. 
158 Clinton, Bill. "The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa of Japan in 
New York City, September 27,1993, " Public Papers of the President of the United States, William J 
Clinton 2 (1993): 1619-1623.1622. 
159 Albright, Madam Secretat),, 146. 
1607be United Nation, The United Nations and Sornahý, 1992-1996. - With an Introduction bv Boutros 
Boutros-Gliali, Secretari, General qf the United Nations. The United Nations Blue Books Series. Vol. Ill. 
New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1996.44-45. 
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in 18 deaths among US soldiers) was 'planned, decided and launched entirely without the knowledge 
of United Nations officials. ' 161 in contrast, the EC-UN promoted peace plans in Bosnia either asked the 
US to participate in the main body of the UN peacekeeping operations, or to accept UN control over 
the question of aerial strikes by NATO. 
For these four reasons above, it is plausible to conclude that the series of speeches 
represented America's reaction to multilateralism and to the Bosnian policy promoted by Europe. The 
US experiences in Somalia and resulting domestic politics worked as a catalyst for the formation of the 
Clinton administration's guideline of the UN-led peacekeeping missions (i. e. PDD25) but it did not 
define the contents of the sefies of speeches. 162 
In summing up in relation to the Clinton administration's series of speeches in September 
1993 and its political content, it is possible to argue that the 'Engagement and Enlargement' Strategy 
was, at least regarding its implications, a systematic reaction to the logic (i. e. 'multilateralism', 
4sovereign peace' and the UN-centred approach to the use of coercive power) that the ICFY rehed 
upon. The US opposition to the ICFY-promoted peace plan was mainly based on its assumption that by 
accepting the substantial authority of the UN over NATO military actions it could alter the nature of the 
latter fi7om that of a collective self-defence to a collective security organization. In other words, the US 
administration was reluctant to use its military power for the sake of multilaterahsm. Indeed, as Warren 
Christopher suggested, '[m]ultilateralism is a means, not an end. '163 
With regard to the concept of 'democratic peace', however, the US administration did not 
actively commit itself to promotmg this value. For instance, on the one hand the Clinton administration 
made clear its principle that the US would not support a peace plan if the Bosnian government were 
161 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 103-104. 
162 It was reported that the Clinton administrafion was studying the guidelines of the UN-led peace-keeping 
missions since May 1993. By August 1993, the Clinton administrafion formed several options. Gelh-nan, B. 
"Wider UN Police Role Suspended, " The Washington Post, 5 August 1993, A 1; 
Holines, S. "Clinton May Let US Troops Serve Under UN Chiefs, " Ae New York Times, 18 August 1993, 
A 1,7; A more detailed account of the relationship between the formation of the PDD 25 and US domestic 
politics can be found in: MacKinrion, Michael G. 1he Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy wider Clinton 
a Faint, cather Ftiend? Portland, Oregon.: Fmnk Cass, 2000. Chap. 1,4. 
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unwilling to accept it. On the other hand, however, the Americans failed the Bosnian government by 
their unwillingness to provide military support on the ground. The Clinton administration also refused 
to hft the arms embargo when the Boslýan government requested the US to do so. This was because 
the liffing of the arms embargo could have led to the withdrawal of the UNPROFOR troops and thus 
the US would have had to take over the vacuwn fis left on the ground. 
In short, as Anthony Lake has made clear, the US administration used the concept of 
'democratic peace'theory in order to promote America's policy. 164The essence of this American policy 
was to re-organize the Western Order under Quasi-multilateralism. This logic on the one hand prevents 
the UN from exercising any authority over NATO military actions and keeps the US away from 
fighting on the ground in Bosnia, while on the other hand the same logic maintains America's profile as 
an actor that cares more for common moral value ('liberal democracy') than any of its self-serving 
interests. The 'Engagement and Enlargement' strategy thus defined the common moral value that the 
US supported and the corTesponding interpretation of when it was able to use its military power. The 
new definition of America's interests (i. e. promoting 'market democr-acy'not multilateralism) proVided 
a rationale for the US administration to assume the mantle of the Western cooperation whilst in reality 
pursuing its own self-serving interpretation of the conditions for use of its military power. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided empirical documentation for the key claims of this thesis that the 
US only supports the outcomes of multilatemlism if the consequences accord with American vital and 
geo-str-ategic interests that the US has decided before any multilateral interaction. In addition, the US 
manipulates the interpretation of the collective 'ideational' interests of the West in accordance with its 
vital interests. With regard to these claims, this chapter has shown the political motives behind the 
Clinton administrution's promotion of 'democratic peace'. However, the Clinton administration's 
163 Christopher, "Building Peace in the Middle East., ' 
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application of this notion did not aim at promoting democracyper se. Tl-ýs moral rhetoric was, on the 
contrary, used to protect its vital interests-especially maintaining NATO's defacto independence from 
the UN in relation to the use of coercive power-against the background of mounting pressure on the 
US to follow the outcomes of Westem multilateralism in the form of the ICFY-led peace plan. 
During the summer of 1993, the UK and other EC members promoted the Owen- 
Stoltenberg Peace Plan through the UN-centred multilateral framework of the ICFY. The US 
administration was not only reluctant to support the framework of the ICFY but also unwilling to 
accept the implications of the ICFY-promoted peace plan(s) regarding the UN's authority over the use 
of Western military power. The Clinton administration considered that the political implications of the 
ICFY-promoted peace would challenge America's vital interests In maintaining NATO as a collective 
self-defence organization and of not accepting any international authority other than that of the US 
president to dictate the use of NATO military power. To put it conceptually, there was a tension 
between the notions of collective security on the one hand and collective self-defence on the other, 
regarding the mode of the West's use of coercive power in implementing a peace plan in Bosnia. 
Given the context discussed above, the sefies of speeches of high-i-anking officials of the 
Clinton administration in September 1993 constituted a systematic attempt to alter the kind of 
multilateralism that produced the ICFY peace initiative in Bosnia. These speeches demonstrated that 
the Clinton administration wanted to promote its international vision of US actions not being evaluated 
on the basis of multilateralism and its relationship with the UN, but rather on its attachment to the 
pursuit of 'market democracy' across the globe. In this way, the Clinton administration demanded that 
its European allies abandon their vision of multi-lateralism and the corresponding institutional 
an-angements that would re-vitalize the authority of the UN over conflict resolution mechamsms. In 
short, the essence of this policy was to maintain America's hold over NATO and to avoid any nuhtary 
involvement on die ground. 
164 Inter6ew With Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004. 
164 
This strategy of 'Engagement and Enlargement' on the one hand altered the US stance of 
presenting itself as a multilateralist in terms of its promotion of 'market democracy'. However, on the 
other hand, it legitimized America's reluctance to follow the outcomes of genuine multilateralism and 
also provided an excuse for the US not to do enough in Bosnia until there was a clear case for 
protecting 'market democracy'. These findings are quite the contrary to the interpretation provided by 
the Liberal Multilateralists. Indeed, as the working hypothesis of this thesis has suggested, America's 
new interpretation of moral value ('liberal democracy') corresponded to its vital interests. 
Chapters 5 and 6 will analyse America's application of the logic of Quasi-multilateralis-in 
and its consequences. The working hypothesis predicts that America's use of Quasi-multilateralism- 
namely the maintenance of NATO's collective self-defence identity and the European states' loss of 
influence on the US policy-making process-would impose a negative impact upon the interests of the 
Bosnian govenunent and upon the welfare of civilians on the ground. 
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Chapter 5 Quasi-Multilateralism in Action: the Contact Group and the US, 
from October 1993 to December 1994 
This chapter covers the period from October 1993 to December 1994. One of the most 
significant developments in this period was America's active involvement in the situation in Bosnia and 
the wider international diplomatic sphere. Institutionally, this led to the transformation of the main 
institutional framework of international mediation, from the ICFY, to the so-called Contact Group. The 
Contact Group consists of US, M France, Russia, and Gennany. It arguably represented a concert of 
major powers rather than genuine multilateralism. In contrast to the ICFY-promoted peace negotiations, 
the Contact Group's approach to the waning parties contained some elements of coercion. ' The 
Western approach to Bosnia gradually tilted towards America's position of using coercive power. 
However, the rationale for doing so had been transformed fi-om America's initial rhetoric of protecting 
the interests of the Bosnian govenunent, to one that advocated the use of coercive power, in order to 
impose a peace settlement. 
WMIst subtle in appearance, this shift in style had critical implications for America's policy 
of coordinating its two vital interests (i. e. not using its ground troops and maintaining NATO's dejacto 
independence from the LJN) and two values of the West (i. e. respecting the outcomes of multilateralism 
and promoting 'liberal democracy'). As we noted in Chapter 4, America's choice was to project the 
rhetoric of 'democratic peace' and thus advocate an ideological interpretation of Westem values, rather 
than promote a procedural normative value of multilateralism. The application of this normative 
standard was again the 'lift and strike' policy However, this time, America's promotion of 'lift and 
strike' policy was based on a different motive. Initially, it used 'hft and strike' policy to deter the 
authority of the UN and multilatemlism. This time, added to this original intention, the US 
I To be precise, this 'coer-r-ive' means that the way international actors promote a peace plan. The ICFY did 
not substantially employ military means to impose its peace plans. Of course, sever-al UN resolutions 
concerning the Bosnian conflict (e. g. UNSCR 713,770,836) were based on Chapter VH of the UN Charter 
and thus they contained some elements of 'coercion'. However, these resolutions were not aimed at 
promoting a particular peace plan. 
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administration attempted to keep a distance from the interests of the Bosnian government that would 
demand the deployment of US troops. Instead, the US began to cultivate a close relationship With the 
Croatian government. This was legitiniized to re-establish geo-strategic stability (i. e. balance of power) 
in the region. Indeed, America's favourable political system of 'liberal democracy' demands a stable 
international environment for the smooth operation of the market economy. This can be argued to be an 
application of the ideological interpretation of Western values, based not on advocating a 'just' peace 
that would protect 'victims' of the conflict in the form of the Bosnian government, but on promoting 
stability for the sake of 'market democracy' (see Chapter 4 in detail). Such manipulation of ideological 
interpretation of moral values did not work in favour of the interests of the Bosnian governinent. 
Theoreticafly speaking, this chapter attempts to analyse why the Clinton administration 
failed to follow the logic of multilateralism in the fonn of supporting the EU-UN sponsored peace 
plans. It also addresses the fundamental reason for the Clinton administration's failure to give substance 
to its initial moral argument for supporting the interests of the Bosnian government in the form of 
unposing the 'lift and strike' policy. These analyses will conclude a debate regarding the factors that 
prevent the work of an alleged hannonious multilateral cooperation between the US and its allies. 
To reiterate the key interpretational differences, Liberal Multilateralists believe that 
America's domestic politics forced the US administration not to support the EU-UN sponsored peace 
plans. In addition, they argue that European opposition to the 'lift and strike' policy prevented the 
Clinton administration from imposing it. In this way, they blame either European countries' inability to 
look at moral issues or America's domestic actors' narrow-minded approaches to the Bosnian conflict 
for failing Bosnian civilians on the ground and intr-a-Westem multilateralism. Hence, they still claim 
that the Clinton administration supported multilateralism. In opposition to such interpretation, this 
research focuses on the US government's policy, its responsibility for the failure of Western 
multilateralism in Bosnia. The analysis of the str-ategic consft-aints, for implementing the 'lift and strike' 
policy will illustrate flie Clinton administration's core interests on the Bosruan issue. It will also 
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demonstrate the fact that the Clinton administration's initial commitment to the interests of the Bosruan 
government was a tactic to maintain NATO's de. facto indq)endence from the UN. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows. The first section will look at the interactions 
between the US and its European allies in relation to the EU Action Plan of November 1993, the 
Sarajevo Market incident of Febnmry 1994, and the formation of the so-called Mustim-Croat 
Federation in Bosnia of March 1994. The key issue between the US and its European allies was the use 
of air strikes and the authority of the UN. This first section will analyse the extent to which the US 
policy, regarding the Bosnian conflict, was linked to its interests to refonn NATO's direction. Tfýs 
section will also look at the gap between America's rhetorical support to the interests of the Bosnian 
government (i. e. maintaining territorial integrity of Bosnia under the leadership of Izetbegovi6 
government) and the substance of its actions. 
The second section will analyse the forniation process of the Contact Group, and it will also 
analyses as to the reason why the Clinton administration's reluctance to follow the outcomes of the 
conclusion of the Contact Group. This section will demonstrate the fact that, despite the establishment 
of the Contact Grope, the US administration attempted to maintain the maxlrnw-n operational fi7eedom 
of NATO's actions, not only fi7om the UN but also from the Contact Group. In relation to fis point, it 
will look at the extent to which the outcomes of the intra-western interactions were defined by the 
America's vital interests (of maintaining NATO's de facto independence from NATO and keeping the 
US away fi7om the sending its ground troops) in comparison with other possible factors (i. e. 
congressional opinion, European violation of Western values and bureaucratic politics). This will 
challenge Libeml Multilatemlists' interpretation of America's reluctance to cooper-ate with its allies. 
The third section will discuss America's renovated promotion of its 'hft and strike' policy 
during the autumn and winter of 1994, and the difficulties faced by the US administration as a result of 
this. It will analyse the Clinton administration's policy regarding the tension between America's two 
vital interests (i. e. not deploying troops in order not to get militarily involved in the conflict on the 
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ground and maintafiiing NATO's defacto independence fi7om the UN). This section will also illustrate 
the negative implication of such Ameaica's calculation upon the interests of the Bosnian government 
and situation of the civilians on the ground. 
The Western Debate on the NATO Air Strike of Early 1994: Friction between 
America's Vital Interests and Its Ideological Moral Values 
Since the collapse of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan, the Clinton administration attempted 
to discredit European policy-makers' peace initiatives throughout October 1993. For this purpose, 
Clinton even explicitly condemned the UK and France, in the following way: 
I had the feeling that the British and French felt it was far more important to avoid 
lifting the arms embargo than to save the country. 
A c! Clinton directly criticized the UK (and possibly as a result of two previous peace plans), it was 110 
unable to lead another initiative .3 This time it was France and Germany that produced the new peace 
plan on 7 November and eventually it was officially fon-nalized as the 'EU Action Plan. 
The EU's strategy was to demand the cooperation both from Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian 
goverrunent. On the one hand, the ICFY Co-Chainnen assurned that territorial concession on the part 
of the Bosnian Serbs was an essential condition for obtaining the Bosnian govenunent's consent. 5As 
an incentive, the EU proposed easing the UN's economic sanctions on Serbia in return for MilogeviCs 
exerting influence on the Bosnian Serbs. Milogevi6 was willing to accept this offer, as he was keen to 
end the crippling sanctions regime. On the other hand, this tactic implied that the EU would urge the 
2 Quoted in "It's Self-Evident That We ... Can't Solve All the Problems. " [an excerpt of the interview With 
Bill Clinton] Ae Washington Post, 17 October 1993, A 28. 
3 In addition, it can be argued that one of root causes of this tension was John Major's support of Bush senior 
in the US presidential election in 1992. However, the policy-makers of both sides dismissed this 
interpretation. Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004; Lord Robert Remvick on 5 October 2004; 
Interview with Robert Hunter on 17 May 2004. 
4 'Me EC became the EU on I November, when the Treaty of European Union came into effect. The UK 
govenu-nent did not take part in the formation of the plan but supported it when it was proposed. As for the 
details of the EU Action Plan see: "The European Union Action Plan, " Ramchar-an ed., The International 
Coqfercnce on the Former Yugoslavia .- (ýfficial Papers. Vol. 1.330-336; AFP, "Fr-ance, Gen-nany Back 
Conditional Lifting of Belgrade Sanctions, " Agence France Presse, 8 November 1993, LexIS-Nexis. 
5 Owen, David. Balkan Oc4-ssci,. London: Indigo, 1996.251-252. 
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Bosnian government to cooperate with the peace process. French Foreign Mir-ýister Allan Jupp6 and his 
Gernian counterpart Klaus Kinkel outlined the EU Action Plan in the following way: 
We must stress to the leadership in Sarajevo [the Bosnian govenunent] that the 
military option leads nowhere and that they would thereby risk losing the support 
of the intemational COMMUnity. 6 
However, the Bosnian govemment's reluctance to cooperate was in many respects similar to its 
approach to the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. 7 Izetbegovi6 had made clear that the critical interest of 
the Bosman government was not obtaining 'an unjust peace' in the form of the EU Action Plan, but 
8 
continuing 'a just war of defence'. 
Encoumged by America's unwillingness to support the EU's peace initiative, the Bosnian 
government stiffened its resolve. Thus, on 10 November 1993 Izetbegovi6 advocated, contra the EU 
Action Plan, that the Bosnian govenunent take a more assertive direction: 
We are thinking of switching fi7om a defensive war to a war of liberation, and 
hbemting the occupied teffitones. 9 
Indeed, towards the end of 1993, the Bosnian government opened various war fronts against the two 
enernies: the Bosman Serb forces and the Bosnian Croat forces. 10 This was partly in response to its 
enemies' offensives and partly driven by the Bosnian government's will to re-MSert its administrative 
authority across Bosnia by means. " 
To elucidate the above-mentioned development, there were two choices for the Western 
states in conjunction with how they perceived the interests of the Bosnian government. One was to 
promote a settlement of the conflict, regardless of the Bosnian government's reluctance. The other was 
to scrap the EU Action Plan and try to reconsider the means to protect the interests of the Bosnian 
6 Quoted in AFP, "France, Germany Back Conditional Lifting of Belgrade Sanctions, " Agence France 
Presse, 8 November 1993, Lexis-Nexis. 
7 Izetbegovi6, Ahja. Inescapable Questions: Autobiographical Notes. Translated by Saba Rissaluddin and 
JasiTdna Izetbegovi6. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 2003.258-259. 
8 Izetbegovi6, Inescapable Questions, 165. 
9 Quoted in AP, "Bosnian Serbs Reported Willing To Yield More Land, " The Associated Press, 10 
November 1993, Lexis-Nexis. 
10 The Bosnian government's actions during this period, see: lzetbegovi6, Inescapable Questions, 165-177. 
1 izetbegovi6, Incscapable Qucýtions, 165-177. 
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government. However, given the Bosnian government's willingness to continue its offensives, 
mcreasing the prospects for the Western states becoming ftuther militarily involved the conflict. The 
EU made the choice to push for a settlement. 
The US faced a dilernma. It was clear that the Clinton administration did not want to support 
the EU Action Plan, as it was basically a revised version of the Owen Stoltenberg Peace plan. 12 h1stead, 
as we have discussed above, the US again advocated lifling the arms embargo. Ms policy satisfied 
America's strategy to present itself as not pressuring the Bosnian government to give up its territonal 
integrity, while undennining the authority of multilateralism. However, as we have noted in Chapter 3, 
the 'lift and strike' policy would have led to the withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops and may have 
resulted in a serious demand for the US to send ground troops to give substance to its rhetoric about 
protecting the interests of the Bosnian government. Given IzetbegoVI6's aforementioned bellicose 
remarks, it could place the US in the position of supporting the Bosruan government militarily This 
was the predicament of America's use of quasi-multilateralism. As a result, the US administration could 
not present its own plan to settle the Bosnian conflict, notwithstanding its criticism of the EU Action 
Plan. 
Against this background, in December 1994, Warren Cluistopher visited European capitals 
in order to finalize preparation for the NATO Brussels summit of January 1994. It was to be Clinton's 
first visit to Europe since he had assumed the Presidency The purpose was to consolidate America's 
transatlantic alliance in accordance with its vision of NATO's supremacy in European security without 
imposing any burdens or constraints on its military strategy, in the form of accepting the 'lift and strike' 
policy However, Christopher faced serious opposition from the European affies. 
13 
It can be said that Christopher realised that the US was caught in the above-discussed 
predicament of quasi-multilateralism. In other words, if the US did choose to oppose the plan, and not 
successfully keep distance fi-om its initial moral support to the Bosnian govenu-nent, then it would have 
12 owerl, Balkan Odyss, ýv, 251-252. 
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became involved in offering a military support to the Bosnian government. Therefore, Christopher 
decided to launch an altemative American initiative vis-a-vis the Europeans, when he returned to the 
US. 14 US policy-makers began formulating a policy that would re-organize the situation on the ground 
without undermining America's vital interests and without accepting the EU Action Plan. 15 It 
eventuafly paved the way for the fon-nation of the Federation between the Bosnian govenunent and the 
Bosnian Croats. In other words, the US began to geo-strategicafly re-mould the situation on the ground 
in order to overcome its predicament. The NATO summit of January 1994 and the subsequent 
American diplomacy M Europe were the forum that the US administration outlined this. 
. 
The NATO Summit ogfJanuag 1994. - a Compromise between European Multilateralism and Ameficcz, ý 
Vi ta 1 In te res ts 
In the winter of 1993 and 1994, there were three important US policy objectives regarding 
European security. Firstly, it planned to construct a framework for preventing nuclear proliferation in 
Russia and other republics of the fonner Soviet Union. Secondly, it needed to refonn NATO- 
represented by initiatives such as the Partnership for Peace (pfp)16 and the Combined Joint Task Force 
(CJTF). 17 Finally, it intended to launch a new initiative in relation to the BoSMan conflict. With regard 
to the first and second policles, NATO's European member states did not raise serious objections. By 
the end of 1993, they agreed with each other on the contents to be decided at the NATO sumnut. 
13 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 Febniary 2004. 
14 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 Febniary 2004. 
15 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 Febniary 2004. 
16 PfP was an idea that was principally aimed at paving a way to enlarge NATO in the field of peacekeeping 
opemfions, while soothing the Russian hostility to NATO. This fimnework was formed as a result of the 
Polish general election of September 1993 (that resulted in a majority for the former Communist party) and 
the Russian Parliament election in December 1993 (that gave seats to the Liberal Democratic Party, the 
right-wing nationalists). See: Goldgeier, James M. Not nether but "en. - the U. S. Decision to Enlatge 
NATO. Washington D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1999.24-26.54-58; Interview with Robert Hunter on 17 
May 2004. 
17 CJTF is airried at providing a fi-amework for NATO to work together with other regional organizations 
such as WEU (or EU) in regard to the so-called 'non-article 5' activities (i. e. peacekeepmg/enforcing 
operations that would take place outside of NATO's geographical jurisdiction). As for details of this, see: 
Bany, Charles. 'NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Pr-actice, " Sun, ival 38, no. 1 (1996): 
81-97. 
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However, the proposed BoSMan policy, namely, ignoring the EU Action Plan, created a serious tension 
between the US and its European allies. This was the ftwmtlantic political context wl-&h existed 
during the NATO Summit of January 1994. 
The summit took place 10- 11 January 1994, in Brussels, and resulted in the issurng of a 
mixed message. On the one hand, they agreed to express their support for the EU Action Plan in the 
foRowing way: 
We are united in ýu Morting the efforts of the United Nations and the Euro 
Union to secure a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Bosnia, agreeable to an 
parties, and we commend the Europppn Union Action Plan of 22 November 1993 
to secure such a negotiated settlement. We reaffirm our determination to contribute 
to the implementation of a viable settlement reached in good faith [emphasis 
added]. 18 
However, NATO did not spell out the means to promote 'a negotiated settlement' or how it would 
implement the peace plan, but suggested the other way of engaging the Bosnian conflict as follows: 
[w]e reaffinn our readiness, under the authority of the United Nations Security 
Council and in accordance with the Alliance decisions of 2 and 9 August 1993, to 
carry out air strikes in order to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas 
and other threatened areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 9 
Yet, it was not clear whether the proposed air strikes were aimed at intervenmg in the conflict or rather 
they merely restrained form of involvement, in accordance with NATO's decision on 9 August (see 
Chapter 4). In other words, it was not specified who would define the aim of the air strikes and who 
would authofiseit. 
20 
This vagueness was partly a product of a compromise between the US and France. " The US 
18 NATO, "Declaration of the Heads of States and Governinent, Miriýisterial Meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council/ North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10- 11. January 1994, " NATO 
Ministerial Communiqu& (1994): M- 1 (94)3 Pam 24. 
19 NATO, "Declaration of the Heads of States and Government, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council/ North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10- 11. January 1994, " Para 
25. 
20 NATO, "Press Statement by the Secretary General: Following the Special Meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council, " NATO Headquarters, Brussels 2 August 1993. NATO Ministerial Communiques (1993). NATO, 
"Decisions Taken at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 9th August 1993, " NATO Press Releases 
(1993): 93 (52). 
21 Van Eekelen, William. Debating European Security. - 1948-1998. The Hague: Sdu publishers, 1998.169- 
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wanted to obtain NATO's explicit support for air strikes. France and other European leaders were eager 
to get America's endorsement for the EU Action Plan. In addition, they did not want to remove UN 
authority from air strikes for fear of escalating the conflict and the potential damage to the security of 
UN troops on the ground. As far as the NATO Communique is concerned, NATO reaffirryied its 
support for potential air strikes. France and America's other European allies, in exchange, received at 
least nominal support for the EU Action Plan, and they also obtained the US concession to maintain 
partial UN authority over NATO's potential air strikes in the dual key agreement. 22 
A 
i ,-a result of the NATO summit, the transatlantic relationship in the form of NATO was to 
detennine not only the political fi-amework but also tactical details of any international approach to the 
Bosnian conflict. This implies that, as a collective self-defence organization, NATO would take the key 
decisions of international action regarding the Bosnian conflict, instead of a collective security 
organization: the UN. One of the effects of this transfonnation was the marginalization of the role of 
the ICFY. After the NATO summit, the ICFY Co-Chairmen reahzed that they had been sidehned in the 
international mechation process of the Bosnian conffict. 23 Nevertheless, so far as the process by which 
NATO reached this decision is concerned, there is some validity in Liberal Multilateralists' theories 
(see Chapter 1). In particular, they seem correct in regard to the multflateral pohcy-making process 
wiffiin the intra-western relationship, as the NATO summit produced a compromised Commuraque 
that did not merely approve America's position. However, the outcomes of fis compromised 
agreement are another issue. In order to support the claims of Liberal Multilateralists in an absolute 
fashion, it is necessary to look at the consequences of the NATO summit. In other words, this is the 
issue of to what extent the US changed its policy after the NATO sumnut. 
171. 
22 As a result of the NATO summit, the ICFY Co-Chainnen realized that they were sidelined in the 
international mediation process of the Bosnian conflict. In addition, the then WEU Secunity-General who 
attended the NATO sunirnit witnessed this Franco-US cooperation behind the curtain. He understood that 
the WEUs role as well as the British role in the Bosnian conflict was sidelined by NATO's pre-summit 
meetings in November and December 1993 and by Franco-US cooper-ation in the NATO sumrrut of January 
1993. Van Fekelen, Debating European Security, 169-17 1. 
23 Owen, Balkan Oaý, ss(yv, 269. 
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After the NATO summit, in order to obtain Ameiica's support for the EU Action Plan, the 
French Foreign Minister, the German Chancellor, and the British Foreign Secretary met their American 
I counterparts in Paris (24 January) and in Washington D. C. (31 January and I February) respectively -, 
However, the US responded by criticizing the European Action Plan. For example, US Secretary of 
State, Warren Christopher, categoricaUy dismissed sending American ground troops to implement the 
plan and urged France to support air strikes. 25 
In contrast to the European approach of processing the fonnal peace negotiation, the US 
administration attempted to propose a more geo-strategic approach that would ti-ansform the situation 
on the ground. Following Christopher's visit to Europe in December 1993, on 4 February 1994, US 
foreign policy-makers referred the Muslim-Bosnian Croat Federation plan to President Clinton, in 
order to fonnalize their idea . 
26 The plan envisaged establishing a federation wifl-ýn Bosnia, consistmg of 
the Bosnian government controlled territories and that of the Bosnian Croat . 
27 This would result ma 
united war effort against the Bosnian Serbs and, criticaRy, end the fighting between the Bosnian 
, government and the Bosnian Croats. In addition to this initiative, the US administration also advocated 
NATO air strikes in conjunction with the NATO Communique of January 1994 to end the siege of 
Sarajevo. Both policies would not require US troops on the ground but would bring initiatives of 
international diplomacy widiin America's hand and restore its credibility. 28 
The Clinton administration's policy to maintain its international credibility took the indirect 
fon-n of military intervention in Bosnia. In this respect, Liberal Multilateratists' claim of NATO's 
24 AFP, "US rejects French proposal to force Bosnians to make peace, " Agence France Presse 1994,24 
January; Clinton, Bill. "Exchange with reporters Prior to Discussions with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of 
Germany, January 31,1994, " Public Papers ofthe President ofthe United States, William J Clinton I 
(1994): 144-145; McCurry, Michael. "Department of State Daily Briefing on 2 February 1994, " Department 
ofState Daily Press Briefing (1994): 
http: //dosfan. lib. uic. edu/ERC/briefing/dafly__ýriefings/1994/9402/940202db. htn-d [Accessed on 30 March 
2005]. 
25 Schweid, Barry. "Christopher Slaps Back at France over Bosnia, " Vie Associated Press, 27 January 1994. 
Lexis-Nexis. 
26 Daalder, Ivo. Getting to Dayton. - the Making ofAmerica Bosnia policy. Washington, D. C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2000.24-25. 
27 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004; Interview, %krith Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004. 
28 Sciolino, Elaine, and Jehl, Douglas. "From Indecision To Ultimatum -A Special Report; As U. S. Sought 
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aReged function to fonn a united Western opinion and to work in coHaboration with other security 
organization such as the UN or the EU does not have substance. The US did not provide 'voice 
opportunities' to its allies regarding the American and the Westem approach to the Bosnian conflict. 
The Sarajevo crisis of February 1994 provided an ideal opportunity for the US administration to 
facilitate its policy. 
AeSaMjgýo Market Place Incident on 5Februarv]994. - Can NATO Act Alone? 
On 5 Febnmty 1994, the Sarajevo open-air market place was attacked by a mortar-shell and 
that killed more than 50 people. 29 This incident happened in the context of the above-mentioned 
international circumstances. Despite the fact that the culprit is still not clear [as of August 2005], the 
majority of the intemational community concluded that it came ftom. Serbian occupied temtoly. 
30 By 
blan-dng Bosnian Serb forces, France and the US demanded that NATO air strikes should take place. 31 
In fact, the Conirnuniqu6 of the NATO summit of January 1994 had supported air strikes as response to 
32 
the situation in Sarajevo. However, supporting the US on such issue was unusual, on the part of 
France. By proposing the European Action Plan, France considered that the threat of air strikes could 
be useful for maintafi-iing 'safe areas' and would facilitate NATO's cooperation with the 
implementation of the Peace Plan. 33 
This issue of air strikes was, however, complicated as it was not only NATO's solidarity and 
credibility on the line, but also that of the European Action Plan. The ICFY Co-Chairmen had hosted 
a Bosnia Policy, The French Offered a Good Idea, " The New York Times, 14 February 1994, A 1,6. 
29 An UN insider's account of this: Akasl-ii, Yasushi. &ru Kotonimo Kokoroseki: Kokusaishai ni 1kitekita 
Hitorino Kiyeki [7he text in Japanese]. Tokyo: Chuokoron-Shinsha, 2001.148-149. 
30 Akashi, &ru Kotonimo Kokoroseki, 148-149. 
31 AFP, "Fr-ance announces NATO Council Meeting on Bosnia, " Agence France Presse, 6 February 1994, 
Lexis-Nexis; Christopher, Warren, Lynn Davis, Craig Johnstone and Michael McCurry. "US Department of 
State Daily Press Briefing, Monday, February 7,1994. " 
http: //dosfan. lib. uic. edu/ERC/briefing/dafly__ýriefings/1994/9402/940207db. htnl [Accessed on 9 March 
2005]. 
32 NATO, "Declaration of the Heads of States and Government, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council/ North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10- 11. January 1994, " Para 
25. 
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three-party meetings regarding the EU Action Plan on 18-19 January and also planned the next one for 
10 February 1994.34Furthermore, some members of the EU, especially the M were reluctant to 
endorse NATO's air strikes because the British government wanted to leave open an opportunity to 
settle the conflict by negotiation and maintain the safety of its troops on the ground. 35 Russia opposed 
launching any NATO air strikes against Serbs due to its frustration of NATO's growing role in the post 
Cold War Europe. 36 
On 9 Febnmry NATO convened an NAC meeting and decided to take coercive action if 
Bosnian Serb forces did not move its heavy weapons from Sarajevo by 200' of February 1994.37 
According to Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, the British government did not veto the proposal due to 
consideration of 'realism', that it should maintain 'the Atlantic Alliance, and that meant keeping our 
disagreement with the Americans widiin bounds. 08 Indeed, according to 7he New York Times, Warren 
Christopher suggested in an interview that that: '[t]here was a strong sense that our interests and 
NATO's credibility were at stake [regarding the NAC's decision on 9 Febnmry]. 09 Cluistopher was 
satisfied with the conclusion of the NAC meeting, neither because NATO would take coercive 
measures, nor the US and NATO would (at least indirectly) support the Bosnian government's fight for 
self-detennination. FEs satisfaction was due to '[t]he fact that the United States is taking an active role 
is making a difference, because of our status in the world and our perceived ability. '40 
FoHowing the NAC's decision, the US and the European major powers intensified their 
diplomatic activities. The British govemment and UNPROFOR put their efforts into reviving hopes for 
a negotiation-based peace process. Thus, in effect, they attempted to prevent air strikes. This relied on 
33 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 260-261,276-279. 
34 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 267-270. 
35 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004; Interview with Robert Hunter on 17 May 2004. 
36 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 267-270. 
37 NATO, "Decisions taken at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session, NATO 
Headquarters 111 Brussels, 9 February 1994, " 9 February 1994. Pam 10. 
38 Hurd, Memoirs, 467. 
39 Warren Christopher quoted Mi ScioliO, Elaine, and Douglas Jehl, "From Indecision to U`ltimatum---A 
Special Report; As U. S. Sought a Bosnia Pohcy, nie Frrnch Offered a Good Idea, " The Nevt, York Times, 
14 February 1994, A 1,6. 
-111 Warren Christopher quoted in Sciolino and Jehl, "From Indecision to Ultimatum, " A 1,6. 
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two actions: fustly easing the tension on the ground and, secondly, the removal of the Bosnian Serb 
forces' heavy weapons from around Sarajevo by 20 February 1994. This policy was legitimized by the 
logic that a peace by negotiation is better than fighting a war that would finther damage civilians' lives 
on the ground. Moreover, their critical interest-namely peacekeepers' safety-would be risked as a 
result of air strikes . 
41 To elucidate this point, the British government and the UN offices regarded the 
situation based on the distinction between the interests of the Bosnian govenunent and that of civiliam 
on the ground. The Bosnian governinent wanted to accomplish its political object of defeating the 
Bosnian Serb forces and restoring territorial integrity of Bosnia by all means, whereas the civilians 
wanted to restore their ordinal life as soon as they can. 42 
AS for the issue of controlling tensions on the ground, on 6 February the newly nominated 
UN Secretary-General Special Representative for fonner Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi, proposed an 
immediate cease-fire around Sarajevo, ordering the UNPROFOR Bosnia Commander, General 
Michael Rose to obtain consent from the local Bosnian waning pafties. 43 ()n 10 Febnimy 1994, as 
soon as the NAC issued a threat of air strike, the local cease-fire was announced. 44 On 12 February, the 
UN Security-General Boutros-Ghah delegated the UN side of the 'dual-key', of air strikes, to Akashi, 
. 
45 
who was generally cautious about using air power Akashi told news reporters that air strikes should 
be carried out on whomever would violate the cease-fire. Tl-ýs statement implied that the UN's 
interpretation of the aims of air strikes was different from that of NATO, which only blamed Bosnian 
Serbs . 
46 In other words, by implying potential to pwýiish not only Bosnian Serbs but also all warring 
41 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004; Interview with David Hannay on 6 October 2004; 
Interview with Robin Renwick on 5 October; Interview With Robert Hunter 17 May 2004. 
42 For instance, in February 1994 the Bosnian government refused to accept humanitarian aid in Sarajevo in 
order to bring international attention to the situation in eastern Bosnia where the Muslims were losing their 
fights against the Bosnian Serb forces. The UNPROFOR, the UNHCR (as well as European states) were 
highly critical about such political use of humanitarian. See. Ogata, Sadako. The Turbulent Decade: 
Conftonting the Rqfugee Cfisis qf the 1990s. New York: London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2005.82; 
Rose, Michael. Fighting. for Peace: Lessonsftom Bosnia. London: Warner, 1999.116-117. 
43'A'kaSl-ý' Ikint Kotonimo Kokorosek, 143-145; Rose, Michael. Fightingfor Peace, 68-75. 
-ý4 Akashi, Airu Kotonimo Kok-oroseki, 143-145; Rose, Fightingfor Peace, 68-75. 
45 
'A 'kaShi, Rini Kotonimo 
Kokorosekl, 146-147. 
46,, kkaShi, Airu Kotonimo Kokomseki, 146-147. 
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parties, Akashi attempted to prevent the use of air strikes. 
With regard to the issue of moving the Bosnian Serb forces'weapons, Russia became a key 
player. 47 The British government and the UN asked Russia to persuade the Bosnian Serbs. This was 
because Russia had contributed to UN peacekeeping operations in Croatia and thus had substantial 
numbers of troops near the border of Bosnia. In addition, it was generally regarded as having a good 
relationship with Serbia as well as the Bosnian Serbs. For these reasons, the UK and the UN 
anticipated that Russia would be able to prevail on the Bosnian Serb forces to remove the heavy 
weapons while using its troops to monitor the progress. However, initial reaction on the pail of Russia 
was negative. 48 Against this background, the British Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary flew to 
Moscow in order to hold a meeting with the President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin. 
On 16 February John Major and Douglas Hurd had a meeting with YeltsIn. This had been 
planned before the incident M the Sarajevo market and thus the British leaders did not explicitly link 
issues regarding the UK-Russian relationship with the potential Russian contribution to the Bosnian 
conflict . 
49However, the British leaders had a modest expectation of obtaining Russian support for their 
position with regard to the Sarajevo issue. This was because, before the Anglo-Russian surarnit, the 
Russian government had explicitly denounced NATO's ultimatum against the Bosnian Serbs and 
demanded adherence to the UN's conflict resolution mechanisms . 
50 Russia's Bosnian Envoy, Vitaly 
Churkin, suggested that its participation in the international decision making process in relation to the 
Bosnian conflict was the critical condition for dispatching its troops to Bosnia. 51 
In the meeting with the Russian President, John Major prorMsed that the UK would work 
47 The ICFY and the UNPROFOR regarded the Russian reaction to this situation as critical. For u'istance, 
when Boris Yeltsin criticized NATO's decision on the air strike, David Owen suggested his intention to step 
down to Douglas Hurd. However, Hurd requested Owen to stay. Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 285-286; Akashi, 
&ru Kotonimo Kokoroseki, 147-148. 
48 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 285. 
49 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004. 
50 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004; Stephens, Philip, and Lloyd, John. "Russian Troops Told to 
Defy UN: Yeltsin Administration Says Orders Must be Cleared with Moscow, " Financial Times, 16 
February 1994,16. 
51 Hraqjski, Hrvoje. "Russia Warns Airstrikes in Bosnia Beyond U. N. Framework., " United Press 
International, 16 February 1994, Lexis-Nexis; Akashi, Alni Kotonimo Kokoroseki, 147-148. 
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hard to make Russia become a member of the G7 . 
52 TI-fis would provide an opportunity for Russia to 
participate in one of most influential decision-making bodies in world politics. Major also suggested 
that the Queen Elizabeth H would pay a fon-nal state visit to Russia, making her first British Royal visit 
to the country since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 . 
53 It can be argued that the implication of this 
Royal visit to Russia was to symbolize a de facto recognition of the Yeltsin's regime, which had 
dissolved the Russian Parliament by military power in October 1993. Yeltsin decided to seize fis 
opportunity He implied that Russia would send its peacekeeping troops in order to monitor the 
BoSMan Serb forces'comphance to the NATO ultimatum demanding that they remove heavy weapons 
54 in and around Sarajevo. Bosnian Serbs armounced that it would remove the heavy weapons on the 
following clay. 55 Jonathan Aitken, the British Minister for Defence Procurement, relayed the 
development to the members of the House of Commons, praising John Major 'on what has clearly 
been a successful diplomatic initiative'on his pall. 56 
On 21 February, the UN Special Representative, Akashi Yasushi, announced that he was 
satisfied that the Bosnian Serbs had complied, after he had received a NATO field official's call that 
affirmed thiS. 
57 The NATO secretariat also followed Akashi's estimate . 
58 The crisis had been avoided. 
This was regarded as a jubilant moment for British diplomacy and its promotion of the European 
vision of multilateralism, and effectively paved the way for Russia's participation in the international 
diplomacy regarding the Bosnian conffict. With the help of Russia, Europeans still maintained its grip 
on the international initiatives on the Bosnian conflict regarding its use of coercive power. However, 
52 Landry, C. "Major Visits Key Reform City, Says Queen to Make Trip to Russia, " Agence France Presse, 
16 February 1994, Lexis-Nexis. 
53 Landry, "Major Visits Key Reform City, Says Queen to Make Trip to Russia. " 
54 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004; Daly, Emma, Andrew Marshall, Tony Barber, Patricia 
Wynn Davies, and Christop. "Sarajevo Air Strikes Forestalled by Russians; Serbs Pull Back Guns but 
Muslims fear Moscow's Troops Will Freeze Siege Lines, " Independent, 18 February 1994,1. 
55 Moutot, Michel. "Serbs Said to Withdraw fi7om Sarajevo after Russian Pressure, " Agence France Presse, 
17 February 1994, Lexis-Nexis. 
56 Jonathan Aitkin, House of Commons Debate, 17 February 1994, Hansard, Vol. 237,1155. Also quoted in 
Daly et a], "Sarqjevo Air Strikes Forestalled by Russians. " 
57 Oakley, M. 'NATO Ultimatur-n Expires, No Immediate Air Strikes Foreseen, " Agence France Presse, 211 
February 1994, Lexis-Nexis; Akaslii, Ikiru Kotonimo Kokoroseki, 153-154. 
58 NATO, "Staternent by Secretary General to the Press Following Expiry of Deadline for Withdrawal of 
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the US administration prepared to transform the dynamics of the international diplomacy by re- 
moulding the situation on the ground. 
The Muslim-Croat Federation: Creating, an Entiýy in Order to Promote AmericaS' Interests 
The Clinton administration decided to formalize the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia as 
soon as the incident in the Sarajevo market occurred. 59 In Febniary 1994, Clinton dispatched his 
advisers to Europe to explain the Federation plan, while America's European allies were attempting to 
prevent NATO's air strike against the Bosnian Serb forces. 60 Eventually, US Special Envoy to Bosnia, 
Charles Redman, managed to conclude an agreement. On 18 March, the US President hosted a 
ceremony establishing the federation attended by the signatories . 
61 This policy characterized the duality 
of the US cooperation with the EU and the UN. On the one hand, the US was officially working for the 
EU Action Plan; however, on the other hand, in reality, the US Envoy was trying to broker the Muslim- 
Croat Federation. 62 
A- previously discussed in relation to Warren Christopher's visit to Europe in December 
1993, the idea of Muslim-Croat Federation was promoted in order to overcome the tension between 
two vital interests of the US, as a result of promoting 'lift and strike' policy In other words, preventing 
America's direct involvement in the ground war was the essence of this policy Hence, Charles 
'D ý Iwdman suggested that the rationale of fonning the Federation was to settle the conflict between the 
Bosnian government and the Bosnian Croat forces and fonn an effective counter power against the 
Heavy Weapons from in and around Sara evo, " NATO Press Releases, 21 February 1994, (94)21. j 
59 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004. 
60 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004; Daalder. Getting to Dayton. 27; Schweid, Barry. 
"U. S. In Diplomatic I)iive to Set Up Two-Republic Bosnia, Linked to Croatia, " Associated Press, 24 
February 1994, Lexis-Nexis. 
61 Clinton, Bill. "Signing of a Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia: President Cliton, Secretary 
Christopher, Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic, Croatian Foreign Minister Granic, Bosnian-Croat 
Representative Zubak: Statement by President Clinton, released by the White House, Office of the Press 
Secretary, Washington, DC, March 1,1994, " US Department ofState Dispatch 5, no. II (1994): Article 1. 
62 Silber, Laura, and Allan Little. The Death of Yugoslaiia. Rev. ed. London: Penguin/BBC Books, 1996. 
319. 
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Bosnian Serb forces. " In this respect, the US Envoy claimed the initiative paved the way for the final 
settlement of the Bosnian conflict-64 
America's approach, however, did not satisfy two parties, namely America's European allies 
and the Bosnian goveniment. European policy-makers did not like the idea of the Mustim-Croat 
Federation because of the fact that the EU Peace Plan was still officially on the table and the new 
international initiatives of the US unden-nined it. 65 Tbus, the pohcy-makers of its European allies were 
kept away from the negotiation process and had little knowledge ofAmerica's negotlations. 66 
The Bosnian govenunent was, initiaHy, also not eager to take pail in the Muslim-Croat 
Federation, as it would prevent the Bosnian govenunent fi7om winning the then ongoing offensives 
against the Bosnian Croat forces and regaining its territorial integrity under the leadership of 
IzetbegoVi6.67 They also distrusted the Croatian President, Franjo Tujman, due to Ms role in 
orchestrating many of the military actions of the Bosman Croat forces . 
68However, the US pushed 
forward the Federation idea regardless of the initial reluctance on the part of the leaders of the Bosnian 
government. 69 According to the US negotiator, Charles Redman, because of aforementioned factors, he 
did not let the Croatian and the Bosnian leaders directly talk to each other at the negotiation table. He 
discussed issues with each side separately, acting as a key interlocutor. 'O Thus, the leaders of the 
Bosnian government also sat at the negotiation table without clearly knowing what the Croatian 
counterpart was up to and vice versa. 71 Hence, the Bosnian President, Ahja IzetbegoVI6, believed that 
the creation of the Federation was a result of Croatian acceptance of its political and n-fflitary defeat 
against the Bosnian government. 72 However, in reality, it was a product of US policy to manipulate the 
63 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004. 
64 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004. 
65 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004; Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004. 
66 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004; Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 296. 
67 Izetbegovi6, Inescapable Questions, 259-260. 
68 lzetbegovi6, Inescapable Questions, 175-176 
69 interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004. 
70 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004. 
71 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004. 
72 Izetbegovi6, Inescapable Questions, 177,259-260. 
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geo-strategic situation on the ground (to form an implicit cooperation between the US and Croatia). 
Therefore, the outcomes were contrary to what Izetbegovi6 believed. He stated that '[m]any of the 
institutions of the supposedly abolished para[-]state of Herzeg-Bosnia (Bosnian Croat's occupied 
temtory) have continued functioning today [as of 2001 ]., 73 In short, the Bosnian govemment was not 
pleased with the Mushm-Croat Federation because it fimdamentally constrained its iights of self- 
detennination over the Bosnian Croats'occupied tenitories. 
The establishment of the Federation was, in retrospect, the beginning of the Clinton 
administration's betrayal of its own justification of the Bosnian policy and its alleged moral interests of 
the West that they should protect the right of Bosnia to self-detenrdnate and to maintain its territorial 
integrity, under the Izetbegovi6 government. 74 These developments do not contravene what the 
working hypothesis of this thesis has assumed. European's loss of 'voice opportunities' within the 
Western policy-making process does not necessarily work in favour of the Bosnian government. it was 
not only the Europeans but also the US that prevented the promotion of the interests of the Bosman 
government. America's key motive in its Bosnian policy was based on its vital interests and geo- 
political approach thus its initial moral advocacy of protecting the Bosnian government was used a 
means to accomplish the end of organizing the Western Order under quasi-multilaterahsm. 
The Cfisis at Gondde in Apill 1994. - the NATO ý Defiance of Quasi-Multilateralism 
In the meantime, Bosnian Serb forces surrounded the US 'safe area' of Gor-a2de. In early 
April 1994, the Bosnian govenunent requested UNPROFR to order a NATO air strike. 75 However, 
General Rose, did not want to drag UNPROFOR into the Bosnian govemment's war against the 
Bosnian Serb forces . 
76 In addition, there had been no draniatic incidents in GomMe, equivalent to the 
73 Izetbegovi6, Inescapable Questions, 177. 
74 MiS justification is according to Anthony Lake's comments. Intemew with Anthony Lake on 19 May 
2004. 
75 Rose, Fighting. for Peace, 145-147. 
76 Rose, Fighting. for Peace, 145-147. 
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bombing of the Sarajevo market, which could justify punitive air strikes. 
Thus, UNPROFOR attempted to promote a local cease-fire in and around Gor-a2de, instead 
of using air strikes. On 9 April, General Rose urged Izetbegovi6 to endorse the idea of promoting a 
local cease-fire: however, Izetbegovi6 refused to accept it. 77 As a result, the conflict between the 
Bosnian government forces and the Bosnian Serb forces intensified. Despite Izetbegovi6's 
deterinination, the Bosnian government forces nearly collapsed in areas around Gora2de. 78 Tfýs 
situation forced the UN take the option of air strikes. 
On 10- 11 April, NATO launched its first aerial strikes on the Bosnian Serb forces in support 
of the UNPROFOR n-ýission in a 'safe area. '79However, as had been predicted before the air stiike, 
Bosnian Serb forces took a number of UNPROFOR personnel hostages. According to General Rose, 
this was a critical moment of international diplomacy, as it had the potential to trigger the tennmation 
of the UNPROFOR mission . 
80 The key diplomats, such as the ICFY Co-Chairmen, the UN Secretwy- 
General Special Representative, the US and the Russian Envoys came to Sarajevo. They negotiated in 
order to find a way out of the crisis for the UNPROFOR mission. However, the US Envoy, Charles 
Redman, argued that there should not be any peace negations until Bosnian Serb forces were punished 
81 
and the status quo had been restored. Izetbegovi6 also claimed that the UN should give up its control 
of air sffikes. 
82 
In order to find any opportunities for negotiation-based solution, the UN Special 
Representative, Yasushi Akashi, carried out shuttle diplomacy between Sarajevo and Pale. However, 
83 
the prospects of his activities were not promising. Akashi even suggested, that in the worst case 
77 Rose, Fighfing. for Peace, 152-155. 
78 Rose, Fighfingfor Peace, 155-159. 
79 On 12 March Akashi agreed to launch air strikes as a reaction to the situation in Biha6. However, NATO 
failed to implement this due to badweather. Akashi, Ikiru Kotonimo Kokoroseki, 158-159,164-165. 
80 Rose, Fighfing. for Peace, 162. 
81 Rose, Fighting. for Peace, 163. 
Q Rose, Fighfing. for Peacc, 166. 
83 Akashi, Aim Kotonimo Kokorosekl, 165-173. 
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scenario, the UNPROFOR would have to withdraw from Bosnia. m America's uncompromising 
position, together with the Bosnian govennnent's stiff resolve to continue fighting, clearly prevented 
Akashi and Europeans fi7om promoting a negotiation based settlement. Facing such a deadlock, David 
Owen suggested that the ICFY would accept the option that the US and the Russian Envoys were to 
take over its position of Co-Chairmen. 85 It was in such a political context that BoSrUan Serb held LJN 
workers on the ground as hostages and threatened to shoot down NATO aircrafts, which resulted in the 
. 
86 en i fi postponement of air strikes The international actors involved in diplomacy conc ung the Bosn an 
conflict began to pay attention to the next move. 
On 15 April, the US administration suggested that it would hold proximity negotiations 
concerning tenitorial settlement in Bosnia, despite the fact that the ICFY was still the only legitimate 
international institution to do SO. 87 Furffiermore, the new US Joint Cl-ýiefs of Staff, General John 
Shaliakashivili, infonned UNPROFOR that NATO would launch punitive air strikes against the 
Bosnian Serb forces . 
88 The Deputy Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan and Akaslý agreed that 
the LN should prevent NATO air strikes in relation to the situation in Gora2de. 89 However, on 22 April 
NATO held a NAC meeting and issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serb forces. 90 
Against this backdrop, UNPROFOR was stiH promoting a cease-fire on the ground. On the 
same day as the NAC meeting (22 April), Akashi went to Belgrade. He held a series of meetings with 
Milogevi6 and the leaders of the Bosnian Serb forces. Milo§evi6 summoned Radvan Karad2i6 and 
other leaders of the Bosnian Serb forces to attend this series of meetings. On 23 April Akashi and 
Karad2i6 agreed to stop fighting in Gora2de. 91 Akashi and General Rose, perstmded. NATO to respect 
84 Akashi, Ikiru Kotonimo Kokoroseki, 170-17 1. 
85 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 296. 
86 Linnee, Susan. "Serbs Restrict U. N. Movements; Diplomatic Efforts at High Speed, " 7he Associated 
Press, 13 April 1994, Lexis-Nexis. 
87 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 296. 
88 Rose, Fighting. for Peace, 173-174. 
89 Akashi, Ikini Kotonitno Kokoroseki, 173. 
90 NATO, "Decisions on the Protection of Safe Areas: Taken at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 
Pen-nanent Session, NATO Headquarters, Brussels. 22 April 1994, " ,, VA TO Ministetial Communiquýs, 22 
April 1994. 
91 Akashi, Ikiru Kotonitno Kokorosekl, 174-175; Rose, Figlitingfor Peace, 174-175. 
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the local cease-fire. 921n addition to this, AkasW publicly demanded that the US respects the value of the 
local cease-fire . 
93 However, the NATO Secretary-General and NATO's Allied Supreme Commander 
disagreed with the UNPROFOR. 94 MoreoVer, the US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleme Albright, 
bluntly dismissed Akashi's requests in the following ways: 
International civil servants should remember where their salaries are paid - by 
member states. They should not even be thinking of criticizing the policies of 
member states. Frankly, I'm tired of it. 
95 
This underscored America's perception that international organizations only exist in order to promote 
aims set by its member states, more precisely by the US. In contrast to Liberal Multilateralists' 
viewpoint that the US is a 'benevolent' leader of the West, there was no space for such a perspective. 
Added to Albright's remarks, the Clinton administration appointed Richard Holbrooke to be 
A 
., ssistant 
Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs in order 'to deal with the key issues of 
Bosnia and NATO's future. 196 He was one of the original advocates of the 'lift and strike'policy among 
Clinton's policy advisers and even a vocal supporter of America's implicit violation of the arms 
embargo through a third party. 97 This shuffle of officials In Washington implied that the US 
administration would become more hawkish in its reaction to the Bosnian conflict. 
To retwu to the international diplomatic stage, as shown above, the UN officials and UN 
b7oop contributing states such as Britain and France vigorously opposed the launching of full scale air 
strikes for fear of the safety of their soldiers on the ground. 98 Eventually their efforts prevented NATO 
from going ahead with additional air strikes in relation to the situation of GoraMe. They succeeded M 
this because NATO lost its rationale to impose air strikes as the situation on the ground improved after 
92 Akashi, Ikiru Kotonimo Kokoroseki, 176; Rose, Fightingfor Peace, 180-182. 
93 Cohen, Roger. "Man in the Middle Calls on Confucius, " Ae New York Times, 26 April 1994, A 6. 
94 Akasl-ý, Airu Kotonimo Kokoroseki, 176; Rose, Figh tingfor Peace, 180-182. 
95 Quoted in "U. S. Envoy Scolds U. N. Aide For Criticizing Administration, " Washington Post, 27 April 1994, 
A 28. 
96 Holbrooke officially took over the Assistant Secretary of State position from August 1994. Christopher, 
Warren. Chanecs qfA Lifetime. New York: Scrbner, 2001.256. 
97 Holbrooke, Richard. To End a lVar. New York: Random House, 1998.52-53. 
91 Akashi, Rini Kotonimo Kokoroseki, 178-179. 
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Akashi's local cease-fire agreement with Karadli6.99 In a sense, the UN officials, the British and the 
French government empowered the UN based-multilaterahsm in order to prevent NATO fi-om 
implementing its decisions. 
The Clinton administration was not pleased by the result. The then US Ambassador to 
NATO, Robert Hwiter, said: 
There were suspicions that the British officers serving with UNPROFOR were 
doing what they could do ftustrate the decision of the Nato [sic] council. ' 00 
In fact, some of British officials were also fiustrated at the action of the tN office as well as those of 
their own govenunent's policy in Bosnia. 101 They shared a desire with their Amencan counterparts for 
a more robust approach against Bosnian Serb forces. As far as this point is concerned, they had a 
potential to form an inter-governmental network with American officials. As we have discussed M 
Chapter 1, the Liberal Multilateralists argue that such a network may maintain Western solidarity 
regardless of their official policies. 
The reality was, however, not in accord with the Liberal Multilateralist interpretation. First 
of all, the British officials who supported the robust action felt that they were not in the position to 
demand that their own government shift the policy'02Moreover, their position and that of the US 
administration was fimdamentally different. These British officials were quite critical of America's 
indifference to the European promoted peace plan(s) and its lack of any alternative idea, to promote 
pmce. 
103 
To sum up the above-discussed developments fi7orn the EU action Plan to the Gora2de crisis, 
there are various points to be noted. First of all, the claims on the part of the Liberal Multilateralists that 
99 On 27 April the UN at last managed to send an additional 6,500 troops to reinforce the UNPROFOR 
mission in Bosnia instead of continuing NATO's air st: rikes. Rose, Fightingfor Peace, 186. 
100 Quoted in Simms, Brendan. Unfinest Hour. - Bfitain and the Destruction qfBosnia. London: Allen Lane, 
The Penguin Press. 203. 
101 For instance, the UK Ambassador to the USA, Robin Renwick, UK Ambassador to the UN, David 
Hannay, the Political Director at the Foreign Commonwealth Office, Pauline-Neville Jones were among 
such officials. Interview with Robin Renwick on 5 October 2004; Interview with David Hannay on 6 
October 2004; Also see: Rose, Fightingfior Peace, 249-250,262-265; Simms, Unfinest Hour, 240-248. 
102 Interview with Robin Remock on 5 October 2004; Interview with David Hannay on 6 October 2004. 
103 Interview With Robin Renwick on 5 October 2004; Interview with David Hannay on 6 October 2004. 
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the Western states share common 'ideational' interests for deciding their collective action cannot 
explain the British and UN actions. The British govenunent and the UN officials acted together to 
prevent any possibility of launching air strikes for the sake of protecting the own peacekeeping troops 
and maintaining a momentum for the negotiation based peace. However, this worked not in favour of 
the ideological interpretation of Western values in this case such as protecting the interest of the 
'victirns'of international insecurity (i. e. the Bosnian government). 
The same can be said of the decisions of the US administration. The US promoted the 
Muslim-Croat Federation, regardless of the initial unwillingness of the Bosnian govenunent. Moreover, 
the US advocacy of air strikes did not give substance to Liberal Multilateralists' claim that the US (and 
the West) acts in accordance with its (ideological interpretation of) moral values of protecting the 
Bosnian government. This was because there was a fimdamental difference between the motives of the 
US and that of the Bosnian govemment. The Bosnian government aimed to obtain a settlement that 
guaranteed recognition of their territorial integrity or to provide all means to accomptish it by 
themselves. However, the Clinton administration did not want to undermine its vital interests (i. e. 
deploying ground troops). Added to that, with regard to the negotiation process of the EU Action Plan, 
the US did not respect anotherprocedural definition of Western values (i. e. multilateralism) in order to 
maintain NATO's defacto independence from the UN. 
As a result of these Western actions, the two opportunities were missed. From a viewpoint of 
respect for multilateralisn-4 it was a chance to implement the EU Action Plan. From an ideological 
interpretation of Western value, it was an opportunity to take robust action against Bosnian Serb forces. 
Hence, the ftindamental interests of civilians on the ground- saving their lives by all means, regardless 
of the values it would promote-were not well represented in the Western approaches to the Bosruan 
conflict. In short, the above-discussed facts contend with the Liber-al Multilateralist's assurnptions. The 
West did not act in accord with its alleged attachment to moral obligation to protect international peace 
and justice. Also, NATO did not cooperate with the UN and its multilateral-decision making process 
188 
did not function as predicted by Liberal Multilateralists. 
The Formation of the Contact Group: Was Multilateralism Restored? 
European policy-makers realized the limit of their political impact on the direction of the 
international mediation concerning the Bosnian conflict, while they attempted to resolve the crisis in 
Gora2de in spring 1994. In relation to this, David Owen proposed a new international policy 
coordination body that would directly involve the US and preferably Russia as weH. 'O' In fact, before 
David Owen's proposal, at the working-level, there were informal practices between the US and some 
of its European allies to share information regarding their diplomatic activities III relation to the 
Bosnian conflict. 105 The US administration agreed to fonnalize these practices. However, the US 
Envoy to Bosnia, Charles Redman, was sceptical about the efficiency of such a forum. In particular, the 
US administration did not want to include twelve EU members in such a forurn. 1 06David Owen shared 
these concerns regarding its efficiency 107 
The EU leaders were at first reluctant to defer to the Contact Group, as it was only a few 
months since the concept of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) had been formatized. '08 
However, its position was undennined by its failure to conclude a peace plan with the waning parties 
of the Bosnian conflict. Eventually, on 18-19 April 1994 the Foreign Ministers of the EU held their 
ministerial meeting and agreed with Owen and Redman's propos . 
109 
On the following day (19 April) the US, the UK, France, Gennany and Russia effectively 
institutionalized a policy consultation fi-amework among the great powers. ' 10 The so-called 'Contact 
Group' replaced the ICFY's leading international forurn, with the aim of defining the direction of the 
104 Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004. 
105 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 Febnlary 2004. 
106 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 Febmary 2004; Owen, Balkan Odyssci,, 295-296; Daalder, Getting 
to Dal, ton, 28. 
107 Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004. 
108 Owen, Balkan Oaý, ssci,, 296-299. 
109 EPC, "Statement on Bosnýia, " European Foreign Policy Bulletin, 18 April 1994. (94/137); Owen, Balkan 
Oaý,. výo,, 296-299. 
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peace process, effectively undem*iing the EU and the LN's role in the peace process. "1A relatively 
open-ended multilateralism in the fonn of the UN and the ICFY was replaced by multilateralism 
among a limited group. The international interaction was getting one step closer to the idea of quasi- 
multilateralism that allows America's exceptional position vis-a-vis the outcomes of policy 
coordination among more than three parties. 
It can be argued that an inter-governmental policy network between the Co-Chairmen of the 
ICFY and the US Envoy to Bosnia helped the establishment of the Contact Group. Indeed, the idea of 
Contact Group did not come from their superiors. As far as this point is concerned, there is some 
validity in the assumptions of the Liberal Multilateratists. As previously discussed (Chapter 1), they 
argue that such formation of policy networks and transnational cooperation of bureaucratic offices are 
positive products of pluralistic Western democracies, which supplement governmental level 
communication and thus facilitate intra-western multilateralism. 
It is important to note, however, the political development, which forced the Co-Chairmen 
of the ICFY to propose the establishment of the Contact Group; namely America's explicit reluctance 
to cooperate with the EU, the LN, and the ICFY in promoting peace in Bosnia. Therefore, contra 
Liberal Multdatei-alists, it was not the democratic identities of the Western regimes, but diplomatic 
deadlock on the part of the ICFY, that was the cKtical factor in bringing about this transnational 
cooperation between the ICFY and the US Envoy to Bosnia. In essence, this was a product of power 
politics and America's vital interests, not that of policy-network or the ideological moml value of the 
West. Hence, the formation of the Contact Group did not guarantee America's support to promote 
peace on the ten-ns of the ICFY. 
110 Owen, Balkan Odýýssey, 296-299. 
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The Contact Group Peace Plan: Imposing a Settlenwnt 
On 13 May 1994, the Contact Group held its first ministerial meeting and decided to direct a 
new peace process mvolving the three waning parties of Bosnia, and, in 1994, lt held various meetings 
with their representatives throughout May and June. ' 12 On 5 and 6 July 1994 the second ministerial 
was convened which led to the proposal of the Contact Group Peace Plan. ' 13 
Ms plan presented a map that envisaged Bosnia as consistMg of two components (the 
Muslim-Croat Federation and the territories controRed by the Bosnian Serbs); mstead of the 
Stoltenberg-Owen Peace Plan's three divisions. It gave 51% of the Federation territory to the remaining 
49 % of it to the Bosnian Serbs. With the exception of the numbers of the territorial divisions, the 
essence of the Contact Group Peace Plan was based on the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. ' 14 However, 
in contrast to previous peace plans, the Contact Group did not present clear constitutional an-angements. 
The details of these critical issues were to be addressed as soon as the waning parties consented to the 
territorial divisions. ' 15 In addition, the plan was unique as it contained some elements of coercion as a 
means to achieve the settlement. Tfiýs was called the 'take it or leave it'principle, which demanded the 
ffiree parties accept the Plan by 20 July 1994, or face sanctions (including the possibility of NATO air 
strikes). "' However, the plan was promoted at the cost of ignon-ng the interests of the Bosnian 
govemment. 
For instance, Izetbegovi6 and other Bosnian leaders disliked the Contact Group Peace Plan 
as it posed a critical challenge to the interests of the Bosnian government. 117 They saw it as a product of 
the Clinton administrution's shifting priority fi7om its rhetorical support of the interests of the Bosman 
112 For the details of the activities of the Contact Group during this period, see: Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 299- 
306; Rose, Fighting. for Peace, 199-212. 
113 "Ministerial Text of 5 July 1994, " The International Conference on the Former Yugoslaiid : Official 
Papers, edited by Ramcharan, Vol. 1,337-34 1. 
114 Daalder. Getting to Dayton, 28-30. 
115 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 299-300,306-307; Clark, Bruce. "Geneva talks stave off war in ex-Yugoslavia - 
for a While: Gloomy Prospect from BosniaContact Group' Discussions, " Financial Times, I August 1994, 
2. 
116 Ducrot, Victor Ego. "Bosnia-Herr-egovina: Factions Given Two Weeks to Agree on Peace. " Inter Press 
Sen, ice, 6 July 1994, Lexis-Nexis; "Ministerial Text of 5 July 1994, " Ducrot, "Bosnia-Her-cegovina: Factions 
Given Two Weeks to Agree on Peace. "; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 30. 
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government, to actively pursuing America's interests as a world super power. ' 18 In short, fi-om the 
view-point of the Bosnian government, the Contact Group Peace Plan was an 'unjust' plan and was a 
symbol of America's betrayal of its initial promise to protect the tenitorial integrity of Bosnia. " 9 
Under intense international pressure (especially from the US), the MuslIM-Croat Federation 
indicated its intention that they would accept the Contact Group Peace Plan (i. e. not the fonml 
acceptance). 120 The Bosnian Serb leader Karad& attended the meeting of the Contact Group, where he 
raised concerns about the absence of concrete constitutional arrangements in the plan. 121 
After the deadline, on 29-30 July, a third ministerial meeting (of the Contact Group) was 
held to discuss the situation. However, no clear constitutional arrangements were agreed on. 122 
Moreover, substantial international sanctions did not follow even when the Bosnian Serbs rejected the 
peace plan, due to internal divisions between the members of the Contact Group. 113 The US demanded 
the launch of air strikes and lifting the an-ns embargo on the Muslim-Croatia Federation side. The 
European members of the Contact Group, in particular Britain and Russia, opposed this. 124 British 
opposition was based on the logic that air strikes would lead to the withdrawal of the UNPROFOR 
troops on the ground or result in hostages. Russia contested NATO's military operation, because there 
was insufficient support from the UNSC. 
Thus, by the end of the diird ministerial meeting of the Contact Group in late July 1994, the 
117 Izetbegovic, Inescapable Questions, 26 1. 
118 Izetbegovic, Inescapable Questions, 26 1. 
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US moderated its advocacy of a 'hft and strike' policy This was not only a result of the pressure from 
other members of the Contact Group, but of America's belated realization of the potential 
consequences of the 'fift and strike'. The 'hft and strike'poficy was rationahzed by the America's moral 
conunitment to the interest of the Bostlian goveminent. This was a means to oppose the ICFY 
promoted peace plans and thus a political tool to protect one of America's vital interests of maintaining 
NATO's de facto independence from the UN. However, imposing 'lift and strike' policy would have 
lead to the withdrawal of the UNPROFOR and the deployment of US ground troops-a scenano the 
US wanted to avoid. 125 Ili reality, the 'lift and strike' policy only exacerbated this predicament for the 
US in the form of the tension between two vital interests maintafi-dng NATO's defacto independence 
from the UN and not deploying ground troops). As a result, US was not able to give substance to the 
Contact Group's 'take it or leave it 'approach. 
fthe Anm Embargo: Impact ofAmericas' Domestic Politics The Croatian Violation o 
Despite the above-discussed strategic context, it is widely believed not only by the Liberal 
Multilateralists, but also by some academics that domestic pressure, particularly from US Congress 
forced the Clinton administration to oppose the anns embargo on Bosnia. 126 The Republican Party's 
(whkh demanded the lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnian Muslims) control of majority in both 
chambers of the US Congress in November 1994, makes this causal relationship between the 
congressional pressure and America's failure to comply with multilateralism (in the form of the arms 
embargo on Bosnia) seem plausible. 
127 
The US administration, however, fon-nally adopted the 'lift and strike' policy in May 1993. 
125 Interview with Robert Hunter on 17 May 2004; Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004. 
126 For instance, see: Ruggie, John Gerard. Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era. 
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This was nearly half year before the mid-term US congressional election. US policy-makers such as 
National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, underscored this point. According to him, the US 
administmtion formed its Bosnian policy in relation to the European promoted peace plan(sý-in other 
words promoting 'hft and strike' policy- primarily based on the practicality of the plan(s), not based 
on congressional pressures to do so. "' in other words, America's domestic pressure was not the critical 
factor in detennining the Clinton administration's policy in Bosnia and they had a grip on the direction 
of the policy based on rational calculation of America's vital interests. The following story is another 
case that may confirm this point. 
On 29 April 1994, the US Ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, and the US Envoy to 
Bosnia, Charles Redman, met government officials of the Croatian Republic. The Croatian officials 
informed its US counterparts that they would supply arms to the Muslim-Croatia feder-ation in Bosnia, 
via Iran. 
129 The US diplomats did not oppose it. 
130 According to Redman, he and Galbraith reacted to 
their Croatian counterpart by saying that: 'we would not put [on] the green light [for the am-is 
smuggling] but the red fight as well. We simply say [sic], "it's your decisiolf '. 1131 The Whýite House was 
informed of the meeting and did not oppose their actions. 131 In other words, high-ranking US foreign- 
128 Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004. 
129 Galbraith, Peter. "Prepared Statement of Peter W. Galbraith, U. S. Ambassador to Croatia, before the 
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policy makers had clear knowledge about this development and implicitly supported it. "' Tfiis was 
clearly a defacto endorsement of a violation of the arms embargo. 
According to Galbraith and Redman, they also reported the contents of their conversation 
with the Croatian officials to all the members of the Contact Group. 134They recalled that other 
members of the Contact Group did not criticize America's defacto implicit acceptance of the violation 
of the arms embargo on the part of Croatian authorities. Thus, Redman considered that it was either not 
a serious piece of infonnation or they accepted the fact as it was. 135 However, the then British Foreign 
Secretary, Douglas Hurd, contested this claim, noting that he, as a member of the Contact Group, did 
not received Us critical information. He presumes that, had they been informed, it would certaiffly 
have provoked criticism from Britain against the US. 
136 
After the US administration implicitly endorsed the Croatian violation of the arms embargo, 
the US administration did not infonn the US Congress. Without knowing what the administration was 
up to, the US Senate and the House of Representative voted in favour of America's the unilateral lifting 
of the arms embargo on 12 May and 9 June 1994 respectively 137 The US administration did not 
officially endorse congressional resolutions, however, it had known the fact that the Croatian 
government had been ignored the an-ns embargo regime. It was unnecessary for the Clinton 
administration to provoke international criticism against them (and take responsibility for "s in the 
form of sending ground troops) by explicitly violating the arms embargo. Tbus, the Clinton 
133 Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004. 
134 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004. "Hearing of the House of International Relations 
Committee, Subject: Iranian Arms Transfers to Bosnia, Chaired by Representative Benjamin Gilman (R- 
NY). " 
135 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004; "Hearing of the House of International Relations 
Committee, Subject: Iranian Arms Transfers to Bosnia, Chaired by Representative Benjamin Gilman (R- 
NY). 11 
136 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004. 
137 The US Senate voted in favour of (50-49) the following registration: "An Act to Remove the United 
States Arms Embargo of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. " (S. AMDT 1695 to S 2042). The 
House of Representative also voted in favour of (244-178) the similar act: "Fiscal 1995 Defense 
Authorization/ Bosruan Arrns Embargo Tennination" (HR4301). Details of congressional debates are in: 
Doherty, Carroll. J. "Senate Sends Mixed Signals on Bosnia, " Cong? iffsional Quanerly Meekly Repon 52, 
no. 19 (1994): 1233-1234; Doherty, Carroll. "House Votes to Force Clinton to End Bosnia Arms Ban, " 
Congre, v. viowil Quanerly If eeld-y Repon 52, no. 23 (1994): 1535-1534. 
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administration, on the one hand, refused to accept the congressional demand. Members of the Congress 
who supported lifting the anns embargo were frustrated at the Clinton administmtion's indecision. 118 
By that time (spring 1994), it was too risky for the US administration to expticitly 
unilaterally undennine, the authority of UN Secufity Council Resolution 713, which constituted the 
arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia. 139As we discussed before, this was because the US had not 
deployed peace-keeping troops on the ground and, thus, Hing arms embargo would obViously 
provoke European allies to pull out their troops. It would eventually drag the US into a war against 
Bosnian Serb forces on behalf of the Bosnian government, or the Bosnian Croats. 
On the other hand, since early 1993, the Clinton administration had ignored its own party's 
ranking members in the Congress, who supported the ICFY's efforts to settle the Bosnian conflict and 
urged the US to act with Europeans. For instance, the then Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee 
in the House of Representative, Lee Hamilton, said, 
[i]f we lift this embargo, we are going to intensify the war, and by intensifying the 
war that is another way of saying we are going to be killing a lot more people. '40 
Thus, Hamilton and other Democratic members of the Congress who supported multilateral US policy 
in Bosnia were uncomfortable with the Clinton admirdstmtion's approach. 141 
Considering both opinions for and against the arms embargo, the US Congress did not have 
any power over the outcomes of the US endorsement of the Croatian violation of the arms embargo. 
The main reason for this was that the critical information (i. e. America's implicit endorsement of the 
violation of the arms embargo) was clearly concealed by the administration. In other words, the Clinton 
administration formulated the Bosnian policy by isolating congressional inputs. Indeed, contra-Liberal 
Multilateralism, US policy-making system was neither 'open', 'penetrative' nor 'competitive'. It is 
now plausible to conclude that America's imphcit support for Croatia's Violation of the arms 
138 Interview with Robert Hand (Foreign Policy Staff of the Congressman Steny Hoyer, who supported the 
'lift and strike'policy) on 19 May 2004. 
139 UN Security Council Resolution 713.25 September 1991 (S/Res/713). 
1-4) Quoted in Doherty, "House Votes to Force Clinton to End Bosnia Arrns Bari, " 1535. 
141 interview with Martin Sletzinger (Foreign Policy Staff of the Congressman Lee Hamilton, xho opposed 
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embargo--4he symbol of intra-western multilateralism-was not based on its domestic politics but the 
Clinton administration's rational calculation of US interests. 
To sum up the developments fi7om the formation of the Contact Group to the Croatian 
violation of arms embargo, we have discussed some important counter arguments agamst the 
assumptions on the pail of Liberal Multilateralists. Firstly, the formation of the Contact Group can be 
interpreted as a work of intra-western multilateralisn-4 assisted by the inter-govenunental network, in 
the fonn of the cooperation between the ICFY and the US officials. However, as we have discussed, 
America's persistent ignoring of the efforts of the ICFY ptior to the establishment of the Contact 
Group, was a more fimdamental factor in creating the Contact Group. 
Secondly, even after the establishment of the Contact Group, the Western states were not 
niý Able to form a united approach to the Bosnian conflict. In particular, they strongly disagreed with each 
other on the issue of the use of coercive power. The US did not want to endorse the UN's command 
and control power over NATO's military action. In contrast, the European members of the Contact 
Group insisted on maintaining the UN's role in the use of coercive power and their efforts to promote 
peace due to concern over the implications, for UNPROFOR troops on the ground. This episode 
suggests that NATO's cooperation with other international organizations is defined by the political 
negotiations-in other words balance of power consideration-among the member states of NATO. 
NATO's aReged hybiid characteiistic, as Liberal Multilateralists assume, did not facifitate the 
cooperation between NATO and the UN. 
'Ihirdly, the indecisive outcomes of the Western debate on the Bosman conflict at that tune 
were partly a result of intra-Westem disagreement. However, given America's asymmetric power over 
other Westem states, t1-: iis was more to do with America's mdecision related to the probable 
consequences of 'lift and strike' pohcy for the vital interests of the US that keeps Amencan ground 
ti-oops away fi-om the conflict. This constituted a tension beetween America's two vital interests (i. e. 
the 'lift and stiike'policy) on 17 May 2004. 
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NATO's defacto independence from the UN and not deploying ground troops). So long as the Bosman 
government pursued a 'just peace' by all means, there was a danger that the US would become 
embroiled in fighting a war on behalf of the Bosnian government. Thus the Clinton administration 
faced the predicament of promoting quasi-multilateralism in relation to its advocacy of the 'lift and 
stfike policy'. 
Fourthly, the administration's implicit choice to overcome this predicament was a use of 
geo-strategic (i. e. balance of power) approach that encouraged a local force (i. e. Croatia) to promote its 
favoured policy, but without sacrificmg America's vital interests and without seriously undenriinirýg its 
profile as a supporter of the humanitarian situation in Bosnia and international collaboration. However, 
America's commitment to such normative values would be compromised in order to promote its vital 
interests that demands 'stability' more than the contents of 'justice' on the ground. `nfis was the 
implication of the America's promotion of 'market democracy', based on the logic of 'democratic 
peace' instead of other fonns of Westem values (i. e. respecting multilateralism and protecting the 
interests of the Bosnian government). This was a way to organize the Western Order under the logic of 
quasi-multilateralism. Hence, in contrast to Liberal Multilateralists' claim, the pressure fi-om the US 
Congress did not force this policy The formation of the Muslim-Croat Federation and the case of the 
Croatian violation of the an-ns embargo underlines America's actions based on its vital interests. 
Lastly, if the working hypothesis of tl-ýs research is correct, this situation would lead to 
another step. The US would mount fiuther international pressure for its allies to accept the logic that 
coercive action, and not negotiation, was the central means to accomplish a settlement in Bosnia. In this 
way, the West would impose a settlement that the Bosnian government did not want and it would 
devastate the conditions of civilians on the ground. The next section will demonstrate whether this 
interpretation is accountable and supported by events. 
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War or Negotiations? America's Vital Interests and Domestic Politics 
From autumn to winter 1994, the situation in Muslim controlled areas such as Tuzla and 
Biha6 had deteriorated. The Bosnian Federation demanded NATO air strikes in order to support their 
mihtary operations. It also urged the international community to hft the arrns embugo on Bosnia. 142 
The then UNPROFOR Commander in Bosnia, General Michel Rose, however, was critical about 
NATO's action under such a situation as one of intervening in the Bosnian conflict, and demanded that 
NATO comply with the UN's authority over its air strikes. '43This was based on the interpretation of the 
'dual-key'of air strikes, which stated that NATO's actions were only pennitted in order to protect either 
UNPROFOR personnel or to assure the flow of humanitarian assistance on the ground. Moreover, it 
also demands such actions should be authorized by the UN Secretary-General (Via his special 
representative Akashi Yasushi or UNPROFOR Commander). 144The European members of the 
Contact Group, especially Britain, stood behind this interpretation. 145 
Regarding this issue, together with UNPROFOR officers, the LJK attempted to regain the 
political control over the international approaches concerning the Bosnian conflict. Their efforts 
consisted of four aspects. Firstly, the British government attempted to persuade the US to respect the 
'dual-key' arrangement. However, this was not strong enough to convince the US administration. 146 
Secondly, the ICFY Co-Chairmen, UK., France and Russia urged the US to accept the premise that 
maintaining political contact with the Bosnian Serbs leadership and Slobodan Milogevi6 was critical in 
order to facilitate potential negotiations for a settlement. 141 Thirdly UNPROFOR demanded that the 
Bosnian government should not exploit NATO's actions In order to launch its own military offensives 
142 SilaJdzic, Harris. "Prime Minister Silajdzic Addresses Bosnian Assemblies, Radio Bosnia-Hercegovina, 
Sarajevo, in Serbo-Croat 1334 gint 7 Nov 94, " BBC Swnmary of World Broadcasts Pail 2 Central Europe 
and the Balkans; Former Yugoslavia; Bosnia Hercegovina (1994): EE/2149/C. 
143 Rose, Fighting. for Peace, 262-264,298-299. 
144 NATO, "Press Statement by the Secretary General: Following the Special Meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council on 2nd August 1993, " NATO Press Releases; NATO, "Decisions Taken at the Meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council on 9th August 1993. " NATO Press Releases. (93) 52. 
145 Rose, Fighting. for Peace, 262-264. 
146 Interview with Robin Renwick on 5 October 2004; Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004. 
147 pahner, John. "Allies' Federation Lure for Serbs: Five-Nation Group Hints at Tie-Up Between Karadzic 
and Milosevic, " Vie Guardian (1994): L; Owen, Balkan Oqýýssci7,331-332. 
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OrCeS. 
148 
agaffist the Bosnian Serb fi Fourthly, they attempted to promote any form of local cease-fire(s) 
between the Bosnian Serb forces and the Bosnian government. The UN Special Representative, 
Yasushi Akashi, attempted to broker negotiations that aimed at bringing about cease-fire(s) between the 
waning pafties of the Bosnian conflict. 149 Lastly, the British govemment attempted to peramde the 
Bosnian government to postpone its demand to lift the anns embargo. "0 The Bosnian government 
agreed to do so for six months. 
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In contrast, the US administration criticized the Europeans', especially the British and 
UNPROFOR's approaches as being too lenient on the Serbs in general and Bosnian Serb forces in 
particular. ' 52 The US administration supported punitive use of NATO air strikes on Bosnian Serb forces. 
Furthermore, by the summer 1994, the Americans came up with the idea, supported by Germany, of 
closing all political communication, not only with the Bosi-ýian Serbs, but also Serbia. 153 
The gap between the US, on the one hand, and British, French and Russian policies on the 
other hand was too wide to bridge at that time. Then UK Ambassador to the USA, Robin Renwick, 
recalled that the differences between the US and W on the issue of the Bosnian conflict, resulted in 
serious criticism of the British foreign policy from Americans. 154 There was a shared feeling among the 
American policy-makers that the British govenunent, more than any other state, was the critical 
obstacle in Bosnia. 155 This was the political reality of the 'special relationship' of the dernocratic 
regimes between the US and the UK at this time. This episode suggests that, in contrast to Liberal 
Multilateralists, America gives 'voice opportunities' for its allies, not based on their domestic identities 
but based on the affinities of strategic interests between the US and its partners. 
148 Rose, Fightingfor Peace, 255-256,257-259,266-270. 
149 Rose., Fighting, for Peace, 318. 
150 Hurd, Memoir, 470-47 1. 
151 Hurd, Memoir, 470-47 1. 
152 Intemew with Robin Renwick on 5 October 2004; Interview with Robert Hunter 7 May 2004. 
153 Owen, Balkall Oaý, sscv, 325-33 1. 
154 Interview xýath Robin Renwick on 5 October 2004. 
155 Interview With Robin Renwck on 5 October 2004; Interview with Robert Hunter on 19 May 2004. 
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7he Im assional Election o November 1994 plications o)Lthe USMidtenn Congr 
The result of the US midterm election on 9 November 1994 did little to help to improve the 
situation in favour of the European members of the Contact Group. The Republican Party won the 
elections and obtained a majority in both houses of US Congress. They campaigned for a strong anti- 
UN position and demanded no 'US troops under UN Command. ' 156 On 10 November, President 
Clinton announced that the US would no longer take pail in the international monitoring Mission to 
prevent an-ns flowing into Bosnia. He went onto suggest that the administration would pursue strategic 
air strikes against Bosnian Serb forces in order to support the Bosnian government. 157 Tbýs was a 
renewed avocation of the 'lift and strike' policy America's policy at that time can be summarized as 
follows: a) suppoiting the interest of the Bosnian goveniment at least rhetorically; b) withdrawing itself 
from the intemational monitoring missions of the arms embargo on Bosnia; c) launching NATO air 
strikes on Bosnian Serb forces regardless of UNPROFOR contributing countries' opposition; d) 
freezing any political contacts with the Serbs; and e) being unwilling to support any implementation of 
a peace plan. 
This set of policies provoked outrage among the European members of the Contact Group. 
'Mey denounced the approach, suggesting that it would merely intensify fighting on the ground rather 
than promote peace. 158 Was the Clinton administration forced to take such actions because of US 
domestic pressure? Before the n-ýidterrn congressional election of 1994, the US Congress had a 
consensus on lifting the an-ns embargo but it was not able to form a consensus on NATO air strikes 
against Bosnian Serb forces. 159 The midterm election finally provided the opportunity for members of 
156 GOP, "Republican Contract w1th America: 6. The National Security Restriction Act, " (1994): 
http: //www. house. gov/house/Contmct/CONTRACT. hftffl [Accessed on 10 March 2005]. 
157 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 31-32. 
158 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004; Interview with Robert Hunter on 19 May 2004, Interview 
with Martin Sletzinger 17 May 2004; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 31-32. 
159 To clarify this point, before the mid-tenn US congressional election the leaders of both Democrats and 
Republicans had agreed on the necessity of NATO air strikes but their consensus was not strong enough to 
persuade other reluctant members of the Congress. See: Doherty, Can-oll. J. "U. S. Policy in Use of Force 
Puzzles May Lawmakers, " Congressional Quarterly Week4, Report 52, no. 15 (1994): 906; Doherty, 
"Authorization Bill Urges Clinton to Anns Bosnian Muslims, " Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 52, 
no. 16 (1994): 1011-1012; Doherty, "Senate Sends Mixed Signals on BoSrUa, " Congressional Quarterly 
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Congress to speak with a more united voice to lift the anns embargo. Therefore, as far as the timing of 
fis announcement was conceined, it would be possible to suggest the existence of a link between this 
and congressional pressure. However, considering the contents of his announcement, this was not a 
drarnatic departure fi7om Clinton's previous position. As discussed, the Clinton administration had 
advocated the essence of the congressional demands before the midterm election. Thus, the midterm 
election only had limited impact upon the contents of the US government's policy 
For the reasons above, it is justifiable to reconsider the Liberal Multilateralists' interpretation 
that the Clinton administration was forced to take a unilateral position vis-A-Vis its European allies. In 
fact, regardless of congressional pressures, the US administration was able to envision and to promote 
American interests in the form of 'hft and strike' poticy that ignored other Western states' opposition. 
Hence, it is wrong to blame America's domestic actors' narrow-minded opinions as the key factor for 
dictating the US government's anti-multilateral actions. It would be accurate to suggest that the 
outcomes of the US rrýidterrn congressional election provided an opportunity for the Clinton 
administration to revitalize the 'lift and strike'that they had previously advocated. 
Indeed, after Chnton's statement on 10 November 1994, the US adniinistration attempted to 
deprive the LN of its authority over the so-called 'dual-key' of air strike by encouraging NATO to 
engaging air strikes. Towards the end of November 1994 Cazin, a Muslim enclave in the northem part 
of Bosnia, had been exposed to Bosman Serb forces' attacks. In response, NATO carried out several air 
strikes on Serbian airfields and related facilities at the Serb-occupied town of Udbina in southern 
Croatia. 160 This action alarmed the UNPROFOR Bosnia Commander, Geneml Rose, as it went beyond 
the prernise that NATO conduct air strikes in order support UNPROFOR's activities and not get 
I Veekly Report 52, no. 19 (1994): 1233-1234; Doherty, "Vets Add Weight to Hill Debate on Use of Military 
Power, " Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 52, no. 17 (1994): 1077-1079; Also see: Hendrickson, 
Ryan C. 7he Clinton If ýirs: the Constitution, Congrffs, and War Poiters. NashvIll, Tennessee: Vanderbilt 
University Press, 2002.77-79. 
160 Udbma was a Serbian forces controlled area of Croafia. The Serb forces' air fighters made sallies fi-om 
there to Cazin. Cazin was a town near Biha6 at a Muslim enclave in the northern Bosnia. 
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involved in military operations of any particular group. 161 
In the meantime, the situation in and around one of the 'safe areas' of Biha6 had also 
deteriorated. 162 In order to avoid the Bosnian government blame UNPROFOR for failing Biha6, 
General Rose requested NATO's air support against Bosnian Serb forces' tanks and artiHery. 163NATO 
agreed to endorse the request on the part of the UNPROFOR. However, NATO's new Supreme Alhed 
Commander, General Wesley Clark, told General Rose that the so-called 'dual-key' of air strike was 
effectively out of the LNPROFOR Commander's hand. 164 
Furthermore, in New York, the US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, demanded 
that then UN Deputy Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, accept NATO's strategic air strikes against 
Bosilian Serb forces. 165 In other words, NATO would attack targets beyond the hinted scope of those 
posing an imminent threat to UNPROFOR's activities. UN officials, the British, the French 
governments all made efforts to prevent these strategic air strikes. 166 As a part of this, on 30 November 
Boutros-Ghali visited Sarajevo to discuss the situation with local leaders and UNPROFOR officers. He 
warned that UNPROFOR personnel would be withdrawn if the Bosnian government (of IzetbegoV16) 
did not stop fighting. 167 On this occasion, Boutros-Ghali agreed with Rose that NATO should not 
launch stnategic air strikes. 168 In addition, the British Foreign Secretary and his French counterpart 
urged the US administrution to lift its ban on contacting Serbian and Bosnian Serbs leaders in order to Cw, 
facilitate a negotiation based settlement. 169 
In this context, on I December NATO held a NAC meeting and decided to support the re- 
161 The UNPROFOR Commander witnessed the fact that the Bosnian Prime Minister Harris Silajd2i6 had 
visited Washington prior to the NATO's air attack. The US government informed Silajd& about this 
Teýation. Rose, Fightingfor Peace, 295-299. 0 
Cazin is situated near Biha6 
163 Rose, Fightingfor Peace, 307-308. 
164 Rose, Fightingfor Peace, 308. 
165 Rose, Fightingfor Peace, 305-309. 
166 Rose, Fighting. for Peace, 305-309. 
167 Rose, Fightingfor Peace, 305-309. 
168 Rose, Fighting. for Peace, 313. 
169 AFP, "Hurd, and Jupp-& Could Travel to Belgrade, " Agence France Presse, I December 1994, Lexis- 
Nexis; Hurd, Douglas. Memoirs. London: Little, Brown, 2003.469-470. 
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vitalization of the Contact Group Peace Plan. 170 On 2 December, the Contact Group also convened its 
fouith ministerial meeting in Brussels. Ministers agreed to ease the degree of political isolation which 
had been imposed on Slobodan Milogevi&"' After the meeting, the British Foreign Secretary and his 
French counterpait announced that, ftorn 4 December 1994, they would make a joint tour of the 
Balkan Peninsula to discuss the prospects for peace negotiations with all main local leaders, including 
Slobodan Milogevi6.1`2 
It seems that European influence on US policy worked in practice. However, in fact, before 
the Europeans demanded recognizing political contacts with the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia at the NAC 
meeting (I December), the US administration had faced a situation that forced them to modify its 
robust policy based on Clinton's 10 November announcement. 173 This situation was essentially 
America's classic predicament of quasi-multilateralism in the form of the tension between its two vital 
interests. 174 To elucidate this point, at that time, US policy-makers considered that the choice they could 
make was as follows: whether they continued to advocate air strikes and consequently send US troops 
on the ground in order to support UNPROFOR's evacuation, or they betrayed its initial promise to 
protect the interest of the Bosnian govenunent by halting air strikes in order to avoid sending its ground 
troops. 175 The latter option was taken. 176 In other words, America's agreement to recommence the 
Contact Group's negotiation with Milogevi6 did not come about because of the power of 
multilateralism, but as a result of America's realization of the negative impacts of its 'lift and strike' 
pohcy on its vital interests. In short, the US needed time to re-fonnulate its pohcy towards the Bosnian 
170 NATO, "Final Commur-ýqu& Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO 
Headquarters, Brussels, I Dec. 1994, " NATO Ministerial Communiqu& (1994): M-NAC-2(94)116. Pana 20. 
Sciolino, Elaine. "Conflict in the Balkans: In BnLssels; U. S. and NATO say Dispute on Bosnia War is 
Resolved, " Ae New York Times, 2 December 1994, A 14. 
171 For the parficipants' speeches at the meeting, see: "Contact Group Meeting on Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Secretary Christopher, Contact Group Members, Opening Statements at a Press Conference Following 
Meeting, Brussels, Belgium, December 2,1994, " US Department ofState Dispatch 5, no. 51 (1994): Article 
3. 
172 Sciolino. "Conflict 'in the Balkans: In Bnissels. "; Hurd, Memoirs, 468-470. 
173 According to Daalder, they realized it 'by thanksgiving time' (i. e. 24 th of November, 1994). Daalder, 
Getting to Dayton, 33. 
174 Daalder, Getting to D(ii, ton, 33. 
175 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 33. 
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conflict. 
For this reason, the US did not react to the European demands positively The US 
administration did not soften its hostile attitude towards Slobodan Milo§evi6 and thus did not spell out 
any incentives for him. 177 In addition, Warren Christopher went back on his initial suggestion that he 
and Douglas Hurd might visit Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia. ' 78 Christopher even kept his distance ftorn 
Hurd and Juppý's initiative to negotiate with Seibian authonty. 179 'Mere was a clear contradiction 
between an allegedly agreed Western diplomatic initiative and America's persistent advocacy of 
isolating Serbia. 180 Furthermore, the US administration embarked on alternative initiatives that did not 
relate to the Contact Group's activities. On I December, the US adniinistration had dispatched the then 
US Ambassador to Germany, Charles Rechnai-4 to Bosnia to meet the Bosnian Serb leaders'. 181 
According to David Owen, the ICFY and European leaders only discovered this on 2 December, just 
before the Contact Group ministerial meeting. They were 'amazed' by America's lack of coordination 
with other members of the Contact Group. ' 82 The next section will add fixther elaborations about 
America's solution to the tension between its two vital intemsts, that were created by its use of quasi- 
multflaterahsm. 
The 'Containment'PoligZ. - Overcoming the Predicament ofouasi-Multilateralism 
As we have discussed above, after Clinton's announcement on 10 November, US policy- 
makers faced a reality that its policy of 'hft and strike' would not provide any substantial breakthrough 
176 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 33. 
177 Cluistopher, Wan-en. "A Time of Historical Challenge for NATO, Secretary Christopher, Beginning the 
Process of NATO Expansion Opening statement at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO 
Headquarten, Brussels, Belgium, December 1,1994, " US Department of State Dispatch 5, no. 51 (1994). 
Article 1; AFP, "Hurd, and Jupp-6 Could Travel to Belgrade, " I Decernber 1994, Lexis-Nexis. 
178 AH, "Hurd, and Jupp& Could Travel to Belgrade. " 
179 AFP, "Hurd, and Jupp& Could Travel to Belgrade. " 
180 See Christopher's corriments in: "Contact Group Meeting on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Secretary Christopher, 
Contact Group Members, Opening Statements at a Press Conference Following Meeting, Brussels, Belgium, 
December 2,1994, " US Department qfState DiTatch 5, no. 51 (1994): Article 3. 
181 Sciolino, "Conflict in the Balkans: In Brussels. " 
1 ý2 Owen, Balkan odyssty, 332. 
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in bringmg about a settlement and that this created a danger for its vital interests. Thus, it began to 
modify its policy towards Bosnia in order to prevent the scenario of deploying US forces on the ground. 
The essence of this revision was to keep distance from the Bosnian conflict in general and from the 
interests of the Bosnian government in particular. 
The Clinton administration's new approach was aimed at 'containing' the domino effect of 
the Bosnian conflict that would gain time to avoid facing the consequence of the 'lift and strike' policy 
(i. e. withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops, which could trigger potential deployment of US ground 
forces). As a part of 'containment' policy, the Clinton administration suspended its option of launching 
strategic aerial strikes. ' 83 In order to achieve this modified goal, the principal policy-makers discussed 
what tactics to follow and also how they should promote a peace, whilst keeping distance from the 
Bosnian conflict. 
A 
., Ls a result of this discussion, in late 1994, the Clinton administration decided to promote a 
settlement based on the following tIuve elements: 1) re-negotiating the Contact Group map; 2) 
accepting some formal political relationship between the Bosnian Serb and Serbia; 3) resuming 
political contact with the Bosnian Serbs. 184The principal policy-makers of the Clinton administration 
agreed that there needed to be a three to six month cease-fire in order to enhance the likelihood of 
success. 185 In order to buy time, the US administration began to promote a provisional cease-fire. 186 
As soon as the Clinton administration adopted this policy under the banner of 'containment', 
the US Ambassador to Germany (and the former US Bosnia Envoy), Charles Redman, Visited Pale and 
the US ended the political isolation of the Serbs. 187 In addition, on 8 December, Clinton made clear the 
conditions for sending American troops in his letter to the allies of the US and to the US congress. He 
told them that if the settlement was agreed, the US would provide 20,000-25,000 ground troops. 
183 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 33-35. 
184 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 33-35. 
185 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 33-35. 
186 Daalder, Gctting to Dcjyton, 33-35. 
187 Cohen, Roger. "Maps, Guns and Bosnia: Redrawn Peace Plan Is Unlikely to Please, " Ae Neiv York 
Time, v, 6 December 1994, AI- 
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However, he emphasized that it must be under NATO command not as a part of the LN peacekeeping 
operation. 188 
Formally acting in an individual capacity, but in reality endorsed by the Clinton 
administration, on 20 December, the former US President, Jimmy Carter, visited Bosnia. 
189 f_hS 
purpose was to contact Bosnian Seib leadership and to seek a possibility of negotiation. 190 He 
eventually brokered a provisional cease-fire agreement among the warring Bosnian parties from 
Christmas 1994 until 30 April 1995.191 The Carter mission consolidated the Clinton administration's 
6containment policy' of the Bosnian conffict. 
192 MUS' it only eased the level of fighting, and did not 
guarantee a substantial cease-fire. Moreover, the US did not provide ground troops because it was a 
provisional cease-fire, not the settlement. This, of course, did not satisfy other parties, but only the US 
administration. 
193 
To sum up the developments from autumn to winter 1994, the US adrainistration eagerly 
promoted its interests. The critical point for the US administration was that it did not want to deploy 
any troops on the ground, without having NATO's substantial control over such nussion. One US 
policy-maker remarked that 'NATO is more important than Bosnia. ' 194 Indeed, the essence of 
America's approach was geo-strategy in the fonn of manipulating the balance of power between the 
waning parties of Bosnia. Thus, it was based neither on procedural normative value of respecting the 
outcomes of multilateralism, nor implementing the alleged ideological moral value of the West in the 
form of protecting the interests of the Bosnian government. Nevertheless, America's initial advocacy of 
the 'lift and strike' policy was, rationalised by such ideological interpretation of Western values. 
188 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 47; Jehl, Douglas. "25,000 U. S. Troops to Aid U. N. Force If It Quits Bosnia, " 
The New York Times, 9 December 1994, A 1; Barber, Tony. 'Nato Lays Plans to Pull UN Troops Out of 
Bosnia, " 7he Independent 1994,1. 
189 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 35. 
190 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 35. 
191 Latel, Srecko. "Serbs, Bosnians Approve Truce, But Problems Rernami, " The Associated Pre, ýs, 23 
December 1994, Lexis-Nexis. 
192 Daalder, Getting to Day, ton, 35-36. 
1113 A Clinton administration official's evaluation of Carter mission, see: Daalder, Getting to Daylon, 35-36. 
194 Quoted in Daalder, Getting to Dqvt0n, 34. Original text in Kelly, Michael. "SurTender and Blame, " The 
Ncjj, Yorki- (1994): 5 1. 
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Eventually, in order to implement its 'containment' policy, the US government retreated from its 
rhetorical commitment to protect the interests of the Bosnian government. It is now legitimate to say 
that one of the fi mclamental Macies of the Liberal Multilateralists' interpretation of the Westem Order 
was their failure to look at this strategic use of ideological moral values. 
Conclusion 
The Contact Group replaced the ICFY's -and thus effectively the EU and UN's- 
nutiatives to lead international mediation of the Bosnian conflict. It was formed as a result of the lack of 
American coopemtion with the ICFY. Before its establishment, the US administration bypassed the EU 
Action Plan and promoted the Muslim-Croats Federation of in Bosnia. After the establishment of the 
Contact Group, the US attempted to impose a peace plan. However, America's attempt failed, due to 
disagreement among its members. The US and Germany supported a wider air strike policy, but the 
UK., France, and Russia opposed this. 
This limited fonn of poficy-coordination among the great powers was expected to bridge a 
gap between the US and its European allies. However, the Europeans did not want to sideline the 
authority of the UN over NATO air strikes. Moreover, the US administr-ation did not change its 
preference for the formal 'lift and strike' policy In April (America's implicit endorsement of the 
Croatian violation of the arms embargo) and November 1994 (Clinton's announcement of withdrawal 
ýC__ from the international monitor regime of the arms embargo scheme), the Clinton administration 
ignored the effect of an arms embargo on Bosnia, which was authorized by the UN Security Council 
Resolution No 713. 
The US adminýistration, however, faced two obstacles to any all-out implementation of the 
'lift and strike'policy One was an institutional obstacle-namely the so-called 'dual-key'an-angement. 
The other was a political one. America's European allies' threatened to withdraw UNPFOFOR troops 
on the ground if the 'lift and strike' policy were to be implemented. This would have led to US 
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participation of the war on the part of the Muslim-Croat Feder-ation. The political nsk of tl-ýs policy was 
too high for the Clinton administration. Therefore, it was not the multilateral poticy-coordination 
among the Contact Group as such, but the issue of the 'dual-key' and the risk for America's Nrital 
interests, that prevented the US from imposing the 'hft and strike' policy ma comprehensive manner 
By the end of 1994, the Clinton administration had decided to buy time and promote a 'containment' 
policy for the Bosnian conflict. 
The Clinton administration, however, still struggled with the predicament of quasi- 
multilateralism in the fonn of the tension between the two vital interests (i. e. maintaining NATO's de 
facto independence from the UN and not deploying ground troops) throughout 1994. This anguish on 
the part of the US administration produced a policy to construct a working cooperation with local 
forces, without sacrificing its vital interests, as well as its profile as a supporter of Western values. This 
could shift America's approach fi7om international militarization to the intensification of the conflict at 
the local level. Formation of the Muslim-Croat Federation in March 1993, the Clinton administration's 
implicit endorsement of the Croatian violation of the an-ns embargo in April 1994, and Bill Clinton's 
announcement of unilateral withdrawal fi7om the arms embargo-monitoring MIssion in November 1994 
underscored this point. 
America's European allies were only able to prevent the full-scale Western military 
intervention in Bosnia in the form of 'lift and strike' policy However, as the result of a failure on the 
pail of the ICFY, they lost the political resources to promote substantial peace negotiations between the 
waning parties of Bosnia. Thus, the direction of the political interaction among the Western states was 
transformed from the Europeans' demand for the US to cooperate with its UN based multilateralism to 
the American pressure for its European allies to accept the 'hft and strike' policy In shoft, European 
voices were only heard in a passive way Accordingly, the future of BosrUa was to be led by the 
Western states-essentially, by the US administration and its pohcy of indirect nuhtary mtenention in 
the BosTUan conflict. If the working hypothesis of this research turns out to be true, the likely 
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consequences of such a policy would 'betray' America's initial promise to protect the interests of the 
Bosnian government and it would also 'devastate' civilians on the ground. The next chapter will 
evaluate this causality. 
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Chapter 6 The Consequences of Quasi-Multilateralism: the End of the Bosnian 
Confficý from January to December 1995 
This fmal empirical chapter of this thesis discusses the Westem approaches to the Bosruan 
conflict from January 1995, to the end of the conflict in November 1995. The key features of this 
period were as follows. Firstly, there was America's continuing struggle with its predicament of quasi- 
multilateralism, in the fonn of the tension between its vital interests that was symbolized by the 
deadlock of the 'lift and strike'poficy, as discussed in Chapter 5. Secondly, it was UNPROFOR's lack 
of ability to stabilize the situation on the ground. Thirdly, it was America's decision to intervene in the 
conflict in the form of NATO air strikes and by implicitly supporting the Croatian offensive. Finally, it 
was the Dayton peace negotiation that ended the conflict. 
Theoretically, this chapter will evaluate the validity of the working hypothesis, especially, the 
causal relationship between the formation of the quasi-multilateralism (i. e. the loss of European 'voice 
opportunities' within the West as a result of America's manipulation of the definition of the Western 
moral values) and the negative consequences it would cause the situation in Bosnia. 
With regard to America's manipulation of moral values, it is clear that other Western states 
were not able to prevent America's opportunistic interpretation of Western moral values and its 
corresponding advocacy of use of coercive power (see, Chapters 3,4 and 5). This is because the 
direction of the Western Order is not determined by multilateralism or other moral values as Liberal 
Multilateralists assume, but by an asymmetric power relationship between the US and other Western 
states (see Chapter 3). Moreover, America's actions were essentiafly a product of the tension between 
its two vital interests (i. e. maintaining NATO's defacto independence from the UN and keeping the US 
away from the conflict on the ground) and as a result of the opportunistic manipulation of the Western 
moral values (see Chapter 5). If the working hypothesis is correct, such a way of losing European 
&voice opportunities' in the name of promoting 'market democracies' would not work in favour of the 
interests of the Bosnian government or that of the civilians on the growid. 
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this research discussed in Chapter 1, such negative outcomes of the diminishing in the 
Western multilateralism in the Bosnian situation would take the form of. a) America's betrayal of its 
promise to protect the interests of the Bosnian government, such as maintaining the territorial integnty 
of Bosnia under lzetbegoviCs leadersMp; b) a means to promote a settlement that would impose 
finther violence onto civilians (regardless of ethnic background) on the ground, c) a settlement that 
would deprive Bosnian people of their right to self-detemiination and self-govemance. This chapter 
will particularly demonstrate the validity of the working hypothesis in relation to the above-discussed 
points a) and b) regarding NATO's and America's coRaboration with the Croatian offensives toward 
the end of the conflict. 
The first section will look at the crisis of the UNPROFOR mission in the early 1995 and 
America's ambiguous action between its rhetorical advocacy of use of coercive power and its practical 
inaction. It will suggest, in contrast to the Liberal Multilateralists' interpretation, that America's 
continuous adaptation of such 'wait and see' approach to the Bosnian conflict was a product of the 
tension between the two vital interests of the US-keeping America away from military conflict on the 
ground, on the one hand, and consolidating NATO's defacto independence firom the UN regarding its 
so-cafled 'out of area' operations, on the other. 
The second section wiH analyse Western reactions to the crisis of the UNPROFOR mission 
(i. e. the security situation regarding Gora2de and the UNPROFOR's failure to prevent the 
Srebrenica. massacre) on the ground from the spring to the summer 1995. In the face of this situation, 
the European members of the Contact Group attempted to promote various initiatives, including the 
use of coercive power. They needed America's military support to accomplish such an aim. 
However, the Clinton administration's reaction was contrary to European expectations. By analysing 
the motives of the Clinton administration's politics, this section re-confirms the clairn of this thesis 
that Amenca's vital interests were the critical factor that caused the US to act outside of a multilateral 
fi-amework. In relation to fis point, fis section will also discuss the growilig gap between 
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America's original justification for the use of coercive power (i. e. protecting the interests of the 
Bosnian government) and the reality of its application in conjunction with the Clinton 
administration's deepening collaboration witti the Croatian government. These facts will again 
challenge the Liberal Multilateralists' interpretation and suggest that America's actions in Bosnia 
were neither based on multilateralism, nor its genuine desire to promote democracy but based on its 
vital interests. 
'Me third section will discuss one of outcomes of America's use of quasi-multilateralism in 
the forin of NATO strategic air strikes, in conjunction with the local forces' (especially the Croatian 
Army's) offensives on the ground. In this process, the US sidelined the European members of the 
Contact Group fi7om the Western decision to launch such intervention. Regarding the working 
hypothesis of this thesis, this section mainly looks at the implications of such intervention for the 
civilians on the ground. 
The fourth section discusses the settlement of the Bosnian conflict. In particular, it will look 
at the negotiation process at the Dayton Air Base. As we will discuss in detail, in contrast to Liberal 
Multilateralists' interpretation, this process iflustrutes the old fashioned tension between America's 
hegemonic position and its European allies"voice opportunities. 'h-ýitlally, the US legitirnized its policy 
of advocating air strike, under the cover of promoting 'democratic peace' and urged other Western 
states to respect the interests of the Bosnian goveniment. However, as suggested above, the final 
application of this logic did not protect the interests of the Bosnian goverranent. This was because the 
US needed such settlement in order to avoid America's direct involvement in the conflict on the ground. 
Accordingly, the settlement was based on geo-political distribution of powers on the ground nather d= 
on alleged moral values of the West (promoting the interests of 'victims' of the conflict in the form of 
supporting the multi-ethnic state under the leadership of the Bosnian govemment). This meant that the 
US, Croatian, and Serbian leaders defined the bulk of the settlement and the Bosnian govenunentwere 
placed under its pressure to agree to the proposed deal. Tfiis section will provide a conclusiN, e analysis 
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on the working hypothesis of this thesis by discussing the implications of such promotion of quasi- 
multilateralism for the interests of the Bosnian government and the conditions of the civilians on the 
ground. 
The Crisis of the UNPROFOR Mission: Distorting Western Moral Values 
During the provisional cease-fire period (from January to March 1995), the international 
mediators prepared their next move. The Co-Chairmen of ICFY attempted to broker direct negotiations 
between the Bosnian government and Slobodan Mflogevi6. In order to facilitate this, they argued for a 
lifting of economic sanctions, which four years previously had been implemented on the rump 
Yugoslavia (i. e. Serbia and Montenegro). 1 The aim was to agree a policy to ease sanctions towards 
Serbia in exchange for MilogeviCs support for the peace negotiations, as well as his recognition of the 
borders of Bosnia and Croatia. 2 The British, French, and 'independent'negotiator, led by Jimmy Carter, 
all supported this idea .3 However, the US, Germany, and the Bosnian government were cautious about 
negotiating with MilogeviL 
In the meantime, the Croatian authorities put InCreasing pressure on the UNPROFOR in 
Croatia to leave, in the light of its failure to bring security to Croatia. 5 On 12 January 1995, the 
President of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, claimed that Croatia would not accept the presence of 
UNPROFOR after March 1995. However, as a result of international pressure (including that of the 
US), on 12 March 1995, the Croatian President firlaUy gave him consent to its presence. 6 The US Vice 
President, Al Gore, led the American side of initiative on this issue remarking that: 
I assured him [President Tudjman] of fuH U. S. support for restoring Croatian 
I United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 713.25 September 199 1. (S/Res/713). 
2 Owen, David, Balkan Oaý, sscy- London: Indigo, 1996.339-340. 
3 Owen, Balkan Odý,, Ysey, 336-339. 
4 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 336-339. 
5 Owen, Balkan Odyss, ýV, 336-339. 
6 Crossette, Barbar-a. "Croafian Leader Agrees to Continuation of U. N. For-ce, " The Xc-ýt, Kn-k Times 1995, 
A9. 
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sovereignty to aH vaits of Croatia [emphasis added]. 7 
From the Croatian perspective, this remark implied that the US would not obstruct its forthcoming 
military operations to retake territory held by the Croatian Serbs. 8 
Indeed, the US administration did not exclude the possibility of the use of coercive power to 
deter the Serbian offensives. According to No Daalder's account, who was at that time the Director for 
European Affairs at the NSC, the US administration looked at what kinds of possible action NATO 
could take if the UNPROFOR withdrew its personnel M the event of the 'lift and strike' policy being 
implemented. 9 To look at this point from the context, the tirnffig of US consideration implied that the 
Croatian government and its military forces-rather than the Bosnian government-would become 
America's key local allies of the potential NATO's military operations in and around Bosnia. 
It is important to note, however, that America's original nationale for advocating the use of 
international coercive power and criticizing ICFY-led peace negotiations was to support the territorial 
integrity of Bosnia neither under Serbs or Croats but under the leadership of Izetbegovi6 (see Chapters 
2 and 3). 'OAs we will discuss later, this indicates a double moral standard, employed by the US 
administration. On the one hand, it used the logic of 'democratic peace' and paid attention to the 
international responsibility to protect the interests of the Bosnian govenunent in order to challenge the 
European vision of multilateralism. On the other hand, it implicitly encouraged military actions on the 
part of the Croatian government in order to avoid sending America's ground troops to operate in an 
offensive capacity. In other words, the US administration began to distort the contents of the application 
of 'democratic peace' and Western moral values in order to protect its vital interests. Indeed, as 
Anthony Lake suggested, the Clinton administration's adaptation of 'democratic peace'was a means to 
promote America's interests of maintaining the Western Order under the leadership of the US, not the 
7 Quoted in Crossette, "Croatian Leader Agrees to Continuation of U. N. Force. " 
8 Slavonia had substantial numbers of ethnic Serb communities in some parts (i. e. Western Slavonia). It was 
on that basis the Serbian leaden claimed it as their territory. 
s held majority of population. It is also a strategically important point in the control of highways into Bosnia. 
9 Daalder, Ivo H. Getting to Dayton. - theUaking ofAmellcaý Bosnia Policy. Washinzon, D. C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2000.87-89. 
10 interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004. 
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international organization of UN (see, Chapter 4). " 
As soon as the Carter cease-fire ended, the fighting intensified. On I May, regular Croatian 
Republic forces launched a n-dhtwy operation against the UN protected area of Western Slavonia. 12 In 
the meantime the situation in Bosnia also deteriorated. Concerning the situation around Sarajevo, on 7 
May the Bosnian government urged the UN either to launch air strikes or to lift the am-is embargo. 13 As 
it was a politically sensitive issue, the UN office asked for decisions of Boutros-Ghali and he rejected 
both options. 14 The Co-Chairmen of the ICFY were also wary of any movements towards Western 
military intervention and supported the Boutros-Ghali's decision. 15 However, the US Ambassador to 
the LN, Madeleine Albright, criticized decision of Boutros-Ghali and demanded the UN release its 
hold over the 'dual-key' 
16 
7'he Frasure Mission and Amefica ý Persistent Promotion ofIts Vital Interests 
Against this backdrop, the US administration took a new initiative and began to consider 
some kind of political resolution, along with the military measures they thought to be necessary. The 
US administration, as well as NATO officials, had undertaken an internal study in regard to what 
military means they should take. The UN Secretary-General requested in Febnk-uy 1995 that NATO 
should start making a plan to assist the possible evacuation of UNPROFOR in relation to the potential 
implementation of any Peace Plan. " NATO's answer to this request became OPLAN 40104.18 Along 
with studying OPLAN 40104, during May 1995, the foreign and security policy-makers of the Clinton 
administration discussed the 'fift and strike'policy again, but could not reach agreement concerning the 
11 Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004. 
12 Silber, Laura. "Croatia attacks Serb Area as Bosnia Truce Ends, " Financial Times, 2 May 1995,20. 
13 Cunliffe-Jones, Peter. "Bosnia Demands Action after Nine Die in Serb Shell Attack, " Agence France 
Presse, 7 May 1995, Lexis-Nexis. 
14 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 346-347. 
15 Owen, Balkan Othsscv, 336-339. 
16 Albright, Madeleine. Madam Secretaty. - A Memoir. New York; London: Miramax; Macmillan, 2003.184- 
185, AP, "U. N. Rejects Sarajevo Air strikes, " ne ýssociated Press, 8 May 1995, Lexis-Nexis. 
17 UPI, "U. N. Says Role'hTeplaceable', " United Press International, 14 February 1995, Lexis-Nexis. 
18 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 47-48. 
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details of how to implement it. " 
As for the diplomatic aspect of above-discussed policy, the Clinton administration directly 
contacted Milogevi6, although there was a disagreement among the US policy-makers as to whether 
this was advisable. 'O On 18 May 1995, Robert Frasure, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
European Affairs, met Mflogevi6 in his presidential retreat. On this occasion, Frasure initiaUy reached 
an agreement with him that the West would lift economic sanctions against Serbia in exchange for 
MilogeviCs recognition of Bosnia and Croatia .2 
'This was the policy that the Co-Chairmen of the ICFY 
had demanded the US support. Frasure asked the VA-ýte House to endorse the so-called Frasure- 
Milo§evi6 Agreement. However, as a result of the debate among the high-ranking officials in 
Washington, the Clinton administration decided against this. 22 At that time such hawkish opinion was 
in the ascendant. The critical reason why the US administration ditched the Fmsure-Milogeviý 
Agreement was its ambiguity over the role of the UN Security Council in the implementation of the 
subsequent peace plan. 
23 
In order to legitimize the policy to scrap the political negotiation with Mflogevk, 
Washington placed additional demands on Milogevi6 over and above the initial Frasure- Mflogevi6 
Agreement. For instance, Frasure's new conditions were that the West would suspend the sanctions for 
200 days, if Serbia recognized Bosnýia. However, it would keep punitive measures, such as the 
international ban on access to foreign credit, oil, and weapons. 24 How could the Serbian economy 
19 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 49-50,89-90. 
20 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 39. Note 6. 
21 Bildt, Carl. Peace Journey: the Soygglefor Peace in Bosnia. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998.20. 
22 It is reported that Madeleine Albright and Vice-President A] Gore's National Security Adviser, Leon 
Fuerth, opposed the negotiationwith Milogevi6 prior to the Frasure mission. They argued that sanctions or 
military pressure would be effiective but negotiations with Milogevi6 would not. They were opposed to give 
any sanctions relief to Serbia. For details of this, see: Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 39. Note 6; Albnght, 
Madam Secretary, 184-186; Sell, Louis, Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, Durhain, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2002.227; Bildt, Peace Journey, 20-2 1; Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 348. 
23 Sell, Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction o Yugoslavia, 227; Bildt, Peace Journey, 20-21; Owen, )f 
Balkan O&, sscl,, 348; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 3940. 
-4 AFP, "Milosevic Refuses to Budge on Recognizing Bosnia: Diplomat, " Agence France Presse, 23 May 
1995, Lexis-Nexis; Barber, T. "France Warns of Bosnia Retreat, " 7he Independent, 24 May 1995,13. AFP; 
David Owen was disgusted at this US spin: '[.. ] which was a position Milosevic was never likely to accept. 
To cover their tracks the US publicly blamed Milosevic; this he took uncomplainingly, and did not in public 
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recover without oil or any foreign credit? Milosevi6 refused to agree to these new conditions. Moreover, 
the US administration imposed a chtical new condition that the US, not the UN Secuiity Council, 
could impose economic sanctions on Serbia . 
25 MS corresponded to the demands on the part of the 
Clinton administration that the US or NATO should take over the UN Security-General's control over 
the 'dual-key', as well as any Muence on the peace process. " 
Such demands contradicted the US official interpretation that Frasure carried out his mission 
27 
on behalf of the Contact Group. Indeed, this American policy reflected its sensitivity over the UN's 
ftmction in the peace process. It was one of America's vital interests, of maintaining NATO's defacto 
independence from the UN that eventually blocked the Frasure-Mflogevi6 Agreement. However, the 
US placed responsibility on Milogevi6 to accept new conditions. 28 As a result of thýs American policy, 
the Contact Group lost another chance to move forward on the settlement of the Bosnian conflict. 
The 'Human Shields'andAmetica ý Evasion o)fLm aNATMDecision . plementing 
After the failure of these negotiations, the situation in Bosnia deteriorated finther, in 
particular the so-called 'safe areas'of Biha6, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuz1a, and 2epa. On 22 May 1995, 
the offensives on the part of Bosnian Serb forces escalated around Sarajevo. On 25 and 26 May, NATO 
attacked areas around Pale, having gained authorization from the UN Secretary-General's Special 
Representative, Yasushi Akashi . 
29Before the authorization, Akashi was in a dilernma about the 
reveal the details of the package. 'Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 348. 
25 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 348; Bildt, Peace Journey, 20-21; Sell, Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction 
of Yugoslavia, 228. 
26 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 347-348; Bildt, Peace Journey, 20-2 1. 
27 Lord, Winston, and Christine Shelly "Department of State Daily Briefing on 30 May 1995, " Department 
ofState Daily Press Briqfing. 
http: //dosfan. lib. uic. edu/ERC/briefing/dafly__ýriefings/1995/9505/950530db. htrnl [Accessed on 30 March 
2005]. Shelly, Christine. "Department of State Daily Briefing on 31 May 1995, " Department ofState Daily 
Press Briefing. 
http: //dosfan. hb. ulc. edu/ERC/briefing/daily_bnefings/1995/9505/95053ldb. htrrd [Accessed on 30 March 
2005]. 
28 Bums, Nick. "Department of State Daily Briefing on 12 June 1995, " Department of State Daily Press 
Briqfing. http: //dosfan. lib. uic. edu/ERC/bnefing/dafly__ýriefings/1995/9506/950612db. htrffl [Accessed on 30 
March 2005]. 
29, A,. kashi, Ikiru Kotonimo Kokoroseki, 193. 
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consequences of air strikes (i. e. Bosnian Serb forces actions should be punished, but such an action 
ety). 
3 
would certainly risk UNPROFOR personnel's saf 0 As had been predicted, Bosnian Serb forces 
took members of UNPROFOR hostage in defiance of NATO air strikes. The UNPROFOR hostages 
were referred to as 'human shields. 931 
Madeleme Albright had urged the UN to authonze air strikes prior to that. However, she 
kept silence at the UN Security Council after the catastrophic result of air strikes became clear. 32 In fact, 
she 'was shaken' in the face of the debacle, following the air strikes and came to the belated realization 
, 33 that the US 'need [a] better strategy [instead of air strikes] . In addition, the air strikes led to the peace 
initiative by Robert Fmsure being halted, after the recommended to the White House that his mission 
be aboliShed. 34 Instezd, he urged the Clinton administration to support European initiatives led by 
David Owen and Carl Bildt, who was to take over officiaHy from Owen on 12 June . 
3' However, wHst 
the White House scrapped Frasure's mission, they declined to support any initiatives by Bildt. 
As a result of the implementation of air strikes, the US administration faced a classic 
dilenima, namely that the air strikes would force UNPROFOR to evacuate their personnel from Bosnia 
and such a situation would place demands on the US to give substance to its rhetonc, to suppoft the 
interests of the Bosnian government, in the form of providing ground troops. To make the matter worse, 
as a result of the implementation of air strikes, the US now lost its options (not only 'fift and strike' 
policy but its peace initiatives) and that made the ICFY-promoted peace process was the only credible 
30 At first Boutros-Ghali received a memo from General Janvier and General Smith on 22 May. Boutros- 
Ghall understood both Generals to believe that the 'air strikes will work on an individual or selective basis - 
only sustained air strikes might make an impactý but they would produce many casualties if UNPROFOR 
remains deployed as it is. ' Boutros-Ghali decided that he should 'redeploy and reduce the number of UN 
troops. ' General Janvier reported it to the UNSC on 24 May. However, Madeleine Albright adamantly 
criticized the UN position as being prepared to 'dump the safe areas. ' On the one hand the US called air 
strikes. On the other hand, the US opposed the precondition to commence it (i. e. the withdrawal of 
UNPROFOR). Boutros-Ghah, Unvanquished, 234; Albright, Madam Secretary, 184-185; Akashi, &ru 
Kotonimo Kokoroseki, 191-192. 
31 According to Akashi, the total number was 320 (170 were French troops). The US, NATO and staff in the 
UN Headquarters in New York pushed him to authorize air strikes but Akashi was quite sceptical whether 
they considered the consequences of air strikes. Akashi, Ikiru Kotonimo Kokoroseki, 191-192. 
32 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 235 
33 Albright, Madam Secretaty, 185. 
34 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 40. 
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choice. Accordingly, the US administration had to pay attention to the intra-Western policy-debate in 
order to re-consider the choice they could make. Indeed, as Albright suggested, the fon-nation of a 
'better strategy'was needed. 
During UNPROFOR's crisis over its hostages in late May 1995, there were thr-ee major 
plans, coming from France, the UN and the US respectively Firstly, on 27 May, the newly elected 
French President Jacques Chirac and the US President Bill Clinton discussed the Bosnian situation on 
36 
the telephone. Chirac proposed to dispatch the so-called Rapid Reaction Force to Bosnia. This 
consisted of around 10,000 heavily armed French, British and Dutch soldiers. " The mission was to 
assist the evacuation of UNPROFOR troops. The members of the Contact Group, of NATO, and of the 
UN Security Council all discussed the plan to send the Rapid Reaction Force and endorsed it In 
principle towards the nuddle of June 1995 . 
38 As far as the political procedure to bring about a 
settlement was concerned, France, Britain and Russia supported the idea to re-Vitahze the peace 
negotiations. For fis purpose, they argued for the easing of some of the sanctions against Serbia in 
exchange for Serbian recognition of Croatia and Bosnia. However, on 29 May the US refused to 
endorse this at the Contact Group meeting. 39 
Secondly, on 30 May, the UN Secretary-General presented four options to the members of 
the UN Security Council regarding the future of intemational. involvement in the Bosnian conflict. 40 
35 Holbrooke, Richard. To End a War. New York: Random House, 1998.63. 
36 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 4446. 
37 Whitney, Craig R. "Diplomatic Moves Pressed by Paris, " Ae New York Times, 28 May 1995, A 1; Daalder, 
Getting to Dayton, 4446. 
38 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 44-46; United Nations Security Council "3543 rd meeting. " on 6 June 1995. 
United Nations Security Council Provisional Verbatim Reconi. (S/PV/3543); UN Security Council 
Resolution No. 998.16 June 1995. (S/Res/998). 
39 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 350. 
40 The first option was to withdraw UNPROFOR, which he disliked because it would be perr-eived as a 
failure of the UN and also give the impression that the international community was abandoning the Bosnian 
people. The second option was to maintain the status quo. He thought this would be impossible. The third 
option was to change the mandate of UNPROFOR by allowing it to take military actions. He told the UNSC 
members that this would require that 'the UN forces be replaced with a multinational force under the 
command of the mqjor country or countries contributing to it. 'Tbe fourth option was to scale down the UN 
mandate and to limit the mission to those only relating to humanitarian work. In addition, he wanted to 
address a fifth option but he did not. This was because Boutros-Ghali considered that it would be difficult to 
obtain support for this option from the members of the UNSC. TI-iis fifth plan was a plan to maintain the UN 
mission but to increase its military capability. Boutros-Ghali, Lnvanquished, 236. 
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One of his major suggestions was the choice, either of withdrawing UNPROFOR troops or of re- 
enforcing them. At the UN Security Council, Madeleine Albright clismissed both ideas. 41 Instead, she 
demanded that the UN mission on the ground should concentrate on its humanitarian mission. 42 She 
also argued that the UN should not put any obstacles in the way of air strikes. 43 In essence, she 
demanded that air strikes be launched regardless of its impact on the UNPROFOR troops. in other 
words, the US administration was stiH undecided over whether, on the one hand, to impose the lift and 
strike policy or international intervention that would require American Militaly involvement, on the 
other. Eventually, as a compromise, on 16 June, the UNSC endorsed the idea of the Rapid Reaction 
Force-to assist partial withdrawal of the UNPROFOR personnel, but without involving US ground 
troops. 44 
Thirdly, the US administration considered how it should react to Chirac's Rapid Reaction 
Force initiative. It decided not to object to it, as long as it would not require American ground troops. 45 
However, the Clinton administration was wary of any potential pressure for the US to support the 
evacuation of UNPROFOR . 
46 US policy-makers also looked at what they should do in accordance 
with the NATO's contingency plan of OPLAN 40104, which envisaged NATO's support for the 
withdrawal of UNPROFOR once it received a formal request from the UN to do so. " On 31 May, the 
Clinton administration, initially, decided to support the OPLAN 40104 in principle. 48 Clinton hinted at 
4 50 
this position in his speech on 31 May 9 and 3 June 1995 . 
On 14 June, Chirac came to Washington D. C. to discuss the situation in Bosnia. Given 
41 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquiyhed, 241. 
42 Albright, Madam Secretary, 185-186. 
43 Albright, Madam Secretary, 185-186. 
-W United Nations Security Council Resolution 998.16 June 1995. (S/Res/998). 
45 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 44-46. 
46 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 44-46,48-55. 
47 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 46-48. 
48 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 48-55, 
49 Clinton, Bill. "Remarks at the United States Air Force Academy Commencement Ceremony in Colorado 
Springs, Colorado, May 31 1995, " Public Papers ofthe President of the United States, 471liam J Clinton I 
(1995): 765-770; Clinton, Bill. "Interview With Jim Gransbery of the Billings Gazette in Billings, Montana, 
May 31,1995, " Public Papers ofthe President ofthe United States, 11 71liam J Clinton I (1995): 774-790. 
50 Clinton, Bill. "Ibe Prrsident's Radio Address, June 3,1995, " Public Papers ofthe President qf the United 
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Clinton's remarks, Chirac, as well as other UNPROFOR troop-contributMig countries, anticipated that 
the US would support the Rapid Reaction Force initiative, through OPLAN 40104. " However, on 14 
June, the Clinton administration decided not to support UNPROFOR's withdrawal and, thus, also 
OPLAN 40104, realizing it could potentially pave the way for 20,000 US ground troops to be sent and 
also lead to the LN Secretary-Geneml's asserting authority over NATO military opemtIons . 
52 Two days 
after the Chirac's visit to Washington D. C., Clinton remarked: 
I have made it clear the circumstances under which we would help our NATO 
partners and our U. N. partners to withdraw or to help them if they were in a 
terrible emergency [] 
But I do not beheve the United States should send ground forces into the 
U. N. mission as it is constituted, and I certainly don't believe we should send our 
uound forces into some soit of combat situation in Bosnia [emphasis added]. 53 
Accordingly, the US made it public that it would only support the Rapid Reaction Force initiative as 
long as it did not require any American military involvement on the ground. 
Keeping America's independence away from international pressure, w1file simultaneously 
maintaining its profile as a supporter of international cooperation-namely, the use of quasi- 
multilateralism-was a key aspect wifin the Clinton administration's policy towards the Bosnian 
conflict. In tWs way, on 16 June 1995, the UN Semity Council adopted Resolution No. 998 that 
States, William J Clinton 1 (1995): 804-805. 
51 The then US Ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter suggested that prior to Chirac's visit, the details of the 
OPLAN 40104 was discussed among the members of the NATO and they, including the US, did not have 
any objection to implement it. Interview with Robert Hunter 17 May 2004. 
52 According to Richard Holbrooke and Ivo Daalder, an intra-administrative dispute occurred in the evening 
of Chirac's Visit to Washington. Clinton had a short conversation, %krith his foreign policy-makers when he had 
finished dinner with Chirac. It was Richard Holbrooke who raised doubts about Clinton's decision of 31 
May by which the US would support OPLAN 40104. Holbrooke's point was that OPLAN 40104 meant 
that around 20,000 US troops would be automatically sent if the UN asked NATO to support the withdrawal 
of UNPROFOR. Christopher agreed \kith Holbrooke. Clinton was durribstruck for a while when he heard 
this. Following this, Clinton reneged on his decision of 31 May. The then US Ambassador to NATO Robert 
Hunter and also Daalder criticized this interpretation of OPLAN 40104 as a misunderstanding. Hunter 
clair-ned that the US administration as well as NATO officials were closely involved in the forination process 
of OPLAN 40104 and thus there was no space for a re-1171terpretation of its deficits. Hunter and Daalder 
understood that NATO that was to decide how the UN requests should be reacted to. Interview with Robert 
Hunter on 17 May 2004; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 57-61,97-98; Holbrooke, To End a Mir, 66-68. 
53 Clinton, Bill. "The President's News Conference in Halifax, June 16,1995, " Public Papers of the 
Pwsident qfthe United State-v, Milliam J Clinton I (1995): 893-899.896. 
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provides legal status for the Rapid Reaction Force. 54 However, the resolution defined the role of the 
Rapid Reaction Force as being to re-enforce the UNPROFOR (i. e. humanitarian assistance), not to 
directly engage Bosnian Seib forces. Without having America or NATO's substantial involvement on 
the ground, it would be impossible for the European troops to take such an action. Moreover, the US 
administration was still unwilling to give substance to its rhetoric to suppoit the self-detennination of 
the Bosnian government. 
To sum up UNPROFOR's crisis and the Westem reactions In the early sununer 1995, once 
again the US administration did not live up to its allies' expectations as well as its original promise to 
the Bosnian government. America's decision to eventuafly ditch the Fnasure-Milogevi6 mission and 
especially its opposition to NATO's OPLAN 40104 were strongly related to Clinton's motivation to 
maintain NATO's defacto independence fi7om the UN concerning use of coercive action outside of its 
jurisdiction. This hypocrisy underlined the very essence of the US policy to organize the westem Order 
under quasi-multilateralism. 
The US relied on multilateralism as long as it worked in America's favour. However, if the 
outcomes of multilateralism. worked against the interests of the US, it employed ideologically charged 
moral arguments (i. e. the interest of the Bosnian government). Such ideologically defined moral 
arguments under the banner of 'democratic peace' were the means to promote America's interests and, 
thus, the US did not give serious substance to such moral value in the form of assistmg the Bosnian 
government's militwy fighting on the ground. In order to disguise the reality of this opportunistic use of 
mom] arguments, the US administration resorted to its common refi-ain, namely doing little to help the 
situation in Bosnia as well as blaming the Europeans and the UN. The fate of the UN mission was 
predictable without any American and NATO's substantial political or rnihtaiy support for dicir 
operation. 
54 1 United Nafion Security Council Resolufion 998.16 June 1995. (S/Res/998). 
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The Collapse of the UN Mission and America's Final Decision 
On 6 July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces began to attack the Muslim enclave of Srebrenica and 
the military offensive continued until they entered the town on 16 July Although some NGOs 
contested the number of those killed and who was behind these events", it is widely believed that 
Bosnian Seib forces systematicafly Uled about 7000 civilians during this period. 56 Bosnian Serb forces 
of a few thousand outnumbered about four hundred and fifty Dutch UNPROFOR troops in Srebrenica, 
however, it was clew that UNPROFOR failed to save those hveS. 57 Furthermore, on 25 July, another 
'safe area', 2epa, fell to the Bosnian Serbs'. In the meantime, other 'safe areas, ' especially Gora2de, 
were still under attack and the latter was about to fall under Bosnian Serb control. 
The failure of international actions on the ground generated widespread international 
criticism of the 'dual key' an-angement and also made a mockery of the concept of the 'safe area. ' 
Those people who supported robust military intervention in Bosnia criticized the validity of the 'dual 
18 key' in relation to its practices. With regard to Srebrenica, the UN Special Representative, Akashi 
Yasushý was criticized for blocking further NATO air strikes. 59 As the then British Ambassador to the 
UN recalled: 
[ ... ] the Americans and even to some extent the British and the 
French, became 
very fiustr-ated. Because the evidence accumulated that whenever there was a bad 
incident, Akashi, Boutros-Ghali, and General Janvier always found some reason 
not to ask for NATO air support. 60 
55 For instance the former UN Civilian Affairs Coordinator in Bosnia, Phillip Crowin, estimated the figure of 
casualties lower than that was publicly believed. See: International Strategic Association. "Srebrenica 
Controversy Becomes Increasingly Politicized and Effinically Divisive, Increasing Pressure on 
Peacekeepers, " Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily NXI, no. 149 (2003): Lexis-Nexis. 
56 Rohde, David. End Game. - The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe ý Worst Massacre since World 
War ff. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997. XVI. 
57 For details of this event including chronological background, see: UN, "Report of the Secretary-General 
Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35, The Fall of Srebrenica, " 15 November 1999. (A/54/549). 
58 Interview with Robm Renwick on 5 October 2004; Interview with David Hannay on 6 October 2004. 
59 According to Akashi, it was the Dutch Defence Minister who phoned Akasl-ý to have him stop the air 
strikes. TI-iis was because the former was wary about the possibility that the Dutch military personnel would 
be irýjured by the air strikes. Indeed, in April 2002 the then Dutch government collapsed when the official 
study of the Dutch troops' role in the Srebrenica incident came to general notice. Akashi, Airu Kotonimo 
Kokoroseki, 202. The study Dutch government had comi-nissioned on Srebrenica can be found at: 
http: //www. srebreiiica. nl/en/a - 
index. htm [Accessed on 21 March 2005]. 
60 interview with Da6d Hannay on 6 October 2004. 
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The 'dual-key' an-angement became a symbol of inefficiency of the UN peacekeeping mission in 
Bosnia. 
Against this background, Western states expressed their outrage in the strongest manner. For 
instance, on 13 July, the French President Jacques Chirac proposed that in order to save Gora2de there 
should be international mihtwy intervention (i. e. Rapid Reaction Force) in the conflict . 
61 He 
emphasized that the international community should stand by the UN's pledge on the issue of the 'safe 
areas. ' For this purpose, he proposed to send 1,000 additional troops (i. e. Rapid Reaction Force) to 
GoraMe, with the assistance of airlifts by the US. 
The West, however, still lacked consistency On the day of Chirac's proposal (13 July), the 
newly appointed British Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, dismissed it. 62According to him, the 
British govenunent was: 
very sceptical of President Chirac's Rapid Reaction Force proposal, as it seemed 
more of a symbolic political gesture than an initiative that had military substance. 63 
The contents of this 'scepticism' were clear, given the international context, as we have discussed 
above. It is, namely, that the British government believed that in order to carry out robust action it was 
necessary to withdraw UNPROFOR troops on the ground to prevent them being used as 'human 
shields'. However, the US refused to support this mission in the form of not endorsing NATO's 
OPLAN 40104: furthermore, it did not provide any substantial plan for the settlement at that time. This 
implies that the British goveniment and the Rapid Reaction Force would end up as fighting a war for 
self-detennination on the side of the Bosnian government 
For these reasons above, instead of supporting Chirac's proposal, on 14 July, the British 
64 
govenunent called for the convening of the second London Conference. As we have discUSsed in the 
previous section, the US administration was at that time also under the pressure to provide an 
61 Silber and Little, Ae Death qfYugoslavia, 35 1. 
62 Silber and Little, The Death qfYugoslavia, 35 1. 
63 A letter exchanged vridi Malcolm Rifidnd dated on 19 March 2004. 
64 Silber and Little, Ae Death qf Yugoslavia, 35 1. 
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alternative policy instead of merely criticizing European and UN efforts in Bosnia. Hence, holding an 
mternatio conference was a convenient gesture, not only for the British government, but also the US 
administration for not sending its troops on the ground. 
Following the British proposal to convene the Second London Conference and in the light of 
the situation in Srebrenica and Sarajevo, the new EU Special Representative for Bosnia and the ICFY 
15 Co-Chainnen, Carl Bildt, was putting all of his efforts into re-vitalizing the peace process. Eventually, 
on 19 July, Bildt reached an agreement with Milo§evi6 to promote the peace process. 66Ms was the so- 
cafled Bildt-Mflogevi6 Agreement. Milogevi6 agreed that he would appear on Serbian television and 
criticize the Bosiiian Serbs' leadership in particular, Kara&iCs policy to continue fighting; and he 
pledged to recognize Bosnia and also agreed to the implementation of the Contact Group Peace Plan. 67 
In exchange, Bildt proposed that international sanctions against Serbia would be lifted wid-iin 9 months 
of the settlement after the approval of the UNSC or all five members of the Contact Group. 68 
The contents of the Bi-ldt-Milo9evi6 Agreement were, in fact, almost identical to that of the 
Frasure-Milogevi6 Agreement. One of the differences was that the former suggested the sanctions be 
69 lifted after nine months, whereas Frasure put this back to twelve months. However, there was a most 
notable difference. Bildt intended to refer the result of his agreement with Milogevi6 to a vote among 
the UN Security Council members. 'O Ms implied that the members of the UN, including the US, 
would be bound by the UNSC's decision over the implementation of such an agreement. In regard to 
the theoretical issue of this thesis, Bildt attempted to use the authority of the UN in order to establish a 
fi-amework that would force the US to follow the consequences of multilateralism. 
While the Europeans were not able to consolidate their interests, the principal policy-makers 
65 For details of his diplomatic activities during this penod see: Bildt, Peace Journey, 54-67. 
66 Bildt, Peace Journey, 65. 
67 Sell, Slobodan Milose-vic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, 228-229. 
68 Bildt, Peace Journey, 65; Sell, Slobodan Miloseiic and the Destruction qfYugoslavia, 228-229. 
69 Bildt, Peace Journey, 65, Sell, Slobodan. 11ilosevic and the Destruction of1ugoslavia, 228-229. 
70 Bildt, Peace Journty, 65; Sell, Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction ofTugoslavia, 228-229. 
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71 
of the Clinton administration discussed their reaction to these international proposals. They agreed 
that the Chirac proposal would be a risky mission, in practice, but the US could not disagree with it in 
theory. 72 However, the US administration still intended to seize an opportunity to launch strategic air 
strikes instead of sending ground troops. 73 On 18 July, the Clinton administration insisted on the 
following two points for its allies: the US would not provide ground troops but air attacks alone and the 
'dual-key' must be removed . 
74 In order to persuade Europeans, the US Chainnan of Joint Chiefs of the 
Staff, General Shalikashivili, the US Secretary of Defense, William Perry, and the US Secretary of 
State, WarTen Christopher, flew to London in order to attend the Second London Conference (i. e. joint 
meeting of NATO and Contact Group). 
It was predictable, however, that both British and French reactions would not be 
enthusiastic . 
75 As previously discussed, NATO had already defined the aim of air attacks as only 
ensuring the safety of UNPROFOR troops in the 'safe areas' and not to intervening in the conflict on 
behalf of any waning party. 76fbe Clinton administration's policy to promote strategic air strikes by 
NATO would distort the original aims and procedures that had hitherto been laid down regarding the 
role of launching air strikes. The US now challenged 'UN authority over air strikes and thus, the 
foundation of Westem multilatemlism. 
f Quasi-Multilateralism Ihe Second London Conference: Consolidation o 
On 21 July, the Second London Conference discussed two major issues: firstly, how to 
promote peace based on the Bildt-Milogevi6 Agreement and, thus, what kinds of action the Contact 
71 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 69-70; Silber and Little, The Death ofYugoslavia, 351-352. 
72 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 69-70. 
73 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 69-70. 
74 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 71-73. 
75 Christopher, Warren. Chances qf a Lifetime. New York: Scibner, 2001.254; Daalder, Getting to Da-vton, 
70-71. 
76 However, the then British Ambassador to the UN, David Hannay, understood that UNSCR 836 (safe area) 
provided sufficient legal authority for taking robust action against Bosnian Serb forces. Interview wth Da"'id 
Hannay on 5 October 2004. Also see: Gow, James. Diumph of the Lack of will. - International Diplomacy 
antl the Yugoslav Mir. London: Hurst & Company, 1997.135-136. 
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Group and NATO should take in accomplishing this; secondly, America's proposed str-ategic air strikes 
in relation to the debate on what kind of coercive measures the Contact Group should take to improve 
the situation on the ground, especially the situation of GoraMe. 
Russia, the UK, France, Gennany, and Spain supported the peace negotiations, based on the 
Bildt-Milogevi6 Agreement. 77 However, the US rejected it and effectively killed the proposed 
agreement. 78 According to Carl Bildt's adviser, Louis Sell, the critical reason why the US did not 
support the Bildt-Mflogevi6 Agreement was the plan's political strategy to refer to the UNSC. 791f the 
agreement was referred to the UNSC, it would be difficult for the US administration to veto it and they 
would thus be bound by it. 
With regard to the situation in Gorulde, Warren Christopher demanded that his European 
allies support NATO air stfikes on the strategic facilities and equipment of Bosnian Serb forces. 80 
Christopher also suggested that he did not intend to seek ftuther UN authority and had no mterest in 
supporting ideas about the negotiation based peace process. 81 The participants of the Second London 
Conference appeared to have reached a consensus that there should be some form of coercive action 
(i. e. air strikes) if the situation of Gora2de deteriorated fiuther. 82 However, there was a debate regarding 
the imphcations of air strikes. First of all, strategic air strikes would certainly force UNPROFOR 
suspended its humanitarian missions In Bosnia and thus the Bosnian civilians would suffer from lack of 
basic food and medications. In this respect, there was a long debate between the US and its allies 
77 Bildt, Peace Journey, 67-68. 
78 Bildt, Peace Journey, 68. 
79 Christopher also confided to Bfldt in private that 'the upcoming Senate vote made it unfeasible, but that he 
thought the whole thing would blow over in a week or two, and that we could then proceed with the 
package. ' [Quoted in Bildt, Peace Journey, 68]. Soon after fis conversation, on 26 July 1995 the US Senate 
voted in favor of withdrawing US participation in the arms embargo scheme. However, the US 
adininistration did not follow this congressional opinion. In other words, the congressional opinion was not 
strong enough to push the US administration by that time. Therefore, with regard to 'power over outcomes', 
it is plausible to consider that the critical factor that made Christopher oppose the Bfldt-N4ilo§evi6 Agreement 
was its potential to restrict NATO and US policies via UN authority. Sell, Slobodan MiloseWc and the 
Destruction of YugosIm4a, 228-229; Bildt, Peace dburncv,, 68. 
80 Christopher, Chance qfa Lýfetime, 254-256. 
81 Christopher, Chances qfa Lifetime, 254-256; Bildt, Peace Journey, 67-68. 
82 Christopher, Chancev ofa Lýfefime, 254-256, Bildt, Peace Journey, 67-68; Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 
239-240, 
228 
regarding NATO's obligation to support withdrawal of UNPROFOF, if it carried out strategic air 
strikes. Secondly, European and UN policy-makers demanded that a political str-ategy to settle the 
conflict should be accompanied by military action. Regarding the issue of UNPROFOR personnel's 
safety, Boutros-Ghali understood that the participants of the Conference approved of the UN pulhng 
out its staff if air strikes were to be implemented. 83 In this way, he agreed to hand out his part of 'dual- 
key' of authorising air strikes to the UN commander in the field. 84 However, from the military 
perspective, the UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia, Lieutenant General Rupert SMitl-4 stiH voiced I-iis 
concerns that air attacks alone would not help GoraMe. 85 Carl Bildt also emphasised tl-ýs point from a 
political point of view, regarding the necessity of peace negotiation along with air strikeS86 However, as 
the British govennnent and other Europeans did not object to Christopher's opinion, the representatives 
of the UN and the EU (i. e. Carl Bildt) were not able to influence Christopher's opinion. 87 
This high-handed American attitude, as well as the actual outcomes of the Second London 
Conference by no means satisfied the EU and the UN delegates. Carl Bildt expressed his frustration in 
the following way: 
rMe Second London Conference] had not managed to resolve the differences. I 
was convinced that we needed a more open dialogue with the Americans on a 
higher political level [emphasis added]. 88 
However, the European members of the Contact Group and the UN Security-General were not able to 
raise fiirther objections to America's above-discussed manipulation of the interpretation of moral 
values and the corresponding outcome of the UN's loosening its grip on the use of coercive power in 
Bosnia. Warren Christopher recalled this point in his memoirs, noting that after the conference the UN 
Secretary-General's authority was treated in the following way: 
83 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 240. 
84 In practice this was a unplemented in the forrn of the shift from Boutros-Ghali's civilian representative 
Yasushi Akashi to the commander of entire UNPROFOR mission, General Bernard Janvier. Boutros-Ghah, 
Unvanqu&hed, 240-241. 
85 Bildt, Peace Journej,, 67; Boutros-Ghali, UnvanquLýhed, 24 1. 
86 Bfldt, Peace Journey, 67. 
87 Christopher, Cliances qf a Lýfefime, 256; Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 240-241; Bildt, Peace Journey, 
67-68,71-72. 
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Within a few days of the [Second] London conference Boutros-Ghah tried to take 
back what he had given up in London. He insisted that he had intended all along to 
preserve a U. N. veto right over NATO air strikes. On Tuesday, July 25,1 
telephoned him to remind him that he had sat silent as we ratified the plan in rth 
second] London [Conferencel and that backtracking now would send precisely the 
wrong message to the Bosnian Serbs. Boutros-Ghali responded fiigidly, and I had 
to call him a second time before he finally stood down' [emphasis added]. 8' 
Indeed, there was no substantial mutual consultation in the formation of a common position, as Liberal 
Multilateralists' view of America's allies' 'voice opportunities' assumed. Despite the discontent of its 
European allies and the UN, the US administration believed that strategic air strikes and the removal of 
UN authority over the 'dual-key'-as well as its rationale of deterring Serbian offensives as the end of 
Western action-were (in Christopher's evaluation) 'ratified'at the Second London Conference. 90 
This coflective 'ratification' of America's position gave a justification for the US to transform 
the rationale to use coercive power in Bosnia. Initially, the Clinton administration advocated taking 
robust action in Bosnia, based on the rationale that the West had moral responsibility to maintain the 
territonal integrity of Bosnia under the leadership of Izetbegovi6.91 Thus, it promoted a 'lift and strike' 
policy against the Serbian offensives as a means to accomphsh the end. Christopher now retreated 
from the initial rationale of the coercive action, as it would eventually force America to participate in 
the conflict on behalf of the Bosnian government, not only against Bosnian Serb forces but also against 
the Bosnian Croat forces. In order to avoid such a scenario, the US administration adopted a new 
interpretation of Westem moral values that derived from 'democratic peace'. It emphasised restoring 
the stability of intemational affairs for the sake of the effective operation of 'market democracies' in 
Europe, rather than paying attention to the quality of 'justice' In Bosnia (see Chapter 4). America's new 
approach to the coercive action in Bosnia can be interpreted as deterring the Serbian offensives (i. e. 
88 Bildt, Peace Joumci,, 71-72. 
89 Christopher, Chances of a Lýfefime, 256. Boutros-Ghali presented a different account regarding the same 
events, See, Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 240-24 1. 
90 Christopher, Chances qf a Lýfetime, 256; Dallon, J. "Conflict in The Balkans: Policy- Allies Wam 
Bosnian Serbs of'Substanfial'Air Strikes in if U. N. Encla-ý,, e is Attacked; Accord Mi London, " TheNeu, 10rk 
Times, 22 July 1995, A 1. Daalder- Getfing to Daý-ton, 75; Holbrooke, To End a Tfbr, 7 1. 
91 Interview with Anthony Lake, 19 May 2004. 
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restoring stability) as an end, not a nwans, of Western policy to the conflict. In this way, Christopher 
dismissed the Bildt-Mflogevi6 Agreement that would give 'too much to SerbS,. 
92 However, he did not 
spell out what was the appropriate balance between the three ethnic groups in Bosnia and what kind of 
peace plan the West should propose in conjunction with its coercive action. 93 In this way, America's 
initial advocacy of its alleged moral value of protecting the interests of the Bosnian government was 
distorted in order to promote America's vital interests of maintaining NATO's dejacto independence 
from the UN and keeping the US away from the ethnic war on the ground. In other words, 
Christopher's advocacy suggested that the official aim of the air strikes shifted from ensuring the safety 
of UNPROFOR mission (i. e. the UN and the EU's position) or protecting the territorial integrity of 
Bosnia-namely the critical interests of the Bosnian goverriment and America's initial rationale to use 
coercive power-to deterring Bosnian Serb forces in order to facilitate the geo-str-ategic approach to 
the settlement of the Bosnian conflict, without sacrificing America's vital interests. 94 
In short, the Second London Conference marked the final turning point of the Western 
approach to the Bosnian conflict regarding the role of multilateralism in relation to the West's use of 
collective coercive action to outside of its territory. Practically, the outcomes of the conference and 
America's approach that defined it can be summarized as follows: firstly, it would prevent UN's 
management of the use of coercive power in Bosnia. Secondly, NATO would launch str-ategic air 
strikes punishing Bosnian Serb forces but not promoting the critical interests of the Bosnian 
government (i. e. maintaining territorial integrity of Bosnia under the leadership of Izetbegovi6). Thirdly, 
these air strikes would be launched in conjunction with local forces-essentially the Croatian Anny- 
fightIng on the ground behalf of the US strategy. Lastly, the US would impose the settlement based on 
the newly created military balance ofpower. Thus, it would not be based on both interpretations of 
Western values (i. e. multflater-alism or protecting the interests of the Bosnian government). ne 
92 Quoted in Sell, Slobodan MiloseviC and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, 228-229. Also see: Bildt, Peace 
Jounicv, 67-68. 
93 Bildtý Peace Journev, 67-68,71-72; Sell, Slobodan Milosovic and the Destruction ofYugoslavia, 22 8-229. 
94 Bildtý Peace Journcý,, 71-72. 
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working hypothesis predicted that such promotion of America's interests under the banner of 
'democratic peace' would not work in favour of the interests of the Bosnian government or the 
conditions of civilians on the ground (see Chapter 1). The next two sections will look tat the coherence 
of this interpretation. 
'Devastating'the Civitians on the Ground: Consequences of Quasi-Multflateralism (1) 
The Second London Conference paved the way for Western rt-ýfitaiy intervention in the 
Bosnian conflict. On 25 July, and again on I August, NATO endorsed a policy that substantiated the 
Second London Conference's decision on air strikes. 95 However, given NATO's decision to carry out 
air strikes, UNPROFOR would have to be withdrawn in order to avoid a repeat of the hostage scenario. 
There was a problem, however, as the US administration did not fully endorse OPLAN 40104, wl-kh 
96 
was precisely intended to deal with the issue of UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Given the Clinton 
administration's blocking of OPLAN 40104, there was now no concrete plan in the part of US and 
NATO as to how UNPROFOR personnel would be withdrawn. Therefore, NATO did not cany out its 
air strikes for a while. In other words, the Clinton administration bore responsibility for presenting a 
workable comprehensive plan to replace UNPROFOR's functions, as well as the EU-UN's political 
roles in Bosnia, when NATO began its strategic air strikes. The US decision on this issue was eagerly 
awaited. 
In regard to this absence of America's political strategy to settle the conflict, Carl Bildt and 
David Owen visited Washington to discuss the peace plan, on 3 August. They attempted to obtain the 
support of American policy-maker-slor the Bildt-Milogevi6 Ageement. 97 Bildt impressed upon the US 
administration the need for the West to develop a potitical. strategy for peace before undeftaking any 
95 NATO, "Press Statement by the Secretary General FoHowing North Atlantic Council Meeting on 25 July 
1995. " http: //www. nato. int/docii/speech/1995/s950725a. htm. [Accessed on 21 March 2005]; NATD, "Press 
Statement by the Secretary General Following North Atlantic Council Meeting on I August 1995. " 
http: //www. nato. mt/docu/speech/1995/s950801a. htrn. [Accessed on 21 March 2005]. For an analysis of 
these decisions see: Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 77-79. 
% Daalder, Getting to Dqjlon, 79-80; Bildt, Peace Journey, 58-59 
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military action. 98 However, Richard Holbrooke, Al Gore, and others in the Clinton administration 
expressed their disagreement with Bildt on this matter 99 A] Gore even suggested that the US cannot 
accept any plan that is negotiated with Milogevi6.100 Hence, Bddt failed to persuade the Clinton 
administration. 
After this meeting, on his way to the airport before returning to Europe, Bildt was informed 
by US intefligence services that the Croatian army was preparing to attack Kunin in the Krajina region, 
(Croatia) in early morning. 101 Accordingly, at 5 am on 4 August the Croatian Army commenced its 
mihtaiy offensive, known as Operation Stonn. '()2Given its expectation of militaty opemtlOns, within 
the near future, it was not surprising that the Clinton administration thought Bildt's efforts were 
unhelpful. It would be natural to consider that, before any intra-Westem interaction, the US position 
had already been decided and the EU had absolutely no impact on the outcomes of US policy 
Prior to tWs episode, on 22 July the Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and the Bosnian 
President Alija Izetbegovi6 held a meeting regarding Operation Storm, which was attended by the US 
ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith. 103 At the meeting, Tudjman proposed that the joint military 
action in the Westem Slavonia (that stride over the border between Croatia and BoSMa) against Serbian 
forces. In particular, Tudjman suggested that the Croatian forces would assist the Bosnian 
government's actions in its Muslim enclave of Biha6, in Northern Bosnýia. 104 Izetbegovi6 'immediately 
accepted the offer', as he was desperate to obtairt any military SUpport. 
105 In other words, from the 
Bosrýan govemment's perspective, eagerly awaited military help came not from the US, which at least, 
97 Bildt, Peace Journey, 71-72. 
98 Bildt, Peace Journey, 71-72. 
99 Bildt, Peace Journey, 71-72. 
100 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 354. 
101 Bildt, Peace Journey, 71-72. 
102 For a detailed account of this operation, see: Ripley, Tim. Operation Deliberate Force. - The UN and 
NATO Campaign in Bosnia 1995, Forwarded by Nik Gowing. Lancaster, UK: Centre for Defence and 
Intemational Studies, Cartmel College, Lancaster UnIversity, 1999. Espec. Chap. 14. 
103 Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force, 177; Original inforTnation in, Galbraith, Peter. The United States and 
Croatia. -A Documentary Mytory 199.2-1997. Vienna: USIA Regional Office, 1997. xviii. 
104 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 120; Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 354; Izetbegovi6, Ahja. Inescapable Questions. - 
Autobiographical Notes. Tmnslated by Saba Rissaluddin and Jasnuna lzetbegovi6. Leicester: The Islarnic 
Foundation, 2003.222. 
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rhetoricaUy maintained its support of the interests of the Bosnian government on the mtemational stage, 
but from an enemy However, militarily speaking, this agreement consolidated the fact that the fate of 
the Bosnian government's interests would be subordinated to the actions of the Croatian Amy. 
Publicly, the Clinton administration officials were reluctant to endorse this operation before 
it begun. 106However, US officials, in fact, supported the Operation Storm fi7om the beginning. For 
instance, the US ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, attended the meeting between Tudjman and 
Izetbegovi6, on 22 July, in order to show a 'US support for the Croatian-Bosnian alliance'. ' 071ndeedas 
soon as the Croatian army commenced military operations the Clinton administration gave its support 
to the Croatian army's actions. ' 08 
Against this backdrop, the principal policy-makers of the Clinton administration held 
meetings on 7,8 and 9 August. 109 They, at last, discussed how they might form a comprehensive 
American policy to settle the Bosnian conflict, accompanied by both military and political measures. 
On 9 August, at the end of this series of meetings, Clinton made his final decision regarding the US 
policy' 10 He decided to bring about the settlement on the basis of the Contact Group Peace Plan, but 
also by employing a 'carrot' and 'stick' policy. To be precise, this new approach did not aim to base 
itself sIMPly on the Contact Group Peace Plan as it was. Clinton intended rather to re-negotiate parts of 
the Contact Group map with the waning parties. 111 Tlýs was the 'carrot. ' Thel-4 as the 'stick', Clinton 
112 decided to use military power (i. e. stmtegic air strikes) if necessary. This had been proposed by 
advisers who were concerned about American credibility in the West, rather than the Bosnian situation 
Itself 
113 In other words, America's vital interests would dictate the process to bring about settlement. 
105 lzetbegovic, Inescapable Questions, 222. 
106 Holbrooke, To End a War, 72-73. 
107 Galbraith, The United States and Croatia, XVfH. 
108 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 122-123. 
109 Holbrooke, To End a War, 73-75; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 106-114. 
110 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 106-110. 
111 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 109. 
112 Daalder, Getting to Dqvton, 109. 
113 According to Daalder's account, there were two agendas in the meetings. The first was what kind of 
settlement the US wanted. The second was the issue as to what extent the US would be prepared to use its 
Inilitary power. it was discussed in relation to the definition of American interests in intervening in the 
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This constituted the final form dmt the American policy would take in the Bosnian conflict. 
Immediately after Clinton made these final decisions, he dispatched Anthony Lake and 
other members of the administration to Europe to explain them. On 12 August, the administmtion also 
annotuiced that the Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke, and the US Special Envoy to the 
fonner Yugoslavia, Robert Frasure, would go to Bosriia. 114 In principle, the European capitals 
welcomed what looked like a new American initiative. ' 15 The main reason for this openness on the part 
of the Europeans was that at least the US was making some kind of effort to settle the conflict. ' 16 
However, the US and the other Contact Group members could not come to a common position in their 
discussion as to how to settle the conflict. For instance, after the announcement of this American 
initiative, Bildt and Holbrooke both carried out shuttle diplomacy across the Balkan Peninsula, albeit 
separately On the one hand, Bildt continued to broker his peace plan that the US administration refused 
to accept in early August. ' 17 On the other hand, Holbrooke promoted American policy that involved 
military operations by Croatian anny on the ground and NATO on the air. 
On 16 August, Holbrooke and Bildt had a detailed conversation about each strategy. " 8 They 
discussed tactical aspects of how the West should promote peace. However, they were not able to form 
a common strategy. This was because the differences between them arose from the fact that the US 
disliked being limited , even by the limited logic of multflaterafism, in the form of the Contact Group. 
Holbrooke regarded the very fi-amework and its practices of the Contact Group undennined the 
credibility of the Atlantic alliance and that of the US in Europe. Holbrooke claimed to his senior the US 
Bosnian conflict. On the one hand, the State Department and the Defense Department thought that the 
principal aim of Arnerican involvement in Bosnia was to end the violence. In this respect, they wanted to 
Iii-nit American military involvement to a minimum. On the other hand, Lake and Albright argued that not 
only ending the violence but also American credibility in the world, particularly among its transatlantic 
partners, was at stake. 'fbus, they pushed to use rrulitary power, if the three waning BoSrUan parties disagreed 
with the US. Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 106-110. 
114 Shortly after that Holbrooke took over as the Special Envoy It was due to the accident. On 20 August, 
Robert Frasure and his assistants lost their lives in a traffic accident on Mount Ingurn near Sarajevo. 
115 Bildt, Peace Journty, 82-83. 
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Secretary of State, Warren Christopher: 
[t]he Contact Group presents us with a constant conundrum. We can't live without 
it, we can't live with it. If we don't meet with them and tell them what we are 
doing, they complain publicly. If we tell them, they disagree and often leak-and 
worse. 119 
Such a position is, indeed, the central motive for the US administration to promote the logic of 
intemational order; what this research has referred to as quasi-multflateralism. The US only supports 
multilateralism as long as its outcomes correspond to America's interests and, when the results of 
multilateralism do not accord with its interests, the US legitimizes its exceptional position, by 
advocating an ideological interpretation of the moral value of the West. However, other Western states 
would still consider themselves bond by the genuine rule of multilateralism, regardless of their like or 
dislike of its outcomes, as the US ultimately maintains the order by military power. 
US policy-makers understood that the UN's hold of the 'dual-key' over NATO air strikes 
institutionally protected the British and Russian position of not taking robust action in Bosnia. 120 In 
other words, the UN authority in Bosnia (i. e. 'dual-key' arrangement) was regarded as a pivotal 
obstacle promoting America's vision of international order. Therefore, with a determination to launch 
military intervention, sidelining the authority of the UN was an essential part of America's strategy to 
place a block on genuine multilaterahsm witl-ýn the Contact Group. 
Operation Deliberate Force 
On 28 August 1995, a shift In perception on the Bosnian conflict occur-red within the 
Contact Group. On that day, the indoor market M Sarajevo had been hit by mortar sheU-fire wl-&h 
killed 37 people. 121 This time the UN explicitly condemned the Bosnian Serbs as responsible for the 
119 Holbrooke, To End a lfýir, 84. 
120 Interview . krith Anthony 
Lake on 19 May 2004; Interview with Robert Hunter on 17 May 2004; 
Interview with Robin Renwick on 5 October 2004. 
121 Up,, "U. N. Warns of Drainatic' Step in Bosnia, " United Press International, 29 August 1995, LeXis- 
Nexis. Akashi, lkiru Kotonhno Kokoroseki, 208-209; Boutr-os-Ghali, Unvanquilyhed, 243. 
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killing. On 29 August, the Contact Group held a meeting in Paris. 122 As a result of the pre"ous day's 
lu- ZILLelling, they did not oppose the NATO offensive-i. e. strategic air strikes to deter Serbian 
offensives-which was code-named Operation Deliberate Force. 123 On 30 August, NATO began 
operations, attacking the Bosnian Serbs' key infrastructure from the air. The short-term aim of this 
military operation by NATO was to compel Bosnian Serb forces to remove its heavy aitillery around 
Sarajevo and to release that city fi7om its siege. 124 NATO continued the operation until 14 September 
1995, when the Bosnian Serbs complied with its demandS. 125 
, As, soon as the operation commenced, the US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright 
wanted to make sure the 'dual-key' did not stop NATO air attacks. Because of Boutros-Ghah's absence, 
she negotiated with his deputy Kofi Annan. As a result, the UN did not exercise the authority they 
possessed to prevent operations. 126 US policy-makers understood that Annan indicated as much to the 
UN personnel. "' Holbrooke made mention of this episode in Ifis memoirs: 
Annan's gutsy performance in those twenty-four hours [the first day of NATO air 
attacks] was to play a central role in Washington's strong support for him a year 
later as the successor to Boutros-Ghali as Secretary-General of the United States. 
128 Indeed, in a sense Annan won the job on that clay' 
Indeed, in 1996, the US prevented Boutros-Ghali from serving his second term and it instead supported 
Kofi Annan's candidacy Holbrooke's recollections give us an insight into what the US administration's 
critical concern was, in regard to the Bosnian conflict. Ilds was the question of UN authority over 
122 Bildt, Peace Journey, 94. 
123 Bildt, Peace Journey, 94. A detailed study of the operation is in Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force. 
124 NATO, "Statement by the Secretary General ofNATO, 30 August 1995, " NATO Press Releases (95) 73. 
125 NATO, "Joint Statement by the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Secretary General of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 14 September 1995, " NATO Press Releases (95)85. 
126 To be precise, Boutros-Ghali disagrees with flýiis reading in the following way: 'On August 30, hardly a 
day after the bombing began, Ambassador Albright telephoned Under Secretary-General Annan to ask when 
the air strikes would end. In a note to me reporting on Albright's call, Annan expressed astonishment that she 
should ask him such a question. Albright apparently did not understand that the decision-makin(Y process for 
the air operation had been delegated to the commanders in the field weeks ago. She was anxious that the 
bombing not go to the point where it would der-ail the peace process. Annan told her that we were in touch 
with our UN con-u-nanders in the field and suggested that she contact her own military authorities on the 
matter' Quoted in Boutros-Ghah, Umanquished, 224-225. 
127 Holbrooke, To End a [Var, 99,103. 
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NATO operations-i. e. the very essence of the European vision of multilateralism and its 'sovereign 
peace, ). 
In the meantime, the Croatian army moved its frontline from Krajina to within the Bosnian 
territory. In other words, the US compensated for the lack of any ground troops with the Croatian 
army's offensives. However, these offensives became as those of Bosnian Serb forces. Holbrooke, was 
aware of this; he 'told Tudjman that current Croatian behavior might be viewed as a milder forrn of 
ethnic cleansing. Tudj man reacted strongly, but he did not deny iti. 129 Yet, after Operation Storm began, 
Holbrooke said: 'Mr. President [Tudjman], I urge you to go as far as you can, but not to take Banja 
Luka [the Bosnian Serb's main strongliold]. ' 130 The Croatian Army carried out its military action 
accordingly However, as Holbrooke implies his initial acknowledgement of the fact, such military 
action was implemented at the cost of the civilians on the ground. 
In 2001 the Croatian army officer in charge of Krajina, offensives (i. e. Operation Stonn) and 
its military activities in Bosnia (i. e. that in effect acted in conjunction with NATO's Operation 
Deliberate Force), General Ante Gotovina, was indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia. 13 ' He has been charged with crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or 
customs of war in regard to Croatian offensives from summer to winter 1995. nie initial version of his 
indictment says: 
Between 4 August 1995 and 15 November 1995, large numbers of Krajina Serbs 
fled or were forced to flee to Bosnia Herzegovina and Serbia. [ ... 
] Ante 
GOTOVINA rsic] acting individually and/or in concert with others, includin 
President Franjo Tudj , planned, 
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise 
aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of persecutions of the 
132 Krajina, Serb population [emphasis added]. 
In this iiýiitial indictment, the Criminal Tribunal implied that the Croatian goveniment, including its 
129 Holbrooke, To End a [Far, 160-16 1. 
130 Holbrooke, To End a If ýir, 160. 
131 The Prosecutor of the Thbunal, "The Prosecutor of the Thbunal agafiiSt Ante Gotovmia, " 77je 
Inteniationtil Criminal Tilhunal , 
for the Former Yugoslavia, 200 1. CASE NO: MO 1 -45-1. 
132 Me Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Ante Gotovina, " Count I (Persecutions). [Initial version]. 
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head of state, Franjo Tudjman, was behind such ethnic cleansing. 133 As we have discussed, it was the 
US administration that effectively provided political context for the Croatian authorities' actions. 
This episode suggests that the quality of ideological nwral value was easily comprorrused m 
accord with the vital interests of the US. The use of coercive power under the banner of punishing a 
non-democratic regime would devastate innocent civilians on the ground. These people who were 
devastated by such intervention would ask that; what was the use of 'democratic peace' for the quality 
of their life? Moreover, General Ante Gotovina, as well as Bosnian Serb leaders such as Radovan 
Karacl2i6 and General Ratko Mladi6, are stil-I at large [as ofAugust 2005]. 
To sum up, the actual outcomes of the Western actions underlined the fallacies of the claims 
on the part of the Liberal Multilateralists. As we discussed in Chapter 1, they argue that the Western 
coflective action is guided by not America's vital interest, but by the procedural nonnative value of 
multilateralism, due to America's open and competitive domestic policy-making system, as well as its 
benevolent international leadership. The outcome of such Western policy is characterized by its another 
ideological moral value of liberal democracy-such as respecting law and order, fi7ee enterprise, 
democratic governance and human rights-and, thus, it would create stability, not only within the West, 
but also in the non-Western world. In other words, according to Liberal Multilateralists, there is a 
hannony between the procedural normative value and the ideological moral value of the West. 
This section provides a catalogue of gaps between the Western promises to promote some 
justice and the outcomes that they created. America's encouragement of the Croatian offensives was 
one negative consequences of its promotion of quasi-multilateralism, In order to maintain its vital 
mterests, the US attempts to overcome the regulative power of multi-lateralism, under the cover of the 
133 The Criminal Tribunal later issued an amendment of the indictment. In the new indictment the same 
paragraph was re-worded as follows: 'Between 4 August 1995 and 15 November 1995, the accused Ante 
GOTOVINA, acting individually and/or in concert with other members of the joint criminal enterprise, 
planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation, or 
execution of persecutions of the Krajina Serb population in the southern portion of the Krajm*a region' 
[emphasis added]. President Tudjman was not mentioned in this revised indictment. This illustrated that the 
action of the Crirninal Tribunal is politically vulnerable to diplomatic pressures. The Prosecutor of the 
Tribunal, "The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Ante Gotovina: Amended Indictment, " The International 
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Western collective action for a ideologically defined common cause, but without any senous constraint 
attached to America's actions. As a result, the process (i. e. use of coercive power) that is alleged to 
promote 'democratic peace' sometime compromises the very essence of justice that the ideal 
democratic regime would be able to provide. Indeed, civilians on the ground were devastated by such 
hypocrisy. 
'Betraying'the Bosnian Government: Consequences of Quasi-Multilateralism (11) 
While NATO carried out its aerial strikes and coordinated the Western attacks on the ground 
against the Bosnian Serbs, the US Special Envoy, Richard Holbrooke, and the Serbian President, 
Slobodan Milogevi6, agreed with the basis for peace negotiations. On 30 August, Milogevi6 and his 
Serbian military commanders met the Bosnian Seib leaders in Belgrade, with the Patriarch Pavle of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church in attendance. The Patriarch brokered an agreement to the effect that 
Mflogevi6 would represent all Serbs in international negations relating to ffie Bosnian peace process. 134 
'Mis is referred to as the Patriarch Paper. Milogevi6 became the key person in the matter of any 
settlement. 
Immediately after this, Milogevi6 met Holbrooke and infort-ned him of what had been 
agreed. Holbrooke was delighted with the fact that the US could negotiate widi Mllo§evi6 . 
135However, 
as previously discussed, this was the very point over which the US administration had repeatedly 
criticized and dismissed the EU-UN peace efforts as an appeasement of 'aggressors'. Ths gives a sense 
of American policy-makers' real concem about the Bosnian conflict. In short, the fact that they were 
willing to negotiate with Milogevi6 demonstr-ates that America's initial advocacy of the moral issues M 
the form of negotiating with the Serbian leaders was not the ctifical issue for the US. In the context of 
the transatlantic relationship during the Bosriian conflict, as this thesis has discussed, it is plausible to 
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understand that America's use of anti-Serbian rhetoric was a means to undermine the European Nision 
of the Western Order under multilater-alism and to prevent its involvement in the conflict on the ground. 
The situation on the ground intensified intemational diplomatic activities. On 7 September, 
the Foreign Ministers in the Contact Group along with the EU Troika and the Canadian and Dutch 
Foreign Mi: nisters assembled in Paris. 136 On the same day in Geneva, the US Special Envoy, Richard 
Holbrooke, convened negotiations between the Bosnian waning paities. Once the US had decided who 
would attend, it excluded the UN chief diplomatic envoy for the former Yugoslavia, Thorvald 
Stoltenberg. 137 Boutros-Ghali wrote a letter to Christopher that the US should accept Stoltenberg in the 
Geneva meeting as the UN representative fi7om the ICFY 138 As a result, Stoltenberg was invited. 
However, he was only given very limited access to the meeting. Boutros-Ghah realised the fact that the 
US would not give any role for the UN regarding the settlement of the Bosnian conflict. 1 39 
This episode suggested that the US finally succeeded in sidelining the UN not only militarily 
but also politically As the working hypothesis of this thesis has suggested, America's promotion of its 
supremacy within the Western Order under the cover of 'democratic peace'would not necessarily work 
m favour of the interests of non-Western world. Therefore, in order to assess the validity of tEs claim, it 
is essential to look at the negotiation process of the Bosnian waning parties after this phase of the 
chronology in the international involvement in Bosnia. 
In Geneva, the waning parties and the Contact Group discussed various issues. The most 
important agreement was the acceptance of the Bosnian Serb entity, 'Republika Srpska'within the state 
of Bosnia. 140 The US administration put a lot of pressure on the Bosnian government to accept tl-ýis. On 
8 September, in one meeting between Holbrooke and the Bosnian government's delegate and its 
Pennanent representative to the UN, Muhamed Sacirbey, Holbrooke threatened Sacirbey in the 
136 Canada and the Netherlands were contributing troops to the UNPROFOR. Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 358- 
359. 
137 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquislied, 245. 
138 Boutros-Ghali, Unwinquished, 245. 
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foRowing way: 
I told Sacirbey that if he precipitated a failure in Geneva, the United States would 
hold him responsible, and only the Serbs would benefit. [ ... In order] to protect this 
process, I later asked Christopher to call Izetbegovic and Sflajzic in Sarajevo to 
calm them down. He did so irmediately [ ... ]. 
141 
As a result, the Bosnian government reluctantly accepted 'Repubhka Srpska' in principles. However, 
tWs means that Bosnia would be practically divided into two parts. This was a clear betrayal of 
America's initial arguments to use coercive power-namely, maintaining territorial integrity of Bosnia 
under the leadership of the Izetbegovi6 government. 142 
In order to maintain the territorial integrity of Bosnia, the Bosnian government did not want 
to accept the idea of regional based election system for the position of presidency 14' However, as a 
result of the negotiation between Holbrooke and Milogevi6, the US demanded the Bosnian government 
to accept such a system. 144Finally, the Bosnian government had to accept the position America tabled 
in exchange for the Clinton's informal guarantee to oppose any future partition of BosrUa that did not 
have any legal force regarchng the actions of the US. 145 As a result of these arrangements, however, the 
future central government of Bosnia and its 'Bosnian Presidency' would not have a sufficiently 
substantial administrative authority to represent the whole of Bosnia. Indeed, under the Dayton 
Agreement, the position of President is split into three: namely one Muslim, a BoslUan Croat, and a 
Bosnian Serb. 146 Having succeeded militarily to deter the Serbian offensives and also to place the 
Bosnian government's actions under the dependence of the Croatian Army, the US moved to the next 
stage of the negotiation. 
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The Foreign Ministerial meeting of the Contact Group in New York in late September 1995, 
the international actors ITIVOlved in the diplomacy regarding the Bosnian conflict tried to bring about 
settlement. On 5 October, the US President announced a cease-fire that would take effect In five days 
time. However, on the same day that Chnton made thýs announcement, Holbrooke was in Zagreb in 
order to talk with Tudjman. Holbrooke recalled what he said to the Croatian President: 
F was] urging Tudjman to capture more territory before the cease-fire took effect. 
[] "You have five days left that's all, " I said, "What you don't wM on the 
battlefield will be hard to gain at the peace talks. Don't waste these days' ,. 147 
Holbrooke's comments precisely reflected territorial-based and edinically-divided prescription for the 
future of Bosnia. However, it is clear that militarily actions in accord with such logic would exacerbate 
the dire conditions of civilians on the ground. Indeed, Amencan-designed peace was promoted at the 
cost of civilians' lives on the ground. This undermines the claims of Liberal Multilateralists that the 
Western action is motivated by its 'ideational'interests (i. e. promoting 'liberal democracy' through the 
process of multilateralism) and that the West brings the outcomes in accordance with its values. 
In October 1995, while the US administration was engaging military operation in Bosnia, 
the members of the Contact Group planned to convene intensive negotiations in order to bring about a 
settlement. These negotiations were due to take place at the Dayton Air Base, Ohio, in the US. Before 
the Dayton meeting could go ahead, the US had to resolve several international issues concerning the 
implementation phase of the peace process. There were three importmt issues: Russia's role in the 
implementation of peace agreement; NATO's role in the post conflict Bosnia; and the international 
civilian administrator's role. 
148 
As for the first issue, on 23 October, the Presidents of the US and Russia agreed that the 
latter will take part in the peacekeeping mission. 149 Following this, on 27 October the US Secretary of 
147 Holbrooke, To End a [Var, 199. 
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Modern War. - Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Funtre of Coqflict. New York, Oxford: PublicAffairs, 2001.56-58; 
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Defense, William Perry, and his Russian counterpart Pavel Grachev reached an agreement to the effect 
that the Russian troops would be deployed separately fi7om NATO but would be under NATO 
command. 
150 
With regard to the second issue of NATO's role, the US government decided to proVide 
ground troops, but it was determined to claim that the mission must be entirely under the conu-nand and 
control of NATO. 15'America's allies were ready to accept this point, but there was disagreement 
among the policy-makers of the US regarding the tasks and the duration of NATO's operation in 
Bosnia. 152 Eventually, by the end of October, the Clinton administration decided to send NATO troops 
with a minimal nuhtary role and with the additional condition that they were to pull out after one year 
of deployment. Following this decision, the NAC later authorized an implementation plan for the 
Dayton Agreement that was codenamed Operation Joint Endeavour (also known as the OPLAN 
153 -MS 154 40105). operation plan was unlike its two predecessors. First of all, it was in fact implemented. 
Secondly, this plan reflected the above-discussed US administration's intention to minimize NATO's 
political and police role in Bosnia. Therefore, the US was reluctant to accept the potential that NATO 
would get involved in actions against persons indicted for war crimes, wl-&h was in contrast to Bildt's 
requests. 
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(1995): 1661-1663. 
150 Martin, Jurek. "US, Russia Agree Joint Bosnia Unit, " Financial Times, 28 October 1995,3. 
151 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 139-149. 
152 According to Holbrooke and Daalder there were two opinions within the administration. On the one hand 
Holbrooke and other members who were responsible for the Bosnian negotiations were in favour of giving 
an extended role to NATO and extending the length of its stay in Bosma. They assumed that the Bosnian 
ethnic groups would have insufficient ability to administer the state. In order to bolster the settlement of the 
Bosnian state, they wanted to define NATO's mission in Bosnia as nanging from policing to military 
monitoring. On the other hand, however, Lake and the Defense Department argued in favour of the opposite 
position. They were worried that if NATO stayed in Bosnia with a large role, it would allow the Bosnian 
parties to work less hard to implement the peace agreement. Thus, the role of NATO should instead be 
limited to monitoring the separation between the waning forces on the ground. Lake and the Defense 
Department's Views also set out from congressional suspicions about the sending of American ground troops. 
Holbrooke, To End a War, 215-223; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 144-149. 
153 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 147-148. 
154 NATO had looked at two important operations plans in relation to the Bosnian conflict. They Nvere 
namely. OPLAN 40103 that was aimed at implementing the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and OPLAN 40104 
that supposed to assist to pull out UNPROFOR troops. See: Bildt, Peace Journey, 114,170. 
155 Richard Holbrook also defended NATO's initial reluctance to assist the implementation of disarmament 
and as a tactics to seal settle the conflict. Holbrooke, To End a TVar, 36 1; Bildt, Peace Joumiýv, 170. 
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The most controversial issue was the third issue, the role of the civilian administrator in 
Bosnia-the High Representative. At first, on 29 September 1995, the member states of NATO 
decided to set up this position in order to 'monitor the total implementation of the peace agreement'. "' 
Initially the US representative in charge of the future role of this post, Richard Gaflucci, predicted that 
an American would take the role of High Representative. Therefore, he planned to vest strong 
administrative power in this position. 157 However, as previously discussed, the US had decided that 
NATO would engage in only minimal civilian tasks in post conflict Bosnia. As a result the US changed 
its opinion about the High Representative and it was detennined to prevent any interference to any 
NATO's actions in Bosnia. EventuaRy, the US administration turned out to be reftising to give any real 
military power to the f1igh Representative, particularly over NATO forces. 158 This again underlines the 
fact that America's concern was not based on its ideological moral value of West (i. e. looking after 
civilian and political re-constructions; of Bosnia) but the national interests of the US, of not 
undenuining NATO's efficiency 
This tension between the US and the Europeans was prolonged up until the final phase of 
the negotiations at the Dayton Air Base. 159 On one occasion, a French member even threatened to leave 
the talks. '60 However, this did not change the finidamental nature of the negotiations that the US 
controlled the key initiatives. Finally, the Contact Group reached a compromise that the fligh 
Representative would only be able to exercise civilian and political aspect of administrative authority 
and would thus have no military power over NATO. 161 
This division of labour between the NATO and the Fligh Representative, however, came to 
be regarded as being to the detriment of effective governance in Bosnia, especially Its quality of legal 
justice. Right up to the Present day [as of August 2005] NATO and its successor (EU troops) have 
156 Bfldý Peace Journey, 130. 
157 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 156-15 8. 
158 Bfldý Peacc Journey, 130; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 156-158. 
159 Bfldý Peacc Journey, 131-132. 
160 Sflber and Litfle, Ae Death ofYqgoslcn, ia, 372. 
161 Bfldý Peace Journey, 131-132; Daalder, Getting to Dqvton, 156-158. 
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failed to arrest two of the most senior persons indicted for war criminals including Mladi6 and 
Karad&. 162The incumbent mgh Representative [as of August 2005], Paddy Ashdown, has in the past 
publicly criticized NATO's lack of cooperation on this issue. 163 This can be argued to be one of the 
examples of the gap between the promise the West and the US made in the name of promoting 
'democratic peace' in Bosnia and the reality of its practice, when it comes to a challenge to the strategic 
mterests of the US. 
To return to the Bosnian side of settlement, intensive negotiations between the three warring 
parties (i. e. the Bosnian government, the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs) and the Contact 
Group were held in the Dayton Air Base in Ohio fi7om I to 21 November. The Contact Group 
remained in Dayton throughout these negotiations. However, in reality, the US led the negotiations. 164 
The Bosnian government faced mounting pressure on them ftom. the US to make unbearable 
concessions. One of such an issue was their territorial claim over Br6ko. The Bosnian government was 
forced to accept putting the decision of the sovereignty of this area under future international 
arbitration. "' 
On 21 November 1995, after intensive negotiations, the waning parties of the Bosnian 
conflict signed the Dayton Agreement. 166 However, the Bosnian government could not be shy about 
their anger and firustration over the agreement. On his way back home from Dayton, Izetbegovi6 could 
not contain his resentment at the outcomes of the negotiation: '[i]t is a world in which it is possible to 
lead an unjust war and impose an unjust peace 9.167 Despite America's betmyal of its initial rhetoric 
162 Nevertheless, it should be noted that NATO whilst operating as SFOF, did conduct a number of arrest 
operations. See generally, Bass, Gary Jonathan. Stay the Hand of Vengeance: the Politics of ivar Crimes 
Dibunals. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000. Chap. 6, Espec. 266-27 1. 
163 Castle, S. "Ashdown Plots Way to Net Most Wanted Man in the Balkans, " The Independent, I Febniary 
2003,12. 
164 A letter exchanged with Malcolm Rifkind, dated on 19 March 2004. 
165 Izetbegovi6, Inescapable Questions, 326. In May 1999, the arbitrul tribunal decided that this area is a 
multiethnic terntory. Arbitral Tribunal for Dispute over Inter-Entity Boundary in Br6ko Area, "Final Award: 
Arbitration for Brcko Area, " 5 May 1997. 
http: //www. ohr-int/ohr-ffices/brcko/ýrbitr-afion/default. asp? content - 
id=5356 [Accessed on I April 2005]. 
166 For details of the Dayton Agreement and its related documents, see: "Me Proximity Peace Talks, " Pie 
International Confewncc on the Former Yugosltwia : Qfficial Papers, edited by Ramcharan, Vol. 1.342-445. 
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about protecting the interests of the Bosnian government, in December 1995 the Dayton Agreement 
was fonnalized at the Elys6e in Paris with the attendance of the leaders of the Contact Group. 
The international implementation process followed on from this. However, nearly a decade 
since the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia is still politically and militarily occupied by the Western powers. 
There is no clear date given as to when this occupation will come to end. Moreover, on the political 
plane, Bosnia is divided formally into two parts (i. e. the Muslim-Croat Feder-ation and the 'Republika 
STska', albeit, in practice, these would be considered to be three divisions at the level of the political 
leadership (i. e. the Muslims, the Bosnian Croats and the BosMan Serbs). 
To sum up this section of the Dayton Agreement, America's diplomacy accompanied by its 
military actions, finally settled the conflict. TIfis gives credibility to America's claim that the European 
efforts did not work, because it was unwifling to use coercive power and appeased Bosnian Serb forces. 
Originally, the US advocated the use of coercive power in order to protect the interests of the Bosman 
government-the territorial integrity of Bosnia under the Izetbegovi6 government. 168 The US 
administration employed this logic in order to justify its 'lift and strike' policy and challenged the 
validity of European peace initiatives. However, the outcomes of America's military intervention were 
far from aiming at fulfilling its initial rhetoric. 
President Clinton justified the Dayton Agreement and the subsequent deployment of 
America's troops on the ground for implementing it by asserting that it 'served our [Amenca's] 
strategic interests and advanced our fundamental values' . 
169He still shares the viewpoint with the 
Liberal Multilateralists that there was no serious tension between promoting America's 'strategic 
interests' (i. e. to consolidate NATO's supremacy in the forin of maintaining its defacto independence 
from the UN) and its 'fimdamental values' (such as promoting democracy and respecting human 
rights). However, as this section clearly demonstrated, Amenca's initial rhetoncal commitment to 
168 Interview with Anthony Lake on 21 May 2004; tzetbegov'6, Inescapable Questions, 290. 
169 Clinton, 11, tv Lýfe, 685. 
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maintain the territorial integrity of Bosnia was dismissed as a result of the Clinton administration's 
promotion of the strategic interests of maintaining NATO's de facto independence fi7om the UN (and 
thus limiting the role of multilateralism) and not sending ground troops to fight on behalf of the 
Bosnian government. This betrayal was a symbol of the treatment that a non-Western received as a 
result of America's manipulation of moral values in order to organize the Westem Order under quasi- 
multilaterahsm. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the impact of the intra-Westem interaction for the Bosnian 
civilians and the Bosnian government concerning the settlement process of the Bosnian conflict. TNs 
thesis has four theoretical claims to be discussed in order to examine the validity of the working 
hypothesis vis-a-vis Liberal Multilateralists' views. They are as follows: firstly, it claims that there are 
tensions between the Western states regarding interpretation of legitimate actions; secondly, it suggests 
that America's supremacy within the West and its democratic aflies' 'voice opportunities' are 
incompatible; tNrdly, it argues that NATO is a collective self-defence organization that promotes the 
West's (or America's) chosen values; and lastly, it claims that America's promotion of quasi- 
multilateralism within the West does not necessarily promote the genuine contents of the Western 
values and, thus, it would not necessarily act In favour of non-Westem world. The following 
paragraphs will look at what we have found out with regard to the first, second and the third point. 
Then it will discuss the empirical materials used in this chapter in relation to the last point. 
A c! 
,,, 
for the first issue regarding the debate on Western values, it is clear that the Clinton 
administration's vision to organize the Western Order-quasi-multilateralism-was not in accord with 
the European vision of multilateralism. America's vision advocated the multilateral decision-making 
process of a collective self-defence organization, not that of a collective security, and it opposed placing 
any substantial authority over America and NATO's military action, as the outcomes of intra-Western 
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interaction. 
With regard to the second issue, of the nature of the intra-Western interaction, this was not 
found to accord with the Liberal Multilateralists' vision. Evidently, regardless of its allies' 
apprehensions, the US administration urged Western military intervention, albeit, without any direct 
involvement ofAmerican ground troops. 
Concerning the third issue on NATO's identity, this was well illustrated by the US policy to 
remove the UN's hold of the 'dual key' of air strikes. 'Me same logic-namely America's dislike of 
multilaterahsin on security cooperation and the UN'authority over the US and NATO's use of coercive 
power-explains the dispute between the US and the Europeans such as OPLAN 40104, the Frasure- 
Milogevi6 Agreement, the Bildt-Mflogevi6 Agreement, and the role of the Fhgh Representative. Indeed, 
the Clinton administration created a situation that allowed the US to use its military and circuinvent 
UN authority. In contrast to the assumption on the part of the Liberal Multilateralists, NATO cannot 
effectively cooperate with other security organizations regardless of their identities (i. e. collective self- 
defence or coHective security). 
We tum now to look at the fourth claim that concerns the irnpact of such Westem policy 
towards Bosnia. Liberal Multilateralists' pivotal claim is that the Western Order produces a policy in 
accord with Westem value of 'liberal democracy', which is compatible with Westem procedural 
non-native value of multilateralism. This Western policy is expected to bring the benefit of 'liberal 
democracy'and multilateralism, not only wifl-ýn the West, but also to the non-Western world. However, 
the Bosnian case illustrates contra such perspectives. Western multilateralism was restricted as a result 
of America's advocacy of usmg a NATO strategic air strike. 
The use of air strikes was initially rationalized as a means to protect the interests of the 
Bosnian govenunent. However, in reahty, the US did not want to send its ground troops to fight on 
behalf of the Bosruan government. As a result, the Clinton administration sl-ýftecl its rationale to use 
military power fi-om protecting the Bosnian government to deternng the Serbian offensives. However, 
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as we have discussed, the implication of this manipulation of the end of coercive power was quite 
devastating for the interests of the Bosnian government. Thýs means that the military balance of power, 
not the morul integrity, detenýnined the contents of the settlement. 
First of all, the Croatian Anny's offensives arguably exacerbated the conditions of civilians 
on the ground, especially the Croatian Serbs. Regardless of the brutality of the Croatian action, the US 
formed an implicit military cooperation with Croatia. The Bosnian government had no choice but to 
rely upon this collaboration. This implied that the Bosnian government could not impose its demands 
onto Bosnian Croat forces and their de facto occupation of the Bosnian territories. Moreover, at the 
final stage of the conflict, the bulk of the settlement was negotiated between Tudjman and MilogeV16, 
with the Bosnian goveniment having to accept the outcomes of these negotiations. Tfiýs demonstmtes 
the fact that America's initial advocacy of protecting the interests of the Bosnian government was used 
as rhetoric to undermine the moral authority of the ICFY-promoted peace plans. Therefore, the US 
administration dismissed this rationale, when it realised that the ICFY no longer commanded moral 
authority to define the Western approach to the Bosnian conflict. Moreover, the US did not back up its 
rhetorical threat to protect the territorial integrity of Bosnian under the leadership of Izetbegovi6. Indeed, 
the Clinton administration did not act in accordance with its own moral advocacies because it gave 
priority to the vital interest of the US. 
The above-discussed facts correspond to what the working hypothesis of this thesis has 
predicted. America's approach to the Bosnian conflict was driven by its policy to organize the Western 
Order under quasi-multilateralism in order to protect its vital interests. For this purpose, in opposition to 
proceduml non-native value of multilateralism, the US administration advocated the ideologically 
defined concept of protecting the interests of the Bosnian government as the moral value of the West. 
However this newly defined moral value was also used as a nwans to promote America's interests. In 
this way, the US eventually beti-ayed its initial promise to the Bosnian government and also devastated 
the lives civilians on the ground. In shoft, the interests of the Bosnian govemment were not only 
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neglected by the European approach to the conflict but also by the Clinton administration. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
As defined in Chapter 1, this thesis analyses the intra-Western interaction in relation to the 
Bosnian conflict, with a special reference to the ffiction among the Western states regarding 
interpretations of Western values that constituted the justification for the use of coercive power in the 
post-Cold War world. As a pivotal part of these analyses, this thesis traces the following developments: 
the formation process of the American vital interests as opposed to the impact of the European 
mterpretation of the procedural normative value of multilateralism and its ICFY promoted peace 
negotiations; the corresponding US manipulation of Western moral values, based on an ideology of 
'liberal democracy', in conjunction with the Clinton administration's advocacy of the 'lift and strike' 
policy towards the Bosnian conflict and the implications of such a policy for the situation in Bosnia. 
The interpretation of this causal relationship between America's world vision and its 
implications for European security and Bosnia was already suggested in the fonn of the working 
hypothesis in Chapter 1. That was, namely, Western policy towards Bosnia did not work to support the 
interests of the Bosnian government, and adversely affected its civilians, who suffered as a result of 
conflict being prolonged and of the West ý failure to protect them in the early stages of international 
involvement Western hypocrisy was exacerbated due to US manipulations of the interpretation of 
Western moral values in order to organize the Western Order under quasi-multilateralism. 
This working hypothesis consists of four counter-argurnents to the Liberal Multilateralists' 
view of the Western Order. To repeat the four points of the debate, they are as follows. 'Me first relates 
to the question of whether the Western states share the idea that moral legitimacy hes only in 
multilateralism, or that there is more than one concept of moral values. The second concern is as to 
whether the reality of America's supremacy is compatible with its allies" voice opporturiities'. Thirdly, 
it challenges the validity of the Liberal Multflaterahsts' claim that regard NATO as having a hybrid 
identity of coHective self-defmce and coHective security, which does not undennine the operation of 
the conflict resolution mechanism of the US. In opposition to that this research argues that NATO is a 
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collective self-defence organization that promotes the particular values that the West selects, and thus 
NATO does not always act m collaboration with other international organizations (such as the UN). 
Lastly, there is the question as to whether or not the Western Order acts in favour of the non-Western 
world, especially the interests of the Bosnian government. 
The successful evaluation of the four counter-argurnents, that correspond to the working 
hypothesis of this thesis would provide an alternative theoretical, yet finnly empirically-based 
interpretation of the nature and the implications of the Western Order. The rest of this Conclusion 
evaluates the validity of the working hypothesis and its four counter-arguments in relation to empirical 
cases we have discussed in this thesis. 
Does Multilateratism Alone Constitute Western Values? 
A c! As the empirical chapters of this thesis (especiaHy Chapters 2 and 4) have demonstrated, 
there were clearly differing visions of the intra-Western collaboration. One vision was based on the 
Libeml Multilatemlists' interpretation that predicts revitalizing the UN's conflict resolution mechanism. 
By implication, this order would be the embodiment of the 'sovereign peace' on the basis of the 
procedural normative value of multilateralism. The member states of the European Union regarded the 
ICFY-promoted peace plans as an embodiment of fl-iis Vision. The other vision was promoted by the 
US. The Clinton administnation beheved that the ICFY-promoted peace plans would pose serious 
threats to the vital interests of the US. The interests were, firstly not sending America's contribution of 
ground troops for implementing the UN regulated peace plan and, secondly, maintaining NATO's de 
fiacto independence from the UN regarding NATO's 'out of area'operations. 
In order to protect its vital interests, the US promoted the ideological moral value of the 
West wider the bmner of 'democratic peace' as the altemative to the procedural non-native value of 
multilateralism and its 'sovereign peace'. America's advocacy of the 'lift and strike' policy and the 
justification for it-respecting the interests of the 'democratically elected' and 'law-abiding' regime Of 
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the Bosnian government-gave substance to the ideological moral values under the banner of 
'democratic peace' (see Chapters 3 and 4). Such American manipulation of the moral values of the 
West facilitated the re-organization of the Western Order in accordance with the logic that this research 
terrns 'quasi-multilateralism'. This logic allows the US to orchestrate Western collective nulitaty action 
with sufficient moral legitimacy but without following the outcomes of genuine multilateralism. This 
American policy of re-organizing the Western Order under quasi-multilateralism and the corresponding 
'lift and strike'policy in Bosnia caused controversy, however. 
AW n1 Is we have discussed in Chapter 5, this policy not only filled America's allies with a sense 
of outrage, but it also created a tension between tile dual interests of the US in relation to the Bosnian 
conflict. On the one hand, the Clinton administration advocated the 'lift and strike' policy and the 
. -I- ideological moral values (in the fonn of protecting the territorial integrity of Bosma under the 
leader-ship of Izetbegovi6) in order to maintain its vital interest in NATO's dejacto independence from 
the UN. However, this policy of deterring the procedural normative value of multilateralism in the 
fonn of the ICFY peace plans effectively encouraged not only the Bosnian Seib forces and the Bosruan 
Croat forces' offensives but also the Bosnian government's military action to maintain its territorial 
integrity (see Chapter 5). Hence, the implementation of the 'lift and strike'pohcy would have triggered 
the evacuation of the UNPROFOR troops. This situation put mounting pressure on the US to sacrifice 
another of its vital interests -that of not sending ground troops- in order to give substance of the 
ideological moral value of protecting the territorial integrity of Bosnia under the leadership of the 
Izetbegovi6 government. This situation is what this thesis calls the predicanwnt of quasi- 
multilateralism. 
It was this predicament, not the Western moral values or America's allies' voice 
opportunities', that led the US administration to increasingly ignore the concerns on the part of its allies 
as well as the interests of the Bosnian government. There was not a substantial consensus among the 
Western states, either, as to how they should settle the conflict over the issue of what End of Bosrua 
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they should create. As demonstrated in Chapter 6, this drove the US to form an implicit alliance with 
the Croatian government in the Bosnian conflict. Tl-ýs was far from America's initial rhetoric of 
promoting a 'just' settlement under the banner of the ideological moral values of the West in the name 
of promoting 'democracy' in Bosnia and the poticy of tift and strike. In fact, such interpretation of 
moral arguments was a means to promote America's vital interests in NATO's defacto independence 
from the UN and of not deploying ground troops. To elucidate this point, the form of 'democracy' the 
US eventually promoted was the 'market democracy' (i. e. liberal democracy) and the market demands 
a stable international enviromnent (see Chapter 4). Thus, encouraging Croatian forces' offensives 
(which may have intensified the war at the cost of the civilians' lives on the ground) and not giving 
substance to the values of democracy itself in Bosnia can be legitin-iized as a nwans to create stability 
across the Balkan Peninsula. As Anthony Lake stated, the humanitarian tragedies in Bosiiia itself do not 
'define our broader strategy In the world. " Bosnia 'deserves American engagement' not only because 
of the humanitarian issues but also for the reason that 'it lies alongside the established and emerging 
market democracies of Europe. 92 In short, as long as the US maintained the impulse to legitimize its 
hegemonic position wid-lin the West, and other Western states did not siMPly accede to this logic (of a 
hegemonic vision of quasi-multflater-alism), a single vision of legitimacy could never regulate the 
relationshýp among the states wifin the Western Order. 
Was America's Supremacy within the West Compatible with its Allies' 'Voice 
Opportunities"? 
The empirical part of this research has demonstrated (especially in Chapter 3) that there is 
little evidence of a causal relationship between the Westem demands made to the US and the actual 
outcomes of American foreign policy As discussed in Chapter 1, Risse-Kappen spells out the 
1 Lake, Anthony "From Containment to Enlargement, Address at Johns Hopkins Uruversity, September 21 
1993, " US Departinent qfState DiTatch 4, no. 39 (1993): Article 3. 
2 Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement', Address at Johns Hopkins University September 21 1993. " 
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conditions under wl-&h the US is unable to follow the outcomes of intM_WeSteM MUItflaterahSM. 3 
According to this View, factors that prevent American compliance with genuine multilateralism are as 
follows: 1) overwhelming objection by domestic actors against US policy; 2) violation of Western 
values on the part of the European allies; and 3) America's vital interests where these am incompatible. 
As we have also discussed in Chapter 1, some Liberal Multilateralists, such as John Ruggle and US 
policy-makers, have accepted that Bosnia constituted a failure of intra-Westem multilateralism but that 
this was due either to America's domestic opposition or to European indifference to Western values. ' 
Others, such as Risse-Kappen and Peter Katzenstaine, do not regard the Bosnian case as a failure of 
multilaterahsm. among the member states of NATO .5 As a group, however, they dismiss the possibihty 
that Bosnia constituted a threat to America's vital interests. 
In contrast to such interpretations tl-ýs thesis argues that America's two Vital interests- 
namely not sending ground troops, and maintaining NATO's de facto independence from the UN- 
were at stake in Bosnia and these interests dictated the US' disregard for its allies' opinions. As Chapter 
2 of this thesis illustrated, the London Conference of August 1992 and the ICFY embodied the 
European vision of Western Order, which was regulated by the procedural moral value of 
multilateralism and the idea of 'sovereign peace'. US policy-makers perceived that the European 
approach to the Bosnian conflict would undermine NATO and US supremacy in Europe and that it 
would also demand America's military contribution on the ground in order to give substance to the 
proceduml non-ns of multilaterahsm. 
Following this, Chapter 3 discussed the Clinton administration's reaction to the Vance Owen 
Peace Plan. The Clinton administration was quite detennined to oppose the European approach to the 
3 Risse-Kappen, Tbomas. Cooperation among Democracies .- the 
European Influence on US. Foreign 
Policv. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.13 -14,3 7. 
4 Ruggie, John Gerard. 11"inning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era. New York 
Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1996.172. For US policy-makers' opinions see, Chapter 3 and 5 of 
this thesis M detail. 
5 Risse-Kappen, Tbomas, and Peter J Kau: enstem. "Collective Identity in a Democr-atic CommUnIty : the 
Case of NATO, " In Ae Culture ofNational Identity Norms and IdentitY in World Politics, edited by Peter J 
Katzenstem, 357-399. New York: Colombia Utuversity Press, 1996.394. 
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extent that it even rejected the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and proposed to adopt the so-called 'hfl and 
strike' policy nis was legitfinized by America's use of the ideological value based on protecting the 
mterests of the democratically established new state of Bosnia under the leadership of IzetbegoViý. 
Contmry to the claims of Liberal Multilatemlists, this American policy was formed ptior to any 
substantial domestic pressure on the VVMte House to adopt it. 
In Chapter 4, we have also studied America's motives for launching the Engagement and 
Enlargement strategy, As Anthony Lake acknowledged, America's use of the logic of 'democratic 
peace' was a means to promote its national interests. 6 In this way, the Clinton administration advocated 
the alternative ideological moral values of the West as opposed to multilateralism. Again, the content 
and the ramifications of that strategy were neither based upon a serious dialogue between the European 
states and the US nor upon pressure by American domestic actors on the US administration. It was in 
fact the Clinton administration that consciously chose a suitable rhetoric-namely 'democratic peace' 
theory-to consolidate the defacto independence of NATO from the UN and its position at the heart of 
the post-Cold War European security order. However, as we have discussed, this in turn created the 
predicament of quasi-multilaterahsm with its associated dilemmas. 
The findings of Chapter 5, and partly Chapter 6, delineate the Clinton administration's 
strategy to overcome this predicament of quasi-multilateralism, (the predicament in the form of tension 
between the administration's two vital interests of NATO's defacto independence from the UN and of 
not deploying its troops on the ground in combat). Practically, fis tension took the form of the 
contradiction between the US advocacy of the ideological moral values of protecting the interests of the 
Bosman govenunent and its cooperation with the Croatian forces. Tbýs thesis made it clear in Chapter 5 
that it was this predicament of quasi-multilateralism (more specifically the consequences of the Clinton 
adrainistration's naive marupulation of the interpretation of ideological moral values of the West for the 
sake of its vital interests)-and neither European allies' 'voice opportmities' nor US domestic 
6 Interview with Anthony Lake on 21 May 2004. 
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opposition to the Clinton administration--that was the critical factor in creating America's indecision 
with regard to the Bosnian conflict during 1994. 
Indeed, as we documented in Chapter 5 and 6, the US government eventually attempted to 
keep distance from both the interests of the Bosnian government and its West European allies'demands 
on the US to follow the outcomes of multflateralism, in order to overcome the predicament of quasi- 
multilateralism. Consequently, the US, on the one hand, demanded that the Bosnian government give 
assent to the establishment of the Mushm-Croat Federation and also to accept the Contact Group Peace 
Plan, regardless of its initial reluctance to do so. On the other hand, the US ignored the outcomes of 
multilaterahsm. by implicitly encouraging the Croatian government to violate the UN arms embargo. In 
addition, it urged the European members of the Contact Group to accept the use of strategic air strikes, 
irTespective of their opinion. America's advocacy of the use of air power was not directly aimed at 
protecting the interests of the Bosnian govenunent. Instead, air strikes effectively assisted the Croatian 
offensives to conclude the conflict as soon as possible, because the US wanted to avoid using its 
ground troops. Finally, America's vital interests prevented the endorsement of its initial ideological 
interpretation of Western values (in the form of protecting the interests of the Bosnian government). 
To sum up, the empirical analyses provided in this thesis have indicated, contra Liberal 
Multilateralists, that the tension between America's two vital interests (i. e. maintaining NATO's de 
facto independence fi7om the UN and not being militarily involved on the ground) and America's 
strategy to overcome the tension were the critical factors for defining US actions In Bosnia. In other 
words, according to Risse-Kappen's criteria (see Chapter 1), the case of Bosnia was the one where the 
US acted in accordance with its vital interests, rather than with the procedural nonnative value of 
multilateralism or the ideological moral values of promoting 'liberal democracy'. Intra-Westem 
multilateratism only ftinctioned so long as outcomes worked in favour of America's interests. 
Amenca's adoption of multilateralism was indeed conditional. 
The major fallacy of the Liberal Multilateralists hes in the fact that they cannot adequately 
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account for an asynunetrical power relationship between the US and other Western states. From the 
Vance-Owen Peace Plan to the Dayton Agreement, America's 'power over outcomes' regarding die 
Western approach to the Bosnian conflict was paramount. The US even manipulated the contents of 
Western moral values in accordance with its vital interests. To conclude this section, there is more than 
sufficient evidence to argue that America's actions to consolidate its supremacy in relation to the 
Bosnian conflict undennined its allies"voice opportunities. ' 
Did NATO Give Substance to its Alleged Hybrid Identity? 
NATO's actions during the Bosnian conflict eventuaHy consolidated the identity of NATO In 
line with the perceptions of the US policy-makers and NATO officials. Before the settlement of the 
Bosnian conflict, the member states of NATO did not have a clear consensus as to how they should 
define the alliance. As we have discussed in Chapter 2, the differing interpretations of the implications 
of NATO's New Strategic Concept of 1991 induced disagreements among the heads of state regarding 
the future direction of NATO. Western experiences during the Gulf War of 1991 and the 'New World 
Order' encouraged the European leaders to demand that the US give substance to multilateralism 
regarding security issues such as extending NATO rMssions, to support UN-led peace-keeping 
operations. The political motive of European leaders in establishing the ICFY, was to implement this 
framework. 
in opposition to such demands, the US administration(s) and NATO officials defended the 
de facto independence of NATO from the UN. For instance, the then NATO Secretary General, 
Manfred W6mer, defined his organization's identity when he discussed the relationship between 
NATO and the UN as follows: 
For instance, in the conflict in former Yugoslavia, NATO is supporting with its 
ships in the Adriatic, [sic] the UN in the enforcement of the embargo. [] 
Do these recent developments mean that NATO is becoming a 
"peacekeepuig-agency" of the United Nations? Certainly not. Collective defence 
remams the core of our Miance. It is NATO's capability to provide for the secunty 
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of its member states that creates the political power enabling us to shape political 
change. NATO's role as a major political factor would vanish if we were unable to 
maintain strong, coRective defence capabihties. ' 
By the end of the Bosnian conflict, the European members of NATO realised that they were unable to 
grasp the opportunity to give substance to Western multi-later-alism by revitalizing the UN-led 
peacekeeping operation in the forin ofNATO's substantial cooperation on the ground. 
At the NATO Madrid Summit of 1997-the first NATO summit after the Bosruan 
conflict-the heads of states issued a declaration that reflected the above-discussed concession in the 
f6flowing way: 
NATO will remain the essential fonun for consultation among its members and the 
venue for agreement on pohcies bearing on the security and defence commitments 
8 
of Allies under the Washington [emphasis added]. 
In order to legitimize their commitments to such a collective self-defence function in the post-Cold War 
Europe, the leaders of NATO spelled out the airn of the Western collective military action as follows: 
The security of NATO's members is inseparably linked to that of the whole of 
Europe. [ ... ] The consolidation of democratic and free societies on the entire 
continent, in accordance with OSCE principles, is therefore of direct and material 
concern to the Alliance [emphasis added]. 9 
They affinned that the orthodox interpretation of the Western moral values have now shifted from the 
procedural nonnative values of multilateralism and its vision of 'sovereign peace' to the ideological 
moral values of promoting 'market democracy' and its vision of 'democratic peace'. Indeed, NATO's 
declarations formed a kind of coHective endorsement of America's Engagement and Enlargement 
Strategy and its opportunistic use of the 'democratic peace' theory to serve America's national interests. 
This compromise among the heads of state of NATO imphes that the UN or other international 
7 Manfred W6rner. "Speech by the Secretary General at the Centro Al Ti Studi Difesa, Rome, 10 MAY, 
1993, " (1993): http: //www. nato. 'mt/docu/Speech/I 993/s9305 I Oa. htm. [Accessed on I March 2005]. 
8 This 'conu-nitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty' means the collective self-defence obligation 
under the Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949. NATO, "Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic 
Security and Cooperation, Issued by the Heads of State and Government, 8th July 1997, " NATO Press 
Releases: M- 1 (97)8 1. Para 2. 
9 NATD, "Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlanfic Security and Cooperation, Issued by the Heads of State and 
Government, 8th July 1997, " NA TO Press Releases: M- 1 (97)8 I. Para 3. 
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Organmtions cannot exercise any substantial authority over NATO action under the cover of 
multilateralism, especially its so-called 'out-of area'operation. 
In order to clw* the arguments outlined above, this thesis has presented three critena to 
distinguish the identity of collective self-defence (or bilateral alliance) from the ideal type of collective 
security (see, Chapter 1). These elements are as follows: the degree and the role of power asymmetry 
between participants within a group; obligations of every member state; and the treatment of non- 
member states. The following sub-sections evaluate the finding of Us thesis M the light of the above- 
mentioned three ciiteria. 
The Power Agmmepy between the US and Other Member States 
This thesis has demonstrated that in terms of the 'power over outcomes' there was a clear 
power asymmetry between the US and the other member states of NATO in relation to the Western 
approach to the Bosnian conflict. The differing Western opinions were not My discussed within 
NATO despite its alleged multilateralism. Instead the US policy bolstered by the country's dominant 
power vis-a-vis other Western states, defined the outcomes of NATO's action. In other words, because 
of NATO's nature of institutionalizing America's supremacy to other member states, the US tends to 
prefer the collective self-defence arrangement (or bilateral alliances) to the collective security 
mechanism of the UN in its use of coercive power in the non-Western world. 
This was, in a sense, a return to nonnahty in the intra-Western relationship and the onginal 
function of NATO as it was established during the Cold War. The hints that the US gave in the early 
1990s, that it might promote a LN-centred multdateralisin merely constituted an exceptional phase of 
American foreign policy America's more conventional logic is that of quasi-multilateralism. In other 
words, with regard to the legitimacy of Western use of coervive power, there was a pattern that, on the 
one hand, the US wanted to be regarded as multilateralist but, on the other hand, it avoided being 
const-ained by the outcomes of any genuine multilateral consultation process. 
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America's use of quasi-multilateralism accompanied by its manipulation of Westem 
'ideational' interests-namely, its dismissal of procedural nonnative value of multilateralism and 
advocacy of the ideological moral value of 'liberal democracy'-and its corresponding institutional 
arrangements (i. e. the collective self-defence organization of NATO or bilateral alliances, but not the 
collective security organization of the UN) for legitimizing the use of coercive power. This is seen to be 
the centml continuity in the pattem of America's coopemtion m intemational security. Indeed, the US 
has demonstrated its overwhelming supremacy vis-A-vis the other member states of NATO during the 
Bosnian conflict and this, moreover, was the cfificalfactor in determining America's modus operandi 
in the use of coercive power. 
Obliggations ofMember States 
Concerning the justification of the Western use of coercive power, the Gulf War of 1991 and 
America's subsequent promotion of the so-called the 'New World Order' marked an exceptional phase 
in US foreign policy This is because the promotion of the 'New World Order' implied America's 
involvement in the materialisation of the above-discussed European vision of multilateralism that 
facilitates 'sovereign peace. ' According to the notion of 'sovereign peace' and its procedural normative 
values of multilatemlism, the UN Security Council Resolution 660 provided a clear war aim for the 
multilateral forces during the Persian Gulf War, which was to restore the status quo ante between Iraq 
and Kuwait. ' 0 Due to this, the multilateral force did not invade Iraqi territories arid halted its offensives 
as soon as it restored the sovereignty of Kuwait. Following fi7om fis, the 'New World Order' 
revitalized the UN conflict resolution mechanisms-in other words, what this research refers to as 
4sovereign peace'. The UN document entitled An Agendafor Peace reflected this American initiative 
of taldng collective coercive action, based on discussions at the UN Security Council. 
" 
10 United Nation Secuiity Council Resolution No. 660.2 August 1990. (S/Res/660). 
The United Nations, . 4n Agenda. 
for Peacc: PreventAv Diplomacy, Peacekeeping and Peacc-making, 
2 77-s/241 1). Report ofthe Secwtaty-General, (1992): (A/47/ ý 
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The Somalia and the Bosnia peacekeeping operations were regarded as the major test cases 
for this vision. During the initial phases, the Somali mission did not provoke senous controversy 
between the US and its Western allies. The Bush Senior administration decided to dispatch American 
troops in order to support the UN mission on the ground. In October 1993, the Clinton administr-ation 
faced the collapse of the Somali mission and decided to retreat from supporting the UN mission. As 
European states were not seriously involved in the Somalia oper-ation, this decision did not provoke 
serious criticism from America's Western allies. Hence, as far as the intr-a-Westem relationsEp was 
concemed, the Bosnian conflict was the real test case for examining the dur-ability of the vision of 
'New World Order'. 
A 
,, 6a result of the tension 
between the US and its Western allies, the US neither dispatched 
any peacekeeping troops on the ground, nor supported the EC/EU- and UN- promoted peace plans. 
The Clinton administration advocated the so-called Engagement and Enlargement strategy that 
legitimatized interventionist policies in the name of promoting 'democratic peace' and its ideological 
moral values of 'liberal democracy'. As Michael Doyle argues, the idea of 'democratic peace'has the 
potential to create a bypass for the justification of the use of coercive power beyond the UN-centred 
conventional notion of the sovereign state system (see Chapters I arid 4). 12 Indeed, this logic was 
employed to legitimize America's actions such as the use of NATO air strikes, and also its neglect of 
the UN arms embargo on Bosnia (see Chapter 4). Ever since the Bosman conflict, it seems that the US 
has deliberately used ideological moral values to justify its use of coercive power when its actions do 
not conform to the outcomes of negotiations at the UN Security Council. 
In retrospect, the Bosnian conflict was the turning point that led to the failure of the New 
World Order and the implementation ofAn Agendafor Peace. Therefore, it is fair to say that America's 
approach to the Bosnian conflict reversed the definition of Western values fi7om the short-jiý, ed 
12 Doyle Michael, W "Liberalism in World Politics, " Ametican Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (1986): 
1151-1169. 
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multHateralist Vision to a more conventional one of quasi-multflateralism that is i-atiOnahzed by 
America's chosen ideological moral values (such as 'liberal democracy' and 'anti-terrorism'). 
Subsequently, the US started ignoring outcomes of collective decision-making processes if they 
imposed too much a constraint to actions on the part of America. However, at the same time, the US 
manipulated the interpretation of Western values and pretended that Arnefican action was not based on 
self-serving interests but on universal justice. The US urged other states to assent to values that, in 
reality, are chosen to justify not the common interests of the West but America's own interests. 
For this purpose, the US ostensibly promoted the Western collective actions M forums, like 
NATO, where they can control outcomes. As a result of the above-cliscussed transformation of the 
vision of international cooperation on the part of the US, NATO acted only in order to protect its 
chosen values (i. e. 'democratic peace' in the fonn of promoting 'market democracy'). The previously 
quoted communique of the NATO Madrid Summit of 1997 lHustrated such outcomes. In other words, 
the US re-defined its image and its post-Cold War obligations to the member states of NATO. 
A. - ording to this new definition, NATO may help the UN's peacekeepi g missions outside I JAIC M 
the territories of its member states (the so-caUed 'non Article 5 activities' or 'out-of area' tasks). 
However, NATO would only carry out 'out of area' operations to the extent that the UN mission 
concurs with NATO's (and Amenca's) chosen values. In other words, this newly-defined obligation to 
members of NATO can be regarded as the collective self-defence task plus alpha. The contents of this 
plus alpha would be defined by the West's-essentially America's- chosen ideological moral values 
such as 'liberal democracy' or 'anti-terrorism' and not by the outcomes of negotiations of other 
international organizations such as the UN that symbolize the highest authority of the procedural 
normative value of multilateralism. In this way, NATO made a clear clistinction. between its collective 
self-defence task plus alpha and collective security tasks under Chapter VU of the UN Charter. Tl-ýs 
distinction defines the responsibility for its member states' respectively. Indeed, America's obligation to 
the NAFO members is limited in accordance with its self-serving ideology of 'democratic peace. 
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How Did NATO Treat Non-Member States? 
As Ian Clark has suggested, the Western policy of re-organizing international order based on 
its 'quasi-constitutional' logic would impose a 'harsh' settlement of the Cold War on the 'losers' M the 
name of multilateralism. 13 Clark has discussed the idea that Russia as a loser of the Cold War receives 
poor treatment fi7om the West. 14 Indeed, Western pohcy in general and the American approach In 
particular, promoted NATO as a central institution of European security. Russia is only given partner 
status in NATO, which neither gives her a veto nor guarantees active participation in the forination of 
the NATO policy In essence, Russia is marginalized in the decision-making process of European 
security. Similar, or even harsher treatment, has been imposed upon Serbia, and other former 
communist regimes, and what Clinton termed 'rogue states' that have not followed the Western vision 
of democratization of politics and liberalization of economy. 
vo Ae we have studied mi this thesis (especially Chapters I and 4), the West's intentional 
distinction between the identity of the West and that of others (losers of the Cold War and the non- 
Western world) is a foundation of the Western approach to the non-Western world. This distinction 
combined with the promotion of collective self-defence arrangements based on its ideological moral 
value of promoting 'market democracies', in the name of consolidating the idea of 'democratic peace', 
instead ofprocedural nonnative value of multilateralism and its ideas of 'sovereign peace', provides a 
context for the West to take coercive action against non-Westem. regimes. This is because, without the 
image of an 'enemy', it would be hard to justify the West's collective coercive action against external 
actors and maintaining a security organization that aims at protecting the West from external threats. 
Hence, as we have noted in Chapter 1, a substantial number of works on security studies point out that 
consolidating an image of an 'enemy'often creates a situation whereby the security within a coflective 
13 Clark, Ian. AePost Cold Pin- Onier. - The Spoils qfPeace. Oxford: Oxford U, iP 
14 Clark, The Post Cold Tfbr Onicr, Chap 4,168-170,186. 
ni-ý, ers ty ress, 2001.178. 
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SeIC-defence an-angement is often maintained at the cost of the insecufity of those outside the 
arrangement and of the opportunity to fonn collective secufity arrangements. 15 
In reality, it is not shared Western values but US interests that detennine Westem actions 
towards the non-Western world. America's collaboration with the Croatian government, instead of 
seriously protecting the interests of the Bosnian government, symbolized the reality of the 
manipulation of Western moral values. TWs case also represented a typical pattern in America's use of 
force in the post-Cold War period. In order to promote its interests, the US employs local forces (e. g. 
the Kosovo Liberation Anny, the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, and the Kur6sh forces in Iraq) 
irrespective of their lack of democratic identities and regardless of their potential to militarize the 
maintenance of order in their respective regions. These factors contradict America's initial ideological 
justification of the use of coercive power (i. e. creating democratic, multi-ethnic and stable societies). 
The policy-makers of America's allies in the West have been taking into account the above- 
discussed point when they plan foreign policies in relation to the US. However, they have not given up 
the idea of influencing the outcomes of America's foreign policy As a consequence of this, they stiR 
attempt to share Amenca's interpretation of ideological moral values, rather than promoting procedural 
normative values of multilateralism. As a result, the more the US demands the use of coercive actions, 
the deeper America's allies are involved in such military actions. In reality, however, such manipulation 
of moral values accompanied with a fixed image of 'others' or 'enerrues' and simultaneously 
strengthened collective self-defence arrangements would raise the tension between the West and the 
non-Western world. Thýs would work to the detriment of any Western attempt to Vitalize collective 
security an-angements with others. 
The US security policy in East Asia indicates such a trend on a global scale. Since the end of 
15 For instance see: Dewitt, David B. "Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security, " The Pacific 
Rei, ici t, 7, no. I (1994): 4-7; Clark, T, Mark. "The Trouble with Collective Security, " Orbiý. - A Journal of 
Morld. -Iga-irs 39, no. 2 (1995): 237-245; Goldenker, Leon, and Thomas Weiss. "The Collective Security Idea 
and Changing World Politics, " in Collective Security in a Changing Ubrld, edited by Thomas Weiss, 3-18. 
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne, 1993.6. 
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the Cold War, some Japanese, as well as American political leaders, have been urging Japan to lifl its 
constitutional and political self-restraint to participate in collective self-defence arrangements. 16 T 'he 
rationale for this is that the Japanese government should follow the British way of esteerning an 
allegedly 'special relationship' (in other words privileged 'voice opportunities') with the US. 17 They 
claim that such cooperation between the US and Japan would promote stability in the region. However, 
a revitalized security alliance between Japan and the US aims at responding to the situation in the 
Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait by military means. If Japan and the US spend too much 
political capital and attention on strengthening their military alliance, and if they begin to consolidate 
their vision of an 'enemy' or the 'others' in East Asia without contemplating the consequences, then 
they will undennine any potential to develop genume multilateralism and a collective security 
arrangement that could include all Asian states. In such a scenario, Japan and the US would exacerbate 
the security situation in East Asia in general and embitter their relationship with China and North Korea 
in particular. 
To sum up, the results of the empirical studies coincide with the hypothesis of this thesis. It is 
now justified to say that America's policy to consofidate its supremacy will-lin the West promoted the 
NATO-led military approach to the Bosnian conflict. This American policy was beyond the 
conventional fi-amework of collective security and the UN conflict resolution mechanisms that are 
based on the sovereign-state system. The Bosnian conflict and the outcomes of the Western approach 
indeed marked a turning point in the trend of the post-Cold War security order from collective security 
16 For instance, an policy recommendation was written by a group of influential foreign and defence policy- 
makers (including two former US Assistant Secretaries of Defence, Richard Armitage and Josef Nye), which 
suggested Japan should take collective self-defence actions with the US in Asia by following the British 
experience of its 'special relationship' with the US. This produced positive resonance among Japanese policy 
makers. For instance, the foriner Japanese Ambassador to Ihai, Hisahiko Okazaki, and the fon-ner Vice 
Seeretary-General of the Liberal Democr-atic Party, Abe Shinzo support such a view. See: An-nitage, Richard. 
et al. "The United States and Japan: Towards Mature Partnership, " 17VSS Special Repon, II October 2000,1 - 
15; Okazaki, Hisahiko. "Armitage Correct on Collective Self-defense, " Daily Yomiufi, 26 December 2004, 
http: //www. okazaki-inst. jp/12262004yon-ýuri-E. html [Accessed on 19 May 20051; Abe, Shinzo. "Miles to 
Go: My Vision for Japan's Future CNAPS Roundtable Luncheon on 2 May 2005. " 
http: //www. brookings. edu/fp,, /'ciiaps/events/abe2OO5O5O2. pdf. [Accessed on 19 May 2005]. 
17 For instance, Abe, "Miles to Go: My Vision for Japan's Future CNAPS Roundtable Luncheon on 2 Nlay 
2005. " 
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based order to an America-centred collective self-defence and alliances based one. 
How Did the US Treat the Interests of the Bosnian Government and Civilians on the 
Ground? 
Also this thesis has Mustrated, especiaUy in Chapter 6, the Western approach to the Bosnian 
conflict 'betrayed' its promise to protect the interests of the Bosnian government and the means to 
impose a settlement (i. e. America's de facto encouragement of the Croatian offensives) and 
'devastated'the conditions of the civilians on the ground. As previously outlined in Chapter 1, in order 
to substantiate the working hypothesis, this research looks at three consequences of the Westem 
approach to the Bosnian conflict, as follows: a) a peace plan that dismisses the Bosnian government's 
desire to maintain a single and unified sovereign state; b) a policy that imposes finther violence onto 
civilians on the ground (regardless of their ethnic origin); c) a settlement that deprives the Bosruan 
people's fight of self-govemance and self-cletennination. 
Mediation ofthe Bosnian Conflict 
The US administration initiaRy advocated that the interests of the Bosiuan government (i. e. 
territorial integrity of Bosnia under the leadership of Izetbegovi6) should be placed at the centre of any 
international approach, on account of the fact that in 1992 the West originafly recognized the 
lzetbegovi6 government. 18 Tbus, it challenged the practicability and morality of the European and the 
UN initiatives of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. In opposition to 
the ICFY approach, the US administration proposed the so-cafled 'lift and strike'policy 
It is important, however, to address the fact that neither the European nor American 
approach to the Bosnian conflict could satisfy the Bosnian government. There were three major points 
that suggest this. First of all, the US did not send ground forces to Bosma untH the end of the conflict 
18 Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004. 
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despite the requests of the Bosnian government to do so. Secondly, from the Vance-Owen Peace Plan 
to the Dayton Agreement, A Western proposals to settle the Bosnian conflict more or less constrained 
the interests of the Bosnian government (to restore its territorial integrity and to reinsert its 
administrative authorities all over Bosnia). Jbirdly, the US eventually relied on the Croatian military 
forces to conclude the conflict, without sacrificing American ground troops despite its initial rhetorical 
advocacy of the 'lift and strike'policy, for the sake of the interests of the Bosnian government. 
In these instances, as mentioned above, the US did not support the Bosnian government's 
desire to regain ffill administrative authority over Bosnia by any means (including military actions). 
Indeed, the Clinton administration's advocacy of ideological moral values of 'marker (liberal) 
democracy' in the fon-n of protecting the interests of the Bosnian government only helped America's 
interests in replacing the procedural norms of multilateralism and, thus, in organizing the Western 
Order under quasi-multilateralism. However, the administration has failed to deliver what the US 
initially promised to the Bosnian government. This hypocrisy is symbolized by the existence of the 
'Republika. Srpska'. Such lack of legitimacy regarding the structure of 'Bosnian state' under the Dayton 
Agreement can be regarded as one of the reasons why the West stiR needs to sustain the post-conflict 
Bosnia through its military presence. 19 
The Treatments ofthe Civilians on the Ground 
With regard to the plight of civilians in Bosnia, the American approach to the Bosnian 
conflict was no less negative than the European one. There were rougWy four major faults that the US 
can be criticized for regarding its attitude to the civilians on the ground. Firstly, the US did not provide 
any ground troops to prevent hwnarutarian crises during the conflict. Secondly, it refused to cooperate 
with the ICFY-led peace plans, based on its stated desire to respect the interests of the Bosruan 
19 For a more ftindamental analysis on this issue see: Bose, Sumantm. Bosnia qfter Dayton : Nationalzst 
Partition and International Interivition. London: Hurst & Company, 2002.42-43,89-93,245-246,249-250. 
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government (see, Chapters 3 and 4). That, in retrospect, only prolonged the conflict. Tbirdly, m this way, 
the US advocated the 'lift and strike' policy, but, for fear of military involvement on the ground, the US 
administration effectively encouraged the Croatian government's military actions, costing civilian lives, 
rather than defending the wishes of the Bosnian government or Bosnian Muslims (see Chapters 5 and 
6). Lastly, despite claim to be concerned about humanitarian conditions on the ground, the US did not 
make serious efforts to bring about the settlement of the conflict until it made sure that NATO initiated 
international military action in the Bosnian conflict (see, Chapter 6). 
To sum up, the US promoted its own interests over a prompt settlement, in the naine of 
respecting the quality of 'justice'. America's promotion of the ideological moral values instead of 
procedural nonnative values of multilateralism justified the West's use of coercive military power. The 
great irony of this approach, however, is that America's means to conclude the conflict effectively 
encouraged the ethnic cleansing committed. by Croatian side, which was far from its original rational a 
I Justl way to conclude the conflict. Added to that, the quality of 'justice', under the Dayton Agreement, 
that the US mihtary power brought forward does not give substance to what the US initiaHy advocated 
(i. e. territorial distribution, the central government's administrative power over Bosma). In this respect, 
there are reasonable foundations to say that the America's approach to settle the BoSnIan conflict 
devastated the conditions of the civilians on the ground. 
The SeLf-Detennination of Bosn 
In regard to the Bosrýian people's right of self-govemance, America's supremacy vis-A-vis 
other Western states also works unfavourably towards implementing a just and stable settlement in 
Bosnia. The following points indicate four erTors in the Western occupation of Bosma. First of all, the 
Dayton Agreement was imposed upon Bosnia principally by military means and, thus, the 
implementation process was accompanied by with Western militaly and civilian authorities on the 
ground. NATO in conjunction with Russia, deployed international forces called TOR (Implementation 
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Force, 1995-1996) and then SFOR (stabilization Force, 1995-2004) in order to 'help ensure 
compliance with the provisions of' the Dayton Agreement. 20 Along with military power, the West 
imposed a civil authority upon Bosnian politics. Ths institution is the Office of Fligh Representative 
(OHR). The power of this authority was enhanced beyond the original arrangements by the decisions 
of the so-called Peace Implementation Council (comprised of the states that sponsor the 
21 implementation of the Dayton Agreement) in November 1997. The OHR now possesses a supreme 
political power (the so-called 'Bonn Powers'), which range from sacking democratically elected local 
policy-makers to imposing administrative orders, regardless of local policy-makers' decisions. " This 
administrative power of OHR causes controversy 
With regard to the administrative power of this authority, David Chandler criticizes the West 
for having so far prevented the Bosnian people from regaining their rights of self-governance. 23 In 
contrast, Sumantra Bose acknowledges the fact that the West contributes to the integration of Bosnian 
society by means of practical actions, such as introducing a sIngle currency and imposing common car 
licence-plates for all Bosnia . 
2' However, it can be said that there is a consensus among these 
researchers and well-known policy-makers that the existence of the OHR does not genuinely empower 
Bosnian people's self-governance. 
For instance, on 12 April 2005 the International Commission on the Balkans, composed of 
20 The General Framework Agreement [Dayton Agreement], Annex I A: Agreement on the Military Aspect 
on the Peace Settlement. Article I: General Obligations. I -a. 21 Peace Implementation Council, "Borin Peace Implementation Council 1997: Bosnia and Herzegovina 
1998: Self-Sustaining Structures, " Bonn: Peace Implementation Council, 10 December 1997. 
http: //www. oscebih. org/documents/61 -eng. pdf [Accessed on 15 March 2004]. For a critical overview of the 
ORR's activities and evolution of its political powers since the Dayton Agreement, see: Chandler, David. 
Faking Democracy After Dayton. London: Pluto Press, 2000. 
22 One of the current high profile cases of sacking were e. g.: Dragon Covic, an ethnic Croatian, from the 
tripartite presidency of BoSrUa in March 2005 and nine Bosnian Serb officials in charge of protecting war 
crirninals in December 2004. For details of each event, see respectively: Jansson, Erick. "Bosnia's Ethnic 
Croat Head of State Sacked, " Financial Times, 30 March 2005,9; Wood, Nicolas. "BoSrUan Serb Prenýiier 
Quits, Criticizing West, " Ae Not, York Times, 18 December 2004, A6; AFP, "BostUan FM Resigns After 
Criticism Over War Crunes, " Agence France Presse, 18 December 2004, Lexis-Nexis. For details and a 
critical overview of the OHR's activities and evolution of its political powers since the Dayton Agreement, 
see: Chandler, David. Faking DcmocraQ-. jficr Dayton. London: Pluto Press, 2000. 
23 Chandler, Bosnia. - Faking Democrag, 4fier Dayton. 
24 Bose, Bosnia qfier Dayton, II 1- 112. 
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seventeen well-known fon-ner policy-makers led by fon-ner Italian Prime Minister, Guhano Amart, 
published a report on Bosnia that urged to restore the self-governance of Bosnia by its peoples, instead 
of the ORR, and its de facto 'neo-colonial rule' . 
2' Following this repoit, even the incumbent f1igh 
Representative, Paddy Ashdown, has accepted that the OHR could not maintain present political power 
over Bosnia in the future. 
26 
Secondly, as we have discussed in Chapter 5 and 6, the territorial integrity of Bosnia wider 
the Izetbegovi6 (Bosnian) government is prevented by two arrangements. One is the Mustim-Croat 
Federation of Bosnia. The other is the existence of 'Repub&a Srpska' (a Serbian autonomous entity) 
within Bosnia. In fact, it was the US administration that compefled the Bosnian government to accept 
both an-angements. In this respect, the Bosnian goverranent and Bosman Mushins were prevented 
from regaining their rights of self-determination. 
'ffirdly, intra-Western tension undennined the quality ofjustice in post-conflict Bosnia. As a 
result of the American reluctance to concede any operational power from NATO to the ffigh 
Representative, the West was not able to implement basic juridical justice in Bosma. As we have seen 
in the empirical study (see Chapter 6), the present I-Egh Representative criticized NAFO for its lack of 
.. 27 
cooperation with him in arresting war criminals. In December 2005, NATO ceased its major mission 
on the groun(ý without accomplishing its initial promise to bring justice and peace to Bosnia. 
28 
America's commitments to establishing a safe and multiedu-& Bosnia, in general, and solving war 
crime issues, in particular, have been fading. There is only limited enforcing power on the ground to 
bring justice to important war criminals. This situation jeopardises the quality ofjundical justice, wl-kh 
25 Notable members of this commission include: the former German President, Richard von Weizsýicker, the 
former President of Macedonia, Kiro Ghgorov, the former High Representative of BosrUa, Carl Bildt, and 
the then British chief negotiator at the Dayton, Pauline Neville-Jones. International Commission on the 
Balkans, The Balkans in Europe ý Future, 12 April 2005.11,24. 
26 Dombey, Daniel. "Ashdown Admits Bosnia Role May End Soon, " Financial Times, 16 April 2005,6. 
27 Castle, S. "Ashdown Plots Way to Net Most Wanted Man in the Balkans, " The Independent, I February 
2003,12; Interview with an OHR staff, Mostal, 6 January 2003; Interview with an OSCE staff, 2 January 
2003. 
28 international policing operations were taken over by the EU. NATO still maintains Headquarters in 
Sar-qjevo but their presence is not accompanied by a substantial number of troops on the ground. 
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is subject to the political negotiations. For instance, the US dernanded that the Serbian authority 
cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal to arrest the prime war criminals in exchange for 
America's policy of re-commencing financial aid. 29 The EU has also demanded that the Croatian 
government cooperate with the International Crirninal Tribunal as a condition for advancing its 
negotiations for accession into the EU . 
30 In contrast to this, the EU decided to commence the 
negotiation of the so-caRed 'stabilisation and association' agreement with Serbia despite international 
criticism regarding its unsatisfactory cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal .31 As a result 
of such politicization of justice and lack of enforcement, even almost a decade after the conflict (as at 
May 2005) both leaders of the Bosnian Serb forces (i. e. General Ratko Mladi6 and Radovan Karaz&) 
and the Croatian leaders (i. e. General Ante Gotovina) are still at large. 
In short, Bosnian people have been left to live in an unstable political environment. The 
Western states made many promises when it promoted the Dayton Agreement but have acWeved little 
to fulfil their rhetonc. For the reasons discussed above, it is clear that the procedures and contents of 
peace that the West, essentially the US, brought about in Bosnia do not work in favour of the interests 
of the Bosnian government and civilians in Bosnia. 
It is now rational to ask the question: was it necessary to wait for the Dayton Agreement 
instead of following one of the plans that preceded it? 32 As far as the civilians' lives are concerned, the 
answer to the question is probably 'no. ' Of course this does not ignore the fact that, as with the Dayton 
Agreement, the ICFY proposed peace plans (i. e. the Vance-Owen and the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace 
Plan) would also not have had a clear advantage in tenns of the quality of justice and of governance 
29 McGavin, Harvey 'Net Closes on Serb Military Chief Wanted for War Crimes, " The Independent, 10 
June 2005,25. ; Beeston, Richard, and Adam LeBor. "Secret Talks to Lure Fugitive General to War Crimes 
Court, " The Times, 16 June 2005,42. 
30 Castle, Stephen. "War Crime Row Hits Croatia's EU Ambitions, " ne Independent, 17 March 2005,20 
31 Dombey, Daniel, and Eric Jansson. "Brussels Backs Closer Ties with Serbia Despite Concem Over War 
Crime Cases, " Financial Times, 13 April 2005,8. 
32 See, Stoltenberg, Tborvald. "From Stoltenberg-Owen to Dayton: An Interview With Thorvald 
Stoltenberg. " In UN Peacekeeping in Trouble. - Lessons Learnedfi-om the Former Yugoslavia. - Peacekeepers' 
T 'iews on the Limits and Possibilities Qftlie United Nations in a Civil War-like Conflict, edited by Wolfgang 
Biennann and Martin Vadset, 6-14. Aldershot, Hants, UK: Ashgate, 1998,11. 
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that they could have provided for the Bosnian people. However, the Dayton Agreement was absolutely 
'necessary' for the US, to promote its vision of the Western Order in opposition to that of the European 
ideas of 'sovereign peace', which were based upon the procedural non-ns of multilateralisrn; and that 
practicafly meant enhancing the UN's authority over the use of coercive power. 
To conclude this thesis, Liberal Multilateralists and the Western politics that supposedly 
reflected such viewpoints have made two critical errors. One is their indifference to the conflict of 
interests between the US and other Western States. The conflict results in the ffiction between differing 
visions among the Western states (i. e. the ideological interpretation of 'democratic peace' that the US 
advocates, against the European definition of the procedural nonnative value of multilateralism 
accompanied with the idea of 'sovereign peace'). The other is the Western use of moral values as a 
means to promote its interests at the cost of the quality ofiustice and stability in the non-Westem world. 
It is justifiable to conclude that the working hypotheses of this research and its four counter claims to 
the Liberal Multilateralists'view have received positive empirical evaluations. 
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